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The Hashtags We’ve Been Forced to Remember
abigail de kosnik and keith p. feldman
In August 2017 the Bay Area ensemble Campo Santo performed “Ethos 
de Masquerade,” an original theater and dance work about the HIV/
AIDS crisis and the Black Lives Matter movement, at the A.C.T. Strand 
Theater in San Francisco. Before the performance began, assistant direc-
tor Ashley Smiley led the audience through some breathing exercises as 
a means of helping us achieve the proper orientation of mind, body, and 
spirit necessary to receive the experience that was about to transpire. 
She encouraged us to inhale, to dwell for a moment on “the hashtags 
you’ve been forced to remember,” and then to breathe them out and 
release them. This book is about the hashtags that we’ve been forced 
to remember. Its pages contain our meditations on those hashtags, our 
coming to terms with them, our processing their contexts and meanings, 
and our releasing them into the world— not as a means of forgetting or 
erasing them but as a way of sharing the understandings we’ve come to 
about what these tags mean, individually and together, and how they 
have served as labels, metadata, organizing ideas, and rallying cries for 
the last several years of our lives.
#identity was collectively produced by a working group called the 
Color of New Media, which is based at the University of California, 
Berkeley, and is sponsored by the Center for Race and Gender, with 
additional support from the Berkeley Center for New Media (BCNM). 
In September 2013 Abigail De Kosnik, a Berkeley faculty member, and 
Paige Johnson, then a PhD student, decided to launch the Color of New 
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Media as a response to a question that they had been asking each other 
for some time: “Is the color of new media studies white?” Both women 
of color, De Kosnik and Johnson wanted to create a space on the cam-
pus in which nonwhite, non- male, non- straight people as well as white, 
male, or straight people who were seriously interested in difference and 
inclusion could gather and discuss the multifaceted ways that minori-
ties are, and have been, actively engaging with, shaping, and expanding 
new media, inclusive of desktop computing, the “blogosphere,” mobile 
culture, social media, UGC (user- generated content), IPTV (Internet 
Protocol television), gaming, and other emergent or transitional media 
forms. One of the two dozen or so people to attend our first meeting was 
Keith Feldman, a Berkeley faculty member in the Department of Ethnic 
Studies, and soon after, De Kosnik asked Feldman to sign on as the co– 
faculty organizer of the Color of New Media, to which he agreed. Today 
the Color of New Media meets monthly in the BCNM Commons (the 
center’s seminar room), and between five and fifteen people attend each 
meeting. Anyone who attends one meeting, or emails one of the orga-
nizers to express interest in the group, is considered a “member” and is 
added to the group’s mailing list. As of this writing, our mailing list cur-
rently has seventy- six members, with the following demographics: 21 per-
cent African American, 32 percent Asian American, 10 percent Latinx, 37 
percent white, 70 percent female, 27 percent male, 3 percent nonbinary 
gender, and 11 percent LGBTQ. In contrast, the demographics of UC 
Berkeley’s graduate student population are 5 percent African American, 
23 percent Asian American, 5 percent Latinx, and 50 percent white (with 
the remainder reported as “Other/Unknown” [Graduate Division 2016– 
2017]), and 46 percent female (Office of the Vice Chancellor for Equity 
and Inclusion at UC Berkeley 2013).
As a group, the Color of New Media has always been interested in 
sharing and popularizing scholarship by or about minoritarian users and 
makers of digital culture, but early on the group expressed enthusiasm 
at the possibility that we might also produce such scholarship. #identity 
constitutes our first collaborative publishing project and demonstrates 
the kind of academic work that we wish to see more of in the world. 
The essays contained in this volume foreground how people of color, 
female, and queer people, and people outside the United States have 
navigated and developed digital networked spaces; how they have used 
these spaces to protect and defend themselves and others and advance 
their causes; and how they have been erased, discriminated against, and 
targeted in these spaces. As Sarah Florini writes, “Users of color are often 
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invisible in academic (and popular) considerations of social media,” as 
the user of social media is “generally presumed to be white” (2013, 225). 
Florini continues, building on the work of Lisa Nakamura (2008): “In a 
social media context, where race could be hidden if a user so desired, 
the act of performing race constitutes an important mode of resistance 
to marginalization and erasure” (Florini 2013, 225). The same could be 
said of other aspects of identity and difference in digital culture. Gender, 
sexuality, nationality, and other traits can be elided or masked in net-
worked participation, and when they are announced— or as Florini says, 
performed— it is often because users have made a deliberate, conscious 
choice to assert that they do not exist simply on the shadow side of a 
digital divide, but that they can and do participate in networks and will 
use their access and facility with digital communications to make their 
perspectives and experiences known.
At the same time, race and ethnicity, gender and sexuality, loca-
tion and nationality, can all be elided or avoided by new media studies. 
Historians and theorists of digital technologies can easily place white 
male inventors and business leaders (Vannevar Bush, Norbert Wiener, 
Doug Engelbart, Steve Jobs, Bill Gates, Mark Zuckerberg, Elon Musk, 
and so on) at the center of their narratives, or assume the “default white-
ness and maleness” (Nakamura 2008) of internet users. To do otherwise, 
to write scholarship that centers on network innovators, makers, leaders, 
and users who are Black, Latinx, or Asian American, who are queer or 
trans, who are African and Indian, who are girls or women, and many 
other identities besides, makes a statement that they exist, are relevant 
and significant, and form the core of an inclusive new media studies. To 
create and publish such scholarship is, to cite Florini, “an act of perform-
ing” identity and “constitutes an important mode of resistance to mar-
ginalization and erasure” (2013, 225). This is the statement, the action, 
the performance, the resistance, that the Color of New Media makes 
with this book.
From the time we began meeting as a working group in 2013, our top-
ics of conversation have ranged far and wide, but threaded through our 
discussions have been Twitter hashtags founded and popularized by mi-
norities. #BlackLivesMatter (or #BLM) was launched by Patrisse Cullors, 
Alicia Garza, and Opal Tometi in summer 2013, just a few months before 
our group first convened that fall. In our first two years, many of our 
meetings started with group members collectively sharing and narrativ-
izing the latest responses to police violence against African Americans, 
and the US legal system’s unacceptable response to this violence, includ-
4  #identity
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ing #BLM, #ferguson, and #icantbreathe, as well as the on- the- ground 
protests that these hashtags supported and helped organize.
Additional objects of our collaborative analysis and interpretation in-
cluded the Twitter accounts of Asian American hashtag activist Suey Park, 
Nigerian American novelist and poet Teju Cole, and African American 
blogger and social worker Feminista Jones (Michelle Taylor); the appar-
ent generational divide between feminist activists who understood how 
to do political organization work on Twitter and those who did not; April 
Reign’s invention of #OscarsSoWhite to call attention to the pressing 
need for more diversity in Hollywood productions in 2016; rapper and 
musician Q- Tip’s forty- plus tweets delivering lessons in hip- hop history 
in 2014 (Williams 2014; Joyce 2014); the tweet- storms inspired by Drake’s 
“Hotline Bling” video in 2015, Kendrick Lamar’s 2016 Grammy perfor-
mance, and Beyoncé’s 2016 Super Bowl halftime show (which dovetailed 
with the release of her album Lemonade); the #GamerGate controversy 
in 2014; and the increasing visibility of white supremacists and antifemi-
nists from #GamerGate onward, which spiked with the launch of Donald 
Trump’s presidential campaign in mid- 2015. Twitter was not the sole fo-
cus of our meetings for those years, but its constant recurrence in our 
conversations made the platform a clear choice for our organizing topic 
when we decided to embark on a group publication effort.
#identity: Hashtagging Race, Gender, Sexuality, and Nation thus emerges 
from the inquiries and debates about Twitter that took place in the Color 
of New Media working group between 2013 and 2016. In this book, we 
ask these questions: How are social difference and diversity articulated 
on Twitter? How are communal minoritarian identities performed, ar-
ticulated, and defined on Twitter? How does Twitter serve as a political 
platform on which users seek to advance issues related to social justice? 
And how do Twitter- based social justice campaigns relate to other forms 
of political action, such as community organizing and participation in 
reform movements?
Before describing the essays contained in this volume, it may be use-
ful to review Twitter’s history of use for social change and minoritarian 
representation. Twitter was launched in 2006 as a social media micro- 
blogging platform that limited users’ posts to “tweets” of 140 characters. 
In August 2007 tech designer Chris Messina proposed the use of the “#” 
sign, or “hashtag,” to “group” tweets (Edwards 2013). In Iran in June 
2009, large- scale protests against the fraudulence of the country’s presi-
dential election erupted, with media accounts focusing on the centrality 
of Twitter for Iranians in the diaspora sharing details about the country’s 
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so- called Green Revolution. As Negar Mottahedeh writes, “#iranelection 
was the first long- trending international hashtag in Twitter’s history” 
(2015, 17). In December 2010 an uprising in Tunisia sparked a series 
of civil insurgencies in North Africa and the Middle East that became 
collectively known as the “Arab Spring.” Studying the intensive use of 
Twitter and Facebook by protesters in these countries, new media schol-
ars formulated a wave of theorizations of social media as a facilitator 
of revolution. Notable among these are Yousri Marzouki and Olivier 
Oullier’s concept of a “virtual collective consciousness” that can mani-
fest via social networks and give rise to significant change; Carne Ross’s 
idea that in the twenty- first century, massive shifts in power will result 
from “leaderless revolutions”; and Manuel Castells’s notion that emerg-
ing technologies of “mass self- communication” help counter- hegemonic 
forces create new public “networked spaces” that comprise digital and 
urban spaces. Zeynep Tufekci calls Twitter’s role in the 2011 uprisings 
in Egypt “an ecology- level effect” (2017, 118). Then, in September 2011, 
when the Occupy Wall Street protest began in New York’s Zuccotti Park, 
and Twitter users around the globe began commenting on events as 
they unfolded with the hashtags #OccupyWallStreet and #OWS, Eric 
Augenbraun of The Guardian coined the term “hashtag activism” (2011). 
Ever since, Augenbraun’s term has been applied by participants and sup-
porters, as well as critics, to the practice of raising awareness, fostering 
a sense of collectivity, and expressing solidarity in relation to political 
causes via hashtags on Twitter (and other media platforms that make use 
of hashtags, such as Facebook, Tumblr, and Instagram).
Taken together, the Green Revolution, the Arab Spring, and Occupy 
form one origin story of Twitter’s use for political change. A parallel origin 
story is that of “Black Twitter.” The preponderance of African American 
users on Twitter started attracting notice in 2009, when a Pew Internet 
report (Fox et al. 2009) found that African Americans “used Twitter 
disproportionately more than other demographic groups” (Brock 2012, 
530). The following year, Slate published an article by Farhad Manjoo 
(2010) called “How Black People Use Twitter,” which noted that many 
of Twitter’s “trending topics” were initiated by users with Black avatars. 
“Black Twitter” quickly became the widely accepted name given to the 
phenomenon of African Americans launching trending hashtags on 
Twitter, though many were quick to note that Black Twitter was neither 
homogeneous nor representative of all African Americans, and not all 
African Americans online participated in Black Twitter (Hilton 2010). 
Information scientist André Brock states, “Manjoo’s column signaled 
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Black Twitter’s ‘arrival’” (2012, 545)— that is, the moment when white 
users, who had constituted the “default” (Nakamura 2008) population 
of the internet for so long, noticed that Black users were present and ac-
tive online in large numbers and were communicating on a social media 
platform in their own vernacular.
For the first few years of Twitter’s existence, Black Twitter hashtags 
tended to be humorous or ironic, replete with insults and jokes that indi-
rectly conveyed social commentary: #ifsantawasblack, #DumbRoastJokes, 
#lilmamasweave, and #onlyintheghetto were a few tags analyzed by Sarah 
Florini (2013) and Sanjay Sharma (2013), early scholars of Black Twitter. 
This first wave of Black Twitter scholarship interpreted the rapid- fire re-
sponses posted in Black Twitter hashtags as examples of “signifyin’,” a 
theory of the multilayered purposes and meanings of African American 
vernacular wordplay and call- and- response group communication first 
proposed by Henry Louis Gates Jr. (1989). Brock argues that to read 
Black Twitter exchanges as signifyin’ means to understand them as “the 
articulation of a shared worldview, where recognition of the forms plus 
participation in the wordplay signals membership in the Black commu-
nity. Black discourse, from this perspective  .  .  . become[s] communal 
commentary upon political and personal realities” (2012, 533). Brock’s 
framing of Black Twitter as signifyin’, when hashtags mostly had comic 
intent, worked to give the phenomenon weight and importance: while 
signifyin’ may appear to be all “disses” and puns, it also allows African 
American users to make themselves known to one another in an online 
space where ethnicity is not de facto visible and to express and reinforce 
perspectives that are unique to their community. As Florini writes, signi-
fyin’ enables “multiple modes of participation. Even serving as the target 
of a diss can function as a viable means of inclusion” (2013, 231). Another 
way that Black Twitter constituted a digital version of signifyin’ was in its 
speed. Florini, referencing the work of Geneva Smitherman (2000), as-
serts that “timing is key to signifyin’,” and that, similar to the way that ver-
bal signifyin’ games depend on near- instantaneous responses, “Twitter 
moves at an extremely rapid pace with hundreds of thousands of tweets 
being posted every minute. With many users tweeting simultaneously, 
there is always activity in the timeline, making the overall pace of the 
[textual] competition move quite quickly” (Florini 2013, 233).
Then, in 2013, the aspects of Black Twitter that Brock and Florini had 
proposed made it a new form of signifyin’. Its ability to build feelings of 
community and shared sensibilities among African Americans online, 
and to generate hashtagged conversations that quickly scaled up into 
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tweets numbering in the thousands or more, were deployed by Black us-
ers to different ends. In July 2013 the acquittal of George Zimmerman in 
Trayvon Martin’s murder sparked the creation of hashtags such as #no-
justice, #RIPTrayvonMartin, and, most significantly, #BlackLivesMatter. 
Other tags protesting systemic racism and violence against African 
Americans followed, each incited by its own series of events.
#SolidarityIsForWhiteWomen, in August 2013, was launched by Mikki 
Kendall in response to the purportedly feminist writer Hugo Schwyzer, 
who had been praised and supported by several prominent white femi-
nists, admitting that he had targeted women of color. #ferguson and the 
related tag #IfTheyGunnedMeDown were both initiated in August 2014, 
after the Ferguson, Missouri, police officer Darren Wilson fatally shot 
eighteen- year- old Michael Brown (Wray 2014; Bonilla and Rosa 2015). 
#icantbreathe began trending in December 2014 after a Staten Island 
grand jury decided not to indict NYPD officer Daniel Pantaleo after 
he choked Eric Garner to death and the video capturing the homicide 
showed Garner repeatedly telling officers that he could not breathe. 
#SayHerName was coined by the African American Policy Forum in 
February 2015, which trended heavily after the suspicious death by hang-
ing of Sandra Bland in a Waller County, Texas, jail (Khaleeli 2016). Black 
Twitter became known primarily as a means of expressing solidarity, 
sharing information, and organizing politically for African Americans 
and their allies. Through hashtag after hashtag, Black Twitter raised 
awareness of the prevalence and danger of racism and sexism occurring 
throughout the United States.
While the events that activists tweeted about were profoundly disturb-
ing and often evoked emotions ranging from sorrow to rage, the uses to 
which Twitter were put between 2009 and 2015 raised hopes that the plat-
form, and social media networks more generally, was aiding campaigns 
and movements for sociopolitical reform and revolution. In a 2015 essay 
on #ferguson, digital ethnographers Yarimar Bonilla and Jonathan Rosa 
wrote:
Twitter affords a unique platform for collectively identifying, articu-
lating, and contesting racial injustices from the in- group perspective 
of racialized populations. Whereas in most mainstream media con-
texts the experiences of racialized populations are overdetermined, 
stereotyped, or tokenized, social media platforms such as Twitter of-
fer sites for collectively constructing counternarratives and reimagin-
ing group identities. (6)
8  #identity
Revised Pages
Although Twitter is a corporate enterprise that has no explicit commit-
ment to politics of any kind, it appeared that the platform was frequently 
serving as a political networked space (to reference Castells 2015), in 
which real- world people and movements intersected with online avatars 
and hashtags, a space in which actual and virtual change agents made 
common cause and mutually reinforced one another. In 2011 Alice Mar-
wick and danah boyd described Twitter as a space of “context collapse,” 
“in which multiple audiences, usually thought of as separate, co- exist 
in a single social context” (145). While Marwick and boyd use this idea 
to comment on the interactions of celebrities and fans on Twitter, from 
2009 to 2015 it seemed that Twitter effectuated numerous instances of 
context collapse between citizens, community organizers, politicians, 
mainstream news reporters, and official representatives of institutions 
such as police departments, government agencies, universities, and cor-
porations. The co- presence of this variety of actors in a single network 
yielded continual rearticulations and calibrations of community toward 
particular aims, what Zizi Papacharissi calls “disruptions [that may] 
become contagious and thus pollute established hierarchies of order” 
(2015, 133).
Bracketed by #iranelection and #BlackLivesMatter, we conceived this 
book in the rare moment of general scholarly optimism about the politi-
cal potential of Twitter. When we met as a working group between 2013 
and 2015, we discussed the difficulties of the work being done by activists 
on the ground and online; the shocking frequency of violence being 
done to people of color, women, LGBTQ people, and immigrants; and 
the ways that hashtag activism alone would never be sufficient to end 
entrenched bias, discrimination, and violence. We did not routinely talk 
about seeing white supremacism, virulent misogyny, hatred of LGBTQ 
people, and toxic xenophobia being on the rise on Twitter, in the US, or 
in the world.
And then, in June 2015, Donald Trump officially began campaigning 
for president of the United States. Our sense of Twitter changed. Twitter 
was Trump’s favorite platform for making boasts and accusations, and it 
increasingly became a stage for the performance of ethnonationalism 
and antipathy to all groups that had gained civil rights since the 1960s. 
At a meeting in October 2016, we noted that earlier incidents of prom-
inent women in tech and entertainment (such as Kathy Sierra, Anita 
Sarkeesian, Felicia Day, and Leslie Jones) being trolled and harassed on 
Twitter, their personal information widely disseminated (doxxed), some 
of which transpired during the 2014 #GamerGate controversy, were not 
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anomalies or independent events but showed a pattern of use of the plat-
form on the rise. Large numbers of people were expressing racist, sexist, 
homophobic, transphobic, and anti- immigrant views on Twitter. Some 
of these expressions were couched as jokes, while others were framed 
as serious political opinions, and yet others were issued as threats. We 
said that we needed to shift our focus to “White Twitter,” which was ap-
parently growing, at least in part as a backlash against and challenge to 
Black Twitter. The next month, Trump won the presidential election.
The election cycle revealed the emergence, alongside progressive 
minoritarian uses of Twitter’s affordances, of mobilizations of Twitter 
from deeply embedded centers of power or those seeking the author-
ity of such centers of power. Discourses that regulated and conserved 
particular formulations of the “national popular,” often articulated in 
an antagonistic relation to minoritarian discourses, proliferated on the 
platform. These discourses were not absent before Trump began his as-
cent to power— they were rampant in #GamerGate and other instances 
in which minorities and women had been targeted— but 2015 was the 
year that, as one magazine headline announced, “the alt- right took over 
Twitter” (Singal 2017).
In mid- 2017, as we completed this book, it became apparent that the 
executive branch of the US government was running on “Twitter time.” 
That is, the rate of the Trump White House’s release of executive or-
ders; hirings and firings of cabinet members and spokespeople; provoca-
tions and condemnations directed at the press, the public, other coun-
tries’ leaders, and supposed “leakers” inside the administration; and 
proposed rollbacks on the rights of immigrants, women, and LGBTQ 
people, were occurring at a faster clip than even a daily news cycle could 
seem to process. Hourly updates regarding the president’s tweets and 
his administration’s announcements were necessary. Trump had long 
used Twitter as a favorite podium for his proclamations, and after his 
January 2017 inauguration, the nation had to learn to ingest information 
at the rate that new tweets appear in a user’s “feed.” The lightning- fast 
speed with which Trump or his White House issued executive orders and 
various proclamations regarding Trump’s wish to shrink or eliminate 
the legal rights of various groups, including women, immigrants, and 
trans people, over the first seven months of his presidency led many to 
note the stark contrast in temporality when Trump did not immediately 
condemn the white supremacists who demonstrated at Charlottesville, 
one of whom drove into a crowd of counterprotesters, killing paralegal 
Heather Heyer. The events at Charlottesville took place on August 11, 
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2017, and it was not until August 14, 2017, that Trump denounced the 
“KKK, neo- Nazis, and white supremacists” who marched in the rally as 
“criminals and thugs” (Graham 2017). Television producer Danny Zuker 
noted the difference between Trump’s Twitter time (the fact that he re-
sponds to critics with alacrity on Twitter) and the fact that it took Trump 
three days to explicitly come out against racists who had incited violence 
in this tweet:
I once challenged @RealDonaldTrump’s ratings & he 
tweeted me in 15 minutes. It took him 3 days to say the 
KKK is bad. Sorry, it’s too late.
The value of Twitter as a media platform for the Trump presiden-
cy has been compared to prior American presidents’ uses of popular 
media— Franklin Roosevelt and the radio, John F. Kennedy and the tele-
vision. Trump has called Twitter his “own form of media” (quoted in 
Levingston 2017), a way to evade the structures of legacy media and ad-
dress people directly. And he has attributed, at least in part, his presiden-
tial victory to the platform. Trump’s exceptional use of the platform has 
spurred on questions about the archive of presidential communication. 
Formal institutions like the Library of Congress have committed to the 
inclusion of presidential tweets, and the US Congress has sought to cod-
ify that commitment in law.1 Semiformal institutions, like trumptwitter-
archive (http://www.trumptwitterarchive.com), automatically archive 
Donald Trump’s tweets, including those that are subsequently deleted, 
and make them readily accessible, searchable, and primed for analysis. 
Informal programs, like the @RealPressSecBot account on Twitter, take 
the words posted by @realDonaldTrump (President Trump’s personal 
Twitter username), and reframe the format to mimic a White House 
press release, including the use of official letterhead. Twitter now must 
be reckoned with as a site of presidential proclamations and as a net-
work populated by masses of Trump’s supporters who, often with the 
help of social bots (Bessi and Ferrara 2016),2 spread pro- Trump, or anti- 
anti- Trump news (Singal 2017), much of it “fake,” not “in the sense of 
wholly fabricated falsities, [but] as disinformation” (Benkler et al. 2017). 
As Yochai Benkler and his colleagues write of the “fake news” phenom-
enon, “What we find in our data is a network of mutually- reinforcing 
hyper- partisan sites that revive what Richard Hofstadter called ‘the par-
anoid style in American politics,’ combining decontextualized truths, 
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repeated falsehoods, and leaps of logic to create a fundamentally mis-
leading view of the world.”
This “network of mutually- reinforcing hyper- partisan sites” and users 
operates, for the most part, on Facebook and Twitter. And the activity of 
participants on these sites is not limited to the virtual realm. The con-
flicts between alt- righters and those opposed to them that took place 
across the country in 2016 and 2017— especially those on the campuses 
of public universities such as the University of Virginia in Charlottesville, 
the University of Washington in Seattle, and the University of California 
in Berkeley that resulted in violence— have shown that a feedback loop 
links hate speech online and hate speech in the “real world.” Ideas ar-
ticulated online fuel real- world actions; demonstrations on the street are 
organized via social media and are physical expressions of the thoughts 
consolidated and spread on those networks. Online spaces cannot be 
regarded as separate or distinct from the spaces in which fleshly bod-
ies meet and do harm to one another. The recent clashes on US streets 
originated on internet platforms, and their results have fed back into on-
line discussions that will subsequently feed back into the physical world 
in new manifestations.
It is ironic, then, that when developing this book between 2013 and 2015, 
members of our working group periodically brought up the possibility that 
Twitter, like so many social networks before it, would soon fade into irrele-
vance and that by the time #identity reached publication, the platform would 
be all but forgotten. We wondered if this project would stand as an archive 
of “Peak Twitter,” which would have long passed by the time it saw print. 
The 2016 election removed this concern. Twitter had already entered the 
annals of history with #ArabSpring, #Occupy, and #BlackLivesMatter, but 
beginning with Trump’s election, it became a battleground between a fed-
eral government that has set itself against identity- based civil rights and the 
#Resistance against that government. For the moment, Twitter lives on as a 
significant site of US public debate, especially around questions of how di-
verse bodies, languages, cultures, worldviews, orientations, and experiences 
are being recognized or denied, included or ignored, honored or despised, 
welcomed or denied by this nation.
Collectively, the essays presented here offer new modes of critical 
analysis of both minoritarian politics and new media technologies. Our 
authors position “new media” as a concept and discourse that simulta-
neously disavows and stages the ongoing, daily renewal of identity and 
difference. We regard Twitter as a form of internet infrastructure that en-
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ables a broad range of collective expressions from (and against) groups 
that insist on the power of specific identity categories and structural, his-
torical inequities, and that refuse neoliberalism’s tendency to discount 
the relevance or even the existence of social difference.
We argue not only that Twitter serves as a stage on which users con-
stantly perform race, gender, sexual orientation, and nationality but also 
that Twitter, like all new media networks, is structured by the historically 
sedimented logics of identificatory classification. After all, race, gender, 
sexual orientation, and nationality are among the oldest and most per-
sistent metadata, or “tags,” assigned to and organizing human relations. 
While class is not a distinct or stand- alone category of analysis in our proj-
ect, the affective and material relations between social media and global-
ized capitalism, neoliberalism, and localized/embodied forms of iden-
tity and sociality are of significant interest. The importance of hashtags 
on social networks foregrounds the stickiness of axes of difference— of 
sorting and filtering and assigning types— as methods of perceiving and 
understanding humanity in an era that many call post- racial, postfemi-
nist, post– gay rights, and global. Race and other categories of identity 
persist despite neoliberalism’s wish to cast them as wholly residual or as 
signifiers of market- based demographic valuation. Wendy Chun (2009) 
writes that race is always a technology of mediation and that race and 
technology must be seen as inextricably intertwined. Following Chun, we 
claim that it is crucial to understand how new media has inherited, and 
continually displays, legacies of race- , gender- , sexuality- , and nationality- 
based epistemologies and regimes of truth.
In affixing a hashtag to the term “identity,” this book builds on schol-
arship that recognizes identity as iteratively constructed, something 
that emerges out of and in relationship to the social (Butler 1990). 
Hashtagging identity conveys that discourse on Twitter is not simply a 
transparent reflection of the material, embodied lifeworlds of minoritar-
ian subjects; nor is such discourse wholly autonomous from the worlds 
of social difference out of which it arises. While it often becomes affixed 
to individual subjects, the performance of identity is situated at the in-
terface between the individual and the social, suggesting also that the 
meanings that accrue to identity are shaped by the affordances of the 
media through which they circulate. Those media are both contingent 
reflections of the worlds in which they have been produced and give 
shape and meaning to the worlds around them. The articulation and 
rearticulation of identity politics leverage Twitter’s affordances, reflect-
ing a wider set of political circuitries that congeal power around particu-




Immediately following this introduction, Abigail De Kosnik’s chapter “Is 
Twitter a Stage?” outlines two major strands of thought, one originated 
by Erving Goffman and the other by Marshall McLuhan, which enables 
us to think of social media participation, and internet communication 
more generally, as performance. McLuhan’s premise that global tele-
communications networks constitute a “global theater,” in which all are 
actors and none are merely spectators, offers the hope and the challenge 
that constantly performing with one another is changing us individually 
and collectively— that social media platforms are serving as sites of large- 
scale social transformation.
Part I, “Black Twitter Futures,” elaborates some of the various ways 
people leverage social media platforms to claim the histories and fu-
turities of blackness in the United States. With #BlackLivesMatter and 
the emergence of the Movement for Black Lives as a backdrop, authors 
move from individual verbal and visual utterances affirming the lives of 
Black women to the storytelling surrounding a Black woman’s death, 
and from the vernacular and quotidian to the strategic expression of 
organizational and institutional campaigns. Malika Imhotep offers a rich 
genealogy of the expression “on fleek,” uttered first by Kayla Newman 
in her six- second video posted to Vine. Drawing from queer and Black 
feminist theorizing, Imhotep explores the uptake of Black Femme aes-
thetic indulgence to consider how large- scale value- inscribing process-
es attempt, and persistently fail, to fully capture meanings encoded in 
the Black vernacular. Paige Johnson examines the hashtag #YouOKSis 
launched by Feminista Jones to combat both street harassment and on-
line harassment, both of which African American cis and trans women 
suffer in disproportionate numbers. Johnson discusses ways in which the 
hashtag has been used to share stories of experiences of harassment, 
as well as strategies for intervening in, or otherwise de- escalating, such 
incidents, and argues that Jones has thus created an important network, 
which Johnson calls a “technocultural assemblage,” for documenting 
violence, spreading information about safety tactics, and memorializing 
the lives of women who have been murdered on city streets.
Mixing critical discourse analysis and digital ethnography, Aaminah 
Norris and Nalya Rodriguez explore the differentiated ways high- profile 
stories about the deaths of Black women under police supervision are 
taken up across different social media platforms. Their analysis of one 
social media campaign developed by the African American Policy Forum 
surrounding the death of Sandra Bland reveals how Twitter was a more 
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effective platform to convey and amplify the narrative details of Bland’s 
death than Facebook, which was more readily used to derail or dismiss 
the narrative. Grace Gipson explores the hashtag #Afrofuturism, which 
is not only used to reference science fiction or technology- themed works 
by African American musicians and writers but also to showcase univer-
sity instructors who are teaching courses on Afrofuturism, academics 
who present innovative theories of Afrofuturism at conferences, com-
munity activists who are building tech- rich community centers in African 
American neighborhoods, and African American science and engineer-
ing students who are developing new technologies. Gipson argues that 
the myriad uses of #Afrofuturism are facilitating a new conception of 
“digital blackness,” which positions African diasporic peoples at the 
center of stories of contemporary digital culture rather than imagining 
them to only exist in the margins, or fictions, of new media. This sec-
tion is rounded out by our conversation with chaplain, activist, and musi-
cian Reverend Osagyefo Sekou, who spoke with the Color of New Media 
working group in the fall of 2015. Reverend Sekou draws extensively 
from the blues to think through the local and transnational manifesta-
tions of social networks such as those that materialized around Ferguson, 
always with a critical eye on questions of authenticity and agency, style 
and spirit, poetics and political economy.
The chapters in part II, “Mediated Intersections,” delve deeply into 
the intersections between digital networked communication and various 
groups: feminists and postfeminists, survivors of relationship violence, 
queer, Latinx, and queer Latinx people. Lyndsey Ogle studies the hashtags 
#WomenAgainstFeminism and #ConfusedCatsAgainstFeminism and 
proposes that the content posted in both tags participates in what Ogle 
calls “postfeminist performance,” which she defines as performances 
that conflate feminist and anti- feminist ideas and modes. Ogle argues 
that while some feminists dismiss postfeminists as “confused” about what 
feminism means and what feminists wants, and some men mock the op-
position between women at different points on the political spectrum 
as an ongoing catfight (or a #ConfusedCats fight), the relationship of 
postfeminists to feminism is more complicated and confusing than many 
assume. For example, as Ogle points out, women who disavow feminism 
online do so as part of an identity performance that asserts their indi-
viduality and makes visible their life experiences as women. Ogle argues 
that autobiographical construction and publication is a feminist tactic 
inherited from earlier waves of the women’s rights movement, even if 
the tactic is now being used by women to distance themselves from that 
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movement. Julia Havard focuses on the hashtags #WhyIStayed, which 
she describes as a “survivor- centered space” in which survivors of partner 
violence share with others their reasons for staying in abusive relation-
ships and, in that sharing, describe how transformations of thought and 
feeling can happen even in “stillness,” in “states of immobility,” in peri-
ods of “incarceration.” Havard argues that the “activist labor” done by 
contributors to #WhyIStayed is not often recognized as activism, because 
it is done in the realm of emotion, reflection, and imagination.
José Ramón Lizárraga and Arturo Cortéz explore the pedagogical 
work of the San Francisco– based Latinx drag queen Persia, elaborating 
how Persia’s “digital queer gestures” traverse actual and virtual spaces. 
Persia’s campy music video “Google Google Apps Apps,” and the hashtag 
it generated, contributed to critical debate about the ways gentrifica-
tion generated by the tech industry wears away at San Francisco’s long- 
standing queer Latinx lifeworlds. These local and embodied forms of 
digital pedagogy are juxtaposed with the rise of what Renée Pastel, in her 
chapter, calls “Hashtag Television.” Pastel traces the official (as opposed 
to fan- generated) hashtags on RuPaul’s Drag Race and Jane the Virgin, 
two network television shows that prominently feature hashtags in their 
broadcasts. Pastel reads how these hashtags contribute to identity forma-
tion and political consciousness for minoritized communities.
While the first two sections of the book study a range of progres-
sive, affirmative, and critical expressions of identity and difference on 
Twitter, part III, “Disavowals,” considers the reactionary deployment 
and effects of social media intent on securing white and heteronorma-
tive forms of identity. Kyle Booten theorizes the production of what 
he terms “post- racial affect” across a corpus of about 150,000 tweets, 
utilizing both micro- rhetorical and statistical forms of analysis. Booten 
effectively shows how #AllLivesMatter produces what he terms “white 
noise” in the broader signal of antiracist demands. Abigail De Kosnik’s 
essay on #CancelColbert analyzes the racist and misogynistic backlash 
against that hashtag’s originator, Suey Park. De Kosnik proposes that 
the alt- right has co- opted the tactic of performing outrage online that 
was developed and promulgated by counter- hegemonic, leftist activists 
such as Park and participants in the Arab Spring and Occupy Wall Street, 
and that this co- optation has given rise to a new kind of persona: the 
“divo citizen.” Bonnie Ruberg examines the #nohomo hashtag, a tag and 
phrase (“no homo,” meaning “no homosexuality”) that, Ruberg states, 
appears approximately 5,000 times each day on Twitter, usually at the 
end of tweets in which a male poster praises a male celebrity, or reports 
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about having engaged in some activity (such as dancing, self- grooming, 
or having feelings) that might be construed as homoerotic or feminine. 
Ruberg argues that #nohomo “functions as a tool for performing and 
self- policing straight masculinity” and offers numerous examples of uses 
of the tag to show how narrowly many Twitter users define “acceptable” 
straight masculine behavior.
The fourth section of the book, “Twitter International,” highlights 
some of the insights that emerge when researchers examine uses of the 
social network outside of the United States. While Twitter and other 
social media sites have been vaunted as platforms that catalyze broad 
and horizontal democratic participation, Neha Kumar’s qualitative, 
interview- based investigation of an urban, lower- , and middle- class set-
ting in India reveals how such claims are hardly universal. Twitter’s 
very limited use among Kumar’s informants contrasted with their ac-
tive participation in other online communities (Facebook, Telegram, 
WhatsApp, etc.), an expression, Kumar argues, of agency and freedom 
to choose whether and how to participate on the platform. Two chap-
ters focus on an array of cases involving the African continent. Reginald 
Royston and Krystal Strong diagnose what they term Africa’s “social me-
diascape.” They surface the vibrant uses of the resolutely local hashtag 
#dumsor to protest Ghana’s ecology of infrastructural breakdown, along-
side the hashtag #BringBackOurGirls, which, while circulating broadly 
across US American social networks, was also thoroughly articulated to 
local Nigerian activism. Building on the productive tensions among the 
local, national, and transnational scales of Twitter activism, Naveena 
Karusala, Trevor Perrier, and Neha Kumar explore the circulation of the 
2015 hashtag #IfAfricaWasABar. Their research reflexively considers how 
“outsider” status problematizes how we come to understand the coher-
ence, meaning, and effects of hashtags and the movements and commu-
nities they cohere. Built on over twenty- three hundred original tweets, 
the researchers reckon with the challenge of at once relying on the rich 
data sets that Twitter makes available while at the same time recognizing 
what may be elided or obscured through such forms of research. The 
section concludes by bringing the book full circle, in Kimberly McNair’s 
“Beyond Hashtags,” which considers the ways Black Twitter operates 
alongside, through, and in relation to off- line international social move-
ment building. McNair’s point of entry is the cross- border interface be-
tween the United Kingdom and the United States in the struggle against 
police violence, underscoring the confluence of discursive activism and 
political activism to confront racism.
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The closing section, “Notes from the Color of New Media,” consists 
of transcripts of two meetings of the working group that produced this 
book. “The Color of New Media Enters Trumplandia” is a transcript of 
our group meeting on February 2, 2017, which was twelve days after the 
inauguration of Donald Trump as forty- fifth president of the United 
States, and the same day that alt- right agitator Milo Yiannopoulos was 
scheduled to visit the UC Berkeley campus. “The Color of New Media 
Responds to UC Berkeley’s ‘Free Speech Week’” is a transcript of our 
meeting on September 1, 2017, after Berkeley’s new chancellor, Carol 
Christ, announced that 2017– 2018 would be the “Year of Free Speech” 
on the Berkeley campus, and student organizations invited a number of 
alt- right spokespeople to the campus. Both transcripts serve as records 
of how the events of 2017, in the physical and online worlds, at the na-
tional and hyperlocal level, elicited dismay, dread, pain, and fear, as well 
as critical thinking, moments of humor, and proposals for future action 
from our members.
Notes
 1. See the June 2017 “Communications over Various Feeds Electronically 
for Engagement or ‘COVFEFE Act,’” proposed by Illinois Representative Mike 
Quigley, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/115/hr2884/text.
 2. Bessi and Ferrara define social bots as “algorithmically controlled ac-
counts that emulate the activity of human users but operate at much higher pace 
(e.g., automatically producing content or engaging in social interactions) while 
successfully keeping their artificial identity undisclosed.”
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one | Is Twitter a Stage?
Theories of Social Media Platforms  
as Performance Spaces
abigail de kosnik
In this essay I identify two major strands of thinking of internet plat-
forms as performance spaces, and of online participation as perfor-
mance. The theorists who originated both strands predated the rise of 
the World Wide Web and social media. The first strand was initiated by 
Erving Goffman and his arguments about performance, or “presenta-
tion of self,” in everyday life; the second strand was launched by Marshall 
McLuhan and his idea that new telecommunications media were bring-
ing into being a “global theater.”
In The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, Goffman (1956) propos-
es that every human being performs roles in everyday life. He writes 
that an individual has “many motives for trying to control the impres-
sion” that they make on others. The “pattern of action” (8) which is 
“presented or played through” on multiple occasions “may be called a 
‘part’” (8– 9). An individual aims to sustain such impressions (that is, to 
perform their “part” and keep the performance of that part consistent 
over time). “Dramaturgical problems,” “stage- craft,” and “stage manage-
ment” all “occur everywhere in social life” (8), states Goffman. Note that 
Goffman is not concerned with the specific content of any particular 
performance; his interest lies not in what is performed, but in the fact that 
performance takes place, and how performance works, in social interaction. 
Goffman proposes that “when an individual or performer plays the same 
part to the same audience on different occasions, a social relationship is 
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likely to arise,” and “we may refer to those who contribute to other per-
formances as the audience, observers, or co- participants” (9).
Goffman’s definitions of performance in everyday life can be used 
to articulate how “we”— by which I mean people in the early twenty- first 
century with regular internet access— perform every day in our uses of 
digital media, particularly social media platforms. The “impressions” 
(that we make) or the “parts” (that we play) described by Goffman are, 
in a social media setting, our online identities. The continuity of our 
performances— the fact that, as Goffman tells us, we perform our parts 
consistently over time (though we typically play different parts to differ-
ent audiences)— translates to social media in our constant uploading 
of new content and our continually posting updates to our accounts. 
The “techniques” of performance preparation that Goffman claims 
we all employ on a daily basis, such as “dramaturgy,” “stagecraft,” and 
“stage management,” are also evident in our social media use: in how 
we thoughtfully prepare and craft our posts in advance; how we create 
content to share; how we strategize (even if only with ourselves) about 
the timing and impact of the release of our content (in other words, we 
ask ourselves when would be the best time to post a particular piece of 
content to attract the greatest possible response); how we launch and 
participate in hashtags; and how we work to attract clicks, views, likes, 
reblogs, retweets, and upvotes. Goffman claims that performances in 
everyday life constitute social relationships, that audiences and observ-
ers can also be considered co- performers and co- participants. Similarly, 
social media use is defined by relations, interactions, and encounters 
between co- participants. All of Goffman’s key arguments that everyday 
life is filled with, and defined by, performance also apply to social media.
A number of social media theorists have built on Goffman’s idea 
that identity is performance— that is, the idea that who we are is the 
persona(e) we perform, day to day, with repetition and continuity. For 
example, in their essay “Public Displays of Connection” (2004), Judith 
Donath and danah boyd propose that on social networking sites, users 
display their networks (their connections, or friends) in order to signal a 
number of traits, such as social status, political beliefs, or cultural tastes. 
In his essay “Social Network Profiles as Taste Performances,” Hugo Liu 
(2007) similarly argues that listing one’s cultural interests in one’s social 
network profile functions as a type of “taste performance.” For example, 
one can indicate a preference for the ironic over the straightforward, the 
dystopian over the utopian, or the sincere over the satirical, simply by 
naming, in one’s online profile (or, to expand on Liu, showing through 
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the posts in one’s social media feed) what one likes: the kinds of bands, 
foods, fashion, restaurants, films, television series, video games, outdoor 
sites, and so on that one prefers. “Lists of interests,” writes Liu— and, 
again, we can elaborate on Liu to include pictures of one’s interests on 
Instagram or Pinterest or text posts about one’s interests on Twitter or 
Tumblr— “might actually be more useful as an indicator of one’s aes-
thetics than as a factual declaration of interests” (273). In other words, 
people might get to know you, or at least your online identity, far bet-
ter through your online “taste performances,” through the content that 
you post and the cultural references with which you tag yourself, than 
through any self- descriptive statements you make (such as “I love old 
movies” or “I love hiking in nature”).
The Goffmanian approach to conceptualizing digital networks as per-
formance emphasizes the individual’s experience of those networks. A 
McLuhanesque approach to digital networks as performance spaces calls 
for more attention to be paid to performances by collectives. As I have 
written about elsewhere (De Kosnik 2015), McLuhan published an essay 
in 1974 in which he proposes his concept of the “global theater,” a the-
ater that came into being with the advent of global telecommunications: 
“Simultaneous man [is] living in a world whose center is everywhere 
and whose margin is nowhere. . . . Instead of specialized jobs he prefers 
role- playing, with its flexibility and diversity. Indeed, at the moment of 
Sputnik the planet became a global theater in which there are no specta-
tors but only actors” (1974, 50). In the same essay, McLuhan reaches for 
analogies to explain how the global theater operates, or will operate in 
the future, and latches onto a communications technology with which all 
of his early 1970s readers were already familiar: the newspaper. McLuhan 
explains that a newspaper is produced collectively by multiple authors; at 
rapid speeds, with many people contributing or “speaking” (seemingly) 
at the same time; and a newspaper lacks a unifying “story line”— that 
is, it consists of “an assembly of unconnected items in abstract mosaic 
form” (50). A newspaper also offers too much information to take in, to 
be comprehensively consumed or understood. McLuhan quotes novelist 
Robert Louis Stevenson, who said, “I could make an epic from a news-
paper if I knew what to leave out” (51). More than forty years after the 
time of McLuhan’s writing, we can readily replace “newspaper” with “so-
cial media platforms” in McLuhan’s description of how the global the-
ater, enabled by telecommunications, operates: social media is produced 
collectively by multiple authors; at rapid speeds, with many people con-
tributing or “speaking” simultaneously; and social media lacks a unifying 
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story line and seems to consist of “unconnected items in abstract mosaic 
form.” Social media also offers too much information for any one user 
to take in as a totality. Perhaps a contemporary novelist could “make an 
epic from a social media platform if [she] knew what to leave out.”
Another way that McLuhan attempts to describe the rise of the “glob-
al theater” is by drawing a distinction between what he calls “old jour-
nalism” and “new journalism.” “Old journalism,” McLuhan argues, was 
about figures— that is, important or prominent people or events. “New 
journalism,” in contrast— and I suggest that we can add or substitute “so-
cial media” for this term— is concerned with “ground” rather than “fig-
ure” (McLuhan here uses terms borrowed from Gestalt psychology), in 
that newer ways of reporting on events are invested in being on the ground, 
reporting on the experiences, opinions, and perspectives of the mass or 
crowd. McLuhan writes that “new journalism” (and, again, I view this 
term as equivalent, in our current moment, with “social media”) consists 
of “immersion in situations which involve many people simultaneously” 
(1974, 51). McLuhan argues:
The “old journalism” had sought objectivity . . . by giving “both sides” 
at once. . . . To give both sides, however, tends to ignore the possibil-
ity that there may be many more sides than two, and as the means of 
access to information improved and as the means of processing infor-
mation speeded up, the mere chiaroscuro of the light and the dark, 
the pro and the con, has tended to yield to . . . depth involvement in 
total situations. (51)
McLuhan holds up Norman Mailer’s accounts of the 1968 Republican 
and Democratic national conventions, at which large anti– Vietnam War 
protests took place (Mailer published his reports as Miami and the Siege 
of Chicago in 1968), as exemplary of the “new journalism.” Mailer, claims 
McLuhan, “is less concerned with the policies and the parties than with 
the experience of the hurly- burly of the conventions” (51). #ferguson, 
the hashtag used for the protests in Ferguson, Missouri, that took place 
following the August 2014 fatal shooting of Michael Brown, an African 
American teenager, by police officer Darren Wilson (and more pro-
tests erupted after the November 2014 announcement that a grand jury 
would not indict Wilson for the killing), operated according to the logic 
of what McLuhan called “new journalism” in that #ferguson was not a 
chronological list of events, nor was it primarily about figures (individual 
people or isolated occurrences); rather, #ferguson presented thousands 
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of people’s experiences of, and perspectives on, the demonstrations 
against racialized police brutality. #ferguson was about the ground.
Statistician Emma Pierson (2014) collected two hundred thousand 
tweets tagged with “#ferguson” (or #Ferguson) that were posted in 
the days just before prosecutor Robert McCulloch’s announcement on 
November 24, 2014 that the Ferguson grand jury would not indict Officer 
Darren Wilson for the shooting of Michael Brown. Pierson grouped the 
tweets into two categories, conservative and liberal, or “red” and “blue.” 
Below are lists of what Pierson found to be the most retweeted “red” 
tweets and the most retweeted “blue” tweets:
Most Common Retweets for Red Group
#Ferguson I would feel safer, any day, to encounter 
#DarrenWilson on the street, than to meet #MichaelBrown 
or half of those now protesting!
Yeah I posted it #ferguson I am not into mob justice on 
media lies #justsaying http://t.co/Fk9EsPtV1P
Autopsy report: Not only did Brown not have his hands 
up he was going4 Gun: http://t.co/6pdv9UL0gx #Ferguson 
http://t.co/pFsa6GfGOJ @MaydnUSA
#Ferguson in case you were wondering, police officers 
are also citizens, with full constitutional rights. 
Rights aren’t just for criminals!
If #Ferguson isn’t race baiting, why are THEY there? 
http://t.co/9ZznN1FsBT
Hard to blame Governor Jay Nixon for declaring a state 
of emergency when the president himself dumps gasoline 
on the #Ferguson fire. Smh
Officer #DarrenWilson Supporters Crowdfund “Pants Up, 
Don’t Loot” Billboard http://t.co/5Bb7VkCeMh #Ferguson 
http://t.co/xxHOCnX7E5
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Most Common Retweets for Blue Group
Governor calls State Of Emergency. National Guard 
waiting. FBI giving warnings. KKK issuing threats. What 
’effing year is this? #ferguson
My mom in ’63, while the police were “just doing their 
job.” Break the internet? Break the system. #Ferguson 
http://t.co/qXd6sZoo2U
State of emergency in #Ferguson must not be used to 
violate human rights, including the right to peaceful 
protest. @GovJayNixon
Despite a State of Emergency remember the #Ferguson cop 
is innocent until proven guilty. As opposed to, say, an 
unarmed guy he shot 6 times.
Please understand the legal ramifications of a State of 
Emergency. Individual rights can be taken away. This is 
his “heads up”. #Ferguson
Please notice that even though this #Ferguson police 
officer was arrested for rape 5 days ago, the St. Louis 
Post Dispatch said NOTHING.
America: Where just the fear of Negro anger, not 
actions, can lead to a State of Emergency. And you 
wonder why cops shoot so fast. #Ferguson
In these tweets, Governor Jay Nixon, Officer Darren Wilson, and Wil-
son’s victim Michael Brown are central figures, yet #ferguson, meaning 
the swarm of events (legal actions, official and unofficial statements, 
press reports, demonstrations, debates, and controversies) discussed in 
that hashtag, some of which were organized and facilitated through that 
hashtag, was not only or even mainly about Nixon, Wilson, and Brown. 
Rather, #ferguson was about the ground: the interpretations, viewpoints, 
and sentiments (the diversity of which is evident in the contrast between 
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the “red” group’s retweets and “blue” group’s retweets), as well as calls 
to action and circulation of facts, that hundreds of thousands of people 
shared and performed online in response to what took place in Fergu-
son, Missouri, in the summer and fall of 2014.
After marking out a movement from the “old journalism” of print 
culture (which centered on figures) to the “new journalism” of global 
networked culture (which centers on— or, we could say, was decentered 
by— an emphasis on ground), McLuhan takes up the Xerox (photocopi-
er) machine as an emblem of the nascent new media era. He writes, 
“Xerox comes as a reverse flip at the end of the Gutenberg cycle; whereas 
Gutenberg made everybody a reader, Xerox makes everybody a publish-
er” (1974, 52). Xeroxing, or making many copies of a work that one has 
typed, “is so decentralized, accessible, and inexpensive that it results in 
making the ordinary person a publisher, if he so chooses” (52). Xerox fa-
cilitates “uniform briefing” (53)— that is, espionage, leaks, surveillance, 
public calls for government accountability (here, McLuhan references 
the Pentagon Papers, which Daniel Ellsberg photocopied before leaking 
them to the press). McLuhan says, “The electronic form of information 
service”— he calls Xeroxing “electronic publishing” (54)— “permits not 
only decentralization of organizations but a wide diversity of products 
without additional expenditure” (54). Remarking further on the photo-
copier as a publishing tool, McLuhan claims, “Xerox completes the work 
of the typewriter. A poet composing at the typewriter is ‘publishing’ his 
work, as it were, while composing. Xerox gives to this fact a new mean-
ing” (54), because the “typescript” can easily be “multiplied,” as the poet 
can give away copies of his work to his friends.
If we replace “Xerox” with “social media,” or, indeed, with “the in-
ternet,” in McLuhan’s sentences, we find an apt description of the way 
that digital networks have led to a proliferation of publishing, or, we 
might say, sharing, both ideas and information. The internet and social 
media have made “everybody a publisher,” or at least made it possible 
for everyone with access to computing technologies to make public a 
wide variety of content on various networked platforms. The internet 
and social media have facilitated numerous leaks of government secrets 
and calls for government accountability, as exemplified by the cases of 
WikiLeaks, Edward Snowden, and Chelsea Manning; internet and social 
media use often conflate the act of composing and the act of publishing 
so that a user can post whatever they compose with a click of a digital 
button. The internet and social media also allow the composer of con-
tent to share “copies” of their work with friends instantaneously, as they 
Revised Pages
Is Twitter a Stage?  27
can “multiply” their “typescripts” ad infinitum by sending their composi-
tions rapidly through networks and onto web pages or into their connec-
tions’ social media feeds.
Thus, McLuhan may be describing 1960s and ’70s phenomena such 
as the Pentagon Papers and zine culture in his analyses of “new jour-
nalism” and Xeroxing, but he also anticipates the many- to- many com-
munication format of web and social media culture, which has made 
“everybody” (with access) a “publisher,” in the sense that anyone can 
create (or appropriate) and post text, image, sound, and video content 
on their own blogs; on WikiLeaks; on numerous fan sites and piracy 
sites; on Twitter, Tumblr, Facebook, Instagram, Pinterest, YouTube, and 
so on. The “global theater” may have been inaugurated at the time of 
Sputnik, Norman Mailer, sci- fi zines, and the Pentagon Papers leak (a pe-
riod spanning 1957– 1974), but digital platforms have more fully realized 
McLuhan’s vision of a world in which all can perform to all, in which no 
one is merely a spectator, but all are actors. (In a mediascape rich with 
platforms for sharing content, all users are actors, because even what 
seems like inaction— not publishing text, images, sound files, or video 
files on these platforms— is a deliberate choice. Lurking, opting out, 
withholding, refraining, or hiding are all actions in the network as much 
as posting, retweeting, reblogging, and commenting are.)
Though McLuhan’s “global theater” essay is populated by multi-
ple print technologies, theatrical metaphors also appear prominently 
throughout the piece. “At the moment of Sputnik the planet became a 
global theater in which there are no spectators but only actors” (1974, 
48) is not only an argument in the essay; it is also the title of the essay, 
which puts theatricality— a becoming- theatrical— at the heart of McLuhan’s 
claims about how global telecom is changing society. It seems likely that 
McLuhan’s idea of the global theater was influenced by cybernetic the-
ory, with its focus on instantaneous feedback loops. (The concept of cy-
bernetic systems was introduced to the public in Norbert Wiener’s 1948 
book Cybernetics and penetrated large areas of social science, business 
culture, and consumer culture after the Macy Conferences on cybernet-
ics [1946– 1953].) Both theater and many- to- many telecommunications 
systems (such as telephony or digital networks) are constituted by high- 
speed exchanges of information— feedback loops— between audiences 
and actors, between readers/viewers and posters. Another probable in-
fluence on McLuhan’s global theater was the 1950s and ’60s experiments 
in performance art, especially Allan Kaprow’s happenings (indeed, in 
his book Take Today, McLuhan (1972) uses the phrase “perpetual hap-
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pening” as a synonym for “global theater”), which sought to thoroughly 
blur distinctions between audiences and performers and to make all at-
tendees into actors.
Another theatrical reference in McLuhan’s 1974 essay is a popular 
1960s Broadway play. McLuhan declares that “the ‘You are there’ immer-
sion approach in [new] journalism” is “natural” in the medium of televi-
sion (51). “Television brings the outside into the intimacy of the home, 
as it takes the private world of the home outside into the forum” (51– 52). 
McLuhan proposes that new journalism’s motto is “A funny thing hap-
pened to me on the way to the forum” (52). This mention of the 1962 
stage hit by Stephen Sondheim, Burt Shevelove, and Larry Gelbart, A 
Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the Forum, in combination with a 
reference to television, resonates with the argument by television his-
torians such as Lynn Spigel (1992) that early US television was largely a 
mediatization of theatrical events, as television broadcasts brought plays, 
concerts, and other live performances into ordinary Americans’ living 
rooms so that they no longer had to commute to city centers to access 
high- quality entertainment, an argument that itself recalls McLuhan’s 
(1974) famous concept that the content of any new medium is an older 
medium. (McLuhan claims that the content of films is novels, and Spigel 
claims that the content of television, when it was new in the United 
States, was theater.)
McLuhan’s use of “A funny thing happened to me on the way to 
the forum” to characterize television and the “new journalism,” both 
of which take a “‘You are there’ immersion approach,” indicates how 
characteristics of theater attendance— including co- presence and inter-
action between audience and actors, and the audience’s feeling of being 
immersed, of being there in the environment presented on and by the 
stage— are, for McLuhan, the defining characteristics of the new world 
being made by 24/7 instantaneous communications networks, which is 
why he deems that rising world a “global theater.” That world, that the-
ater, now includes social media, which, even more than 1960s television 
or journalism, depends on participants having a sense of co- presence 
and interaction with one another and feeling as if they are there, im-
mersed in the multiple simultaneous performances taking place on so-
cial platforms. McLuhan seems to predict that theater has already been 
mediatized once (by television) and that global telecom will be the next 
great mediatization of live performance. He appears to anticipate that 
digital networks will make distant events more present, public events 
more intimate, and intimate experiences more public, just as television 
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brought theater into the home and made private, domestic occurrences 
into social dramas.
A third theatrical metaphor that McLuhan incorporates into his 
“global theater” essay is the “mask.” McLuhan employs this metaphor 
seven times in describing the operations of media production and re-
ception, arguing that a medium is “put on” by its users like a mask so 
that they can extend their perceptions, and the users are “put on” by 
the maker so that the maker can anticipate their reaction and give them 
what they want. When a technological device is put on as a “mask,” be 
it a newspaper, a television set, a laptop, a mobile phone, or a VR (vir-
tual reality) headset, it allows its user to see differently, to see through 
new perspectives or lenses, and to access experiences that they could not 
have without the prosthetic. The media maker, conversely, uses not the 
technological device or medium, but the prospective user, as a mask, as 
a kind of feedforward mechanism (see Logan 2015) that allows the maker 
to craft their production (or, one might say, performance) in order to 
evoke a specific audience reaction. For McLuhan, then, masks do not 
cover or hide reality; masks generate realities, or make possible the pro-
duction and reception of realities that diverge from, modify, or augment, 
the ordinary real (however reality is experienced sans media).
That McLuhan wants the image of masked players to stand in for 
both media producers and media users reinforces his concept of a global 
theater in which all perform and none are merely spectators, even if the 
style of the performances differs for different “roles” being played in 
the media ecosystem. In social media, for instance, participants move 
from the role of content producer to the role of content receiver quite 
fluidly; thus they might be thought of as swiftly, frequently, exchanging 
the maker’s mask for the user’s mask and back again, over and over.
Recent scholarship has built on both the Goffmanian and 
McLuhanesque lines of thought about social media sites functioning as 
performance spaces. For example, in “Interaction in Digital Contexts,” 
Annette Markham (2012) draws on McLuhan when describing how the 
internet shifts distance. Markham writes, “The Internet extends our 
senses in McLuhanesque fashion, allowing us to see, listen, and reach 
well beyond our local sensory limits” (282) and “Having a sense of pres-
ence without actually being there is a hallmark of Internet- mediated 
communication.  .  .  . Presence becomes a more complicated concept 
because it is determined by participation more than proximity” (282). 
Markham here stresses, as McLuhan does in his “global theater” con-
cept, that telecommunications networks bring people into a relation 
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of simultaneous feedback and co- presence, a relation that in earlier 
eras defined live performance against media such as books and films 
and radio, which more clearly demarcated a physical distance between 
producers and consumers.
When Markham notes that the internet shifts time, however, she turns 
to Goffman. She asserts that “now, we not only have to manage various 
presentations of self . . . but also the presentations of selves from the past 
that collide with selves of the present” (283). Markham here argues that 
Goffman’s concept of impression management, and his study of how, 
in everyday life, all members of society work on various presentations 
of self (presenting oneself at work, a different one at family gatherings, 
and another self to friends, for instance), increase in complexity in the 
social media era, for in addition to people having to labor to present 
different selves in different settings, we also have to reckon with the fact 
that our social media accounts may preserve past selves, and those may 
not merge in desirable ways with present selves. The graduating college 
student who must take down images of themselves as partygoers from 
social media platforms as they prepare to present themselves as hard-
working responsible future employees at job interviews understands well 
Markham’s claim that different temporalities of selfhood can clash on 
digital platforms.
Elsewhere in the same essay, Markham combines McLuhan and 
Goffman. She claims that the internet demands that presentation of 
self must be “deliberative” (2012, 284). She writes, “In online environ-
ments, we write self into being” (284), a notion that strongly adheres to 
Goffman’s worldview, which holds that everyone must deliberately pres-
ent themselves, must perform a self (or many selves), in order to be 
seen and known in society. “Then,” Markham continues, “to recognize 
our own existence in any meaningful way, we must be responded to” 
(284). This argument bears strong similarities to McLuhan’s conceptu-
alization of telecommunications networks as spaces in which all perform 
for all, which, as I argued above, was probably influenced by cybernetics 
and performance happenings. Markham frames digital sites as driven by 
feedback loops between “writers”/posters and responders, and under-
scoring her framing is the logic of the stage actor, who believes that his 
work is not meaningful, and indeed may not even truly exist, without the 
presence of an audience. Both stage actor and social media participant 
depend on the reactions of their audiences, whether that consists of ap-
plause and sighs in the theater or likes and retweets/reblogs online.
Another useful application of Goffman and McLuhan’s ideas to social 
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media can be found in Erika Pearson’s 2009 essay, “All the World Wide 
Web’s a Stage.” Pearson’s key proposition is that social media functions 
like a “glass bedroom,” in which there is no clear split between back-
stage and front stage, private and public, and thus, social media takes 
Goffman’s idea of identity as performance to “another level.” Writes 
Pearson:
Inside the [glass] bedroom, private conversations and intimate ex-
changes occur, each with varying awareness of distant friends and 
strangers moving past transparent walls. . . . The glass bedroom itself 
is not an entirely private space, nor a true backstage space as Goffman 
articulated, though it takes on elements of both over the course of 
its use. It is a bridge that is partially private and public, constructed 
online through signs and language.
Goffman emphasized the separation of what he called “regions” of per-
formance (for instance, in a restaurant, a server gives a very different 
performance in the front stage of the restaurant, constituted by the 
seating area, than in the restaurant’s backstage, constituted by the wait 
staff’s break room), but many or most social media users do not main-
tain a sharp distinction between the realm of private behavior and the 
realm of public behavior. In fact, it is the ongoing blending of front stage 
and backstage, the public posting online of one’s ostensibly private life, 
that constitutes a great deal of the appeal of social media performance; 
hence, Pearson argues, in social media use, the metaphorical wall sepa-
rating private and public is made of glass, transparent and meant to be 
seen through. Although Pearson does not cite McLuhan explicitly, her 
glass bedroom metaphor echoes McLuhan’s claims that in the telecom-
munications revolution what is intimate becomes more exposed, and 
what takes place on a large scale is more often experienced as intimate. 
If social media works as a glass bedroom, as Pearson asserts, then social 
media manifests what McLuhan called the “‘You are there’ immersion 
approach” even more strongly than the examples used by McLuhan, 
namely, television and the “new journalism.”
In McLuhan’s emphasis on new media communication systems as 
spaces of constant performance, we can detect his hopefulness that these 
systems will facilitate more civic participation and collective political ac-
tion. When McLuhan writes about his idea that both media users and 
media makers put on “masks,” he describes “the great increase of the 
sense of power on the part of both the maker and the user” (1974, 56). 
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In other words, when consumers put on media technologies as masks 
that afford new perceptions and experiences, they experience an expan-
sion of inputs, as they receive more information more frequently. When 
producers put on media audiences as masks that allow them to predict 
what to post or publish in order to affect those audiences most power-
fully, they experience an expansion of outputs, as they can craft their 
content and time its release in order to maximize its reach and influ-
ence. Social media participants, who rotate between the role of maker 
and user often, thus experience both types of expansion when they use 
digital social networks. Ideally, then, people become both well- informed 
and influential through their participation in social media and could use 
their heightened “power” on social networks to make impactful political 
interventions.
Here is another statement in which McLuhan phrases his optimism 
about new media and political participation in the language of perfor-
mance:
The mysterious thing about this kind of speed- up of information [fa-
cilitated by new communications technologies] is that the public be-
gins to participate directly in actions which it had previously heard 
about at a distance in place or time. At instant speeds the audience 
becomes actor, and the spectators become participants. . . . They seek 
to program events rather than to watch them. (57)
This is a technologically deterministic argument: McLuhan assumes that 
because people can communicate faster (“at instant speeds”) in the new 
global telecom systems than before, they will become actors and par-
ticipants instead of (merely) audience and spectators. He anticipates 
that this “public” will thus become active rather than passive and will 
“program events”— will make historical moments— rather than only 
“watch[ing] them.” The image one derives from McLuhan’s determin-
istic prediction is that of a stage overrun by theatergoers who are no 
longer content to quietly witness whatever is presented to them on a 
given evening but seize control of the theater, collectively devise a show, 
and enact it. Thus McLuhan imagines the rise of new media communica-
tions technologies (which now include social media platforms) as akin to 
the transformation of a traditional proscenium play into a Kaprow- esque 
happening. McLuhan foresees that the global telecommunications tech-
nologies rising in the 1960s and ’70s (which eventually yielded the pub-
lic internet in the 1990s) will lead to a more robust, more lively, more 
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inclusive form of democracy, and the easiest way for him to explain his 
prophecy is by describing a democratized style of performance- making.
Of course, there are many objections to McLuhan’s technological 
determinism. New media does not necessarily lead to new social move-
ments. If it seems that they do (as it did in the cases of #ArabSpring and 
#Occupy), we must keep in mind that it is users’ choices about how to 
use new platforms, not the platforms themselves, that bring such move-
ments about (Tufekci 2017a). Digital networks can, and do, facilitate con-
servative or reactionary movements as easily as they can facilitate reform-
ist or social justice movements. Search engine algorithms can reinforce 
racism (Noble 2018), and social media sites can be swarmed by “fake 
news and other forms of misinformation” (Tufekci 2017b, 266). There 
are many constraints on our digital actions in the form of protocols 
(Galloway 2004; Chun 2006)— that is, the way that digital technologies 
are programmed to operate, which do not offer users choices about how 
they wish to interact with those technologies but simply make certain 
moves necessary and preclude other moves entirely. When people do 
seek to use new media to push for large- scale social, political, economic, 
or cultural change, they can be subjected to large volumes of surveil-
lance, trolling, harassment, and threats from other network users (see 
my essay on #CancelColbert in this volume) or from government enti-
ties. Social media may allow users to access more information, but users 
are likely to access only information that reinforces their already existing 
beliefs, causing an “echo chamber” effect (Pierson 2014).
However, by framing global telecommunications— what we call digi-
tal media, which includes social media— as performance, McLuhan asks 
us to think of new media participation as “making, not faking” (Turner 
1982, 93); as collaborative production; as a set of tools, sites, and practic-
es for putting hidden realities, alternative worlds, and difficult problems 
before publics of whatever size, for however short a time, thereby calling 
upon that public to change. In other words, thinking of digital networks 
as constituting a “global theater” allows us to perceive those networks’ 
potential for working as theater works (whenever theater works). The 
new media of which McLuhan wrote was an early wave of the many tech-
nologies that constituted the information revolution that continues to-
day. For him, this revolution signaled a new age of virtual, networked 
performance that could change the world, because he believed that per-
formance can change the world. At the least, he believed that those who 
perform are changed by the act of performance, and he believed that 
emerging technologies would make more and more people into per-
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formers. It follows that he predicted or hoped that through the transfor-
mation of masses of receivers/consumers/audiences into actors, change 
can sweep the world. McLuhan’s thinking of new media as sites of perfor-
mance is crucial for understanding what he sees as new media’s possible 
impact on society and culture. Since, for McLuhan, the medium— not 
the content— is always the message, then, for McLuhan, the message of 
new media is global theater.
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Authorship, Interpellation, and the Black Femme  
Prowess of Black Twitter
malika imhotep
On June 21, 2014, Kayla Newman (@peaches_monroee), a seventeen- 
year- old Black woman from Chicago, posted an anecdotal video to her 
Vine account. Within five months, the video she posted that day gained 
over 20 million plays, 492,000 likes, and 411,000 re- vines.
This particular video captured Newman bragging about her immacu-
lately arched eyebrows. “We in dis bitch,” she says to the camera angled 
up from her lap toward her face. “Finna get crunk. Eyebrows on fleek! Da 
fuq.” In this moment of Black Femme bravada, Kayla Newman “gave the 
world a word” (St. Felix 2015). While Newman’s “on fleek” is not the first 
Black colloquial turn of phrase to find itself appropriated by “urban mar-
keting” campaigns or incorporated into Dictionary.com’s digital archive, 
it is one of the few whose origins can be definitively traced to a single 
individual and whose prevalence is indebted directly to its social media 
spread. I posit that the raced, classed, and gendered “senselessness” of 
“on fleek!” kept Newman’s authorial ties relatively intact despite such 
wide digital spread.
This essay situates Newman within a larger conversation that explores 
Black Twitter as a complicated ground for the politico- cultural salience 
of Black Femme aesthetic indulgence. I use “Black Femme” to evoke a 
combination of tropes from queer theory and Black feminist studies. 
By naming offline and online performances of Black women who may 
or may not identify themselves as queer “femme,” I assert, following 
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Hortense Spillers (1987), that there is an inherent queerness to (un)gen-
dered Black performance. This theorization of inherent queerness is not 
intended to eclipse or circumvent the particular orientation, narratives, 
and experiences of femme- identified Black queer and trans women. It is 
instead meant to destabilize projections made about what gender signi-
fies and can be made to signify by the performative processes of Black 
bodies. Spillers’ seminal assertion of “ungendering” as part of the pro-
cess through which the captive Black body becomes flesh is mainly con-
cerned with the impact of systemic violence on Black selfhood and socio-
political (im)mobility but offers itself as a “praxis and a theory, a text for 
living and dying and a method of reading both through their diverse me-
diations.”1 Through this praxis I assert that gender, as enfleshed by black-
ness, as performed by Black folks, is inevitably (a potentially liberatory) 
negotiation of deviance, of queerness. “Femininity” was not constructed 
in a vacuum. It is informed by the histories of raced and gendered vio-
lence that Spillers exhumes. Thus, Newman as @peaches_monroee, an 
amalgamation of Southern sweetness (or the name of Nina Simone’s bit-
ter daughter of slaves in “Four Women”) and classic Hollywood glamour 
(Norma Jeane Mortenson’s Marilyn Monroe), performs a disidentifica-
tion in both her act of online self- naming and in her assertion of femi-
nine aesthetic mastery.
Newman’s “on fleek!” resonates with hashtags such as #BlackGirlMagic 
(or #BlackGirlsAreMagic) (Thomas 2015) and #ClassicallyBeautiful 
(Stanley 2014) in signaling an emergent trend of Black women utilizing 
Twitter to publicly assert delight in their appearance, in the face of their 
pervasive marginalization by mainstream media and most of the beauty 
industry. For these women, Twitter serves as a venue for protest coded 
in celebration. I use the term aesthetic indulgence to describe these inten-
tionally overt performances of delight.
To theorize this genre of online performance, I engage with Steve 
Biko’s foundational theory on “black beauty” (1976) in concert with the 
more recent work of Shirley Tate (2009), which focuses explicitly on 
Black female aesthetics and stylization in the Black diaspora. My discus-
sion of “on fleek” as a distinctly Black contribution to language draws 
from the work of Geneva Smitherman on “black talk” (1977) alongside 
Paul Gilroy’s definition of the “profane black vernacular” (1993). To 
analytically support my claims, I turn to data from Google and Twitter 
as harvested through online digital analytics platforms.2 Resituating 
Newman’s “on fleek!” as exemplary of language’s function as an articu-



























break with standard English— I consider the prevalence of linguistic ap-
propriation as symptomatic of Black Twitter’s function as a microcosm 
of Black popular culture at large. In the conclusion, I theorize how the 
act of hashtagging allows for the real- time enactment of radical politics 
that utilize communal acknowledgment and celebration pitched inward 
while exposing the pervasive surveillance of (online) Black social space.
“We in dis bitch”: Validating Black Twitter
A turn of phrase with no clear linguistic or cultural forbearer,3 “on fleek!,” 
or #OnFleek (the popular hashtag that Newman’s invented idiom quick-
ly became), springs forth from the mind of its creator in a quotidian 
moment of personal media content sharing. Legitimized through rapid 
and wide social media spread, the term is rendered a trendy parlance 
upon its official induction in the Oxford English Dictionary just over a year 
after it is first captured.4 A Google Trends analysis of the terms “eyebrows 
on fleek” and “on fleek” (fig. 2.1) shows that by May 2015 “on fleek” had 
hit peak search popularity relative to the number of searches conducted 
globally between July 2014 and February 2016.
In a tweet posted in December 2015,5 Newman appends a screenshot 
of the Oxford English Dictionary (OED) entry for “fleek” with a score of 
celebratory emojis in commemoration of the year she made a word, 
thanking everyone who still uses it (fig. 2.2). The example sentences giv-
en in the OED entry— “OMG the music is on fleek”; “have you ever seen 
anything so fleek in your life?”— seem awkward and forced, attesting to 
the aural materiality of “fleek” that seems stifled by print. However, the 
content under “Origin” in the OED definition is my point of interest. It 
reads: “Apparently an arbitrary formation popularized in a 2014 video 
post on the social media service Vine by Kayla Newman.” This descrip-
tion points to the linguistic peculiarity of “fleek,” the way the exclama-
tory string of syllables has no direct aural resonance, rendering it outside 
of a normative, “standard English” historicization.
The phrase “apparent arbitrary formation” pulls into relief the lim-
its of the OED’s commonsense authority on language. Emerging from 
outside, or beyond, this “sense,” “fleek” elicits its own archive. The 
OED entry continues to foreground the importance of social media 
platforms designed to host communal interactions with content. The 
fact that Newman is named as the author of the term, as opposed to the 
dictionary giving attribution to the social media phenomena of a given 
time period or to a broad geographic region, illustrates plainly that 
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Black cultural products do not just materialize from an imagined vast-
ness, some broad unnamed Black populace, for popular and commer-
cial use. When distinctly Black cultural products enter the mainstream, 
often the Black author, and their authorial moment, gets effaced and 
erased, while the product (the word/phrase/idiom, the dance, the 
sartorial or musical style, etc.) appears to be un- authored and author- 
less. That the Oxford English Dictionary links Newman’s name to her cre-
ation, “fleek,” asserts that blackness is not merely a fecund well, endless 
and abstract in its opacity, that the bucket of mainstream culture can 
dip into again and again.
The persistence of Newman’s authorship demonstrates one of Black 
Twitter’s most generative contributions to popular cultural discourse. 
“Spread,” proposed by Henry Jenkins, Sam Ford, and Joshua Green 
(2013), is a concept that affords the consumer an active role in the dis-
semination of media (to replace the implied passivity of the earlier no-
tion that videos and memes “go viral” without any agency on the part of 
users). In this context, spread allows us to think about participatory cul-
ture as a means to understand online Black sociality. “Participatory cul-
ture” was initially coined by Jenkins (1992) as a means to distinguish the 
social interaction of fan communities from that of other groups of spec-
Figure 2.2. Tweet from 
Kayla Newman (@
peaches_monroee) on 
the addition of “on 





tators. I am interested in what it would mean to consider Black Twitter a 
fan community— not one rallied around a specific show or character, but 
one collectively invested in a wholesale appreciation of (the necessarily 
varied interpretations of) blackness. John Fiske defines “fandom” as “a 
common feature of popular culture in industrial societies,” in which ele-
ments of mass- mediated cultural products are modified through their 
engagements with a particular subset of the popular audience (1992, 
30). Fiske further asserts that fandom is typically associated with “cul-
tural forms the dominant value system denigrates” (30). If this asser-
tion holds, then its application to the distinctly urban Black millennial 
cultural nexus to which @peaches_monroee (Kayla Newman) belongs 
seems apt. In the same article, Fiske apologizes for not considering race 
at length as a principal axis of discrimination that impacts the distribu-
tion of culture, stating that he has simply “not found studies of non- 
white fandom” (32). While this may have been accurate for him in the 
early 1990s, at the onset of fan studies, it is certainly no longer the case 
(Wanzo 2015). Taking Black Twitter seriously as a site of fandom engaged 
in participatory practices of content sharing offers an explanation for 
the spread of “fleek” that speaks (or tags) against the trope of authorial 
erasure that has continually plagued Black cultural production.
As a part of the fandom of blackness, Newman is recognized as a 
valid, contributing member of the peer group afforded “the social pres-
tige and self- esteem that go with cultural capital” (Fiske 1992, 33). Within 
this paradigm, the act of recording and uploading a video of oneself in 
performative celebration of one’s eyebrows and plans for the evening 
becomes an act of community engagement invested less in the potential-
ity to birth language and more in that of recirculation. Here it is impor-
tant to gesture toward the particular function of Vine as a social media 
platform noted for its “distinctly younger— blacker and browner— user 
base” (Chow 2016). Twitter purchased Vine in 2012 and announced on 
October 27, 2016, that it would be shutting down the app. Social media 
response to this loss has focused on the displacement of amateur Black 
and brown comedic talent and performance art on the web. In contrast 
to mediums like YouTube, Vine offered a casual immediacy of dispersal 
and consumption. Ranging from Ferguson protest footage to the ador-
able Black ballerina who taught us how to “Do It For The Vine!,” the six- 
second video platform opened up a channel for social, cultural, and po-
litical recognition at the pace of a finger scroll. Interfaced with Twitter’s 
user base, Vine played a crucial role in the legibility of Black Twitter by 
allowing users to see (each other) and be seen (by broader audiences).
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The particular valuation of acknowledgment from one’s peer 
group— in this case, defined as the online community of intended 
distribution— subverts the dominant cultural system by prioritizing the 
time and engagement of Black youth without a predetermined capital-
ist aim. There is the urge, felt by me as I write, and expressed by various 
Black Twitter users and retrospectively articulated by Newman herself6 to 
demand remuneration citing the various products and marketing ploys 
her phrase has appeared in as exploitative commerce. On February 19, 
2017, Newman launched a crowdfunding campaign with a goal of one 
hundred thousand dollars toward “starting a website, getting this project 
on legal papers with a good team of lawyers, etc and making sure my 
dreams come true as far as this ‘Fleek’ thing.”7
But it is important to acknowledge that in recording the video, 
Newman is not selling anything; she does not express interest in any kind 
of monetary return. While the absorption of Black vernacular culture 
in the United States often unevenly appends material profit to socio-
cultural values; her online content is intended to circulate outside of a 
straightforward capitalist exchange within the shared field of communal 
enjoyment.
Even when conceptualized as a fandom, Black Twitter itself is a space 
of constant context collapse (Marwick and boyd 2010). Within the 
boundaries of this online community engaged in the making, remak-
ing, and distribution of media content marked as Black, there are vari-
ous genres indexed by the hashtag praxis of each individual user. As a 
Twitter user myself, I often marvel at the ways my account shifts genre. 
On any given day, there will be moments where my tweets align them-
selves with my academic interests and may be marked as an entry into 
#BlkGradChat. Later that same day, I may retweet commentary on the 
latest antics of the cast of VH1’s #Love&HipHopAtlanta between calls for 
action and solidarity concerning the issues of #BlackLivesMatter. The 
convergence of these contexts within the space of a single “timeline” is 
then compounded by the accounts of the 22 percent of Black internet 
users (40 percent of Black users ages eighteen to twenty- nine) that were 
recorded as Twitter users in a recent Pew Research Center report on 
African American tech usage (Smith 2014). As a microcosm of Twitter’s 
broader user demographics, Black Twitter functions as a site of context 
collapse that is itself collapsed into (and retweeted onto) various other 
contexts. By focusing on the various distinct and intersecting genres of 
discourse that materialize into Black Twitter, I center an understanding 
of “signification’s discursive constitution of Black identity” (Brock 2012, 
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533). Offering a “technocultural” exploration of Black Twitter’s key fea-
tures and utility, André Brock offers the evolution of the hashtag— from 
curational feature to expressive modifier— as what substantiated Black 
Twitter as a co- constituted social public (534).
These various genres of discourse, often aggregated by Twitter as 
“trending topics,” are just a few of the composite contexts woven into 
the mosaic of Black Twitter. In my view, Black Twitter’s most distinct com-
monalities are its investment in public representations of blackness, the 
enjoyment of reciprocal communication, and the cultural and political 
utilities of social media. In positing the argument that “on fleek” in its 
inception is representative of a moment of what I call Black Twitter’s 
“Black Femme prowess,” I argue that “fleek” is an utterance pitched to 
the assumed social interest and aural aesthetic pleasures of a specific 
subset of Black Twitter. It is a string of syllables meant to resonate with a 
Black audience who may have not heard it before but knows exactly how 
to use it.
I mobilize “fleek” as an expression of Black feminist bravery in 
political- cultural battle in order to open a conversation surrounding 
Black Twitter’s Black Femme prowess. Indeed, Black Twitter operates 
as both venue and occasion for Black Femme rebuttal to mainstream 
denigration. The creative genesis and subsequent commercial hailing 
of “fleek” pull it into the metanarrative surrounding performativity and 
Black language, while its digital materiality lays bare the raced and gen-
dered politics of participatory culture.
Tweetin’ and Testifyin’: Language as an Articulation of Identity
Returning briefly to the screenshot of the dictionary entry that accom-
panies Newman’s commemorative tweet, I want to think again of the 
awkwardness of the featured example sentences. Read alongside the 
rash of articles published by mainstream and corporate media outlets, 
they signify attempts to further inscribe the meaning of “fleek” outside 
the context of Black Twitter. The question “have you ever seen any-
thing so fleek in your life?” has probably never been asked. Not only 
is the sentence missing the prepositional accompaniment “on,” but it 
also lacks the foundational cultural moorings and linguistic structures 
of Ebonics or African American Vernacular English (AAVE) that would 
keep the phrase true to the language of its creator. The sentence reflects 
the forced assimilation of a distinct language system described by Dr. 
Geneva Smitherman as “an Africanized form of English reflecting Black 
Revised Pages
#OnFleek  47
America’s linguistic- cultural African heritage and the conditions of servi-
tude, oppression and life in America” (1977, 1). “On fleek” carries with it 
“Euro- American speech with an Afro- American meaning, nuance, tone 
and gesture” (1).
Notable for explicating the Africanist origins of contemporary Black 
language and speech patterns, Smitherman’s seminal sociolinguistic 
breakdown of what is now commonly referred to as AAVE, Talkin and 
Testifyin: The Language of Black America focuses on the overlapping di-
mensions of language and style. As much about how you say a phrase as 
what you are saying, AAVE is performative by design. A system of speech 
that can be plugged into by the informed speaker to convey effect and 
purpose, AAVE is interwoven within Black spaces of entertainment 
and community engagement. Recognizing “on fleek” within a Black 
linguistic lineage serves to connect the phrase to the larger project of 
Black identity making through language. This performative breaking of 
English conventions into its own lyrical sense can be thought of as an ar-
ticulation of “Afro- American poetics.” Of these distinct poetics, Houston 
Baker writes, “It has always been necessary for black people in America 
not only to comprehend the space of their identity- in- difference but also 
energetically to refigure this space by employing expressive counter- 
energy” (1988, 7). This reconfiguration of identity- in- difference through 
expressive culture speaks to the context of content sharing in which 
Newman participates.
Understanding language as a location of identity making in Black dia-
sporic communities allows us to engage Black Twitter as a mass- mediated 
site of Black sociality. In The Black Atlantic, Paul Gilroy writes of “the 
profane black vernacular” as
a means to think black sociality outside of patterns derived from ei-
ther family- or church- based forms of kinship and community. They 
build on the old patterns of talk about sex, sexuality, and gender- 
based antagonisms that Richard Wright identified as “the forms of 
things unknown.” This profane dialogue between black women and 
men operates by strict genre rules. It establishes the priority of the 
personal, intimate, and non- work rhythm of everyday living and uses 
that focus to institute a community or constituency of active listeners 
(1994, 203).
Here, Gilroy is writing specifically about the profane elements of Black 
music throughout the African diaspora, but the gender- coded profane 
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Black vernacular creation of community he describes correlates to the 
workings of Black Twitter. Black Twitter becomes the host to these “per-
sonal, intimate, non- work rhythms” that are taken up, responded to, and 
shared among a community of participants, or “active listeners.” Read-
ing Black Twitter as a site from which to think Black sociality outside of 
normative patterns locates “on fleek” as an instance of this profane Black 
dialogue, so personal and intimate that it resists a smooth extraction 
from the Black counter- public into the mainstream.
Pancakes on *fleek. (@IHOP, 21 Oct 2014)
Taco Bell on fleek. (@tacobell, 17 Oct 2014)
This translational barrier spurns an air of anxiety in mainstream 
white usage of “on fleek.” Around the end of 2014, several articles pro-
claimed to know “the real meaning” behind “on fleek” (Muenter 2014). 
These articles find their authors reaching into and through the cultural 
anomaly to offer their readers a definitive inscription of the inescapably 
popular term. The majority of the cultural commentators who pondered 
the definition of “fleek” cited its appearances in the Twitter marketing 
campaigns of corporate brands such as IHOP and Taco Bell. One writer 
considered “on fleek” as part of current “teen tech speak” (Pure Wow 
2015). A writer for the feminist blog Bustle described the phrase as a phe-
nomenon “no one really understands but keeps saying [it] anyway . . . 
‘fleek’ is not a word. And it doesn’t even really sound like a word,” writes 
the white woman who relates to her readers with references to Cara 
Delevingne and Kim Kardashian, “It just  .  .  . exists” (Muenter 2014). 
Framed by the writer’s own markedly narrow cultural competency, Kayla 
Newman is rendered a minuscule part of a confusing origin story. Even 
as the authors of these articles are forced to return to the original video 
as the only trusted point of reference from which to gauge the term’s 
definition, any mention of race or African American Vernacular English 
is left out.
As Stuart Hall points out in the essay “What Is This ‘Black’ in Black 
Popular Culture?,” popular culture— and, by millennial extension, 
Twitter culture— has “always contained within it, whether silenced or 
not, black American vernacular culture” (2009, 105). While Hall writes 
from a Black British perspective, the markedly global flow of engagement 
with and within Black popular culture paired with the diasporic reach 
of Twitter’s online community make his analysis germane to Newman’s 
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hailing. Newman performs language as a young Black woman typically 
read as “urban” or “ghetto,” but as her word takes flight outside of the 
Black Femme fan community, it takes on a kind of post- racial popular-
ity. Blackness propels “on fleek” into the mainstream while simultane-
ously preventing its legibility to that same public. Concerning the lingua 
franca of Black life, Toni Morrison states, in a 1981 interview with the New 
Republic, “The worst of all possible things that could happen would be to 
lose that language.” Echoing Smitherman’s sentiments and anticipating 
Gilroy’s, Morrison asserts that “there is a level of appreciation that might 
be available only to people who understand the context of the language. 
The analogy that occurs to me is jazz; it is open on the one hand and 
both complicated and inaccessible on the other” (1981). The online cir-
culation of Newman’s six- second video clip was the virtual “open hand,” 
the language particularity and Black Femme cultural engagement signi-
fied by #OnFleek, “complicated and inaccessible.” Black Twitter brings 
the participatory linguistic structures of Black language to digital relief 
as part of its function as a “strategic contestation” (Hall 2009, 109). 
Black Twitter, like Black popular culture, has “enabled the surfacing . . . 
of other forms of life, other traditions of representation” (109).
Serving Looks: Black Femme Aesthetics #OnFleek
The device that allows “on fleek” to transcend its aural particularity is 
the hashtag. Engaged textually, one does not need to know how to pro-
nounce or even how to use it in context. The phrase can be incorporated 
as part of a sentence (Outfit #onfleek!) or on its own in a stream of cap-
tions (#newoutfit #OnFleek). As a hashtag, #OnFleek’s textual function 
is explicitly tied to a celebration of what I read as Black Femme aesthetic 
mastery— one aspect of Black Femme prowess. Despite being abstract-
ed and divorced from its origins, in its various marketing applications, 
#OnFleek still resonates predominantly within the realm of “urban” 
Black femininity. Here I want to hearken back to my opening provoca-
tion that seeks to “queer” what is meant by Black femininity through the 
use of the appellation “Black Femme.” Black Femme aesthetics are a 
deliberate play in and against conventional ways of being and seeing the 
feminine. As Cathy Cohen wrote in 1997:
As we stand on the verge of watching those in power dismantle 
the welfare system through a process of demonizing the poor and 
young— primarily poor and young women of color, many of whom 
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have existed their entire lives outside the white, middle- class hetero-
sexual norm— we have to ask if these women do not fit into society’s 
categories of marginal, deviant and “queer.”
Thus I interpolate the methods of adornment and signifyin’ produced 
by @peaches_monroee and her worldwide contemporaries as outside of 
normative modes of gender performance. As excessive and indulgent 
displays of blackness and femininity, Black Femme aesthetics are cultur-
ally, politically, and economically disruptive.
Despite (and perhaps because of) this disruptive nature, Black 
Femme aesthetics can be said to have a commercial viability separate 
from that of the Black bodies that initially make them visible. Many white 
women, from pop starlets and socialites to masquerading former NAACP 
president Rachel Dolezal, barter their aesthetic proximity to blackness 
by way of hairstyles, spray tans, clothing choices, and surgical body 
modifications.8 But as explicated in Shirley Tate’s Black Beauty: Aesthetics, 
Stylization, Politics (2009), there is political value to the assertion of Black 
beauty for Black women and their respective communities throughout 
the African diaspora. Tate’s survey of Black women’s antiracist stylization 
across time and national boundaries emphasizes the political imperative 
for what she calls “black beauty citizenship” (151). For Tate, the idea of 
Black beauty citizenship is not invested in an essentialism or the idea of 
an authentic “Black look” or legal discourse that appeals to surveillance 
mechanisms of the nation- state, but in “what everyday stylization can tell 
us about black beauty inclusions/exclusions as we go about our daily 
lives using objects, rituals, technologies etc. to naturalize our ideological 
views and value systems about beauty” (151). By engaging an explicitly 
gendered and diasporic infrapolitics,9 Black Femme aesthetics become a 
means through which antiracist ideologies can be expressed and rallied 
behind. We see this on Twitter through cumulative public aggregation 
of given hashtags.
Two notable examples of hashtags serving an antiracist political agen-
da informed by Black Femme aesthetics are #ClassicallyBeautiful and 
#BlackGirl[sAre]Magic. Both tags gained peak popularity in 2014, con-
temporaneously with Newman’s #OnFleek. Attending to both a direct 
instance of marginalization and a more implicit trend in Black women’s 
(mis)representations in the media, the aforementioned hashtags enact 
Black beauty citizenship by encouraging femme- identified members of 
the Black Twitter- sphere to mark their content (most often selfies) in 
Revised Pages
#OnFleek  51
solidarity. #ClassicallyBeautiful was started in September 2014 by Black 
actor Anika Noni Rose (@AnikaNoniRose) following a New York Times 
article covering the debut of the Shonda Rhimes– produced show How 
to Get Away with Murder, which cast Viola Davis as its lead. In the article, 
writer Alessandra Stanley referred to screenwriter/producer Shonda 
Rhimes as “an angry black woman” and described Davis as “older, dark 
skinned and less classically beautiful than [Kerry] Washington [the star 
of another of Rhimes’s television series], or for that matter Halle Berry” 
(2014). With this comparison, Stanley cleaves Davis from her peers, cit-
ing Davis’s distance from the iconicity of white beauty standards. In re-
sponse to Stanley’s implication that some (thin, younger, lighter- skinned) 
Black women are legitimately beautiful while others are not, Rose issued 
a call for the enactment of Black beauty citizenship. Twitter became 
the site for Black female actors and fans alike to rebuff the racialized 
beauty standards implicit in Stanley’s description. Through the use of 
#ClassicallyBeautiful, Black women on Twitter demonstrated a collective 
appreciation of a range of Black Femme aesthetics. #ClassicallyBeautiful 
directly countered the dichotomy presented by Stanley and rejected 
narrow conceptualizations of acceptable and authentic Black beauty by 
becoming an unmoderated space for the digital appreciation of Black 
women’s varied looks, styles, skin tones, and ages.
#BlackGirlMagic is a hashtag of transformed functionality. Attributed 
to CaShawn Thompson (@thepbg), who began using the hashtag 
“#BlackGirlsAreMagic” in 2013 to highlight positive achievements of 
Black women, #BlackGirlMagic moves between associations with news 
clips showcasing Black women’s achievements to portraits and selfies and 
the space in between where Black women are photographed in highly 
stylized celebration of their accomplishments. Thompson says that she 
uses the word magic “because it’s something that people don’t always un-
derstand. . . . Sometimes our accomplishments might seem to come out 
of thin air, because a lot of times, the only people supporting us are other 
black women” (Thomas 2015). #BlackGirlMagic responds to a more gen-
eral sense of Black women’s displacement in mainstream media. Carving 
out a space within Black Twitter that focuses specifically on positive im-
ages of Black women, #BlackGirlMagic coalesces Black Femme aesthet-
ics as a politico- cultural project. Amid the prominence of other, more 
patent politically oriented hashtags (#BlackLivesMatter, #SayHerName, 
#BringBackOurGirls), #BlackGirlMagic is sometimes thought of as es-
capist. To evoke #BlackGirlMagic is to step outside the realm of Black 
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Twitter’s political current and into a space of aesthetic indulgence. What 
I wish to make plain is the political utility of that space of indulgence.
South African student leader Steve Biko coined the term “Black is 
beautiful” as part of the Black Consciousness movement in the mid- 
1970s. In 1974 Biko and other members of the South African Students 
Organization and the Black People’s Convention (SASO/BPC) were de-
tained under charges of terrorism as a result of their anti- apartheid activ-
ism. In court transcripts from the SASO/BPC trial the first week of May 
1976, Biko explains to defense lawyer advocate David Soggot:
When you say “black is beautiful” what in fact you are saying [to Black 
folks]: man, you are okay as you are, begin to look upon yourself as 
a human being; now in African life especially it also has certain con-
notations; it is the connotations on the way women prepare them-
selves for viewing by society, in other words the way they dream, the 
way they make up and so on, which tends to be a negation of their 
true state and in a sense a running away from their colour. . . . They 
sort of believe I think that their natural state which is a black state is 
not synonymous with beauty and beauty can only be approximated 
by them if the skin is made as light as possible. . . . So in a sense the 
term “black is beautiful” challenges exactly that belief which makes 
someone negate himself. (1978, 104)
Biko’s statement undergirds Tate’s findings that the everyday stylization 
practices of Black folks, specifically Black women, operate as an antira-
cist assertion of humanity. Stylization functions outside of the realm of 
the logocentric— the written word, the esteemed Western philosophical 
canon, the traditional archive— that has in many instances been predi-
cated on the literal and theoretical displacement of Black folks. As Hall 
writes, within “the black repertoire, style— which mainstream cultural 
critics often believe to be the mere husk, the wrapping, the sugar coat-
ing on the pill— has become itself the subject of what is going on” (2009, 
109). There is always style within Black political movements (Ford 2015; 
Gill 2015; Mercer 1987). One could argue that one of the most promi-
nent facets of Black struggle is its iconicity within the racially stratified 
representational economy of global media. Through the conventions of 
Black Twitter, #BlackGirlMagic and #ClassicallyBeautiful digitize Black 
stylistic engagements with politics by allowing quotidian expressions of 




In closing Black Beauty, Shirley Tate asks, “What would a black feminist 
anti- racist aesthetics for the 21st century look like?” (2009, 155).
As evidenced by “#OnFleek,” “#ClassicallyBeautiful,” and “#BlackGirl 
Magic,” the Black feminist antiracist aesthetic of the twenty- first century 
as articulated on Twitter is not one that promotes a set standard for Black 
women’s fashion or hairstyles. (Beauty, like culture, is a living, changing 
thing.) Rather, a political mechanism is at play in the tagging of varied 
articulations of Black beauty: an assertion that Black Femme presence is 
deserving of public space. Sometimes these and similar hashtags speak 
directly to a deficit, and other times they are used just for the sake of 
sharing publicly, of joining in the “personal, intimate, non- work rhythm” 
of belonging to a community of “active listeners,” and as such, they may 
seem apolitical. In six seconds of self- indulgence, @peaches_monroee 
gave the world a word, and the world, in turn, gave her a hashtag, an 
entry point to digital notoriety. Kayla Newman’s self- captured linguistic 
innovation operates much like the well of blackness and performative 
Black femininity from which it springs— puzzling, hard to pin down, yet 
lazily absorbed by mainstream consumer culture. But while the outside, 
the white mainstream, continues to launch attempts at decoding what 
it is the Black Femme knows, of awkwardly adopting and attempting to 
rename and recast Black Femme cultural ingenuity, the metalanguage of 
Black Twitter persists and proliferates to level its coded #clapback.
Notes
 1. Focusing specifically on the condition of the captive Black female body 
reduced to flesh as the seminal figure of contemporary Black women’s societal 
positionality, Spillers writes, “The African female subject, under these historic 
conditions, is not only the target of rape— in one sense, an interiorized violation 
of body and mind— but also the topic of specifically externalized acts of tor-
ture and prostration that we imagine as the peculiar province of male brutality 
and torture inflicted by other males. A female body strung from a tree limb, or 
bleeding from the breast on any given day of field work because the “overseer,” 
standing the length of a whip, has popped her flesh open, adds a lexical and liv-
ing dimension to the narratives of women in culture and society. This material-
ized scene of unprotected female flesh— of female flesh “ungendered”— offers 
a praxis and a theory, a text for living and for dying, and a method for reading 
both through their diverse mediations.” (Spillers 1987, 64– 68).
 2. Namely, GoogleTrends, Hashtagify.me, TWUBS.
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 3. UrbanDictionary.com, “a satirical crowdsourced online dictionary of slang 
and phrases that was founded in 1999 as a parody of Dictionary.com and Vocabulary.
com by white male Aaron Peckham,” reports some variants of “fleek” meaning 
“smooth” and “awesome” as early as 2003. UrbanDictionary can be taken as a 
tongue- in- cheek attempt to penetrate the Black in Black popular culture. While 
the website’s definitions are not limited to inscriptions of African American 
Vernacular English, I read the appellation of “urban” to signify blackness in a 
way that lends itself to the platform’s satirical aims. In order to posit the opposite 
of standard, Peckham employs “urban” as a way to utilize the slippage between 
urban as “of the city” and urban as “of Black origin.”
 4. Searchable on Dictionary.com and oxforddictionaries.com; profiled by 
Merriam- Webster as part of “Words We’re Watching” series. (Merriam- Webster 
2015). Accessed March 30, 2016, http://www.merriam-webster.com/words-at-
play/fleek-meaning-and-history.
 5. Search popularity for “on fleek” decreased by only 15 percent within the 
seven months after its peak popularity, illustrating the ways the digital shelf life of 
Newman’s idiom was extended by both the mainstream frenzy around its mean-
ing and the phrase’s broad utility among its intended urban audience.
 6. One and a half years after posting the initial video, Newman is quoted as 
saying, “I can’t explain the feeling. At the moment I haven’t gotten any endorse-
ments or received any payment. I feel that I should be compensated. But I also 
feel that good things happen to those who wait” (St. Felix 2015).
 7. As quoted from her gofundme campaign in a write up on pop cultural 
news site The Fader: http://www.thefader.com/2017/03/09/peaches- monroee- 
beauty- industry- interview.
 8. Examples include socialite Kylie Jenner’s temporary cornrows and lip fill-
ers and Australian rapper Iggy Azalea’s fake Southern affect and rumored butt 
implants.
 9. Defined by James C. Scott and employed by Robin D. G. Kelley as “‘the 
circumspect struggle waged daily by subordinate groups .  .  . like infrared rays, 
beyond the visible end of the spectrum. That it should be invisible . . . is in large 
part by design a tactical choice born of a prudent awareness of the balance of 
power’” (Kelley and Lipsitz 1996); (Scott 1977).
Works Cited
Biko, Steve. 1978. Testimony of Steve Biko. Edited by Arnold Millard. First Edition 
edition. London: Maurice Temple Smith Ltd, 1978.
Brock, André. 2012. “From the Blackhand Side: Twitter as a Cultural Conver-
sation.” Journal of Broadcasting and Electronic Media 56, no. 4: 529– 49. DOI: 
10.1080/08838151.2012.732147.
Cohen, Cathy. 1997. “Punks, Bulldaggers, and Welfare Queens: The Radical Po-
tential of Queer Politics?” GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies 3: 437– 65.
Chow, Kat. 2016. “A Moment of Silence for the Black and Brown Talent That 





Dictionary.com. 2016. “Fleek.” Accessed March 31. http://www.dictionary.com/
browse/fleek.
Don [pseud.]. 2016. “Eyebrows on Fleek.” Know Your Meme. Accessed March 31. 
http://knowyourmeme.com/memes/eyebrows-on-fleek.
Fiske, John. 1992. “The Cultural Economy of Fandom.” In The Adoring Audience: 
Fan Culture and Popular Media, edited by Lisa A. Lewis, 30– 48. London: Rout-
ledge.
Ford, Tanisha. 2015. Liberated Threads: Black Women, Style, and the Global Politics of 
Soul. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
Gill, Tiffany M. 2015. “#TeamNatural: Black Hair and the Politics of Community 
in Digital Media.” Nka Journal of Contemporary African Art 37, November 1: 70– 
79. DOI: 10.1215/10757163– 3339739.
Giorgis, Hannah. 2015. “Black Users on Vine: Celebrating Blackness 6 Seconds 
at a Time.” The Guardian. Accessed May 18, 2015. http://www.theguardian.
com/commentisfree/2015/may/17/black-users-on-vine-celebrating-black-
ness-6-seconds-at-a-time.
“Google Trends— Web Search Interest— Worldwide, 2004— Present.” 2016. 
Accessed March 31, 2016. http://www.google.com/trends/explore?hl=en-
U S # q = e y e b r o w s % 2 0 o n % 2 0 f l e e k % 2 C % 2 0 o n % 2 0 f l e e k % 2 C % 2 0
fleek&cmpt=q&tz=Etc%2FGMT%2B7.
Heigl, Alex. 2014. “Explaining Internet Slang: ‘On Fleek.’” People, December 15. 
Accessed April 1, 2016. http://www.people.com/article/on-fleek-slang-term-
internet-viral.
Kelley, Robin D. G. 1996. Race Rebels: Culture, Politics, and the Black Working Class. 
New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996.
Kutner, Max. 2015. “Meet the Chicago Teen behind ‘On- Fleek.’” Newsweek, March 
3. Accessed March 3, 2016. http://www.newsweek.com/2015/03/27/meet-
chicago-teen-behind-fleek-311031.html.
Layton, Robert, Paul Watters, and Richard Dazeley. 2010. “Authorship Attribu-
tion for Twitter in 140 Characters or Less.” Paper presented at the Second Cy-
bercrime and Trustworthy Computing Workshop (CTC), Ballarat, Australia, 
July 19– 20. Accessed February 29, 2016. DOI: 10.1109/CTC.2010.17.
LeClair, Thomas. 1981. “‘The Language Must Not Sweat.’” New Republic, March 
21. Accessed March 18, 2016. https://newrepublic.com/article/95923/the-
language-must-not-sweat.
Lenhart, Amanda. 2015. “Teens, Social Media, and Technology Overview 2015.” 
Pew Research Center: Internet and Technology, April 9. Accessed October 29, 
2016. http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/04/09/teens-social-media-technol-
ogy-2015.
Levitt, Heidi M., Elisabeth A. Gerrish, and Katherine R. Hiestand. 2003. “The 
Misunderstood Gender: A Model of Modern Femme Identity.” Sex Roles 48, 
no. 3– 4: 99– 113. DOI: 10.1023/a:1022453304384.
Manjoo, Farhad. 2010. “How Black People Use Twitter.” Slate, August 10. Ac-
cessed March 4, 2016. http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/technol-
ogy/2010/08/how_black_people_use_twitter.html.
Marwick, Alice E., and danah boyd. 2010. “I Tweet Honestly, I Tweet Passionately: 
56  #identity
Revised Pages
Twitter Users, Context Collapse, and the Imagined Audience.” New Media 
and Society 13, no. 1: 114– 33. DOI: 10.1177/1461444810365313.
Mercer, Kobena. 1987. “Black Hair/Style Politics.” new formations 3, no. 54.
Merriam- Webster. 2015. “Vocab on Fleek.” Accessed March 30, 2016. http://www.
merriam-webster.com/words-at-play/fleek-meaning-and-history.
Muenter, Olivia. 2014. “What Does ‘On- Fleek’ Mean? A Brief Timeline of the 
Phrase That No One Really Understands.” Bustle, December 29. Accessed 
April 1, 2016. http://www.bustle.com/articles/55940-what-does-on-fleek-
mean-a-brief-timeline-of-the-phrase-that-no-one-really-understands.
Oxford Dictionary. n.d. “Fleek.” Accessed March 31, 2016. http://www.oxforddic-
tionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/fleek.
Russell, Alex. 2014. “On Fleek: A Definitive History.” Complex, November 14. 
Accessed April 1, 2016. http://www.complex.com/music/2014/11/what-is-
fleek.
Scott, James C. 1977. The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in 
Southeast Asia. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Smith, Aaron. 2014. “African Americans and Technology Use.” Pew Research Cen-
ter: Internet and Technology, January 6. Accessed April 1, 2016. http://www.
pewinternet.org/2014/01/06/african-americans-and-technology-use.
Spillers, Hortense J. 1987. “Mama’s Baby, Papa’s Maybe: An American Grammar 
Book.” Diacritics 17, no. 2: 64. DOI: 10.2307/464747.
St. Felix, Doreen. 2015. “Black Teens Are Breaking the Internet and Seeing None 
of the Profit.” The Fader, December 3. Accessed February 24, 2016. http://
www.thefader.com/2015/12/03/on-fleek-peaches-monroee-meechie-viral-
vines.
Stanley, Alessandra. 2014. “Viola Davis Plays Shonda Rhimes’s Latest Tough Her-
oine.” New York Times: Television, September 21. Accessed October 6, 2014. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/21/arts/television/viola-davis-plays-
shonda-rhimess-latest-tough-heroine.html.
Stiefvater, Sarah. 2015. “Here’s What ‘on Fleek’ Means, Once and for All.” Pure 
Wow, August 13. Accessed April 1, 2016. http://www.purewow.com/tech/Her-
es-What-On-Fleek-Means-Once-and-for-All.
Tate, Shirley Anne. 2009. Black Beauty: Aesthetics, Stylization, Politics. Farnham, 
UK: Ashgate Publishing.
Thomas, Dexter. 2015. “Why Everyone’s Saying ‘Black Girls Are Magic.’” Los An-
geles Times, September 9. Accessed February 29, 2016. http://www.latimes.
com/nation/nationnow/la-na-nn-everyones-saying-black-girls-are-magic-
20150909-htmlstory.html.
Wanzo, Rebecca. 2015. “African American Acafandom and Other Strangers: New 
Genealogies of Fan Studies.” Transformative Works and Cultures, no. 20. Ac-
cessed November 16, 2016. DOI: 10.3983/twc.2015.0699.
Whitman, Neal. 2014. “Geeking out on ‘Fleek.’” Visual Thesaurus. April 25. Ac-




three | “You Ok Sis?”
Black Vernacular, Community Formation,  
and the Innate Tensions of the Hashtag
paige johnson
On June 7, 2014, I had an experience intervening in 
#streetharassment that sparked a global movement, 
#YouOkSis (@FeministaJones, June 9, 2015)
In July 2014 social worker, activist, and blogger Feminista Jones 
launched the hashtag #YouOkSis.1 The phrase itself refers to the mo-
ment when passersby witnessing street harassment of women might po-
tentially intervene by speaking to the victim and asking if she is “okay.” 
The inclusion of the “#” transforms the phrase into a hashtag, which 
allows it to serve as a rallying cry and gathering place for a larger move-
ment combating harassment arising on the street and across various 
web spaces. When the hashtag first launched, it spread quickly, accu-
mulating a trail of personal testimonies, strategies of support, and real- 
time interventions with regard to online harassment that were shared 
with thousands of internet users.
Feminista Jones says that she launched #YouOKSis in order to bring 
a number of voices to bear on the topic of street harassment and to 
generate and share possible solutions. In an interview with theGrio, 
Jones explains, “I define street harassment as any unwanted attention 
from strangers that makes a person feel uncomfortable.” The idea for 
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#YouOkSis was born when Jones intervened in a street harassment situa-
tion on behalf of a young mother pushing a stroller. Jones recalls, “She 
was probably 20 or 21, pushing a stroller with a newborn. I just went and 
asked her, ‘Are you okay, sis?’ and she said she was fine, and so I kept 
walking.” Jones notes that this was her first time intervening in such a 
way when seeing an incident of street harassment and says that no one 
has ever intervened on her behalf in that manner, though she comments 
in the interview that, on average, she experiences harassment on the 
street at least five times a day (Irwin 2014).
In 2014 the nonprofit Stop Street Harassment (SSH) published a 
commissioned national street harassment study conducted from 2012 
to 2014. Sixty- five percent of the approximately one thousand women 
surveyed and present in the focus groups of the study reported being 
harassed in the street by men. Fifty- five percent of participants reported 
being verbally harassed, and forty- one percent noted the addition of 
physical assault. Holly Kearl (2014), author of the study and founder of 
SSH, explains that “street harassment, as an academic subject, is in its 
infancy” and that “few comprehensive studies on the issue have been 
conducted.” Scholarship has shown that online and offline are far from 
distinct spheres and are, in fact, deeply imbricated and infinitely porous 
(Carey 2005; Hine 2005; Jones 1997).
In the light of such statistics, it is unsurprising that users collapse the 
boundary between the digital and “actual” worlds and take to Twitter 
to express their experiences with street harassment. Hashtags such as 
#StreetHarassment, #EndSH, #YesAllWomen, and #NotJustHello cata-
lyze a dialogue about persistent public victimization across the platform. 
#YouOkSis counts on and cultivates this imbrication not only to coalesce 
a networked community online but also to prompt interventions outside 
the platform as well. Kearl (2014) notes that what is known so far about 
street harassment is that there is no set profile of a harasser: the act of 
harassment isn’t statistically related to race, nor does it have a direct link 
to any economic class. As Kearl explains, “Street harassment does seem 
to cut across all economic spectrums, from the man on Wall Street to 
[men in] lower- income areas.”
Revisit my explanation for why there is a “sis” in 
#YouOkSis. It is specific to Black womanhood. Same 
idea. (@Feminista Jones, December 27, 2016)
As gestured to in the quote above, harassment directed toward 
femme- presenting persons is ubiquitous across the porous boundaries 
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of virtual and actual spheres. #YouOkSis bridges these dual spaces to 
address harassment in both. Although Kearl asserts that harassers are 
not statistically linked to specificities of socioeconomic class or race and 
instead cut across all spectrums, more often than not, in a US American 
context, white women become centered as the predominant victims of 
male- directed harassment. Across interviews, Jones clearly expresses why 
her focus is on Black women when she explains, “A lot of the conversa-
tions about street harassment in the mainstream media only show white 
women as the faces of victims. Rarely do you see Black women as the face 
of the victim” (Irwin 2014).
Journalist Terrell Jermaine Starr notes that “the online assaults against 
Black women are particularly harsh and seem coordinated,” especially in 
the case of high- profile accounts such as Jones’s, which currently has 
158,400 followers. For example, he notes some examples of the rhetoric 
aimed toward Black women, which include these tweets:
ain’t no one aggressively approaching these fat, ugly 
ass, bitter Black women in the streets. I’ve seen 
y’alls avis. Lying, b (@JusKeem, July 8, 2014)
another divisive HT to get a rise out of BM for the 
negro bed wenches social and political benefit please 
BM do not participate #YouOkSis (@1blackcrayon, July 8, 
2014)
It’s sad how far black feminist will stoop to prove 
their hatred for black men #YouOkSis (@KingQuawn, July 
9, 2014)
@Russian_Starr @tariqnasheed Really? Brothers are now 
cosigning this fake Street Harrasment Stuff?!!?  
(@bigkdc, June 19, 2014)
Within Feminista Jones’s own tweet, seen above, concerning the use of 
“sis” and her subsequent statements on the matter, one can discern a 
clear sense of authorial intent. The hashtag is meant to perform the spe-
cific function of intervention and highlight the often- devalued voices of 
Black women in the process. Jones hoped that #YouOkSis would inspire 
people of all genders to intervene in harassment situations— not only on 
the streets but online as well— by engaging with the victim of said harass-
ment. As Jones states, “If you just talk to the person who is the focus of 
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the harassment, you’re placing yourself in that moment and giving that 
person an out. It’s something that breaks up the situation and diverts 
attention from the victim.” Given the fact that the #YouOkSis campaign 
launched online, and the fact that Black women on Twitter receive a 
disproportionate volume of harassment compared to non- Black Twitter 
users, Jones explains that “#YouOkSis is absolutely for online situations 
too. Sometimes people will come into my mentions and start tweeting 
the people who are attacking me. People will re- tweet positive things or 
cute animal pictures, things like that” (Irwin 2014).
There has been much debate on and off of the Twitter platform 
about what it means to “author” a hashtag. These conversations are 
laden with implicit or explicit expressions of concern about whether a 
systematic erasure of the labor of Black women, who have originated 
many popular hashtags, is taking place on Twitter. April Reign, who 
started #OscarsSoWhite, and Feminista Jones, who launched #YouOKSis, 
for instance, have taken great pains to assert their authorship of these 
hashtags, and they call for widespread acknowledgment and attribution 
of their authorship outside of the “Twitter- sphere” in publications about 
these hashtags. While I recognize the value of Black women asserting 
their role as progenitors of well- known hashtags, it seems necessary to 
put pressure on the assertion of a single user’s ability to maintain author-
ity over a hashtag’s intent and narrative.
#YouOKSis falls into the broad category of activist or social justice tags, 
but unlike most tags in this category, it has been in daily use almost con-
tinuously since its introduction. In the subsequent years that #YouOKSis 
has remained active, the tag has spread throughout the Twitter platform, 
expanding beyond users who are directly engaged in Feminista Jones’s 
timeline. Although hashtags are sometimes understood by users as hav-
ing individual authors, to a large extent each user of a hashtag feels as 
if they, too, are the author of that hashtag— because they can use the 
hashtag however they want to. For example, in a twenty- four- hour time 
span in early January 2017, a search of the #YouOKSis hashtag yielded 
tweets that either recounted direct personal accounts with street harass-
ment or memorialized women and femmes lost to gender- based violence:
I was supposed to have lunch w/ a friend. She asked 
to reschedule b/c a man followed and tried to grab her 
last night. #YouOkSis (@GloriaMalone, January 5, 2017)
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Shout out to the chick and two dudes who #YouOKSis’d me 
tonight when a dude wouldn’t leave me alone downtown 
ATL tonight (@Dammit_Woman, January 5, 2017)
we’re not even 1 week into the new year and Mesha 
Caldwell has been murdered. Black trans women’s lives 
matter #youoksis (@oxcmoron, January 6, 2017).
More often than not, the hashtag is currently used as a type of metacom-
mentary or citational practice, flagging and archiving retweeted articles 
concerning violence against women:
“forcing sex on girl” [thinking face emoji] the 4 
letters you’re looking for is RAPE #youoksis  
(@GeauxBayouBabe, retweeting @NOLAnews: Man, 26 accused 
of forcing sex on girl, 13, at New Orleans motel, 
January 6, 2017)
#youoksis (@Trenai_, retweeting @Adamferrise: Cleveland 
man accused pouring gasoline in wife’s home, lighting 
it on fire @clevelanddotcom, January 6, 2017)
#youoksis (@SoualiganAmazon, retweeting  
@BlackInformant: Officials In India Are Blaming Women 
After a “Mass Molestation,”2 January 6, 2017)
Beyond the initial goals of sharing experiences of, and strategies for, in-
tervention and de- escalation of street harassment scenarios, these tweets 
demonstrate how uses of #YouOkSis have expanded since 2014. At pres-
ent the tag, often in combination with #SayHerName, serves as a mecha-
nism for signal- boosting information about missing women and girls, for 
documenting state violence against Black women, and for informally ar-
chiving the lives— and violent deaths— of murdered trans and cis Black 
femmes. As seen in recent tweets surrounding the disappearance and 
death of teen Kenneka Jenkins in Chicago:
STOP TREATING BLACK WOMEN AS DISPOSABLE OBJECTS 
#Black Lives Matter #SayHerName # YouOkSis (@scib0rg, 
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retweeting @BreeNewsome: #KennekaJenkins disappearance 
& difficulty in getting authorities to respond 
reflects pattern of disregard 4 safety of black women & 
girls. . . , September 11, 2017)
As demonstrated above, #YouOKSis is frequently coupled with other 
well- known hashtags such as #BlackLivesMatter, #WhyIStayed, #EndSH, 
and #MasculinitySoFragile.
The varied uses of #YouOkSis seen above and on Twitter can be un-
derstood through a framework proposed by Ganaele Langlois (2011) for 
discerning the meanings and cultural logics of digital environments. 
Langlois focuses on the conditions within which internet user expres-
sion is possible, analyzes the “regimes of the production and circula-
tion of meaning,” and acknowledges “the techno- cultural dimension of 
meaning as constituted by a range of heterogeneous representational 
and informational technologies, cultural practices and linguistic values.” 
(1) Langlois argues that these “representational and informational tech-
nologies” coalesce into “technocultural assemblages”: the networked 
connections, informatics flows, and affects that constitute online par-
ticipatory media platforms (10). If conceptualized as a “technocultural 
assemblage,” the very nature of the hashtag as a performative mode of 
doing gestures back to Deleuze and Guattari’s original concept of the 
“assemblage,” or that which “is a becoming rather than a being” (1987). 
Hashtags depend on the participation cultivated on media platforms in 
order to fulfill the full role of hashtag where their “potential or ‘mean-
ing’ becomes entirely dependent on which other bodies or machines it 
forms an assemblage with” (Malins 2004, 85). These networked connec-
tions, potentials, and subsequent meanings— in essence, what a hashtag 
will become— while potentially conceived with a fixed intent by a sin-
gular author, ultimately defies authorial control as it spreads across the 
platform.
This is especially clear when looking at the ways #YouOkSis has been 
taken up outside of the street harassment narrative. The scope and top-
ics of #YouOKSis have grown over the past few years to include not only 
expansions on Jones’s anti- harassment program but also jokes and in-
sults that seem to dismiss or undermine that program. For example:
y’all girls are too much. And when i say girls i mean 
you bitch ass men. #YouokSis? (@KynDough, January 5, 
2017)
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#YouOkSis (@Artistikk, retweeting @Princess_Hokage: 
When he say you can’t lick his gooch, December 31, 
2016)
#YouOkSis (@MafiosoRo, retweeting @ sfreynolds: Tall 
folks stay tall standing on hate- inch heels, don’t 
they?, December 31, 2016)
From the hashtag’s emergence in 2014 to March 2017, @topflightdj has 
used the hashtag for comedic effect across various tweets, including the 
results of college football bowl games:
Watching WNBA all Star game and all I can say is 
#youoksis? (@topflightdj, July 19, 2014)
#youoksis? RT@S_C/- : The iTunes Store wasn’t built in a 
day. It took Spotify 9 years to be successful . . .  
(@topflightdj, April 26, 2015)
#youoksis @OhioStateFB (@topflight[dj], December 31, 
2016)
@uscfootball #youoksis (@topflightdj, January 1, 2017)
Anybody ask that NYPD officer who got in trouble for 
tweeting “Black lives matter” #youoksis? (@topflightdj, 
March 30, 2017)
Pepe le Pew was violating that cat. Somebody needed 
to ask that cat #youoksis (@topflightdj, retweeting 
@LogicalHater: Cartoons definitely influence kids 
behavior. Pepe Le Pew had me walking up to girls on 
some gorilla pimp/harassment shit. As a KID. Not cool., 
March 2, 2017).
These strategies emerge as a part of the implicit nature of the 
hashtag. In 2015 the children’s dictionary writers at Oxford University 
Press (OUP) named “#,” or “hashtag,” the UK Children’s Word of the 
Year. It was found that children under thirteen years old are using the 
word creatively, as a form of emphasis or commenting in stories. The 
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OUP writers state in their Word of the Year announcement, “Children 
are not tweeting and using Twitter, but they are using the word ‘hashtag’ 
and the symbol ‘#’ for dramatic effect, a heightening of tension.” Above, 
we see how Twitter users can refashion a tag, ostensibly for social justice, 
to punctuate jokes or heighten dramatic effect around their commen-
tary. Linguistics professor Vyvyan Evans (2015) told the Guardian that the 
hashtag “has . . . moved across discourse genres: as a linguistic marker 
of emphasis it is evolving a new life, punctuating and so nuancing the 
meaning of language in written narratives.  .  .  . This raises interesting 
questions about the nature and role of digital communication for lan-
guage and human communication more generally.”
Such tweets work less to structure a singular, coherent content mes-
sage and more as the multiplicitous offshoots endemic to the hashtag 
itself— meaning that while one person may author a hashtag, it is all 
but impossible to say how that tag will move, grow, and change due to 
the desires of other users. Hashtags are essentially multiplicities char-
acterized by principles of connectivity and heterogeneity; they always 
have multiple entryways, ruptures, and lines of flight. Thinking with 
Langlois, I argue that hashtags, then, function as (technocultural) as-
semblages due to how they network people together across virtual and 
actual worlds. Tweets such as those cited above do not structure a sin-
gular, coherent content message. Despite our ability to trace hashtags 
such as #YouOkSis to a single origin point (in this case, Twitter user 
@FeministaJones), hashtags do not follow an unproblematic, hierarchi-
cal linearity. Instead hashtags are clusters (jokes, awareness campaigns, 
virulent trolling) that spawn further clusters. Because the hashtag multi-
plies infinitely— in that it can be taken up and used for almost any pur-
pose that aligns with the hashtag originator’s intent or greatly deviates 
from that intent— a dynamic tension with linearity serves as a funda-
mental for thinking through the innate nature of the hashtag. Framing 
hashtags as multiplicitous (technocultural) assemblages provides a way 
to think through the various strategies users implement to shape engage-
ment with hashtags they have authored or to cultivate certain parameters 
of use around hashtags on their own timelines.
Feminista Jones’s use of “Sis” serves as one such strategy. On Twitter, 
Feminista Jones has come to be recognized as a pillar of “Black Twitter.” 
Although the tag was started by Jones, a Black woman, I argue that 
#YouOKSis does not exist as a racialized hashtag or what Sanjay Sharma 
(2013) calls “blacktag.” Sharma explains that “blacktags” are hashtags 
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which zero- in and identify singular Black experiences and as a result 
help to constitute Black Twitter identities. For example, hashtags such 
as #DuragHistoryWeek, #BlackGirlMagic, #CosplayingWhileBlack, and 
#BlackExcellence all gain momentum and popularity through either 
pinpointing shared points of Black American experience gained through 
immersion in Black American culture or by cataloging the achievements 
of Black people. However, I seek to instead claim that no hashtag can be 
inherently racialized (or gendered, or queer, etc.). Users have a wealth 
of ways to convey racialized uses of a hashtag, as seen in the examples 
above. However, the power of the hashtag, where any point can be con-
nected to any other, lies precisely in its openness. Even as we talk about 
spaces such as Black Twitter and the wealth of connections and experi-
ences these identitarian commons on the platform provide, the hashtag 
itself as a device seems to constantly evade an identitarian foreclosure.
As Jones herself has written and tweeted, the hail of street harassment 
knows no singular geography, demographic, race, or age:
As I spoke, I looked into the audience and saw that 
nearly every woman there could relate to being street 
harassed, disrespected . . . smh (@FeministaJones, 
March 17, 2016)
We have to look out for each other. We have to make the 
effort to ask #YouOkSis? Let each other know we’re not 
alone (@FeministaJones, March 16, 2016)
Users, however, can and do invent and spread tactics for asserting spe-
cific positionalities on Twitter, such as those linked to race, gender, class, 
sexuality, or the intersections between them. Feminista Jones has noted 
in subsequent writings and interviews that the use of “Sis” as a tactic 
to cultivate space for Black women’s voices and stories within the wider 
street harassment and gendered violence narrative. Yet this explanation 
is not immediately apparent or intrinsic to the hashtag itself in the way 
of many blacktags. “Sis” itself can potentially be read as vernacular call to 
second- wave feminism’s use of “sisterhood” as a means of coalition build-
ing. However, as noted previously in Jones’s own tweets and interviews 
(two explicit strategies for attempting to capture authorial control), the 
use of “Sis” was intended to speak directly to Black women, and Black 
women heard its implicit call.
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#YouOkSis culture is so real. And it’s one of the many 
wonderful things about black women, and also being a 
black woman (@audria_lb, August 31, 2017)
The hashtag, then, straddles the Black Twitter line through Feminista 
Jones’s own cultural competence of “Sis” and its uses with US American 
Black vernacular. “Sis” then becomes a tactic of “signifyin’,” a genre of 
linguistic performance and long- standing practice within Black Ameri-
can oral traditions, “[serving] as an interactional framework that allows 
Black Twitter users to align themselves with Black oral traditions, to in-
dex Black cultural practices, to enact Black subjectivities, and to commu-
nicate shared knowledge and experiences” (Florini 2014,2). The recent 
proliferation of “Dem” and “Dey” constructions for Twitter TV- viewing 
parties gestures to the power of this vernacular hail. Hashtags such as 
#DemThrones for Game of Thrones, #DemDreadz for Penny Dreadful, 
#DatBot for Mr. Robot, and #DemClones for Orphan Black are of course 
open to all Twitter users, especially those seeking out communities in 
which to engage with popular television programming. Yet the vernacu-
lar call within these tags also offers space specifically to Black consum-
ers of this media, which becomes especially significant, given that such 
hashtags index programming not often associated with Black viewership 
within mainstream media.
#YouOKSis does not necessarily call out to a group of preconstituted 
users. Rather, it produces networked subjects, some of whom see the call 
of identity within the tag. It offers a way to perform blackness as identity 
and to answer the hail of “Sis,” to open a space for the often underre-
ported and over- harassed community of Black women while maintaining 
a space of participation for a wider array of women. Unlike tags such as 
#BlackLivesMatter or #NotYourAsianSidekick, #YouOKSis never explicit-
ly hailed a single racial demographic, or communities of color in general. 
However, responses to the hashtag (which remains in use today, more 
than two years after its debut) have been dominated by voices from the 
Black Twitter community. These responses have come from individuals 
across the gender spectrum and take place both on the Twitter platform 
and offline. Users such as Jones invent explicit and implicit strategies to 
articulate racial, sexual, gendered, and transnational identities and com-
munity boundaries on Twitter. Feminista Jones’s use of the Black vernacu-
lar “Sis” acts as one example of a category of implicit strategies that resist 
hashtagging’s own strategic non- identitarian affinity while simultaneously 
tapping into the medium’s desire for heterogeneous engagement.
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Notes
 1. This formatting reflects Feminista Jones’s initial composition. I have 
changed capitalization and composition of the hashtag to reflect the tweets of 
individual users when quoted.
 2. @blackinformant’s tweet is taken from the title of a Teen Vogue article that 
was published on January 5, 2017.
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four | #SandraBland’s Mystery
A Transmedia Story of Police Brutality
aaminah norris and nalya rodriguez
In May 2015, the African American Policy Forum (AAPF) launched the 
“Say Her Name” campaign to bring attention to police brutality inflicted 
upon Black women and girls and to call for racial justice for all Black 
lives. The campaign, which occurred both online and offline, involved 
the use of the hashtag #SayHerName in conjunction with multiple par-
ticipants retelling stories of Black women and girls who had fallen vic-
tim to police brutality. According to the AAPF’s policy brief, “Say Her 
Name: Resisting Police Brutality Against Black Women,” the campaign 
“sheds light on Black women’s experiences of police violence in order 
to support a gender- inclusive approach to racial justice that centers all 
Black lives equally” (AAPF 2015, 4). The campaign advanced the notion 
that racial justice for Black lives must be meted out in the form of radi-
cal changes to the policies and practices of the criminal justice system, 
which can be achieved with the support of mainstream audiences.
Two months after the Say Her Name campaign was launched, Sandra 
Bland, an activist in the Black Lives Matter movement, was found dead 
in her jail cell. Texas state troopers announced that Bland had commit-
ted suicide three days after being stopped and later arrested for failure 
to use her turn signal. This essay examines how users of the social me-
dia platforms Twitter and Facebook told a transmedia story of Sandra 
Bland’s death using the hashtags #SayHerName and #SandraBland. A 
transmedia story is one that is told “across multiple platforms, preferably 
allowing audience participation” (Pratten 2011, 2). This essay evidences 
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how users of two different social media platforms interacted to tell the 
story of #SandraBland as an exemplar for the #SayHerName campaign. 
Thus, we examine the affordances of transmedia storytelling for con-
verging activism on and offline.
Our interpretation of the transmedia storytelling that took place 
using #SandraBland draws on an interview of transmedia activist Lina 
Srivastava (Jenkins 2016), who said, “We have to recognize that agency 
and self- representation are crucial to social change[,] and people’s per-
spectives of their own situations matter.” Srivastava discussed the impor-
tance of communities telling their own stories in order to inspire and 
motivate activism for and by their constituents. Sandra Bland’s transme-
dia story was told by thousands of different users across social media 
platforms. This chapter investigates how a nonfictional tale of police 
brutality against a Black woman was constructed by thousands of people 
on digital networks with the purpose of engaging audiences in social 
change during their daily lives.
The AAPF’s intent in launching the Say Her Name campaign on 
Facebook and Twitter was to encourage users to “lift up the intrinsic 
value of all Black lives” (2015, 5) by telling the stories of Black female 
victims and memorializing them as individuals. This online collective re-
membrance follows a tradition in the African American community of 
speaking and honoring the names of ancestors (Cleage 2005). As a result 
of the Say Her Name campaign, thousands of storytellers continued to 
tell Sandra Bland’s story long after her death. Using the #SandraBland 
hashtag, a murder mystery without a clear villain was collaboratively au-
thored through distinct narratives that built upon and contradicted one 
another. In the attempt to create loyalty among users to demand justice for 
all Black lives, AAPF failed to realize that there would be user divergence 
(Bolin 2007). Göran Bolin describes user divergence, in the context of 
multifunctional technological appliances, as the varying ways people can 
use media and technology even though we all have equal access to the 
same services and functions (2007, 241). Applying user divergence to so-
cial media activism, we see how a hashtag can be commodified to further 
a message or to derail from the intended message of the hashtag’s cre-
ator. Our essay analyzes how some Twitter and Facebook user- storytellers 
characterized the message of the AAPF by holding police officers guilty of 
police brutality and as villains in Sandra Bland’s story. Other storytellers 
shifted the focus of Sandra Bland’s narrative to criminalize Black victims 
of police brutality and to hold them, in general, and Sandra Bland, in 
particular, responsible for the violence inflicted against themselves.
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We discovered that storytellers using #SandraBland could be catego-
rized as either “Messengers,” who repeated the AAPF narrative of un-
warranted police aggression toward African Americans, or “Derailers,” 
who emphasized the criminality and culpability of the Black victims of 
law enforcement officers. We found that most of the Twitter users we 
studied were “Messengers,” while many Facebook users functioned as 
“Derailers.”
As soon as the AAPF’s policy brief (2015) was released, it became a 
significant text for outlining how stories of police brutality against Black 
women should be told, asking users to post narratives that
• hold law enforcement meaningfully accountable for Black victims’ 
deaths;
• offer “exemplars of the systemic police brutality that is currently the 
focal point of mass protest and police reform efforts” (1);
• reveal how specific Black women and girls have been “profiled, 
beaten, sexually assaulted, and killed by law enforcement officials” 
(3); and
• reveal how these “experiences with police violence are distinct— 
uniquely informed by race, gender, gender identity, and sexual ori-
entation” (1– 2).
We found that Messengers related #SandraBland’s story following the 
blueprint set out by AAPF, because they elevated her as an exemplar of 
police profiling and violence and portrayed Texas state trooper Brian 
Encinia as responsible for Bland’s untimely death. In contrast, Derailers’ 
stories of #SandraBland were antithetical to AAPF’s blueprint, because 
they blamed Bland for her own death. Thus, the story of #SandraBland, 
as it was transmediated, was an unresolved narrative. Users of Twitter and 
Facebook revealed their own perceptions, histories, and beliefs in their 
varied iterations in the unfolding mystery of #SandraBland’s death.
Relevant Literature
Before we offer our analysis of how #SandraBland’s story was transmedi-
ated, we elaborate the theory of transmedia storytelling. We then review 
the scholarly literature on online activism that employs hashtags, with 
a focus on activism around issues of race and gender, so that we might 
explore ways that hashtags have been used to promote social change. 
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Lastly, we discuss how narratives change as a result of user divergence 
across media platforms.
To understand the concept of transmedia, we turn to the work of 
Henry Jenkins. Jenkins (2007) theorized that transmedia stories unfold 
across multiple media channels. He argued:
Most often, transmedia stories are based not on individual characters 
or specific plots but on complex [fictional] worlds, which can sus-
tain multiple interrelated characters and their stories. This process 
of world- building encourages an encyclopedic impulse in both read-
ers and writers. We are drawn to master what can be known about a 
world, which always expands beyond our grasp. This is a very different 
pleasure than we associate with the closure found in most classically 
constructed narratives, where we expect to leave the theater knowing 
everything that is required to make sense of a particular story.
Jenkins described reading and writing one transmedia story across dif-
fering platforms that unfold building “complex [fictional] worlds.” #Say-
HerName differs from Jenkins’s theorization in that it is a nonfictional, 
multifaceted, transmediated story told by a multitude of authors who de-
scribed instances of police brutality inflicted against Black women from 
different backgrounds and lived experiences.
Sandra Bland is one such woman whose transmediated story was 
both read and written by thousands of users from different perspectives 
whose versions of the story inform the larger #SayHerName narrative. 
Therefore, #SayHerName was not simply about #SandraBland. Rather, 
like many other transmedia stories, it was about a multitude of individu-
als. In the numerous #SandraBland posts on Twitter and Facebook, in-
cidents of police brutality were often interwoven with racial and gen-
der discrimination, making a complicated “world” that we, the readers 
and writers, must attempt to understand. The transmediated world of 
#SandraBland is composed of highly diverse elements: listings of the 
known facts surrounding Bland’s murder; opinions about police forces, 
Bland, and her family; conjectures as to who was ultimately responsible 
for her death; grief over the loss of life; suspicion of the motives and 
actions of both police and the victim; and affirmations of the resilience 
of activists protesting Bland’s slaying. Our examination of the case of 
Sandra Bland’s death illustrates how social media users attempt to “make 
sense” of the events of her death, and other incidents of police brutality 
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in the United States, by recounting those events from their individual 
perspectives. #SandraBland’s story forms just one section of a much 
larger narrative of Black women being victimized by police. We call this 
enveloping transmedia narrative the #SayHerName story.
Additionally, we are interested in how #SandraBland’s transmedia sto-
ry unfolds in accordance with hashtag activism. Other researchers have 
examined hashtag activism on social media platforms, especially Twitter. 
Yarimar Bonilla and Jonathan Rosa (2015) contend that social media 
platforms are a powerful means of contestation against police brutality. 
The authors point to platforms such as Twitter as “sites for collectively 
constructing counter narratives and reimagining group identities” (6). 
They argued that Twitter has temporal affordances by providing emer-
gent data on protests as they occur, aggregating activism, and allowing 
for activists to involve themselves in digital campaigns using hashtags 
including #Ferguson and #BlackLivesMatter.
We concur with those researchers who contend that social media plat-
forms including Facebook, Twitter, and Snapchat have been used as sites 
for the circulation of counternarratives to official narratives about bru-
tality inflicted by police on Black people (Clark 2016). At the same time, 
the question of the presumptive audience for such counternarratives is 
a pertinent one. André Brock argues that Black Twitter users engage in 
cultural discourse online, stating, “Black Twitter hashtag domination of 
the Trending Topics [has] allowed outsiders to view Black discourse that 
was (and still is) unconcerned with the mainstream gaze” (2012, 534). 
This chapter complicates the idea that Black Twitter is “unconcerned 
with the mainstream gaze,” because the goal of the Say Her Name cam-
paign is to demand racial justice and gender inclusivity, both of which 
require support from mainstream (non- Black as well as Black) citizenry, 
including Twitter users.
We examined the importance of both race and gender in hashtag 
activism on racial injustice and so build on the work of Susana Loza, 
who explains that hashtags like #SolidarityIsForWhiteWomen function 
as a response to “digital feminists” who “defend white feminism by put-
ting down women of color” (Loza 2014; under “Issue 5”). Loza discusses 
the ways that women of color (WOC) use social media to challenge and 
change mainstream American feminism by emphasizing the importance 
of intersectionality. Through the creation of hashtags specific to certain 
issues, a new narrative can be explored. Loza argues that women of all 
backgrounds are currently creating hashtags that highlight their inter-
sectional experiences to speak up about “trans issues (#GirlsLikeus), sex-
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ual exploitation of Black girls (#FastTailedGirls) and racial stereotypes 
(#NotYourAsianSidekick)” (2014; under “Issue 5”). The use of hashtags 
similar to those named above offer ways for users to create an intersec-
tional approach to feminism. #SayHerName is another example of how 
users engaged in intersectional dialogue about police brutality against 
Black women. Kimberlé Crenshaw (1989), a cofounder of AAPF, coined 
intersectionality theory in order to reframe the traditional views of expe-
riences based on race and gender, specifically how Black women’s mul-
tifaceted experiences are shaped when faced with discrimination. This 
chapter examines how the intersectional framework AAPF has set forth 
influences the online discourse about police brutality on Black women.
Kitsy Dixon (2014) continues Loza’s idea that hashtag feminism is 
redefining feminism. Dixon examined the online activity of women who 
identify as hashtag feminists and described ways they have reshaped the 
dialogue around internet activism. Dixon defines hashtag feminism as a 
space that gives voice to the “controversial” opinions of WOC on femi-
nism and everyday life (34– 40). Through hashtag feminism, WOC are 
able to bring awareness to their lived experiences of having intersec-
tional identities. Dixon explains that hashtag feminists use Twitter to 
start discussions around living in a patriarchal society and the varying 
intersections among women’s experiences, which are then developed 
through the use of Facebook, blogs, or subtweets.1
Dixon describes how WOC use Twitter and Facebook in complemen-
tary ways, engaging in different but related dialogues about feminism 
on the two platforms; WOC treated Twitter and Facebook as intercon-
nected aspects of a single social media network rather than as distinct 
networks. Similarly, we argue that the transmedia story about a WOC, 
Sandra Bland, is collaboratively and collectively generated on both of 
these platforms through the use of hashtags.
Bolin (2007) discusses the increasing nature of media convergence 
as a result of technological advances that make accessing different medi-
ums easier. Not only is terminal convergence of technological capabilities 
influencing how people use media, but, Bolin argues, social and institu-
tional structures also have a role in how technology is used. Digitization 
affects three key points in the consumption of media: production, dis-
tribution, and reception. Because of the variability in how people use 
media, this creates user divergence. User loyalty thus becomes the key to 
successful transmedia storytelling, because texts are promoted over vari-
ous platforms. In this chapter, we argue that the hashtags #SayHerName 
and #SandraBland used over both Twitter and Facebook are important 
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to the narrative construction of Sandra Bland’s death, by creating loyalty 
among some users, “Messengers.” We also saw the divergence of users, 
“Derailers,” who used the hashtags to divert the narrative example of 
ways police brutality affects African American women and, more specifi-
cally, the death of Sandra Bland.
Methods
This study employed digital ethnography and critical discourse analysis. 
Over the course of eight months, we collected data from Twitter and 
Facebook by downloading articles, videos, photographs, and memes that 
were posted using the hashtags #SandraBland and #SayHerName. We 
then identified the public profiles of both Twitter and Facebook users 
who posted or commented with these hashtags. We analyzed their pro-
files to uncover demographic data that was publicly available. We were 
unable to determine gender, race/ethnicity, or age from most of the 
profiles. However, other data, including occupation, area of residence, 
and number of friends or followers was collected. Some Facebook users 
had private accounts, which did not allow us to access any information 
about them. We were unable to ascertain with certainty users’ rationales 
behind their support or criticisms of Sandra Bland and the Say Her 
Name campaign. Rather, we relied on critical discourse analysis as a tool 
for understanding what the posts of users suggested and indexed. In 
Language and Power, Norman Fairclough writes, “Language is both a site 
of and a stake in . . . struggle, and those who exercise power through lan-
guage must constantly be involved in struggle with others to defend (or 
lose) their position” (2001, 29). As we closely analyze the posts of Twitter 
and Facebook users, we examine how storytellers use language in their 
struggle to transmediate #SandraBland’s story.
We identified four roles that were taken up by Twitter and Facebook 
storytellers. These are “Messengers,” “Derailers,” “Fragmenters,” and 
“Resolvers.” The four roles can easily be divided into two distinct cat-
egories. Messengers and Resolvers relayed #SandraBland following the 
blueprint provided by AAPF’s policy brief (2015), while the approach of 
Derailers and Fragmenters was antithetical to AAPF’s blueprint, offering 
differing versions of the narrative with different emphases and invest-
ments. Below is a more detailed definition of each role (also see tables 
4.1, 4.2, and 4.3 for examples):
• Messengers told #SandraBland’s story in a way that made her an ex-
emplar of police profiling of African American women. Messengers’ 
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posts made visible the unique ways in which Bland’s death occurred 
as a result of her race and gender. Therefore, Messengers’ posts fol-
lowed the guidelines set forth by AAPF. These individuals evinced 
their support for all Black lives, especially for Black women victims 
of police violence, by contributing to the narrative of #SandraBland.
• Derailers are users who did not feel compelled to follow the blue-
print of transmedia storytelling set forth by AAPF. Instead, they of-
fered alternative narratives about Bland’s death that criminalized 
her and other Black victims of police brutality. Derailers refused 
to identify police brutality as the cause of Bland’s death. They ex-
pressed a shared reluctance to assign blame to the police.
• Fragmenters’ ambivalent perspectives were reluctant to either de-
nounce police brutality or blame the police. For example, although 
they expressed empathy, they were less likely to post names of 
victims. Additionally, they, like the Derailers, held neither police 
officers nor the police force accountable for Bland’s murder. In 
many cases, Fragmenters qualified statements made by Derailers, 
expressed remorse over Bland’s death, but also characterized Bland 
and other Black victims of police as criminals. Thereby they contin-
ued to derail the message.
• Resolvers responded to the Derailers’ posts and attempted to reem-
phasize the initial message (in line with the AAPF’s goals). Resolvers 
offered summarizing statements that tended to be conclusive and 
to redirect the hashtags’ narrative back to their original intent.
The tables that follow provide examples of each of the four roles de-
scribed above. They include excerpts from data we collected from both 
Facebook and Twitter. We gleaned the data from articles posted by the 
Huffington Post, CNN, and Democracy Now about either #SayHerName or 
#SandraBland. We tracked public posts by individuals who follow the of-
ficial accounts of the aforementioned news organizations. All users have 
been provided pseudonyms. We analyzed engagement with the initial 
posts made by users who commented, liked, tweeted, or retweeted re-
sponses to the news articles posted.
Table 4.1 shows Facebook comments that were written in response to 
Lilly Workneh’s (2015) article “Say Her Name: Why We Should Declare 
That Black Women and Girls’ Lives Matter Too.” The original article— 
which discusses the importance of including the lives of Black women 
and girls as victims of police brutality— was seen by 6,600 users on 
Facebook and received 16 comments.
For example, Walter Reed, a sports editor with 4,000 Facebook 
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friends, took up the role of Messenger by reinforcing the AAPF’s per-
spective. He pointed out, “Black women’s deaths should never be ig-
nored or minimized.” Although Reed’s comment that “all lives matter” 
appeared to be off message, he qualified it by focusing attention on the 
importance of Black women’s victimization. He received 51 likes, index-
ing that his point of view was well received (Workneh 2015). While Reed 
affirmed the AAPF’s message, Gene Michaels, a project manager with 172 
friends, derailed the message of the Say Her Name campaign by applying 
the label “criminals” to the Black victims of police brutality referenced 
in Workneh’s article. Michaels contended that by treating criminals as 
heroes, supporters of Say Her Name set a poor example for their chil-
Table 4.1. “Say Her Name: Why We Should Declare That Black Women and 




Walter Reed, Sports 
Editor, 4K Friends
Yes all lives matter, and most certainly 
Black women’s deaths should never 





I still don’t understand why anyone 
would hold criminals up as heroes 
and have their children look up to 
them and idolize them. . . . isn’t that 
just asking for your children to com-
mit similar acts and results? What par-
ent teaches their children this is ok?
Derailer 23 Likes
Clark Pearson, 
Self- Employed, 118 
Friends
We teach our children to look up to 
criminals all the time. Like George 
Washington, and the other leaders of 
the Revolution. They were criminals, 
in the crown’s eyes. Like Harriet 
Tubman. Like Rosa Parks. Like the 
leaders of the French Resistance. 
Who is and is not a criminal largely 
depends, in a civil rights context, on 




at University, 251 
Friends
Anyone who thinks that everyone 
killed by the police is a criminal is liv-




at University, 251 
Friends
The deaths of Black women by the 
police certainly don’t get as much 
attention as the deaths of men. I sup-
port these protests 100%.
Resolver 15 Likes
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dren. Michaels’ response received 23 likes (Workneh 2015), which shows 
that approximately half the number of users who appreciated Reed’s 
perspective approved of Michaels’ point of view.
Additionally, Clark Pearson, with 118 friends, whose Facebook pro-
file stated that the individual was self- employed, took on the role of 
Fragmenter. Pearson argued, “We teach our children to look up to 
criminals all the time,” thereby reinforcing Michaels’ argument that 
the Black victims of police brutality were criminals (Workneh 2015). By 
providing examples of individuals who were historically viewed as crimi-
nals and who were also taken up as heroes, Pearson’s fragmented per-
spective continued to derail the conversation from the focus on Black 
women’s rights proposed by AAPF. As this user argued that criminality 
is heralded in society, Pearson further delegitimized Black female vic-
tims of police brutality. Christopher Anderson, a University of Georgia 
graduate, made two comments that attempted to resolve the conflict 
made by Pearson (a Derailer) and reinforced the narrative articulated 
by Reed (a Messenger). Anderson began by stating that it was “complete 
denial” to believe that all individuals killed by police were criminals. He 
seemed to shift the focus of the conversation back to the AAPF’s desired 
narrative by discounting Michael’s argument. Anderson’s statement re-
ceived 9 likes and did not receive support from readers who agreed with 
Michaels’ derailment. Anderson concluded his responses by reiterating 
the initial message of the AAPF and affirming this message by writing, 
“I support these protests 100%.” His final comment received 15 likes 
(Workneh 2015). Notably, Anderson’s comments received less likes than 
both Michaels’ and Pearson’s. The clear message that Black women and 
girls’ lives matter and how their stories should be told became derailed 
because they and all Black victims of police brutality were named crimi-
nals.
Another incident where individuals took up differing roles in trans-
mediating the #SandraBland story on Facebook occurred when CNN.
com published “Breaking News: No Indictments in Sandra Bland Case” 
(Ford and Payne 2015), announcing that there were no indictments 
against Officer Encinia. Table 4.2 shows comments made. The initial 
post received 4,100 likes, one love, 1,800 comments, and 4,000 shares.
In table 4.2 the storytellers took up three roles. Jessica James, a stu-
dent with a private Facebook account, served as a Messenger by express-
ing grief over the lives lost in police custody. This post received 570 likes 
and 158 replies. However, Richard Martinez, a high school graduate 
from Texas with 66 friends, made four points that derailed the narra-
Table 4.2. “Breaking News: No Indictments in Sandra Bland Case” Responses




This is just sad. Too many ppl are end-
ing up dead in police custody.





For everyone saying this was racism 
and the cops in Texas are all KKK, 
you do know Democrats started the 
KKK in Tennessee right? Just mak-
ing sure, god forbid a Black hangs 
themselves now, they can’t even get 
verbally and physically combative with 
police then commit suicide without an 
FBI investigation. Now that’s racism. 
Not to mention she had a history of 
suicide attempts. It’s called evidence. 
And it proved in this case she hung 
herself because the family that was so 
quick to get paid after she died didn’t 
care enough to bail her out when she 
begged them on the phone and it mat-
tered. She lost hope, she killed herself. 
Happens every day in jail. End of story. 





In other words, there was a grand jury. 
Grand juries rarely return indictments 
in these cases, against the police. A 
grand jury is what the state decides to 
go with when they don’t want the po-
lice to be indicted. So, the state took a 
side. The outcome was predetermined. 
They tend to know each other and yes, 
it’s somewhat corrupt. At that point, as 
soon as you hear “grand jury”, you’re 
free to give up hope. I have been 
watching these cases enter and leave 
the news for years now, and grand ju-
ries end this way 90% of the time. It’s a 
deliberate strategy.
Shame on anyone insulting this 
woman in her death. If there’s a hell, 
you’re going there.
The list of the people this is surprising 
to: Absolutely no one.
Fragmenter 46 Likes
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tive. First, the user argues that racism didn’t start in Texas, a claim that 
sought to shift the blame away from the Texas police officers accused of 
unjustly killing Bland. Second, Martinez blames victims of police brutal-
ity and their supporters for overreacting to the news about the Bland 
case by stating, “god forbid a Black hangs himself now, they can’t even 
get verbally and physically combative with police then commit suicide 
without an FBI investigation. Now that’s racism.” Thereby, Martinez con-
tends that investigations of police brutality constitute “racism.” Third, 
Martinez blames Bland for landing in police custody by accusing her 
of mental instability. Fourth, this user blames Bland’s family, “who were 
so quick to get paid” after failing to bail Bland out of jail before she 
attempted suicide. Here, “getting paid” refers to the fact that Bland’s 
family filed a lawsuit against the police unit involved with Bland’s death. 
Martinez characterizes Bland, and all Black victims of police brutality, 
as being combative and racist and characterizes Bland’s family as being 
selfish for caring less about her well- being than their own. As a Derailer, 
Martinez shifts the narrative and offers up alternatives to the AAPF 
story of #SandraBland, pointing to “evidence” that “she killed herself.” 
Martinez expressed pride at the derailment, as the final line of the post 
states, “Sorry it don’t fit the narrative.” Martinez makes clear that the 
goal was to shift the narrative of the #SandraBland story. Ramirez’s re-
sponse received 466 likes.
Adam Milton, a Facebook user with a private account, demonstrates 
empathy for Sandra Bland while at the same time qualifying the notion 
that the police are at fault. Instead, this user suggests, grand juries were 
to blame. This storyteller argues that a “somewhat corrupt” criminal jus-
tice system was responsible for selecting a grand jury when “they don’t 
want the police to be indicted.” Milton even points out that “90% of 
the time” grand juries fail to indict police officers. Since Milton quali-
fied the statements with “somewhat” and “90%,” this individual is not a 
Messenger. Also as a storyteller, Milton neglects to state Sandra Bland’s 
name in closing remarks; Milton refers to Bland as “this woman” while 
criticizing the Derailers who have insulted her. By using the anonymizing 
phrase “this woman,” Milton places distance between his narration and 
Bland herself. Milton points out that it was unsurprising that no indict-
ments were brought forward. As a Fragmenter, Milton is able to find 
fault with the system and the Derailers but does not further the AAPF 
narrative.
We found that, unlike users on Facebook, the majority of storytell-
ers on Twitter were Messengers. Every tweet that we collected in the 
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#SayHerName and #SandraBland tags either summarized or affirmed 
the AAPF narrative by assigning guilt to the police and expressing satis-
faction that Sandra Bland was in some way vindicated by Encinia’s indict-
ment. For example, Clark Thomas, a reporter with 1,578 followers on 
Twitter, tweeted a summary of the Democracy Now article. Thomas’ tweet 
garnered 101 retweets and 81 likes. Sara Daze, an aspiring stylist with 449 
followers, tweeted, “#SandraBland and her family received some justice 
today.” Daze invoked Sandra Bland’s name by using the hashtag and ex-
pressed support for Bland’s family in this tweet. The post was retweeted 
53 times and received 87 likes. Kevin Short, senior writer for the New York 
Daily News who has 238,000 followers, also affirmed the narrative by of-
fering support of #SandraBland with a tweet, which stated that Encinia’s 
indictment is “Not good enough [as a form of justice for Sandra Bland’s 
slaying], but progress.” Short garnered 1,000 retweets and likes. As 
Messengers, Twitter users expressed clear support of Bland and blamed 
the police in the #SayHerName and #SandraBland tags. Their tweets 
repeatedly pointed out that the indictment for perjury was not what 
Encinia deserved and argued that he should have received harsher pun-
ishment for his mistreatment of Bland.
Conclusion
Multiple Facebook and Twitter social media users narrated 
#SandraBland’s transmedia story. As storytellers they took on the roles 
that we call Messengers, Derailers, Fragmenters, and Resolvers. Twitter 
Table 4.3. Twitter Responses to Brian Encina’s Indictment
Participant Tweets Role Response
Clark Thomas, 1578 
Followers. Reporter, Texas 
transplant, native Virginian, 
husband, father of a busy 
one year old
“indictment issued for the 
reason he gave for pull-
ing Bland outside of her 
vehicle.” special prosecutor 
#SandraBland
Messenger 101 retweets 
and 81 likes
Sara Daze, 449 Followers. 
Future stylist. Beautiful, 
Valued, Loved.
I’m pleased that 
#SandraBland and her fam-
ily received some justice 
today.
Messenger 53 retweets 
and 87 likes
Kevin Short, 238K follow-
ers. Senior Justice Writer, 
Husband; Father of 5; 
Writing a book;
The officer who arrested 
#SandraBland was indicted 
on perjury charges. Not 
good enough, but progress.
Messenger 1K retweets 
and likes
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was used primarily by Messengers as a space for their affirmations, ex-
pressions of grief, retellings of #SandraBland’s story, and support for 
Bland’s family. Derailers on Facebook were more apt to shift the focus of 
the narrative of #SandraBland, by characterizing Black victims of police 
violence as “criminals” and calling protesters of police brutality “racist.” 
In Jenkins’s (2016) interview with Lina Srivastava, she contended that 
the problem with nonfictional transmedia stories was “the ability to let 
go of control, and hand back the narrative over to communities.” We 
found Srivastava’s comments useful, as they provided a framework for 
researching a nonfictional transmediated story. Further, we found the 
notion of community among Facebook and Twitter users to be compli-
cated, because as storytellers garnered support for their framing and re-
framing of the #SandraBland story, their community of supporters grew. 
For example, Martinez had 66 friends on Facebook; however, nearly 500 
people liked his version of #SandraBland’s story. The goal of the Say 
Her Name campaign was to shift consciousness broadly in mainstream 
audiences and to build a community of supporters who were aware of 
the continuing need for racial justice. Unfortunately, as a result of user 
divergence and the inability to garner enough loyalty among the general 
population, it appears that the consciousness of the mainstream is slow 
to shift, as some social media users demonstrated a strong commitment 
to reinforcing anti- Black narratives and perspectives. Moving from real 
life to the internet to tell a story offers an alternate way to engage in so-
cial activism and allows stories to reach a larger audience, regardless of 
divergence. Perhaps as Sandra Bland’s story continues to be transmediat-
ed along with the larger #SayHerName narrative, Black women and girls 
like Sandra Bland will be held as exemplars who help us “make sense” of 
police brutality and the complicated “worlds”— both the real world and 
the world created in and through media— in which such violence all too 
frequently takes place.
Note
 1. Subtweets are responses to an original tweet that engage in dialogue/cri-
tique with the original poster.
Works Cited
African American Policy Forum. 2015. “Say Her Name: Resisting Police Brutal-






Bolin, Göran. 2007. “Media Technologies, Transmedia Storytelling, and Com-
modification.” In Ambivalence towards Convergence: Digitalization and Media 
Change, edited by Tanja Storsul and Dagny Stuedahl, 237– 48. Göteborg: Nor-
dicom.
Bonilla, Yarimar, and Jonathan Rosa. 2015. “Ferguson: Digital Protest, Hashtag 
Ethnography, and the Racial Politics of Social Media in the United States.” 
American Ethnologist 42: 4– 17. DOI: 10.1111/amnet12112.
Brock, André. 2012. “From the Black Hand Side: Twitter as Cultural Conver-
sation.” Journal of Broadcasting and Electronic Media 56, no. 4: 529– 49. DOI: 
10.180/08838151.2012.732147
Cartensen, Tanja. 2009. “Gender Trouble in Web 2.0: Gender Relations in Social 
Network Sites, Wikis, and Weblogs.” International Journal of Gender, Science, and 
Technology 1, no. 1: 106– 27.
Chen, Gina M. 2015. “Why Do Women Bloggers Use Social Media? Recreation 
and Information Motivations Outweigh Engagement Motivations.” new media 
and society 1, no. 1: 24– 40. DOI: 10.1177/1461444813504269.
Cleage, Pearl. 2005. We Speak Their Names. New York: Random House.
Crenshaw, Kimberlé. 1989. “Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: 
A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory, 
and Antiracist Politics.” University of Chicago Legal Forum 1989: 139– 67.
Cunha, Evandro, Gabriel Magno, Virgilio Almeida, Marcos André Gonçalves, 
and Fabricio Benevenuto. 2012. “A Gender Based Study of Tagging Behavior 
in Twitter.” In Proceedings of the 23rd ACM Conference on Hypertext and Social 
Media, 323– 24. DOI: 10.1145/2309996.2310055.
Cunha, Evandro, Gabriel Magno, Marcos André Gonçalves, César Cambraia, and 
Virgilio Almeida. 2014. “He Votes or She Votes? Female and Male Discursive 
Strategies in Twitter Political Hashtags.” PloS one 9, no. 1: e87041.
Democracy Now. 2016. “Texas: Trooper Brian Encinia Indicted on Perjury Charg-
es.” Democracy Now, January 7. Accessed April 28, 2017. https://www.democra-
cynow.org/2016/1/7/headlines/texas_trooper_brian_encinia_indicted_on_
perjury_charges.
Dixon, Kitsy. 2014. “Feminist Online Identity: Analyzing the Presence of Hashtag 
Feminism.” Journal of Arts and Humanities 3: 34– 40. DOI: 10.18533/journal.
v3i7.509.
Fairclough, Norman. 2001. “Discourse as Social Practice.” In Language and Power. 
London: Longman. 114– 35.
Ford, Dana, and Ed Payne. 2015. “Grand Jury Decides against Indictments in 
Sandra Bland’s Death.” CNN.com, December 23. Accessed April 28, 2017. 
http://cnn.it/1S6Kqyf.
Jenkins, Henry. 2006. Convergence Culture. New York: New York University Press.
Jenkins, Henry. 2007. “Transmedia Storytelling 101.” Confessions of an AcaFan, 
March 22. Accessed April 28, 2017. http://henryjenkins.org/2007/03/trans-
media_storytelling_101.html.
Jenkins, Henry. 2016. “Telling Stories: Lina Srivastava Talks about Trans media 
Revised Pages
#SandraBland’s Mystery  83
Activism.” Confessions of an AcaFan, January 26. Accessed April 28, 2017. 
http://henryjenkins.org/2016/01/telling- stories- lina- srivastava- talks- about- 
transmedia- activism- part- three.html.
Loza, Susana. 2014. “Hashtag Feminism, #SolidarityIsForWhiteWomen, and the 
Other #FemFuture.” Ada: A Journal of Gender, New Media, and Technology 5: 
n.p. DOI: 10.7264/N337770V.
Pratten, Robert. 2011. Getting Started with Transmedia Storytelling: A Practical Guide 
for Beginners. CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform.
Schofield Clark, Lynn. 2016. “Participants on the Margins: #BlackLivesMatter 
and the Role That Shared Artifacts of Engagement Played among Minori-
tized Political Newcomers on Snapchat, Facebook, and Twitter.” International 
Journal of Communication 10: 235– 53.
Smith, Bryan. 2015. “An American Tragedy.” Chicago Magazine, December 14. 
Accessed April 28, 2017. http://www.chicagomag.com/Chicago- Magazine/
January- 2016/Sandra- Bland.
Workneh, Lilly. 2005. “#SayHerName: Why We Should Declare That Black Wom-





five |  Creating and Imagining Black Futures 
through Afrofuturism
grace gipson
The African diaspora has historically been deeply invested in the future, 
from Sun Ra’s use of Egyptian iconography to imagine leaving Oakland, 
California, for a future destination in Saturn; to musical artists like 
Parliament and Outkast taking us on the “mothership” experience; to 
writers and scholars Octavia Butler, Nalo Hopkinson, Walidah Imarisha, 
and Kodwo Eshun creating academic bridges from Africa to America 
to space. Many of the conversations among key figures in Afrofuturism 
have taken place in real time on the digital spaces of social media. Over 
the past five years, social media has fueled a palpable hunger and desire 
among African diasporic internet users to know more about Afrofuturism 
as a lens to better understand our lives and possibilities beyond our pres-
ent circumstances. Twitter, in particular, introduces a space for contem-
porary digital commentary to create Afrofuturistic archival platforms 
and mechanisms for studying objects or for developing new spaces and 
communities of learning.
Afrofuturist writer and artist Ytasha Womack states, “Afrofuturism is 
an intersection of imagination, technology, the future, and liberation” 
(Womack 9). The intersection that Womack describes is not solely the 
domain of artists, musicians, authors, and scholars; in the 2010s, with dig-
ital technologies, numerous people are identifying as Afrofuturists and 
are using Afrofuturist ideas and concepts to educate, share stories, fight 
oppression, and help build communities in need. While some may argue 
that Afrofuturism is a narrow field or genre, social media networks such 
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as Twitter are engaging with Afrofuturism and widening its scope. Twitter 
offers millions of users many opportunities to learn and engage with 
Afrofuturism from several perspectives, and on the platform users can 
encounter Afrofuturism numerous times within a span of minutes. This 
essay argues that academics, artists, and social activists are using Twitter 
to raise awareness about, and expand the horizons of, Afrofuturism. 
Thus, through this essay I suggest the following modes of analysis: (1) 
the idea of flame keeping— through the preservation, continuation, and 
reclamation of African diasporic knowledge; (2) through exploring 
the relationship between Afrofuturist arts and scholarship1; and (3) 
through broadening the geographical boundaries of the Afrofuturism 
movement— to accomplish a creative engagement with the various entry 
points of Afrofuturism and Twitter as a social media platform.
This essay uses tweets as its primary object of analysis. For Afrofuturist 
practitioners, theorists, and teachers, Twitter serves more than entertain-
ment and social purposes; it also facilitates community organization and 
the education of others. Afrofuturists use Twitter as a time machine to 
bring the past into the present and to hail possible future scholars who 
will ensure the future of Afrofuturism. An uncanny and positive tempo-
rality and spatiality operates in these tweets, which, for example, puts 
nineteenth- century African American writers (such as Sojourner Truth 
and W.E.B. Du Bois) and scholars at the University of Massachusetts 
Amherst in conversation with Black college- age millennials in Nigeria. 
Thus, Afrofuturism on Twitter is digitally omnipresent and is not con-
fined to a specific location or time. Additionally, many tweets using the 
#Afrofuturism tag explicitly seek to open up new conversations and proj-
ects that can take place in real- world sites such as classrooms, local com-
munity centers, or one’s private reading space. I argue that every tweet 
that uses the hashtag #Afrofuturism in a meaningful way should be con-
sidered a new addition to the body of Afrofuturist scholarship. After ana-
lyzing a number of #Afrotuturism tweets, I will explain how Afrofuturism 
serves as a form of digital blackness,2 a method of rethinking blackness 
in the age of digital technology.
“Flame Keeping”: Preservation and Continuation of  
Afrofuturist Knowledge
Afrofuturism has always been concerned with creatively telling the histo-
ries of those from the African diaspora while also designing new narra-
tives. Both novices and longtime participants in Afrofuturism also seek to 
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reclaim and preserve the genre’s existing texts and voices. I use the term 
“flame keeping” to describe these acts of preserving the existing cultural 
productions and body of knowledge of Afrofuturism and building upon 
Afrofuturism’s established foundations. The following case illustrates 
how one scholar used Twitter to perform flame keeping.
The tweet from @MelanieCoMcCoy (fig. 5.1) is an introduction to 
and “starter kit” for newcomers to the field of Afrofuturism. The photo 
that McCoy has posted shows two piles of Afrofuturist books. Several 
genres are represented: novels, autobiographies, edited collections, 
scholarly monographs, and comic books. Ytasha Womack’s landmark 
book Afrofuturism: The World of Black Sci- Fi and Fantasy Culture lies atop 
Deborah E. Whaley’s Black Women in Sequence: Re- Inking Comics, Graphic 
Novels, and Anime and beneath Greg Tate’s 1992 essay collection, Flyboy in 
the Buttermilk: Essays on Contemporary America. The majority of the books 
are authored by Black science fiction writer Octavia E. Butler. McCoy 
also includes less canonically Afrofuturist texts, such as Sojourner Truth’s 
1850 The Narrative of Sojourner Truth, and through this inclusion, McCoy 
expands the boundaries of Afrofuturism, indicating that historical Black 
texts can be read as documents of how thinkers from different eras envi-
sioned Black futures.
These texts are aimed at different demographics and employ diverse 
methods of and approaches to Afrofuturism. McCoy’s tweet is important 
because it shows that Afrofuturism is not limited to one type of reader or 
media user and is not defined by one methodology. McCoy’s proposed 
texts could easily be used as the basis for a syllabus of a college course 
on Afrofuturism; they could also just as easily be used by a nonacademic 
reader who simply wishes to begin learning, or to know more, about 
Afrofuturism. Additionally, the people who take up McCoy’s invitation to 
Figure 5.1. An introduc-
tion/starter kit of texts 
for newcomers to the 
field of Afrofuturism.
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read these texts will be able to create an array of interpretations and defi-
nitions of what Afrofuturism means. McCoy’s set of books casts a wide net 
that encourages users to understand how they might fit into Afrofuturism: 
perhaps they will become students or theorists of Afrofuturism as a schol-
arly field; perhaps they will become fans of Afrofuturism as a popular 
subculture; perhaps they will become Afrofuturist artists, or novelists, 
or nonfiction writers, or comic book illustrators and envision their 
own works appearing on a shelf of Afrofuturist texts one day. An ad-
ditional reason McCoy’s tweet is important is because it demonstrates 
how Afrofuturism incorporates numerous academic disciplines. While 
her list could potentially be taken up as a “canon,” McCoy’s diversity 
of texts reflects Afrofuturism’s resistance to canonicity. This resistance 
can be viewed through the amalgamation of different genres and dis-
ciplines versus one central theme under one discipline to define what 
Afrofuturism is. However, the image in figure 5.1 also potentially dem-
onstrates Octavia Butler’s work as primary texts of Afrofuturism and the 
readings on the right as secondary. Nevertheless, this formula could be 
contested due to placing a certain hierarchy on Butler’s body of work.
In this tweet I consider McCoy to be doing the work of a digital cura-
tor. She selects an exemplary group of Afrofuturist works and displays 
it to both novices and initiates. I also interpret McCoy’s tweet as itself 
a work of Afrofuturism: by speaking to Twitter’s millennial user base, 
McCoy brings the history of Afrofuturism into the present, calling forth 
the next generation of Afrofuturists and facilitating the field’s continua-
tion and expansion by those new contributors.
Several historical moments coincide in McCoy’s list— Truth’s Narrative 
was published in the mid- nineteenth century, Butler’s novels were pub-
lished in the late twentieth century, and Tate’s and Womack’s books ap-
peared in the early twenty- first century. At the same time, another set of 
twenty- first- century temporalities speak to creative social justice practices 
in the past, present, and future through Walidah Imarisha and Adrienne 
Maree Brown’s edited short story and essay collection titled Octavia’s 
Brood: Science Fiction Stories from Social Justice Movements; the future of 
race and gender in comics through Deborah Whaley’s Black Women in 
Sequence: Re- Inking Comics, Graphic Novels, and Anime; and Sheena Howard 
and Ronald L. Jackson II’s Black Comics: Politics of Race and Representation. 
Each of the texts embodies the future in some fashion and describes 
the evolution of Afrofuturist work. For example, Imarisha and Brown’s 
Octavia’s Brood speaks to an overall theme of “visionary fiction” that is be-
ing applied not only to the early literary works (i.e., Octavia Butler and 
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Samuel Delaney) of Afrofuturism but also to the way social justice and 
community organizing play a role in forecasting Black futures. The col-
lection also offers another entry point of engagement into Afrofuturism. 
In Black Women in Sequence Whaley creates a platform to recognize and 
acknowledge the existence of numerous female characters and creators 
(past and present) of the African diaspora within the anime and comic 
book/graphic novel field. Much like how those of the African diaspora, 
more specifically women, have been marginalized and seen as nonexis-
tent within the future, Whaley offers creative examples that dispel this 
myth. And Howard and Jackson’s Black Comics, similar to Whaley’s col-
lection, engages with comics, graphic novels, and manga from the Black 
perspective and their significance, but it also recognizes the need for 
more critical engagement and understanding of their “political, social, 
and cultural implications” (Lyn 2015). McCoy, in effect, preserves all of 
the temporalities in a single tweet and does what she can to ensure that 
all of these times of Black imagination continue on into the future.
I have suggested that McCoy’s tweet offers a starter kit for the bud-
ding Afrofuturist and that her list could serve as the beginning of a 
syllabus for a college course. It is important to note that this idea that 
McCoy’s tweet might generate a syllabus is more likely than not. because 
as Afrofuturist literature and arts evolve and grow, more university cours-
es devoted to them are being created. In many colleges and universities 
in the United States and internationally, Afrofuturism is studied as an 
artistic aesthetic, as a tool for critical cultural analysis, as a platform for 
analyzing the impact of modernization on cultural production, and as an 
exploration of Black identity. Here is a tweet from an instructor at UCLA 
about her Afrofuturism class:
The first two works I teach in my #Afrofuturism class 
are W.E.B. DuBois’s short story “The Comet” and Octavia 
E. Butler’s novel Dawn. (@TananariveDue, September 10, 
2016)
The author of this tweet, Tananarive Due, engages deeply with 
African and African American fantasy, science fiction, and historical 
fiction in her scholarship. In her tweet Due makes students (hers and 
others), and the broader public of Twitter users, aware of a well- known, 
often- taught Afrofuturist novel (Octavia Butler’s Dawn) and helps them 
discover a story by an earlier, extremely famous African American writer 
that only recently has been recognized as a work of Afrofuturism (W.E.B. 
Du Bois’s “The Comet,” first published 1920). Due’s putting Du Bois’s 
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story on her syllabus and McCoy’s including Sojourner Truth’s book in 
the previously discussed tweet exemplify how texts from the Black liter-
ary past can be retroactively understood as Afrofuturist.
Through her choice of these two works, Due shows that Afrofuturism 
is not a narrow genre. By teaching “The Comet,” Due shows students 
that Du Bois’s interests stretched beyond sociology and social activism 
and encompassed speculative genre fiction; it also foregrounds Du Bois’s 
investment in envisioning a different future for Black people than what 
white society proposes for them. By teaching Dawn, Due points out the 
radical hybridity of one of Afrofuturism’s most important texts. In Dawn, 
Butler mixes science fiction, postapocalyptic communities, relationships 
between human and aliens, and queer sexualities. Due and McCoy thus 
both offer an initiation into the Afrofuturist movement that encourages 
new followers to grasp the wide range of themes and genres that make 
up that movement.
Due’s tweet may serve the students in her class, but it also makes the 
texts on her syllabus accessible to users online who may not be familiar 
with Afrofuturism. Like McCoy, Due uses Twitter as a platform to teach 
beyond the walls of the academy. In addition, Due uses the spaces of 
the academy to platform Afrofuturism. During her tenure at Spelman 
College in Atlanta from 2012 to 2014, Due pioneered the now annual 
festival “Black to the Future: The Octavia E. Butler Celebration of the 
Fantastic Arts,” which honored the legacy of Octavia Butler. Due invited 
established Afrofuturist writers such as Nalo Hopkinson, Sheree Renée 
Thomas, Nisi Shawl, Steven Barnes, Brandon Massey, Jewelle Gomez, and 
Samuel Delaney to speak at the event. Many Afrofuturist creators rely on 
the organizational labor of scholars such as Due to increase their public 
visibility and reputation, strengthen their cultural legitimacy, and expose 
younger readers to their work. Due’s and McCoy’s work on Twitter paral-
lels the ongoing work they do to promote and support Afrofuturism in 
real- world spaces by organizing and leading live events, such as their co-
ordination of festivals on college campuses and their teaching university 
courses, and by their growing the Afrofuturist network, such as bringing 
artists, novelists, and scholars to campuses and introducing them and 
their cultural productions to one another and to students.
“Tapping into Afrofuturism’s Creative Innovations”: Exploring the 
Relationship between Afrofuturist Arts and Scholarship
Sharing the wealth of themes and elements regarding Afrofuturism 
likely proves valuable to Black academics’ students and social media fol-
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lowers. However, Afrofuturism also comprises multiple elements and 
themes not traditionally highlighted. Historically, scholars and cultural 
critics have focused on the aesthetic genres of Afrofuturism, such as the 
arts (i.e., paintings, sculptures, photography, music) and literature, as 
primary objects of study. Many scholars and cultural critics who have 
written about Afrofuturism have so far ignored the technology sector, 
leaving that sector’s contributions understudied and undervalued. The 
tweet in figure 5.2 offers some insight as to how Afrofuturism motivated 
a tech entrepreneur.
In this tweet, @iafrofuturism links to an article in The Root, a popular 
news blog, about social entrepreneur Emile Cambry. Cambry founded 
a technology center called BLUE 1647 in Chicago in 2011. BLUE 1647 
organizes and hosts classes in which people from underserved com-
munities learn how to code, make apps, and solve technical problems. 
Cambry seeks to bring technological access to the residents of Chicago, 
specifically to neighborhoods that historically have lacked technological 
training and resources. He says, “Too many times technology comes to 
the south and west sides of Chicago after it’s been old” (Dallke 2014). 
Cambry explains that BLUE 1647 serves as an incubator and alternative 
learning and working space for adults and youth; the center’s offerings 
and events include “Creating New Java Files,” “Coding and Minecraft 
Game Development,” the “Code Blue Hackathon” series, and the “Re- 
Figure 5.2. A tweet from 
@iafrofuturism linking to 
an article in The Root on 
social entrepreneur Emile 
Cambry.
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Connect Employment Assistance Program.” At BLUE 1647 students learn 
how to not only use technology but also build technology.
Afrofuturist narratives and artwork often depict Black people build-
ing communities, innovating new technologies, rewriting dominant nar-
ratives, and escaping oppression. @iafrofuturism’s tweet is no different. 
It characterizes Emile Cambry’s project, BLUE 1647, as a technological 
revolution within a Chicago community and explicitly links the project 
to Afrofuturism by using #Afrofuturism in the tweet. Emile Cambry and 
BLUE 1647 are not fictional or artistic constructs but function in ways 
that actualize and embody Afrofuturist ideas and themes. Not only does 
Cambry imagine the building of communities, but he has also actualized 
his imaginings to some degree. It is notable, too, that where Cambry has 
founded his center in Chicago, a city rooted in violence, liberation strug-
gles, blue- collar living, musical and visual artistic expressions, in recent 
years Chicago has seen an increase of work attached to the Afrofuturist 
movement, such as “The Second City” comedy club (comedy with a 
conscience), where this social and political venue combines the Black 
experience from a Black- centered science fiction stance using stand- up, 
sketch, music, and performance. Another example of the Afrofuturist 
movement’s presence in Chicago can be found in the Association for the 
Advancement of Creative Musicians (AACM), a nonprofit organization/
collective that comprises “versatile and innovative musicians performing 
original creative music” (AACM 2015). In addition to their cutting- edge 
musicianship, AACM is also well known for their painted features and for 
costuming that adds a level of mysticism and fantasy to their multigenera-
tional jazz performances. A final example of the Afrofuturist movement 
in Chicago is exemplified in the Center for Afrofuturist Studies (CAS). 
CAS is an initiative to “re- imagine new futures for marginalized peoples 
by generating safe work spaces for artists of color” (CAS 2011). Through 
this institute, artists from all backgrounds are able to serve as “visiting 
artists” or “artists- in- residence” and are able to construct imaginative and 
innovative work that addresses such topics as visibility of racialized and 
gendered bodies in space, Afro- surrealism, mythmaking, and the com-
plexity of memory and ritual. CAS provides not only a safe space for art-
ists but also a venue for community engagement through their public 
lectures, workshops, and forums. Ultimately, @iafrofuturism’s tweet is a 
celebration of Black uses and deployments of technology, a promotion of 
Black media innovation, and a positive engagement with underserved but 
deserving communities. It promotes Afrofuturism as a vehicle for change, 
a tool for teaching and learning, and a method of community building.
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Tweets about Afrofuturism and real- world tech projects include re-
ports about the relationship of Black women and girls to STEM (science, 
technology, engineering, and math). In 2004, on the campus of histori-
cally Black Spelman College, a group of young undergraduate Black 
women founded the Spelbots. This team of future Black women STEM 
leaders was created by Dr. Andrew Williams to encourage Spelman stu-
dents to study robotics and mathematics. In a short amount of time, the 
Spelbot team designed and built eight four- legged robot soccer players 
to compete in the 2005 International RoboCup robot soccer competi-
tion, which made history by qualifying as the first all- Black undergradu-
ate girls’ team to compete in this competition. The Spelbots group start-
ed as a way to encourage Spelman students to engage with humanoid 
robots, observe programming demonstrations, and obtain mentorship 
and guidance, but ultimately the group has become an important fixture 
at the Atlanta college. In the tweet in figure 5.3, @WeAreWakanda makes 
the Spelman technologists objects of attention of the interconnected so-
cial network of Twitter, promoting their accomplishments to users from 
both academia and the tech industry. @WeAreWakanda thus not only 
praises the efforts of these Black women college students but also depicts 
them as creators and inventors in the fields of science, technology, en-
gineering, and math in the United States, which is significant given how 
often Black women have been excluded from STEM jobs and narratives 
about STEM innovation in the country.
By using the #Afrofuturism hashtag, @WeAreWakanda makes the 
Spelbots a new object of Afrofuturist scholarship. @WeAreWakanda si-
multaneously highlights the real- world technological manifestations of 
Figure 5.3. A tweet from  
@WeAreWakanda linking 
to an article celebrat-
ing the Spelman College 
Spelbots robotics team.
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Afrofuturism and advances the ongoing conversation about the need 
for greater equity and inclusion of diverse races and genders in the tech 
field. Just as @iafrofuturism frames Cambry as a leader in tech educa-
tion for Black communities, @WeAreWakanda draws attention to the 
Spelman roboticists as models for Black girls and women who might 
enter the fields of tech research or production. Additionally, the work 
of the Spelbots team in a way continues a conversation from Donna J. 
Haraway’s “The Cyborg Manifesto” regarding reconstructing the tools 
that women use as well as their supposed natural role in society. Although 
not identifying as cyborgs, these women construct their own identities, 
capitalize on technological tools to create humanoid robots, and seize 
the opportunity to go beyond the expected possibilities of young Black 
women. Ultimately, in reenvisioning society the Spelbots highlight the 
technological aspect of Afrofuturism and serve as another example of 
how Afrofuturism is much more than science fiction and fantasy.
The photo that @WeAreWakanda tweets depicts the Spelbot team 
holding their creations of robot babies, which indicates that Black wom-
en do not have to be mothers literally in order to be creators— they can 
choose to be engineers and inventors of future technology. These young 
Black women are equipped with the tools to create and develop techno-
logical futures, hence @WeAreWakanda’s caption of the photo, “Giving 
Birth to the Future.” As inventors of future technology, these students are 
afforded an opportunity of motherhood (again, in this case, their prog-
eny are robots, not humans) that historically was not granted or reduced 
to Black women. One is reminded of Hortense Spillers’s assessment of 
the role of the Black female body in her 1987 essay “Mama’s Baby, Papa’s 
Maybe: An American Grammar Book,” in which Spillers notes how Black 
motherhood was historically sexualized and how Black womanhood in 
the Americas was long characterized by structural captivity and a reduc-
tion to property and flesh. Thus, @WeAreWakanda’s provocative mes-
sage that the Spelman students are “giving birth to the future” points 
to alternate modes of Black women’s creation and future- making that 
diverge from their historical position of abjection and victimization. The 
Black women on the Spelman team do not merely exist as flesh com-
modities; they also have the education and ingenuity to “birth” new tech-
nologies, thereby fostering the generation of new Afrofuturist stories. 
Thus, @iafrofuturism’s and @WeAreWakanda’s tweets make the case that 
the Afrofuturist conversation must go beyond the bounds of fiction to 
include real- world Black technologists.
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The Digital Entrance of #Afrofuturism
Before the #Afrofuturism tag was launched on Twitter, Afrofuturism 
gave rise to a robust early online community. In 1998 sociologist Alondra 
Nelson and multimedia artist Paul D. Miller (also known as DJ Spooky) 
created the Afrofuturist Listserv, whose numerous subscribers included 
scholars, authors, musicians, and artists. Then, in 2000, Nelson and 
Miller launched the website www.Afrofuturism.net. Both Nelson’s and 
Miller’s online communities laid the foundation for their editing a spe-
cial issue of the academic journal Social Text on Afrofuturism in 2002.3 
However, the activity on Nelson and Miller’s Listserv began to decline 
in the early 2000s, and for several years Afrofuturists did not have an 
internet platform on which they could communicate routinely about 
their research and productions. Therefore, I consider 2002– 2011 to be 
a dormant period for internet- based Afrofuturism. In 2011, however, 
Afrofuturism was officially reintroduced to the digital networked space, 
in the form of a hashtag. The tweet below, from @fugitivephilo, was the 
first to use the tag #afrofuturism, and gestures to how that movement 
blends issues of gender, race, sexism, and Black humor.
#XLR8 on #AngelaDavis & #DJ Venus— black humour & sexism 
hit a new low? (and yes, the quotes are BS) http://bit.
ly/htPx9D #afrofuturism (@fugitivephilo, April 2, 2011)
Since @fugitivephilo posted this first #Afrofuturism tweet, the tag 
#Afrofuturism has become a social media conversation thread, a way to 
amplify and express concerns about blackness and technology, and a 
space in which experts in and novices of Black speculative genres can 
come together and form a community. Not only does this tweet mark an 
official social media entrance, but it also becomes attached to an April 
Fool’s joke gone bad. The day before (April 1) this tweet came into ex-
istence, XLR8 (pronounced “accelerate”) blindly entered into a twitter 
feud with queer Latina DJ VenusxGG and an infamous producer, known 
for his cultural appropriation antics, named DJ Diplo. In short, the feud 
circles around problematic issues of imperialism, white male privilege, 
and sexism mixed with musical appropriation. The tweet becomes even 
more problematic when Angela Davis is inadvertently inserted into the 
feud. Although confusing upon first read, when all the details are ex-
plained the tweet becomes more clear. In essence, @fugitivephilo is 
sparking a discussion that is very familiar within Afrofuturism. The mis-
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placement and trivialization of Black women and other women of color 
even in the social media landscape must be examined, revised, and re-
written.
Historically, US academia is not always receptive to Black and African 
diasporic studies such as Afrofuturism; thus, Twitter and #Afrofuturism 
have become an alternative discussion site with a wide reach. Scholars, 
critics, students, artists, musicians, STEM workers, and others who are 
doing work on blackness and technology, social justice and Black futures, 
and Black fantasy are afforded a welcoming space to share their work 
on Afrofuturism. Scholars within African American/African Diaspora/
Black Studies frequently share news about academic conference, sympo-
sia, and colloquia in the #Afrofuturism tag and are thereby using Twitter 
to create and foster Afrofuturist academic communities. Through 
#Afrofuturism, the dissemination of Afrofuturist scholarship evolves and 
expands and research opportunities are announced and spread. An ex-
ample of how Afrofuturist scholars network and share news from confer-
ences in the #Afrofuturism tag can be found in this tweet:
Yaszek looking at covers of Amazing Stories next to 
covers of the Crisis magazine #afrofuturism symposium  
@CAU (@b_rusert, February 22, 2016)
Here, Britt Rusert, assistant professor in the W.E.B. Du Bois 
Department of Afro- American Studies at the University of Massachusetts 
Amherst, tweets about her experience at the 2016 Clark Atlanta University 
Afrofuturism Symposium. Through this tweet, Rusert reports on how fel-
low Afrofuturist scholar Lisa Yaszek, in a talk at that conference, drew par-
allels between the covers of American science fiction magazine Amazing 
Stories and the influential The Crisis,4 the official magazine of the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) (whose 
founder and first editor was another Afrofuturist, W.E.B. Du Bois).5 By 
bringing these publications into conversation with each other, Yaszek 
employs a common Afrofuturist method of foregrounding the relation-
ship between history (nonfiction) and science fiction— that is, between 
the real past and the imagined future. Rusert’s tweet referencing Yaszek, 
The Crisis, and Amazing Stories thus executes a threefold agenda: (1) it 
increases awareness of historical media from the Black community, (2) it 
acknowledges historical texts as part of the lineage of Afrofuturism, and 
(3) it showcases how Afrofuturist academics network with one another 
and learn from each other’s work at academic symposia and conferences.
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Here is another academic tweet in #Afrofuturism that connects the 
African American past to a possible future:
#Mississippi was a giant gulag for #Black people. 
That’s why they shouted for #BlackPower. #afrofuturism 
#PlanetDeepSouthJSU (@Hardcore888, February 27, 2016)
@Hardcore888 is the Twitter pseudonym of Reynaldo Anderson, asso-
ciate professor of communication at Harris- Stowe University. Anderson 
tweeted this during the “Planet Deep South Colloquium: Speculative 
Cultural Production and Africanisms in the American Black South,”6 
which took place in February 2016 at Jackson State University, and his 
tweet suggests a linkage between Southern Black identity, the 1960s 
Black Power movement, historical slavery, and Afrofuturism. Anderson 
re- presents Mississippi (where Planet Deep South was held) as a “gulag,” 
which is a Soviet term for a forced labor camp. “That’s why they shouted 
for Black Power” is a reference to how Black people in Mississippi fought 
for their civil rights in the twentieth century through such efforts as the 
Freedom Riders and the desegregation of the University of Mississippi. 
By tagging this sequence with the #Afrofuturism tag, Anderson shows 
the movement of African Americans from enslavement, to fighting for 
their civil rights, to a future that is undefined but will be grounded in 
Black liberation. Thus, Anderson’s tweet turns Mississippi from a rural 
agrarian state haunted by a past of brutal slavery into a launching pad 
of radical new imaginative thinking about the future of Black America. 
Anderson’s tweet also illustrates the multiple temporalities of Afrofutur-
ism: his tweets create lightning- fast connections between himself, other 
colloquium attendees, and people who could not attend the live event, 
and also underscore the long history and durability of Black Power.
#Afrofuturism tweets at conferences and colloquia also serve as back- 
channel conversations. Not only are Rusert and Anderson physically 
present at their respective events, but they also expand the conversations 
taking place at those live events by participating with audiences online 
through their tweets. The fact that numerous online users interact with 
scholars at academic conferences on Afrofuturism confirms a growing 
interest and investment in Afrofuturism. These off- and online conversa-
tions within the larger Afrofuturist community also qualify as a form of 
networking, through which members of that community become famil-
iar with one another’s work, which can lead to future citations, invita-
tions to perform or speak, and mentoring relationships.
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Eliminating the Borders and Creating New Spaces: Broadening the 
Geographical Boundaries of the Afrofuturism Movement
Afrofuturism as a movement is ascendant outside of the arts and humani-
ties. In this section I will illustrate the connections between Afrofuturism 
and social justice. The following tweets discuss three metropolitan cities 
with significant Black populations and how organizers and activists there 
draw on the themes and imaginaries of Afrofuturism to find hope and 
healing, to rebuild communities, and to seek justice. The first tweet (fig. 
5.4) brings attention to Detroit’s past and future.
In this tweet @iafrofuturism says, “The future was here  .  .  .  ,” im-
plying that Detroit is very much familiar with the future. The city of 
Detroit acts as a kind of time machine in that it has always been a site 
rich with ideas about Black futurity, and different eras of Detroit’s history 
have proposed different futures. For example, in June 1963 Dr. Martin 
Luther King Jr. gave a speech in Detroit at Cobo Hall (now known as 
Cobo Center) titled “The Great March in Detroit,” which served as a 
dry run for his famous “I Have a Dream” speech, which he gave just two 
months later (several passages appear in both speeches).7 King’s overall 
message in his Detroit speech was that it was urgent and important to 
continue the civil rights movement’s forward momentum; King empha-
sized that Detroit, and later Washington DC, and the entire nation, had 
to be future- oriented with respect to racial equality— and Detroit was the 
Figure 5.4. A tweet 
from @iafrofuturism 
bringing attention to an 
article addressing the 




first place to be hailed into King’s vision for the future. Detroit was also 
strongly associated with futurism through its being the site of the first 
Black- owned record label, Motown Records, and by having the status 
throughout much of the twentieth century as the “world’s automotive 
center” (Woodford 2001).
Afrofuturism may have had a long history in Detroit, but since the de-
cline of the US auto manufacturing industry, Detroit has had to redefine 
its future. According to Aaron Robertson, author of the Metrotimes.com 
article linked to in @iafrofuturism’s tweet:
Often the work of Afrofuturists, whether they are artists or engineers, 
is performed in a metaphorical underground. It tries to make ab-
stract and material technologies relevant by giving blacks opportuni-
ties to understand, use, critique, resist, and design them. It reimag-
ines technological processes and the economic and political systems 
that created them. (Robertson 2016)
Robertson argues that Detroit can possibly imagine a new future for it-
self using the lenses of Afrofuturism. One example of Detroit residents’ 
efforts to reimagine their city is the O.N.E. (Oakland North End) Mile 
Project, a collaborative community development effort that works to up-
lift Detroit’s Oakland Avenue and North End neighborhoods through 
cultural production and socioeconomic activity. This is done through 
the promotion of local North End businesses, a community garden and 
arts program (Oakland Community Gardens), seasonal musical perfor-
mances showcasing North End talent, and the launching of its corre-
sponding magazine of the same name. Similar to Emile Cambry’s BLUE 
1647 center in Chicago, the O.N.E. Mile Project is creating a network of 
people who seek to redefine and redesign the technical and cultural leg-
acy of Detroit. Through local businesses, artists, and residents (past and 
present) sharing their stories/experiences, new ideas, and resources, 
Oakland North End benefits from the revenue and is able to build more 
networks and cultivate more public spaces into this once abandoned 
community. A community rich in history is able to maintain its nostalgia 
while also creating a future sustainable environment. The O.N.E. Mile 
Project is meant to catapult projects and programs that create new ave-
nues of production, whether technically or culturally, while also sparking 
present and future conversations and updating past ones. This redefi-
nition allows the people to question the possibilities or even resist the 
system that housed built- in exclusions, thus finding other ways to survive 
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and thrive. Robertson and other residents see Detroit as a place of for-
ward, moving transition.
Although @iafrofuturism’s tweet depicts Detroit as already futuristic, 
it makes clear that this futurism has also had severe consequences by 
including the phrase “#Detroit’s Afrofuturist enclaves.” This phrase po-
tentially invites discussion of Detroit as a modern- day dystopia. Since the 
late twentieth century, Detroit has suffered from economic devastation, 
gentrification, and generational, institutionalized oppression. In a way, 
@iafrofuturism calls for an understanding of Detroit as not just a city but 
also as a character in a story of hope and survival against desperate odds. 
However, despite calling attention to the historical and emotional hor-
rors suffered by Detroit’s residents, @iafrofuturism also frames Detroit 
as a city of reincarnation and renaissance by linking to Robertson’s ar-
ticle on the O.N.E. Mile Project (Hammel 2016). While the tweet is not 
specifically making its own argument, what is notable is that it references 
legacy media reporting on Afrofuturism and points to longer stories 
about Afrofuturism.
Another tweet, from the United States Department of Arts and 
Culture (USDAC) (@usartsdept) offers an informational bridge that in-
corporates art, community engagement, and Afrofuturism while simul-
taneously demonstrating the need to rebuild and maintain a community 
and a sense of Black political, social, and cultural identity for the Black 
residents within the North Philadelphia neighborhood of Sharswood/
Blumberg. The USDAC, which is a nongovernmental organization 
(NGO), acts as a nationwide grassroots action network that actively seeks 
change and promotes programs and organizations that focus on creativ-
ity. Philadelphia, like Detroit, is a city struggling with redevelopment and 
fighting various issues threatening minority communities, including dis-
placement and gentrification. Thus, USDAC on the local level works as 
a partnership that supports communities like the Sharswood/Blumberg 
neighborhood to help support the articulation of their cultural needs 
and imagining their own futures.
According to Rasheedah Phillips (pictured in the tweet in figure 
5.5), an Afrofuturist artist, author, and attorney for the Landlord- Tenant 
Housing Unit of Community Legal Services, practices such as digital 
zine brunches, yoga classes, and housing resource workshops help to 
preserve the Sharswood/Blumberg neighborhood. Phillips calls these 
practices Afrofuturist because they serve as a safe space for the residents 
to “share their memories, hopes and dreams for their rapidly chang-
ing community through various visual, vocal, written, and physical medi-
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ums” (Simpson 2016). Another example of an Afrofuturist community 
effort in Philadelphia is the Community Futures Lab (CFL), which is 
a workshop space, gallery, studio, think tank, and resource library also 
located in the Sharswood/Blumberg neighborhood. The CFL was cre-
ated in response to a $526 million dollar redevelopment project that 
began in the summer of 2015 and forced more than five hundred fami-
lies out of their homes in Philadelphia claiming eminent domain. As an 
Afrofuturist project, CFL becomes a place to heal some of the wounds 
and pain caused by the housing instability. Historically, Afrofuturism 
has always been seen as a liberating practice for Black people within the 
African diaspora, as they are able to use the fantasy, science fiction, and 
Afrocentrism to not only preserve the existing cultural legacy but to also 
reimagine and recreate Black futures. Much like the BLUE 1647 and the 
O.N.E. Mile Project, the CFL works to ensure that the local community 
does not have to be dependent on larger corporations, that it invokes a 
sense of pride and empowerment, and, most importantly, that the local 
residents personally reap the benefits and play a significant role in its 
present and future developments.
According to Phillips, “The Afrofuturist landscape lends itself well 
to exploring notions of institutional liberation, unearthing our true his-
tories, mapping our futures, understanding our present conditions in 
the flow of time and through a speculative lens” (Simpson 2016). This 
“Afrofuturist landscape” can be seen as a redevelopment and reclama-
Figure 5.5. A tweet from 
The USDAC exploring an 
informational bridge that 
incorporates art, com-
munity engagement, and 
Afrofuturism in North 
Philadelphia.
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tion project for the residents of the Sharswood/Blumberg neighbor-
hood. Although the neighborhood is making a transition to becoming 
“The Gallery at Market East,” the CFL and the Black Quantum Futurism 
Collective still seek to uphold an Afrofuturist landscape within the com-
munity so that a part of the community and its residents still remains 
regardless of the gentrification. Thus, according to Phillips, the CFL 
has become a site of institutional liberation by the way it functions as 
a “living gallery.” With all of the stories, collected materials, images, 
essays, and interviews the community residents and nonresidents are 
able to see their own experiences reflected and acknowledged while 
also learning about another person’s journey. This collective memory 
has also become important as an archive in that Phillips has been able 
to capture the such materials to create “BQF Theory and Practice Vol. 
II: Community Futurism,” a follow- up to her original anthology, “Black 
Quantum Futurism: Theory Practice Vol. I.” The @usartsdept tweet 
about Afrofuturism in Philadelphia together with the tweets about 
Afrofuturism at work in Chicago and Detroit showcase Afrofuturism’s 
relevance and importance to black urban community projects.
I Continue to See a Black Future in Afrofuturism
For each of these sites— Chicago, Detroit, and Philadelphia— 
Afrofuturism is rooted in the Black people who have inhabited the space 
in the past and present and who seek better futures for themselves on 
their own terms. Ultimately, Afrofuturism as a movement and a tool for 
freedom, self- determinism, and equality is hopeful in that it looks to 
overcome the ways that society remains unequal. The creative methods 
discussed in each of the tweets presented in this chapter are prescrip-
tions for a promising future. Although Afrofuturism is often about liter-
ary fiction with regard to technologized Black futures, or Black musical 
artists working with advanced sound technologies, the incorporation of 
Twitter affords a new arena for interrogating and exploring additional 
conversations. This chapter has shown that as #Afrofuturism circulates 
through Twitter, it also encompasses Black students and workers engag-
ing with and making digital technologies. Through Twitter, Black schol-
ars are also connecting with one another at academic events, and Black 
communities are using a wide range of ideas and grassroots practices 
that help imagine new futures for themselves in response to, or defiance 
of, structural economic and social inequities. According to graphic artist 
John Jennings, “Afrofuturism is not science fiction, but about imagin-
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ing different spaces of creative thought that doesn’t put your identity 
in a box” (Hardison 2016). All in all, this box that Jennings speaks of 
is a constant battle that Afrofuturists continuously fight to not become 
trapped by or in. From the examples and conversations put forth here, 
Afrofuturism proves to be a convincing identity, network, safe space, and 
artistic expression that dismantles the box and opens up a plethora of 
imaginary spaces of creative thought.
Notes
 1. Most essays focus on the arts and literature as primary and how scholars 
use and continue to use digital platforms as theoretical.
 2. While this essay is primarily concerned with conversations of Afrofuturism 
on Twitter, I want to acknowledge that Afrofuturism has a longer online history 
than the Twitter platform.
 3. Nelson and Miller coedited a 2002 special issue of Social Text dedicated 
to the topic of Afrofuturism. In this special issue, Nelson, Miller, and their con-
tributors sought to demonstrate and share the diverse range of thinking that had 
arisen around the concept of Afrofuturism and to open new areas of scholarly 
inquiry. Nelson and Miller wrote that the task of Afrofuturism is to “explore fu-
turist themes in Black cultural production and the ways in which technological 
innovation is changing the face of Black art and culture.”
 4. The Crisis publishes work toward the present and future, serving as “a quar-
terly journal of civil rights, history, politics and culture and seeks to educate and 
challenge its readers about issues that continue to plague African Americans and 
other communities of color.” http://www.thecrisismagazine.com.
 5. The founder and editor of The Crisis was W.E.B. Du Bois, who many have 
labeled the original “Godfather of Afrofuturism” with his contribution of his 
1920 science fiction short story “The Comet.”
 6. In its first year, Planet Deep South examined the creative and intellectual 
work of Afrofuturism through the inquiry of a centered Southern Black cultural 
production, historical, and speculative lens.
 7. Cobo Hall, now Cobo Center, is a convention center located in downtown 
Detroit, named after former Detroit mayor Albert Cobo (1950– 1957).
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six | Ferguson Blues
A Conversation with Rev. Osagyefo Sekou
transcribed by livier lara
edited by keith p. feldman
In the fall of 2015, as the Color of New Media proceeded with its explora-
tions of Twitter as a locus of social identity and political mobilization for 
minoritized communities, the urgency of the Black Lives Matter move-
ment became of utmost concern. We were honored to engage a central 
organizer and activist from St. Louis, Missouri, the Reverend Osagyefo 
Sekou, in a wide- ranging conversation about connections between Black 
aesthetics, authenticity, capitalist markets, and the virtual and embodied 
networks that sustain political community. Reverend Sekou met with the 
Color of New Media on the UC Berkeley campus on October 28, 2015.
Born in St. Louis, Reverend Sekou grew up in rural Arkansas. He 
attended high school in St. Louis and was ordained at Friendly Temple 
Baptist Church, taught alternatives to gang violence at local middle 
schools, and directed a community center at the city’s Cochran Gardens 
housing project. A widely respected and widely traveled organizer, cleric, 
and musician in the service of justice, Reverend Sekou has been involved 
in struggles against the U.S. war in Iraq, the occupation of Palestinian 
territories, climate change, homelessness, and more. In 2014 he was a 
visiting scholar at Stanford University’s Martin Luther King Education 
and Research Institute. After Michael Brown Jr.’s killing, he traveled to 
Ferguson, Missouri, to organize alongside local and national groups on 
behalf of the Fellowship of Reconciliation. He trained and served as a 
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coleader for hundreds of people involved in militant nonviolent actions 
in Ferguson, and subsequently trained clergy in advance of the so- called 
“Unite the Right Rally” held in Charlottesville, VA in 2017.
Reverend Sekou had the idea to record this conversation about five 
minutes after it began, so the transcription starts in the middle of a dis-
cussion about the importance of maintaining a public commons.
ABIGAIL DE KOSNIK. We talk a lot about preserving the commons, 
but I wonder if [Stefano Harney and] Fred Moten (2013) 
would say something like, “No, we want to preserve the under-
commons, its againstness, its refusal to making oneself avail-
able for co- opting.”
REV. OSAGYEFO SEKOU. One of my mentors would say it this way: “If 
you live in a cesspool, everybody smells like shit.” So I reject no-
tions of certain forms of purity, and question certain forms of 
authenticity, while holding on to them for dear life. Take blues 
music. I’m a blues musician, and so when you think about the 
blues, someone like Robert Johnson who was part of the un-
dercommons . . . 
DE KOSNIK. Mhm.
SEKOU. Black cultural production was fomented within both 
legal and psychic structures. Given that a people had fleet-
ing political victories, the existential became the way in 
which people resisted. Part of that resistance plays itself out 
in various forms of what Bernard Williams would call thick 
and thin opposition. Whether it be through Black style or 
how we walk in time and space, Black naming— Trayvon, 
Shaniqua— these are part of this undercurrent epistemic 
framework and set of cultural artifacts. The blues is a kind of 
musical formation that emerges out of the underbelly of the 
American democracy, a brilliant, eloquent rendering [of] 
Black suffering visible even in a privatized space. Is this an 
undercommon?
DE KOSNIK. Yeah, yeah.
SEKOU. Then when we get the consumption primarily of blues by 
white audiences, one could argue that it loses a certain form of 
authenticity because it’s often place- bound. It’s not played in 
a juke joint, it’s played in Carnegie Hall. But I . . . what is the 
brother’s name again? The undercommons brother?
DE KOSNIK. Fred Moten.
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SEKOU. Fred Moten, I doubt if he would say that B.B. King wasn’t a 
genius until the day he died.
DE KOSNIK. Mhm.
SEKOU. All right, so I’m curious about that. Take a genius like 
James Baldwin, whose writing is saturated with the culture of 
Black working- class poor people living in the underbelly of 
Harlem, his life buttressed between two riots. The way he de-
ploys the parlance of Black holiness and sanctity is thoroughly 
grounded in the tradition of the people that produced him. 
The language of the church is saturating through it, but he 
becomes one of the most important writers in the world, in my 
estimation, the greatest English- language essayist of the twen-
tieth century.
Once Baldwin’s book hits the editor, does it stop being au-
thentic? Do we just want Baldwin reading church- based texts 
in Harlem or in the West Village in Greenwich Village? I dare 
say not. But because I’m a religious creature, I still am willing 
to make the Pascalian wager predicated on the possibility that 
we can change this.
I’m not saying that there’s not always going to be counter-
cultures. There’s gonna be some cool kids doing interesting 
stuff wherever you are in the world, even in the most revolu-
tionary governments, which may or may not tend toward re-
pressive. This idea that once it gets up, it stops being authentic 
and that kind of thing is just interesting. I mean does music 
quality change? Do marketing forces impinge? Those market 
forces are always at work even in the subterranean. Certain 
market forces, bare minimum pay, the worst of society is at 
work even in these communities, and oftentimes in so- called 
undercommon communities. In undercommon communities 
there is also a need for outside intervention.
DE KOSNIK. Everything is subject to critique.
SEKOU. Yeah.
DE KOSNIK. I mean, there aren’t spaces about which we should be 
totally uncritical.
SEKOU. So even in the undercurrents where you have the most 
authentic Black musical production, women are often the ob-
ject of the arbitrary violence of men in those spaces. What we 
must grasp is a kind of permeable undercurrent space in which 
one is trying to hold on to certain forms of culture and tra-
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dition that bend towards thriving democratic sensibilities and 
that sense of the existential democrats, small “d.” We want to 
keep track of the ways in which people make meaning in those 
spaces. But if somebody come in and say, “What y’all doing to 
girls is not cool,” I think that’s an important intervention.
DE KOSNIK. Mhm.
SEKOU. At the same time, don’t throw the baby out with the bath-
water. My grandmother was deeply homophobic, but she knew 
about love. In that sense, I’m suspicious of these kind of reified 
notions— but at the same time it’s what produced me. I was 
raised in a rural Southern village with eleven houses and thirty- 
five people, and everything I knew about the world comes from 
them. There was intervention, right, I was offered other alter-
native space, people coming in, exposed. But who I am isn’t 
how I experienced a certain form of authenticity. I think what’s 
at stake in the undercommons discourse is a notion of what is 
authentic and what is not. For me, I just know it when I hear 
it, like when you hear Aretha say “respect,” and you just know 
it. When Gardner C. Taylor preached, you just know it. Britney 
Spears— not so much.
DE KOSNIK. I’m Filipino, and a mestizo culture like the Philippines 
is racially the result of many colonizations. By now the culture 
and the biology of the people is extremely mixed. To be Filipi-
no means you can be anything at any one time. It is so fluid, it’s 
so flexible. But this kind of flexibility is problematic in the way 
that echoes neoliberalism. There’s something that neoliberal-
ism wants which is spread— flexibility, fluidity, permeability. I 
would say, from my background, that that kind of pivoting is 
crucial to survival. It’s necessary. It’s also a talent and a gift that 
I feel lucky to have, an ability to code- switch between so many 
languages, cultures, and nations. I think of all of those parts 
of my real culture that’s a good thing. But at the same time 
there’s this weight. When I start to talk about it, the postmoder-
nity of the Philippines, it sounds exactly like what neoliberal 
capital wants for everybody. For everybody to be that flexible, 
for all cultures to be that permeable, for everything to be able 
to be transformed into something else.
So I don’t fly the flag of “the authentic” night and day. But 
at the same time, I don’t feel like I have the language to de-
scribe . . . [the] permeability that happens when Robert John-
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son’s music travels to the white North, when Black culture 
travels into white spaces. That permeability so often favors the 
market, as opposed to favoring this other polyphony or multi-
plicity of identity. All the good things that could come out of 
that permeability, they’re part of the undercommons, but they 
also get co- opted so quickly by these market moves.
SEKOU. In addition to authenticity, I want to raise the question of 
agency. I mean, clearly, Black musical production and Black 
cultural production and Black people have agency. Even with 
the market coming in and out, somehow they hold that integ-
rity and that dignity. Robert Johnson had a level of agency in 
the music that he sang. He was not the best blues musician, not 
widely accepted among his peers, but he had dignity. He was 
sharp all the time. He dressed well. There’s a certain profes-
sionalism among Black blues musicians who were understand-
ing the market. They got babies to feed.
DE KOSNIK. Mhm.
SEKOU. All right? So it’s not just simply that they’re victims of the 
market. There are moments when whatever they can carve off 
of the market for themselves puts them in a situation whereby 
they can be able to make some sense of the world in their own 
image and get their music out to the world. How do we honor 
and name that agency? How are folks taking chitlins and mak-
ing a meal? To me, there’s a level of artistic beauty and dignity 
in that that I want to keep track of . . . 
DE KOSNIK. Regardless of the market.
SEKOU. Regardless of the market.
DE KOSNIK. And including the market for chitlins.
SEKOU. Yeah!
DE KOSNIK. There’s a market for chitlins.
SEKOU. Clearly, there is, there’s a market for chitlins, there’s no 
question. You can go to some hipster restaurant and get you 
some for about thirty dollars. That’s just the market being the 
market. The market commodifies anything, it’s going to be it-
self. You can take individual heroic acts, the individual artist 
who says I’m not gonna do that, I’m gonna be authentic. I’m 
going to be pure, I’m not going to change my lyrics, I’m not 
gonna do whatever, right. But it’s gon’ get commodified re-
gardless. The market is gonna be the market. The question is, 
How do we not flatten out even those things we see as primarily 
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market driven so that we don’t lose track of the agency of the 
people?
DE KOSNIK. Right, right.
SEKOU. I keep coming back to music, because African Americans, 
two things we produce— great music and some great preachers. 
Entire countries have not produced musical genius that Black 
folks have produced, right? I mean in my own state alone, Ar-
kansas, we have Maya Angelou and James Cone, the greatest 
living theologian. You know, Uzbekistan ain’t produced noth-
ing like that yet. So when you look at the cultural production 
of the folks, always keep track of the agency, always keep track 
of the way in which they’re making moves inside of it. Because, 
you know, my grandmother would say, “You can’t live in a 
whorehouse and not turn a trick.” This is not to diminish sex 
workers; I think they should have a union. I just can’t organize 
them ’cause it don’t look right, the clergy man organizing ’em 
sex workers. But you understand what I’m saying?
DE KOSNIK. The whorehouse is global capitalism, and everybody, 
even the most undercommons cultures, are in the same house.
SEKOU. Yeah.
DE KOSNIK. Yeah.
SEKOU. So I think we have to acknowledge that those same neo-
liberal values get reproduced in social movements; they get re-
produced in academic circles. I mean even if I’m in an under-
common and I’ve made a decision that I’m a part of a queer 
collective of Black dudes with dreadlocks, that’s who we are. 
But we’re gon’ get a Twitter account. We still subject to the 
market.
The question is, how— what are the ways in which you’re 
going to use those tools? I actually think there’s a popular read-
ing of Audre Lorde’s essay that’s wrong  .  .  . [Audre Lorde’s 
coments at the Second Sex Conference in New York on Sep-
tember 29, 1979, were published in the 1981 anthology This 
Bridge Called My Back: Writings by Radical Women of Color as the 
essay “The Master’s Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master’s 
House”.] Lorde’s not talking about technology, she’s not talk-
ing about the academy. The letter is written in response to a 
panel of white women isolating Black women, thereby repro-
ducing the spirit of the empire. What she’s talking about is a 
more spiritual phenomenon. I’m not talking about spiritual 
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phenomena in terms of connecting to a holy Other. I’m talk-
ing about zeitgeist. The zeitgeist of the empire we can’t use. 
We’re supposed to be in solidarity with the sisters, but if there 
ain’t no Black women, you’re just like the white dude down the 
street.
DE KOSNIK. She’s talking about a more philosophical concern.
SEKOU. It’s at a philosophical level, and I would argue a spiritual 
level, too, because it’s about constitution. She knew those wom-
en. It wasn’t just about some abstract women on the— those are 
folks she knew who claimed to be her allies.
DE KOSNIK. She’s saying, you can’t reproduce patriarchy’s own tac-
tics within feminism and claim it to be antipatriarchal . . . 
SEKOU. Yeah.
DE KOSNIK. That’s not gonna diminish patriarchy.
SEKOU. So you’re going to have an academic panel, which is going 
to be an elite space for this working- class Black woman, you can 
do all of that. Just don’t do that, just don’t be them.
PAIGE JOHNSON. So I’ve got a question that comes back to think-
ing about new media’s overdetermination by neoliberalism . . . 
SEKOU. Mhm.
JOHNSON. One of the ways I’ve been thinking a little about that is 
the ways in which neoliberalism is also about this flattening of 
space. Happy- looking subjects move swiftly across cultural bor-
ders, move smoothly across a kind of smooth space, one that, 
in reality, is actually super-stratified by power and by violence 
and differentiated histories and levels of access. Part of the 
neoliberal attraction to new media is that, at least in the Twitter 
moment, it seems to have the capacity to move horizontally, to 
capitalize on this sort of horizontality that neoliberalism loves. 
But one of the things I heard in your early remarks, and a bit 
in what you were saying more recently about the blues, is that 
place really matters. Place matters in substantive ways for the 
articulation of social movements. Something particular is hap-
pening in Times Square; something particular is happening in, 
you know, Madison, Wisconsin, in 2009, 2010, 2011; and some-
thing particular is happening in an actual place called Fergu-
son, even as social media can almost instantaneously turn Fer-
guson into a metaphor.
SEKOU. Mhm. But, no, see I would actually push back.
JOHNSON. Yeah, great.
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SEKOU. I would actually say that social media at its best . . . If there 
is to be an authentic subterranean narrative articulated about 
Black suffering in the context of the American empire much 
like the blues . . . The reason why the blues works is that you 
can walk into any juke joint and somebody’s singing about “the 
man is taking, I work all day I still ain’t got no money, my wom-
an done left me, this man is treating me . . .” These are local 
specific things that are happening that reflect a universal con-
dition. What Ferguson does is that social media allows to ren-
der visible subterranean narratives that have a universal quality 
because it’s happening all over the country, all over the world. 
And so whether we be in Sweden, in Amsterdam— I covered 
the London riots for Vibe magazine, in any of these spaces, the 
story is the same. And so it’s not about the way in which hege-
mony functions, for hegemony is not that imaginative. We got 
about five things it does: hypersexual stereotypes, legislative re-
pression, vigilante violence, state- sanctioned violence, outside 
of the state lynchings, Matthew Shepard, Emmett Till. It’s real 
limited, it’s not that imaginative at all. Because we’re talking 
about a global crisis. The global economy is collapsing, attack-
ing a people, using the same methods. And people resist in 
similar ways through the new technology of social media and 
the new technologies of warfare. In Ferguson, the same tear 
gas company that makes the tear gas took a shot in Palestine 
when I was there in Palestine. Yeah, that’s right, and there were 
some Palestinians who were tweeting to us in Ferguson. This 
was an organized effort by the St. Louis Palestinian Solidarity 
Committee. Those tweets didn’t just emerge out of nowhere.
When you look at the way in which new technologies of 
warfare are being mediated combined with the way in which 
new technologies for moving capital have caused global crisis, 
we must function differently with the use of these tools. This is 
the discourse that emerges out of the Old Testament tradition 
of beating swords into plowshares. This happens all over the 
world, with people locally bound by time and space, region, 
land, political landscape, geographical location, physical land-
scape, et cetera. This is the case at the same time as the univer-
sality of neoliberalism is becoming more fluid.
DE KOSNIK. There’s so much in what you both are saying. What 
you two are generating is this idea that Ferguson serves as a 
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particular node in a network of collapse, with the caving in of 
certain parts of global capital. What’s interesting about social 
media is that they are built as networks. But what #Ferguson 
is able to surface is another network, a lived network of being 
subjugated by global capital, a real network that people live in 
their bodies every day but isn’t always perceived as such, as a 
global phenomenon.
SEKOU. Mhm.
DE KOSNIK. [That a] hashtag like Ferguson can travel so quickly 
across an established capital- funded network is a co- opting of 
sorts, making that network not exactly more substantial, but 
perhaps more physicalized in the body, a network to make that 
more real.
SEKOU. And to be sure that realness gets manifested only with 
masses of people in the street.
DE KOSNIK. Right. You can’t just be a node in a network.
SEKOU. No, it has to have bodies. That’s the trick, because one of 
the tendencies of neoliberalism is efficiency.
DE KOSNIK. Yeah.
SEKOU. You in the academy hear this all the time.
DE KOSNIK. Yeah.
SEKOU. What is the most efficient way is not the most efficacious. 
Five years and you out. It’s about efficiency. And so while it 
may be more efficient to tweet, it’s more efficacious to orga-
nize. The challenge becomes how do we not allow the spirit, 
the zeitgeist of neoliberalism, to commodify for the market 
the low- technology labor- intensive organizing and connecting 
with people. That’s a critical question for us, because it can 
take it— this is it and this is it, this is all we do. But what Fergu-
son does is that— when you look in Sarajevo and they’re doing 
“hands up,” I don’t even know if there’s Black people in Sara-
jevo, right? You know what I’m saying? I’m just saying, people 
who have a condition of blackness.
DE KOSNIK. Right, right.
SEKOU. Look at Ethiopian Jews in ’48 doing “hands up.” It’s differ-
ent than the West Bank, but in the context of ’48, it looks like 
America. Sell a colonial project, oppress a minority, racialize 
and inscribe access to rights in the US Constitution and in the 
framing of the very institution itself.
DE KOSNIK. Sure. Empire, not capital.
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SEKOU. Yeah.
DE KOSNIK. Capital as part of a larger project of empire.
SEKOU. That’s regardless of what your position is on Israel. You 
can’t argue them facts. It’s inscribed second- class citizenship, 
differentiated schooling, differentiated options on health, 
differentiated options on housing, differentiated options— 
differentiated treatment, differentiated treatment in the 
courts. Ethiopians inside ’48 look on TV and say that they 
look like us, “hands up.” I’ve been thinking about Paul Gil-
roy’s The Black Atlantic [1993], where he talks about the ship. 
The World Wide Web is that same kind of ship in the context 
of neoliberal and global capital. The ship was a feature of the 
market.
So what does the net, what does that infrastructure, what 
does the reproductions of those nodes look like and what are 
various ways in which we can engage in disruption? In the 
Movement for Black Lives a primary political tactic has been 
disruption, which is at one level mirroring the way in which 
hackers interact.
DE KOSNIK. One term that another theorist of the slave ship, Éd-
ouard Glissant [1997], a Caribbean poet and author, used, is 
errantry. The errant might just go off and do her own thing. 
There’s the path of the open boat, as he calls it, there’s the way 
it’s supposed to go, but then there’s the way it goes or the way 
it can be made to go. A lot of what he tries to valorize in Carib-
bean discourse is this errantry that doesn’t look like anything 
to somebody that expects grids or set paths. But if you’re not 
looking at paths that are already carved, if you’re just looking 
at agents or actors that are just transversing the field however 
they can think to do that, then something else emerges, some-
thing which is almost like a genre of errantry. That’s happen-
ing all the time. We just don’t always see it, but it’s also not 
concealed. I mean it’s happening in full view.
SEKOU. Mhm. But I would also want to add to that, that even in the 
well- worn past, there’s a certain way you can walk down it and 
it looks a lot different.
DE KOSNIK. Sure, yeah.
SEKOU. Because, in part, the difference between Caribbeans and 
African Americans is that there is a well- worn infrastructure.
DE KOSNIK. Mm, yeah.
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SEKOU. We inside the empire and we done snatched all they re-
sources to build this out, and so this treads in their paths. The 
question is how do we walk down them. That’s the difference 
between the spirit of the masters, too.
DE KOSNIK. Stuart Hall [1993] was wrestling with this question of 
the global postmodern in the early 1990s. He’s already wres-
tling with this question that I’m trying to articulate around 
Filipino- ness— which is the question of whether we are okay 
with Black culture just being wholesale appropriated and sold 
all over the world, as with the great era of hip- hop flourishing 
as a global music. How are we going to receive that? He tries to 
divorce style from the economy. The commodities are sold, but 
style proliferates. Those two forces spread, and one of them is 
monetized, but the other one is not divorced from the market. 
There’s something powerful and important about style repro-
ducing itself in different bodies all over the world.
SEKOU. Yeah, plus Black people, we just cooler. I think we just cool, 
that’s all. I mean you gotta be. It’s no wonder mass killings 
about Black folks in the USA every other day. Gotta be cool is 
a certain kind of political armor, a social protection in the face 
of vicious onslaughts. Turn on the TV and they’re coming for 
you. You walk down the street, they’re coming for you. Go get 
into the university— the average African American’s SAT scores 
probably ten percent higher than them average white student 
here. But you here on affirmative action, and some race ques-
tion come up and you gotta speak for 33 million African Ameri-
cans. So cool is a way in which this style is being reproduced 
in a certain kind of public decorum which is not necessarily 
connected to a respectability.
DE KOSNIK. In fact, I think it’s counter to a politics of respectability.
SEKOU. Yeah.
DE KOSNIK. Because I think that is what makes hip- hop attractive 
all over the world, that sense of young people especially not 
wanting to play in the politics of respectability but wanting an-
other path.
SEKOU. But one can be nonrespectable and thoroughly capitalist.
DE KOSNIK. Mhm.
SEKOU. Like Mark Zuckerberg, he can throw on a sweat suit and 
come here and be like, “Look it here, I’m about to make a bil-
lion dollars, ya’ll want some of this?”
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DE KOSNIK. Yeah.
SEKOU. In fact part of the cover given to the massive class warfare 
which I believe we’ve lost in the Bay Area is that in part, that 
the public discourse is about cool.
DE KOSNIK. Yeah.
SEKOU. Well, it’s beards, it’s tattoos, it’s the right brand. I think 
Apple is perhaps the greatest commodifier of cool ever. Right, 
right.
JOHNSON. Yeah, they’ve done it for decades.
SEKOU. Right, right, so you see that. Subaru is catching up if you 
look at some of the advertising now. These are market forces. 
Market, right. But it’s the articulation of cool that is ultimately 
about commodification.
DE KOSNIK. That’s the argument Emma Watson pulled.
Graduate Student 2. That’s what Old Navy was doing. They had 
hip- hop artists advertising, particularly when the Christmas 
season came around. I was more focused on who was in the 
commercials than what Old Navy was trying to sell. You get 
distracted, and I don’t know if that necessarily helps Old Navy 
’cause it’s like, I’m not buying your product, I’m just looking at 
who’s in the commercial.
SEKOU. The question again I’m concerned about is the zeitgeist, 
the spirit. This has to do with my own religious sensibilities as 
a Pentecostal. We’ll obsess over signs and wonders and con-
tinued revelation and the spirit of something. It’s a metaphor 
Cornel West uses. What you get when African souls play Euro-
pean instruments, you get jazz. Coltrane plays it a little differ-
ent than Kenny G. And so I am authentic when it comes to jazz; 
Kenny G is not jazz.
DE KOSNIK. But, you know, Western philosophers are also deeply 
concerned with spirit. At the heart of Hegelian philosophy, 
of which Heidegger is sort of the most recent proponent, is 
the idea of spirit and the unconcealing or concealing of world 
spirit.
SEKOU. I have a certain affinity for Heidegger even though he was 
a right wing.
DE KOSNIK. Nazi.





SEKOU. Both to his band members and his women in his life.
DE KOSNIK. Sure.
SEKOU. So where would you situate [Jean- Paul] Sartre on this spec-
trum of authentic and non- authentic jazz musicians?
DE KOSNIK. I think existentialism offers a real alternative to West-
ern philosophy that I think we’ve almost surrendered. It’s like 
we’ve given up on existentialism.
SEKOU. Mm.
DE KOSNIK. I often wonder whether it’s too nihilistic for neoliber-
alism. Neoliberalism prefers optimism. I just had my seminar 
that these guys are in. We read Lauren Berlant’s Cruel Opti-
mism [2011]. That’s a very existentialist work, because if you 
embrace existential philosophy, you’re saying things and be-
lieving things that are not optimistic. They’re not telling you 
there’s a light at the end of the tunnel— you’re just looking at 
the tunnel. You’re telling people you need to see the whole 
tunnel that you’re in, and you’re constantly the person that’s 
like, “Do you see the tunnel now, do you see it now? It’s huge 
and it goes all day long.” Even today, people don’t like that 
kind of philosophy. They like a philosophy that at least has the 
potential for some kind of solution at the end of it. I’m not 
sure that Sartre . . . I’m not sure what he does.
SEKOU. I think in light of our conversation that is interesting, be-
cause there’s a difference. In Western civilization, particularly 
at the end of the age of Europe, nihilism and optimism are 
branches on the same tree.
DE KOSNIK. That’s the Nietzschean part in Sartre. I can definitively 
say Sartre would say it, too; he’s coming out of the Nietzsche 
tree for sure.
SEKOU. But they were just born on the wrong part of the world to 
the wrong people. Spend some time with my grandmama. This 
has to do with luck and circumstances, right? I’m an existen-
tialist. If you haven’t heard it, it’s all over my writing and my 
thinking and my talking, ’cause I’m trying to make meaning 
out of this. Hopefully with a bit of style. To me the tragic flaw of 
the French existentialism that emerges between 1933 and 1968 
is materiality. It’s obsessing with the material, because at one 
level it’s a child of Marx. Camus, Sartre, even Simone de Beau-
voir, all of them come through the communist and then social-
ist traditions. There’s an obsession in which matter is sold both 
primary and soul. It’s the only thing we’re concerned about, 
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the material conditions. Ain’t nobody come and save you, you 
gotta put your head down and deal with this. That’s one part 
of the way in which African Americans— I’m just talking about 
Black folks I’m suspicious of— I suspect that folks from oth-
er parts of the world across racial lines got something for it, 
but I just got what my grandmama gave me. That’s because of  
Camus’s meditation on suicide. If you base it on the pure logic, 
the analytical stuff is all in it, you know. His meditation on sui-
cide makes sense. They right. I might as well go on and kill my 
damn self.
They sold you on the material conditions. Europe is bombed 
out. Germany, you know, had been obsessing with enlighten-
ment. You know, for what, eight hundred years, Germany dom-
inates the philosophical mind and for two hundred years of 
the American project Germany dominates the philosophical 
project, so this idea of right thinking leads to right behavior, 
which is essential to the Enlightenment. And then Hitler pops 
the fuck out. It’s a death knell. We thought we had beat the 
Church. We got significant ruptures in the Church with Martin 
Luther, and then the present rebellions, right? So we breaking 
away from the Church, we breaking away from these masters 
and gods, and the next thing we know, Hitler pop up. Europe 
in all of its grand glory and of all of the self- referential cre-
ations of itself throughout the continent devastated, millions 
upon millions killed. Grand architecture standing for a thou-
sand years is destroyed, and there’s white folks killing white 
folks. It’s not savages from the Philippines and Africa.
And when you look at that, at one level Europe has the 
blues, but it doesn’t have the intellectual and cultural weapon-
ry to combat the blues. That’s because of the material question. 
The European elites throw out discourses about the unholy 
other by virtue of the fact that because the Catholic churches 
dominated so much, so you want to get away from it. We not 
doing none of that magic spooky shit. So where’s that in terms 
of the African American existentialist tradition is to look at the 
material conditions and call them a lie.
DE KOSNIK. So metaphysics is the branch of the tree that answers 
that nihilism.





JOHNSON. I wonder where Césaire and Fanon fit into this conversa-
tion.
DE KOSNIK. I mean [Aimé] Césaire, [Frantz] Fanon, and Sartre all 
endorsed and advocated for what we would now call terrorism. 
I mean, it’s a colonial resistance in Fanon’s case, but even then 
the imperial forces would’ve called that terrorism.
SEKOU. In fact, the word “terrorism” emerges out of the French 
cafés in their response to the French Revolution.
JOHNSON. Right, right. But Fanon’s response is that Europe 
doesn’t have answers to the problems it’s created in the world. 
Nazi genocide is in a certain way a kind of chickens coming 
home to roost for colonial powers. Also, thinking about a sort 
of a wholesale transformation of subjectivity that’s articulated 
to what he’s describing as the total disordering of the colonial 
world. That decolonization is a total scramble. The first move-
ment may be a movement that is an anticolonial counter. But 
the first move in that is a psychic transformation, a psychic de-
colonization.
DE KOSNIK. Yeah, free the mind.
JOHNSON. Yeah, right.
SEKOU. I work with the fellowship of an interfaith peace organi-
zation. The more I work with the org and the more I’ve seen 
nonviolence work in the street, now, in the context of some 
constitutional restraint, like at least we got the myth of the US 
Constitution. They may violate it, but at least we can go to court 
and the lawyer’s gonna make an argument. I might get my 
charges reduced a little bit. Now, that’s a different context than 
Palestine, where there’s a different relationship to the colonial 
project. Because in the context of the US, Black people are won-
dering what that political project is and how it plays itself out as 
it relates to questions of violence at the first stage. Because the 
first stage you did describe in terms of a psychic break.
JOHNSON. Mhm.
SEKOU. A rejection of the psychic violence of the colonial project 
is the first move, which for me doesn’t necessarily move un-
equivocally to the question of what Fanon calls revolutionary 
violence.
JOHNSON. Right, right, right.
SEKOU. ’Cause my concern is . . . I grew up with guns. My concern 
is that the tool itself is a tool of conquest. That the history and 
the making of the gun, its sole purpose is for the conquest of 
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other humans. That technology is only useful in those terms. 
We don’t need it to hunt. People hunted [during] the vast ma-
jority of human experience without it.
DE KOSNIK. Yeah, it’s for people, not animals.
SEKOU. And so given the history of that technology of weaponry, 
there’s something about it. When you hear when people talk 
about picking up weapons . . . 
DE KOSNIK. Or they carry.
SEKOU. I mean, in terms of soldiers on the battlefield— how they 
talk about their relationship to the weaponry, where the gun 
becomes more human than the person they’re shooting at.
DE KOSNIK. Mhm, right.
SEKOU. It gets anthropomorphized. That lends up a question for 
me. Now, the bourgeoisie conference of the interior of the 
American empire predicates where I have access to consti-
tutional restraints, that there is in some form a valid, if not 
mythological or perceived use of revolutionary or nonviolent 
protests to transform society. Jury is still out on it, but it’s still at 
least in the air in the discourse . . . 
DE KOSNIK. Perhaps that jury is working similarly on whether social 
media has that element of performing out something that isn’t 
particularly foolproof but becomes relevant, becomes some-
thing foregrounded, becomes something that hinges on peo-
ple’s realities as opposed to be something that happens in an 
isolated way. I don’t want to claim too much for social media, 
but there is this tactic, this tactical use of it. I think it does work 
sometimes in some cases.
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seven |  Confused Cats and  
Postfeminist Performance
lyndsey ogle
In the summer of 2014, Twitter newsfeeds were bombarded with images 
of cats. A play on benign LOLcat memes that juxtapose cute felines with 
humorous captions, #ConfusedCatsAgainstFeminism was a parody of the 
photo hashtag campaign #WomenAgainstFeminism. Employing the cue 
card confessional trope (K. Hall 2015), young (primarily white) women 
used the hashtag #WomenAgainstFeminism to reject feminism and to 
refute digital feminists’ claim to speak for them, particularly through the 
hashtag #YesAllWomen. Through selfie- style photographs, the women 
combined analog and digital modes of autobiographical storytelling, 
posing with handwritten signs, most expanding on the phrase “I don’t 
need feminism because . . .” For its part, #ConfusedCatsAgainstFeminism 
reenacted these images, posing anthropomorphized cats with signs that 
parodied what contributors saw as the confused and confusing logic of 
#WomenAgainstFeminism. The images ranged from the satirical to the 
absurd, with messages like “I don’t need feminism because . . . I like to clean 
myself and everyone knows feminists don’t bathe”; “I don’t need feminism 
because . . . I think dogs are nice even though some try to kill me”; and “I 
don’t need feminism because . . . I’m a cat and I don’t know what feminism 
is.” These images served to reinforce the narrative that women who re-
ject feminism are either willfully ignorant or incapable of acting in their 
own best interest.
Taken together, #WomenAgainstFeminism and #ConfusedCatsAgainst 
Feminism participate in the online circulation of postfeminist performance— 
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interdependent narratives and representations that conflate feminist 
and antifeminist ideologies and forms. In seeking to articulate and sub-
sequently reject the perceived position of the opposition, these postfemi-
nist performances essentialize the complicated (and confusing) inter-
sectionality that makes feminism a productive political endeavor. Instead 
they recreate the neoliberal conditions of precarity and its demands for 
the continual reinvention and display of the gendered self. They simul-
taneously foreclose the possibility of any fixed and stable reference point 
from which to demarcate the beginning and end of a digital feminist 
exchange.
While the exchange between #ConfusedCatsAgainstFeminism, 
#WomenAgainstFeminism, and #YesAllWomen is but one trajectory 
through which to map the rise of postfeminist performance online, it 
does highlight the increased emphasis on the visual and performative 
in all areas of social media, including Twitter. Where it was once argued 
that we must “write” ourselves into existence online (Sundén 2003), the 
notion of disembodied identity performance on Twitter (widely reject-
ed by performance theorists, critical race scholars, and feminist media 
scholars, to name a few) has been increasingly dispelled in mainstream 
media discourse by the prevalence of memes, selfies, videos, and emojis 
standing in for textual performance, even within the confines of politi-
cal debate. Further, this particular exchange uniquely demonstrates the 
degree to which modes of identity performance thought to be gendered 
are regularly dismissed, even within feminist discourse.
Social movements and their countermovements have never existed 
as discrete entities defined solely in opposition to one another. Women’s 
groups have always responded to, appropriated, and transformed the 
messages and techniques of countermovements against feminism— that 
is, antifeminism has constantly informed and altered the trajectory of 
feminist discourse and activism. Therefore, these adversarial agents, fem-
inism and antifeminism, must be conceptualized together as engaged in 
a “dialectical process” (Steuter 1992) that, in its combination and mu-
tual antagonism, shapes broader understanding of postfeminism. If as 
Stuart Hall (1991) argues, identity is part narrative and part representa-
tion, we might consider how postfeminist identity is formed in relation 
to contradictory performance. In other words, if postfeminist identity is 
defined in terms of what it is not, how can both the narratives circulated 
and the modes of representation employed by self- identified feminists 
and antifeminists help us understand the conditions of postfeminist per-
formance today?
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The Postfeminist Narrative
Women Against Feminism was launched on Tumblr in the summer 
of 2013 and gained a Facebook presence in January 2014 but did not 
begin to trend on Twitter and across mainstream media until it was 
used as a response to the feminist hashtag #YesAllWomen. Placing 
#WomenAgainstFeminism in direct conversation and conflict with 
#YesAllWomen allowed the hashtag and its users to reach a level of vis-
ibility that might not have been possible otherwise. Twitter user @gilded-
spine created #YesAllWomen in May 2014 after Elliot Rodger’s misogynis-
tic killing spree near the University of California, Santa Barbara. Women 
deployed the hashtag to share their stories of violence, harassment, and 
sexism, arguing that while #NotAllMen practice these behaviors, all 
women do in fact experience them. While #YesAllWomen was intended 
to capture the struggle of all women, it was quickly criticized for erasing 
the voices of many, including that of @gildedspine as a Muslim woman 
of color. Queer feminists and feminists of color responded with hashtags 
like #YesAllWhiteWomen and #EachEveryWoman, critiquing what they 
perceived to be white feminism’s continual erasure of race, class, sexu-
ality, and ability in its privileging of gender above all else. At the same 
time, the women who participated in #WomenAgainstFeminism defied 
#YesAllWomen’s assumption that it could speak for them, citing, among 
other things, conservative values, religious beliefs, and views about gen-
der roles.
While some of the #WomenAgainstFeminism contributors did deploy 
stereotypes of feminists as “man- haters, lesbians, and radical activists,” 
most, I argue, used the hashtag to articulate postfeminist anxieties relat-
ed to what Angela McRobbie (2004) has called a “double entanglement” 
or forward movement in sexual and economic freedoms for women that 
coincides with a “patriarchal retrenchment” of social conservatism (xi). 
The assumption that feminism has already succeeded and is thus no lon-
ger necessary is taken up by postfeminist discourse alongside a backlash 
of rhetoric that condemns feminism as an impossible quest to have it all 
or a tyranny of political correctness. We see this articulated frequently 
throughout #WomenAgainstFeminism in posts like “I don’t need feminism 
because . . . I like it when men say compliments about my body.” “I don’t 
need feminism because  .  .  . God gave us different skills. That is not male 
oppression.” And, “I don’t need feminism because . . . I enjoy my role as a 
supportive wife. I love that my man is the head of the household and 
I value being a stay- at- home mom over slaving for a corporation while 
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neglecting my family.” In these posts, women do not address the political 
dimensions of feminism but rather focus on personal relationships and 
identities.
Rosalind Gill argues that feminism can best be understood as a “sen-
sibility” in which a neoliberal emphasis on empowerment, individualism, 
and choice displaces notions of the social or political such that individu-
als resist any idea of being “subject to pressures, constraints, or influenc-
es from outside themselves” (Gill and Scharff 2011, 7). More often than 
not this is manifested in #WomenAgainstFeminism as calls for human-
ism, egalitarianism, and the belief that women are already equal. As one 
contributor writes, “I don’t need feminism because I don’t need others 
to fight my battles for me . . . I believe in earning things for myself . . . 
I believe in proving that I am worthy of what I want and not expecting 
them to be handed to me because I feel entitled.” Here again the focus 
is on personal responsibility and a rejection of representations of women 
as victims or oppressed.
The postfeminist narrative serves not just as a way to refute femi-
nism or to argue that it is no longer needed but also as a way for main-
stream media and digital feminists to counter the rhetoric of groups 
like #WomenAgainstFeminism by offering a picture of feminism that is 
simple, un- confusing, and as Jessalynn Keller (2013) writes, “nonthreat-
ening to the status quo.” In 2015, following the major mainstream me-
dia coverage of #WomenAgainstFeminism, the Huffington Post released 
a video featuring reporters Zeba Blay and Emma Gray titled “What 
Saying ‘I’m Not a Feminist’ Really Means.” In it, the two fashionable 
young women perform a dialogue in which they seek to distance the 
movement (and themselves) from stereotypical portrayals of feminists 
as “hairy, man- hating lesbians” and reframe feminism as a choice, in 
principle if not in practice. They alternate between proselytizing to the 
Women Against Feminism and dismissing them en masse while relying 
on familiar postfeminist narratives. They remind viewers that feminism 
simply means equality between the sexes and that— thanks to the work 
of first- and second- wave feminists— women have the freedom to choose 
to identify in any way they like. By associating equality with choice, they 
obscure the problematic function of equality as the aspirational direc-
tive of feminism within a neoliberal framework that uses it as a ratio-
nale for public austerity measures, anti– affirmative action practices, and 
normative identity politics (Duggan 2003). Additionally, by enacting the 
narrative of choice through a performance that signifies that to reject 
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feminism is to be rendered ridiculous and ignorant, they dismiss the 
productive potential of disidentification for marginalized people who 
neither embrace nor reject the racial or sexual mainstream outright but 
appropriate particular aspects of it to serve their own practices of em-
powerment (Muñoz 2009).
Blay and Gray’s video was only one of dozens of op- eds, blog posts, 
and “listicles” created during the summer of 2014 in response to 
#WomenAgainstFeminism. The outpour was unsurprising. In an age 
when questions over one’s stance on or identification with feminism are 
regular fodder for tabloids, gossip sites, and entertainment news shows, 
feminism is no longer just a political stance but has become a highly 
valuable and regularly traded commodity. To claim or reject feminism, 
in name or in practice, is to situate oneself within a neoliberal framework 
that demands we continually reflect upon and perform our identities in 
ways that contribute to their commodification and consumption. The 
demands of neoliberalism are decidedly gendered. “To a much greater 
extent than men,” Rosalind Gill and Christina Scharff (2011) explain, 
“women are required to work on and transform the self, to regulate every 
aspect of their conduct, and to present all their actions as freely chosen” 
(7). This self- management extends beyond a woman’s identification with 
feminism (or not) to the continued appraisal of her self- performance in 
relation to gendered practices of representation.
Postfeminism and Autobiographic Performance
The women of #WomenAgainstFeminism construct their identities in 
relation to feminism not just through the production of postfeminist or 
antifeminist narratives but also through the “staging” of online identi-
ties through what Deirdre Heddon (2008) calls “autobiographic per-
formance.” Like “postfeminism,” the term “autobiography” harbors a 
history of contradictory meanings, in this case tied to the gendering of 
the form. As a practice of the male bourgeoisie, autobiography was as-
sociated with the exemplary if unusual life that was thought to offer in-
sight into the essence of humanity (Felski 1989). As Sidonie Smith and 
Julia Watson (2002) observe, men were ascribed with “the intellect and 
aesthetic command to make their lives richly self- reflexive, to assess the 
problematic nature of self- knowing and self- telling” (12). On the other 
hand, it was argued that “women could not transcend but only record 
the concerns of the private self” (Stanton 1984, 132, cited in Smith and 
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Watson, 12). While male autobiography was concerned with the extraor-
dinary, women were thought to be narrowly preoccupied with the quo-
tidian, the domestic, and the personal.
In the 1960s and 1970s, second- wave feminists appropriated the au-
tobiographical form specifically for its ability to connect the personal to 
the political, and everyday experiences to the collective reality of women. 
Personal experience was used as evidence of political and structural in-
equalities, but as Heddon contends, the “authenticity” and “authority” 
attributed to these accounts often presented an “unproblematized truth” 
that essentialized all women (2008, 25) As the critiques of #YesAllWomen 
demonstrated, such representations tend to prioritize and recirculate 
the same voices, the same truths— namely, that of middle- class white 
women.
The mode of autobiographic performance enacted by #Women 
AgainstFeminism closely aligns with what Ruth Felski calls the “femi-
nist confession” that “foreground[s] the most personal and intimate 
details of the author’s life” (1989, 87). The feminist confession is de-
fined by a tension between the need to demonstrate the unique authen-
ticity of the individual and the desire to locate that subjectivity within 
a communal experience that links all women (93). It is an embodied 
form of self- disclosure that seeks to claim and make visible a subjec-
tivity that has been repressed by dominant culture. Thus, even while 
#WomenAgainstFeminism uses the confession to enact antifeminist and 
postfeminist ideals, the form still serves to articulate agency within com-
mon systems of representation, in this case Twitter and, more broadly, 
social media.
As a mode of autobiographical performance, the feminist confession 
is directed at both the self and the Other. It assumes a complicit audience 
of women that will reaffirm the performance of identity. It is both a long-
ing for and enactment of intimate connection with a “projected com-
munity of female readers who will understand, sympathize and identify 
with the author’s emotions and experiences” (Felski 1989, 110). Felski 
argues that the written feminist confession encodes the audience as fe-
male through “a tone of intimacy, shared allusions, and unexplained ref-
erences” (99). #WomenAgainstFeminism encodes its audience through 
the juxtaposition of visual, textual, performative, and digitally rendered 
modes of representation thought to be gendered female— the selfie, the 
handwritten text, and the phatic exchange. These forms are often criti-
cized as being narcissistic and self- indulgent while also being assumed to 
be more authentic and intimate than the performances of men.
Revised Pages
Confused Cats and Postfeminist Performance  129
Rather than simply reading these forms as “‘tools’ for rendering a 
preexistent self,” I draw on Smith and Watson’s exploration of “autome-
diality” to consider the degree to which “the materiality of a medium 
is constitutive of the subjectivity rendered” (2010, 168), and thus how 
these forms shape our understanding of postfeminist performance. It 
is the relationship between the embodied confessor and the materiality 
or mediation of the confession, what Smith and Watson (2002) call the 
“relational interface,” that stages the subject in relation to feminism. It 
is also what reveals her interpellation within a postfeminist performance 
that makes use of feminist forms to exert agency against the demands of 
neoliberalism.
As previously mentioned, the majority of images circulated on Twitter 
and on the Women Against Feminism Tumblr take the form of selfie- 
styled photography in which a young woman poses with a handwritten 
sign that reveals a private aspect of her identity— in this case, her re-
lationship to feminism. Kimberly Hall (2015), drawing on the work of 
Michel Foucault (1978), argues that key to this cue- card confessional 
trope is the “centrality of the handwritten account” (Hall 2015, 230). 
The idiosyncrasies of each handwritten sign— from the spelling, punc-
tuation, color, and format, to the materiality of ink on paper— assert an 
indexical authority over the affective narrative produced by each image 
that challenges the ephemerality of digital circulation “as a marker of a 
particular moment that survives in its specificity” (231). The artifice often 
associated with digital modes of self- representation is displaced by the 
authenticity of each crossed- out word or error. This intimate and gen-
dered aesthetic (historically associated with the letter or diary) allows the 
viewer to feel “as if [they were] able to access the producer’s innermost 
thoughts” (232). It reinforces the sense of an embodied one- on- one en-
counter and shifts our understanding of the #WomenAgainstFeminism 
meme from a static image to a performative speech act.
In most of the photos, women hold their handwritten signs near or 
partially obscuring their face. Often the words are placed directly in front 
of the mouth in a manner that seems to indicate that the words should 
be experienced as the embodied voice of the confessor. “Voice” is not just 
a metaphor, James Phelan (2010) argues; rather, it is “a learnable kind of 
synesthesia: as we see words on the page we can hear sounds” (2, cited in 
Smith and Watson 2010, 79). The #WomenAgainstFeminism meme can 
thus be read as a “trace” of the “performance of communicative action” 
(Frosh 2015, 1610). This image, Paul Frosh argues, “says not only ‘see 
this, here, now,’ but also ‘see me showing you me’” (1610). Frosh’s view of 
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the selfie form upends assumptions about a woman’s agency within the 
social field of image production and image consumption and challenges 
previously established beliefs about the gendered power dynamics in 
viewing in which “men act and women appear” (Berger 1973).
Derek Conrad Murray (2015) offers a productive counter- reading 
of feminist self- portraiture, and the selfie specifically, that reasserts 
the representational agency within these forms and demonstrates how 
#WomenAgainstFeminism can operate as a mode of feminist confession 
within the neoliberal framework of postfeminism. Murray identifies a 
gaze that is “unapologetically female. In other words, it aggressively as-
serts a specifically female visual experience and aesthetic point of view” 
(500). Murray provocatively poses the selfie not as an acquiescence to 
the demands of neoliberalism but as “an instinct of self- preservation: a 
survivor- ship reflex” (512). It is a way for women to assert control over 
their own image and experience within the dehumanizing conditions 
of neoliberalism, which, regardless of political intent, can be read en 
masse as “a revolutionary political movement— a radical colonization 
of the visual realm and an aggressive reclaiming of the female body” 
(490). The significance of this reclamation is not solely in the enact-
ment of individual self- performance, or even in the personal revelation 
that is associated with the confession, but in the connection with others 
that results from these acts of self- expression— the fostering of what Zizi 
Papacharissi (2011) calls “the networked self.”
The repetition, appropriation, and circulation of the selfie and card 
confessional trope demonstrate an extension of “phatic exchange” that 
Paul Frosh explains “stage[s] sociability as a binding affective energy 
transferred between individuals in impersonal settings” (2015, 1623). 
Phatic exchange not only invites response; it demands it. This response 
is always embodied whether through the performance of gesture— a lik-
ing, retweeting or typed reply— or, as Kimberly Hall (2015) maintains is 
more often the case with social media tropes, a restaging of the initial 
image.
Postfeminism and Parody
Just as #WomenAgainstFeminism is suffused with feminist and antifemi-
nist practices, David Futrelle’s blog Confused Cats Against Feminism, and 
its attendant hashtag #ConfusedCatsAgainstFeminism, purports to be 
a feminist intervention but repeats many long- standing sexist tropes. 
Futrelle says that, through #ConfusedCatsAgainstFeminism, he in-
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tended to offer feminists a space of “catharsis” from the exhaustion of 
dealing with what he describes as the “myopic” and “ignorant” views of 
#WomenAgainstFeminism (Davis 2014). A closer examination of the blog 
reveals a more complicated and, well, confusing paradigm. By examining 
both the discursive framing and visual/performative tropes employed by 
Futrelle and his contributors to #ConfusedCatsAgainstFeminism, I argue 
that Futrelle resurfaces familiar characterizations of women as ridicu-
lous, ignorant, and unable to advocate for their own best interests, in 
no small part because they are blinded by the constant in- fighting from 
within their own ranks.
Futrelle says he was inspired to launch #ConfusedCatsAgainstFeminism 
in late July 2014, a few days after he read a blog post by noted memoir-
ist and blogger Jenny Lawson. In the post, Lawson writes, “Some of the 
reasons [the women who tweeted in #WomenAgainstFeminism] give for 
not needing feminism almost seem like a parody (“How the fuck am I 
suppose[d] to open jars and lift heavy things without my husband?”) 
and some (“I don’t need to grow out my body hair to prove I’m equal to 
men”) just make me wonder where in the world they got their definition 
of feminism” (Lawson 2014). Over the course of a meandering analogy 
in which she attempts to explain feminism through sharks, bees, and 
other bothersome yet beneficial creatures, Lawson articulates the many 
complexities and confusions within postfeminism that led the author to 
place herself in the ranks of “Women Who Are Ambivalent about Women 
Against Women Against Feminism.” Yet, when this idea was appropriated 
into meme form by Futrelle, much of Lawson’s nuance— her internal 
debates and sense of being conflicted about the apologists for, and an-
tagonists of, contemporary feminism— was lost in Futrelle’s parody.
In describing the project, Futrelle was careful to distinguish his tactics 
in relation to women from the tactics he used with men’s rights groups 
on his earlier blog, We Hunted the Mammoth. He makes a problematic dis-
tinction when he describes the need to be “gentler” with the women of 
#WomenAgainstFeminism than he had been with men’s rights activists; 
Futrelle claims that the participants in #WomenAgainstFeminism are po-
litically ignorant or disengaged but not necessarily driven by ideological 
agendas (Davis 2014). He goes so far as to say that “it just seemed right 
to do a parody reaction to [#WomenAgainstFeminism] that involved 
cats because cats are the ultimate representation of being clueless and 
self- absorbed and not particularly embarrassed to be clueless and self- 
absorbed” (quoted in Figuero 2014). Such assertions trigger a need to 
evaluate #ConfusedCatsAgainstFeminism beyond its claim to be a femi-
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nist project to consider in what ways silence feminist debate by disem-
bodying, thus disassociating, the claims of #WomenAgainstFeminism 
from the women who exert their agency (and privilege) in making those 
claims.
Cat imagery has a history in feminist discourse that dates back to the 
suffragette movement, when postcards featuring anthropomorphized 
felines were created by opponents of suffrage to portray the women as 
“silly, infantile, incompetent, and ill- suited to political engagement” 
(Wrenn 2013). Cartoons of cats also appeared in newspapers during the 
same period to highlight the disturbing behavior of wives who ventured 
outside of the home and into the political sphere. The unhappy animals 
were featured as the thoughtless victims of “bumbling, emasculated” 
fathers, abandoned by their wives, and left to care for home and fam-
ily (Wrenn 2013). In these mass- distributed media, cats represented the 
domestic sphere and were invoked to demonstrate a threat to traditional 
family values and gender roles.
These tropes continue in contemporary gender humor. Limor 
Shifman and Dafna Lemish contend that contemporary humor construc-
tion extends beyond a “conservative/sexist” or “subversive/feminist” 
binary to include “post- feminist humour” (Shifman and Lemish 2010, 
872). Sexist humor establishes male superiority and makes women the 
target of ridicule. This type of humor relies on stereotypical portrayals 
of women as “stupid, illogical, ignorant, or irresponsible” (Shifman and 
Lemish 2011, 254) and as “nagging sexual objects” (Shifman and Lemish 
2010, 873). Feminist humor can be identified as challenging or subvert-
ing traditional gender stereotypes and constructions of femininity, often 
by targeting men. Shifman and Lemish argue that postfeminist humor 
emphasizes the biological and cultural differences in men and women, 
but without the hierarchization found in sexist humor. Inasmuch as both 
men and women become targets for ridicule in postfeminist humor, 
both “different but equally defective,” the authors caution against read-
ing such texts as liberating and empowering for women in that much 
of the “popular Internet gender humor focuses on the ‘different’ while 
totally ignoring the ‘equal’” (886).
#ConfusedCatsAgainstFeminism extends the feline metaphor in a vi-
sual play on the always already sexualized image of the female catfight. 
Media catfights often pit the domestic, conservative woman against the 
sexually liberated working girl. Harnessed by the news media in the 
United States since the 1970s to detract and diminish the significance 
of feminist debates, the catfight has served to foster a reductive and du-
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alistic image of feminist discourse (Hammer 2002, 21). Susan Douglas 
argues that a key tactic used to paralyze the feminist movement in the 
1970s was to leverage and publicize the antifeminist sentiments of disen-
franchised women in press reports:
Women with no economic or political power were used as stand ins 
for men who opposed feminism. Through this tactic, male journalists 
could ask why men should support changes even most women didn’t 
want, and they could smirk over one of their favorite events, the cat-
fight, while smiling knowingly and maintaining that women were dif-
ferent from men, and weren’t those differences cute and delightful. 
(1994, 186)
The language of the catfight has been redeployed by both men and 
women to describe the way in which online “feminist debates often 
turn into seemingly never- ending processes of calling out and blam-
ing for offensive terminology and the ignorance of various groups” 
(Thelandersson 2014, 528). This critique of heightened debate not only 
reads to many as “tone policing” or as a way to silence marginalized 
voices who are rightfully angry, but it also acts as another layer of compli-
cation in the circulation of postfeminist discourse.
Postfeminism and Eventfulness
As we have seen, the “pattern of interdependence” (Steuter 1992) be-
tween feminist and antifeminist narratives and representations manifests 
itself through an intertextual/intermedial call- and- response format in 
which users appropriate, modify, and recirculate the form, content, and 
rhetorical stance (Shifman 2014) of oppositional memes in order to 
make postfeminist claims about female subjectivity. For Samantha Thrift, 
users who participate in these hashtags, be it to catalog everyday acts of 
sexism and misogyny, debate feminist issues, or to participate in “ironic 
activism,” as in the case of #ConfusedCatsAgainstFeminism, render their 
subjects “eventful— that is, worthy of documentation, of remembrance, 
and of public and political discussion” (2014, 1091).
This eventfulness, I argue, is the distinguishing characteristic of post-
feminist performance online, which, thanks to the rhizomatic prolifera-
tion of content through Twitter and across the web, prevents any perfor-
mance from ever solidifying as a “proper object- event” (Caduff 2014, 39– 
40), forcing the gendered subject to continually reevaluate and reper-
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form her relationship to feminism. Carlo Caduff (2014), building on the 
work of Lauren Berlant, proposes that eventfulness (or eventualization) 
should actually be imagined as “the enactment of impossibility,” and as 
such, a postfeminist performance might be read as always incomplete.
I argue that it is this sense of incompleteness that most closely encap-
sulates the precariousness of postfeminism, with its multiplicity of mean-
ings and contradictions and its complicating layers of intersectionality 
and mediation. The affective linkages generated through social media’s 
feedback loops— which may appear to be nothing more than confusion, 
a series of confused and confusing exchanges— constitute the conditions 
of postfeminist performance. Such affective linkages extend beyond the 
life of any particular hypertext. As Jodi Dean explains, “[Affective net-
works] enable mediated relationships that take a variety of changing, un-
certain, and interconnected forms as they feed back each upon the other 
in ways we can never fully account for or predict. So while relations in 
affective networks merge and diverge in ways resistant to formalization, 
the circulation of intensities leaves traces we might mark and follow” 
(2010, 22). We might see these episodes of intertextual propagation, as 
postfeminist performance, whether they claim to be post- , against, or 
with feminism, distinguishing this moment of diffuse, multivocal and 
multimodal discourse from previous moments of feminism.
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Virtual Survivor- Centered Spaces for Transformation  
and Abolishing Partner Violence
julia havard
The 2014 hashtag #WhyIStayed created a virtual survivor- centered space 
that forged new approaches to online activism and abolishing partner vi-
olence. #WhyIStayed models a unique approach to anti– sexual violence 
activism, one that unravels the complex question of why people who 
experience relationship violence stay with abusive partners. In unpack-
ing the embodied resonances of #WhyIStayed, we unravel an alternate 
“hashtivism” that lifts up the possibility of change without visible action, 
the transformation that occurs within the act of staying that makes leav-
ing possible. By “leaving” I mean both leaving an abusive relationship 
and leaving behind the ideologies that encourage our complicity in vio-
lent systems. #WhyIStayed centers feeling, reflecting, expressing, nam-
ing, creating, and imagining as forms of activist labor, all acts that can be 
done surreptitiously or in confinement. #WhyIStayed teaches us that a 
still body is capable of vast interpersonal and social change.
I argue that #WhyIStayed’s centering of survivors’ bodies, experienc-
es, narratives, and feelings links liberation from intimate violence to lib-
eration from systemic violence and points to survivor magic, the unique 
resources that survivors have because of the experience of trauma that 
allow us to develop alternative models of justice that disrupt both in-
terpersonal cycles of violence and the violence of the criminal justice 
system. I ask the question “Why we stayed” versus “Why they stayed,” situ-
ating my position as a white queer survivor of relationship violence in 
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an understanding that my liberation is bound up with the liberation of 
all survivors. It benefits every survivor to understand how systems only 
built to benefit some of us fail all of us. Or in the words of Twitter user 
@egafify in a recent hashtivist movement to free survivors from crimi-
nalization, “Im a survivor / I was not criminalized / All of us or none 
#decriminalizesurvival” (May 22, 2017).1
#WhyIStayed’s Origins and Context
#WhyIStayed originated when Baltimore Ravens running back Ray Rice 
and his then fiancée, Janay Rice (née Palmer) were arrested and each 
charged with assault on February 15, 2014 (CNN 2014). On February 19, 
2014, TMZ released security footage of the incident leading to their ar-
rests, which showed Ray Rice dragging Janay Rice out of an elevator (Hill 
2014). Atlantic City police stated that they had obtained more footage 
showing Ray Rice hitting Janay Rice and Janay falling unconscious in the 
elevator (CNN 2014). On March 27, Ray Rice was indicted on a charge 
of third- degree aggravated assault and the charges against Janay Palmer 
were dropped (CNN 2014). The two, who had been together for seven 
years and engaged for two, were married the next day (Hill 2014). Ray 
Rice was suspended for two games and entered a twelve- month interven-
tion program on May 21, 2014 (Bien 2014). When TMZ released addi-
tional footage of Ray Rice hitting Janay on September 8, 2014, there was 
an escalation of media controversy (Clark 2016). Fox News broadcasters 
questioned why Janay Rice went through with her marriage and argued 
that she was setting a negative example for other women (Clark 2016). 
In response to criticisms of Janay Rice, Beverly Gooden, a writer, activist, 
and survivor of domestic violence, joined a number of other survivors in 
tweeting her experience of domestic violence and why she stayed in her 
abusive relationship, using the hashtag for the first time: “I stayed be-
cause I thought it would get better. It never got any better. #WhyIStayed” 
(Clark 2016). Use of the hashtag subsequently exploded: a study by a 
team of computational linguists counted fifty- seven thousand tweets 
posted using #WhyIStayed within one month of the hashtag’s launch 
(Schrading et al. 2015).
The reasons for staying given by those who posted in #WhyIStayed 
varied, ranging from surfacing the complexities of loving an imper-
fect partner to the financial circumstances that impede leaving an abu-
sive relationship. When @DrHLove5 tweets, “#WhyIStayed I thought I 
could heal their wound” (September 8, 2014), it raises the point that 
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relationship violence involves mythologies between staying and heal-
ing. @DearArtemis tweets, “Because before you know it, everything 
is in his name and he can take it away when he’s mad. #WhyIStayed” 
(September 8, 2014), referencing the impact of economic injustice as a 
tool of manipulation in relationship violence. @MetaHashtivism tweets, 
“#WhyIStayed Because I thought that it had to be physical assault to be 
abuse” (September 9, 2014), citing a common misunderstanding of the 
multidimensionality of abuse. @NanGMbj writes, “#WhyIStayed Because 
he kept track of the mileage on my car and it had to match where I 
had been” (September 9, 2014). @MsDaneToYou writes, “He was every-
where. He stalked me online, at work, and at home. I felt like no matter 
what I did he would find me anyway #WhyIStayed” (September 8, 2014). 
These last two users both make reference to the logistical impossibility 
of escape.
Below are several tweets describing the hopelessness, fear, isolation, 
anger, gaslighting, and manipulation involved in relationship violence 
with various levels of complexity. Examined next to the easily defensible 
practical, economic, logistic, and physical violence- based reasons for 
staying mentioned above, these more feelings- based reasons for continu-
ing an abusive relationship craft #WhyIStayed as not only a catalog of 
personal answers to the question “Why did you stay?” but also an archive 
of feelings.
#WhyIStayed, because I thought if I were just a little 
bit nicer she’d stop hitting me (@PoderosaAna, October 
20, 2015)
#WhyIStayed I had alienated the majority of my friends 
and family. They were all that I thought I had left in 
this world (@divinenoise, September 9, 2014)
As a Blk queer radical feminist activist I was afraid 2 
tell community I was living the reality I was trying to 
dismantle #WhyIStayed. (@BerlinThatcher, September 8, 
2014)
Anne Cvetkovich’s 2003 An Archive of Feelings considers cultural texts as 
repositories of encoded emotions and practices. Because trauma is often 
difficult to represent, she notes that finding records of trauma requires 
creative archival search work. Employing Cvetkovich’s strategy of min-
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ing cultural texts for the feeling of trauma allows us to see these short 
records as encoded practices and to think creatively about how these 
tweets exist in relationship to larger cultural phenomena, such as the 
racist and sexist criminal justice system.
Rosemary Clark’s 2016 analysis of #WhyIStayed unpacks the social 
mechanisms behind its content, visibility, and impact. The hashtag had 
multiple functions and took different forms. Most tweets in the hashtag 
were framed as an answer to the question “Why did you stay?,” beginning 
with “Because” and offering an explanation. Clark found that the major 
content areas of the tweets fell into several main categories: personal sto-
ries of experiences with violence, analysis of how partner violence exists 
in relationship between broader systemic violence, tweets from observ-
ers calling attention to the hashtag’s work, tweets addressing survivors, 
and tweets that comment on stories of violence in the news. Despite this 
range of forms, Clark argues that, collectively, the #WhyIStayed tweets 
shifted blame from the survivors to those who enacted the violence, a 
sentiment initially voiced by the hashtag’s originator, Beverly Gooden 
(Cornish 2014), and echoed across the expansive archive of #WhyIStayed: 
@JMarjarie8765: “It’s beyond frustrating that society continues to ask 
me #WhyIstayed instead of demanding of abusers #WhyDoYouAbuse 
#DVAM #DV @IFloridaFrowned” (October 27, 2014); @_nanyap: “The 
reason Beverly started #WhyIStayed was to change the conversation from 
‘why did she stay?’ to ‘why did he abuse?’ #fresheyes” (October 27, 2014).
Survivors are often seen as responsible for our own trauma by educa-
tional and health care institutions as well as by media and the legal system. 
Blame for our own abuse also affects eligibility for disability benefits and 
accommodations. This perception impacts medical, psychological, and 
community care, as well as criminal justice processes. In October 2015 
the cofounders of Love and Protect (previously the Chicago Alliance to 
Free Marissa Alexander) launched the project #SurvivedAndPunished, 
which demands the immediate release of survivors of domestic and sex-
ual violence imprisoned for actions necessary for their survival. In a live- 
tweeted conference on October 24, 2015 titled “#SurvivedAndPunished,” 
cosponsored by the Center for Race and Gender at the University of 
California Berkeley, a panel discussion broke down the way that survivors 
of sexual violence are criminalized as a result of the imbricated oppres-
sive forces of sexism, racism, and transphobia. Windy Click, an activist 
and survivor of prison, described the case of a criminalized survivor who 
is still incarcerated. She discussed the conversation that ensued in the 
courtroom as the judge tried to reason why the survivor didn’t leave her 
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abusive partner. The judge ultimately decided that she “must have loved 
the abuse and that’s why she stayed.” Due to the judge’s survivor- blaming 
framework, the survivor was punished by the court system for not leav-
ing her husband, and the myth of prison as a simultaneously rehabilita-
tive and punitive space was deemed an appropriate legal response to 
survival. As shown in this case, unpacking this question of why survivors 
stay has vast implications, down to decisions surrounding survivors’ fates 
within the criminal justice system.
The kinds of narratives deemed acceptable in answering this ques-
tion often simplify survivors’ experiences, validating answers that have 
to do with physical and economic violence and minimizing answers that 
involve more complex reasons that could jeopardize a survivor’s image 
as a “good victim.” Alisa Bierria asserts that the question about why sur-
vivors stay evokes a “different kind of politics of respectability,” that in 
order to avoid victim blaming when answering this question, “survivors 
would have to present as sympathetic as possible” (2011– 2012). Bierria 
argues that in not exploring this question, we minimize survivors’ agen-
cy, further objectifying them. According to her, “Stigmatizing the ques-
tion ultimately dis- positions survivors’ subjectivities and actions, leaving 
little room to be frank and public about the complexity of our choices.” 
#WhyIStayed made a clear public intervention into the stigmatization of 
this question, carving out space in the public sphere for honest and com-
plex unpacking of the “less respectable” reasons survivors stay, including 
reasons involving love, care, community, and intergenerational trauma, 
among others.
This hashtag’s swell of popularity resulted in large- scale shifts across 
media. By the end of September 2014 (the hashtag’s first month in ex-
istence), news outlets across the United States, including Fox, the net-
work that originally aired the survivor- shaming comments, adopted the 
premise that survivors should not be blamed for our abuse. In addition, 
the national hotlines often distributed with the hashtag experienced an 
increase in reports of relationship violence (Clark 2016). As part of the 
hashtag’s structure, these facts were also tweeted out as reflective meta-
commentary on the hashtag’s efficacy: @ChicagoTrust tweeted, “After 
the #WhyIStayed hashtag launched calls to domestic violence hotlines 
went up by 65%. @bevtgooden #SMWsoulinsocial #whatyoudomatters” 
(November 18, 2015).
Along with shifting the national narrative, #WhyIStayed fueled ac-
tivists’ work outside of the formal organizations that often invisibilize, 
reduce, or ignore the narratives of survivors who are queer, people of 
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color, disabled, or otherwise marginalized. Clark details the way that this 
hashtag, through its ability to link so many individual stories, forges a 
kind of networked power that grew into digital collective action. I would 
add that by working outside of the nonprofit industrial complex, this 
hashtag was able to create a survivor- centered space for individual and 
collective narratives that intervenes in white cis straight women- centered 
antiviolence work and carves out a space for more complex intersection-
al stories and response, especially responses that engage with the ways 
that the criminal justice system fails survivors.
What is a survivor- centered space?2 According to the United Nations 
Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women, a survivor- 
centered approach is a way of working to end partner violence that pri-
oritizes the “rights, needs, and wishes of the survivor” (2012). This ap-
proach applies a human rights– based approach to designing program-
ming that ensures survivors get to actively choose the course of action 
in dealing with violence. Beyond a rights- based framework, a survivor- 
centered space is developed by and for survivors of sexual violence 
and stems from a respect for the fact that every survivor’s experience is 
unique and deserves its own schema for healing. It means that methods 
for accountability and justice come directly from a survivor, not our ad-
vocates or allies, but from what we explicitly identify as a need in order to 
heal. This process can require space for personal reflection, reframing, 
and other support in order for a survivor to locate needs in the frame 
of recovery. Twitter- based survivor spaces like #WhyIStayed can fill this 
need, unpacking the particularity of survivors’ narratives, manifesting 
the ways that institutional and nonprofit support fails most survivors, and 
simultaneously creating a space to hold these multidimensional stories 
and embodied experiences. These necessary spaces work to carve out 
public arenas for a multiplicity of survivor stories and build a movement 
by and for survivors. #WhyIStayed documents a movement toward and 
need for public spaces for discourse around intimate partner violence.
From archiving moments of transformation to sharing stories and 
sharing resources, #WhyIStayed is a single cultural object that plays a 
multitude of roles. A critical component of #WhyIStayed that has re-
mained undertheorized is the powerful criticism of state violence and 
how it reinforces interpersonal violence. #WhyIStayed asks why social 
services fail most survivors, why survivors can’t call the cops, and why 
the legal system does not provide the kind of justice that will serve sur-
vivors. Understanding and unraveling the content behind #WhyIStayed 
not only opens up questions about how intimate violence is linked to 
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and perpetuated by state violence; it also provides a model of collective 
action that centers survivors and imagines different worlds where justice 
is possible. In their complicity in the criminal justice system, most insti-
tutionalized and funded sexual violence response efforts have inherently 
cissexist, heterosexist, and racist barriers that prevent people of color, 
especially Black people and trans people from receiving care. Black sur-
vivors are disproportionately impacted by the anti- Black racism of these 
statewide systems. So it is meaningful that an African American woman, 
Beverley Gooden, developed and implemented #WhyIStayed. In the 
midst of victim support systems that were not built for her, she created 
her own survivor- centered organization, buffered by the press coverage 
and success of #WhyIStayed, the Ella Mae Foundation.
Racial and gender violence, both interpersonal and state- based, has 
deep historical roots, as do the survival strategies of women of color. I 
note this to ground #WhyIStayed as both an expressive, emotive phe-
nomenon and simultaneously a strategic gesture that has evolved from 
a long lineage of activist work. Women of color have been subjected to 
disproportionate partner and sexual violence for centuries in the United 
States, beginning with violence against indigenous and enslaved people, 
with rape employed as a tool of political control (Collins 2005). Women 
of color have also performed some of the earliest anti– sexual violence 
activism, speaking out about systemic rape in slave narratives, post- 
emancipation South, and protests. “Deploying their voices as weapons 
in the wars against white supremacy,” Black women built movements, 
employing their narratives in the service of civil rights and collectively 
working toward racial and gender justice (McGuire 2011). #WhyIStayed 
can be thought of as a tool with a historical lineage of leveraging person-
al testimony in the service of movement building, a strategy developed 
by Black women far before the white feminist movements of the 1970s.
#WhyIStayed as a cultural text deploys a diversity of tactics. Survivors 
using this hashtag express a strong discontent with the systems in place 
for handling partner violence cases, an aspect of this hashtag that re-
ceived far less media attention than the tweets working toward destigma-
tizing survivors, though destigmatizing surviving and working to undo 
unjust systems are, of course, efforts that are integral to one another. 
If we listen to survivors, we find a powerful link between the need for 
destigmatization and decriminalization. The tweets cite the complicity of 
police and the criminal justice system in perpetuating partner violence, 
framed through a survivor’s personal narrative and analysis. This analy-
sis includes observations about how calling the police often exacerbates 
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physical threat and violence, how the police sometimes have an inability 
to listen to survivor narratives, how officers’ can sometimes be cruel and 
unresponsive to survivors, how partner violence is more common in fam-
ilies of police, and, lastly, how the police tend to blame and criminalize 
survivors for their abuse. The tweets below reveal powerfully rendered 
reasons as to why the criminal justice system is ineffective and call for a 
different type of justice and a dismantling of the current justice system:
#WhyIStayed because the justice system couldn’t make 
me feel safe with a piece of paper that my abuser (and 
law enforcement) ignored (@MedSchoolMommy, September 9, 
2014)
#WhyIStayed so before judging victims of domestic 
abuse, maybe you should take a good hard look at our 
justice system + lack of support (@Loudina09, September 
9, 2014)
#Domesticviolence survivors are being imprisoned. This 
isn’t justice. #waronwomen #yesallwomen #WhyIStayed  
(@BeatnikSolstice, January 29, 2015)
This less publicized aspect of #WhyIStayed was all but erased in the me-
dia surrounding the hashtag’s spread, and this powerful work of chal-
lenging those in positions of power deserves to be raised up alongside 
the other important roles of this hashtag.
The Work of #WhyIStayed: Survivor Magic and Leaving Abuse
In the world of anti– sexual violence activism, which is so overwhelmingly 
structured by a punitive framework, imagining a future where response 
to sexual violence does not breed more violence demands creative labor 
and spaces for creative thinking, art making, and envisioning alternatives 
are essential. My colleague Tonika Sealy- Thompson described survivors’ 
creative work in the midst of trauma as “transformation of trauma into 
alchemy” (2016). Embedded in this theory is the idea that trauma, like 
alchemy, can be a process of significant change, where one substance is 
transmuted into another. There must indeed be a trauma alchemy that 
makes survivors dangerous to the systems that attempt to control them; 
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otherwise why would survivors who defend themselves be so routinely 
incapacitated by the justice system? #WhyIStayed explores the resources 
and spaces necessary to channel life- changing, life- saving survivor magic.
#WhyIStayed, in its link to its partner hashtag, #WhyILeft, makes the 
act of staying ripple with the imagined and realized possibilities of es-
cape. The tweets linking #WhyIStayed to #WhyILeft were some of them 
most retweeted, a reflection of their collective power (Clark 2016).
#WhyIStayed because I thought love conquers all 
#WhyILeft because I was right . . . love for my son 
gave me the strength to protect him (@crowfeather202, 
June 14, 2017)
“No one will ever love you like I do” #WhyIStayed No 
one should ever be “loved” like that . . . #WhyILeft  
(@ifthetiarafits, June 21, 2017)
#whyistayed my son #whyileft my son (@HannahAmbuchen16, 
May 21, 2017)
#WhyIStayed— he had me terrified. #WhyILeft— he had me 
terrified (@TearsofStars, March 2, 2017)
In the first two tweets, the users have constructed specific narratives to ex-
plain why they stayed and left. @crowfeather202 notes a kind of strength 
through love for their son and a desire to protect him, and @iftheti-
arafits shows an evolution of how their conception of the stakes of “love” 
shifted. But the second two users cite the same reason for #WhyIStayed 
and #WhyILeft, a formula not uncommon in this archive. These users 
were able to manifest a story of transformation using the same phrase for 
each act associated with the hashtags (staying and leaving). In these two 
tweets, the change happens through a shift in the feeling of the account, 
the work happening through and beyond the language in the tweets. 
Often the exact tipping point between staying and leaving is narratively 
excised from these Twitter stories in a productive ambiguity. In the mul-
tiplicity of #WhyIStayeds and #WhyILefts, it is impossible to reduce why 
we stay or leave to a single reason. We have no “correct” response to 
“Why did you stay?,” no single answer that others can be compared to for 
the sake of deciding who receives services and who is criminalized. This 
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openness shows survivors in process, occupying multiple temporal and 
imagined positions at once. We can think of this ability to be in multiple 
places at once as another element of survivor magic.
#WhyIStayed encourages us to ask, How do bodies of different move-
ment capacities protest? From the immobilization of a partner’s threats 
to the immobilization of incarceration, how does vital work for social 
change happen in moments when the body is still? Somewhere in the 
process of staying in an abusive relationship, the dream of a different 
world, or escape, is crafted from injury. @TheyDoExist__ writes, “I’m 
making my great escape this week. I have no idea where I’m going but 
I’m getting out of here. #WhyIStayed #DomesticViolence” (June 2, 
2017). @didipuppy85 tweets, “Tomorrow is the day. I can’t believe this 
is happening. 4 years #whyistayed and now I’m leaving. Up and away” 
(April 4, 2017). Users on the cusp of escape express a different genre of 
feeling for this archive— one of hope, excitement, disbelief. As each of 
these tweets suggests, #WhyIStayed not only contains an explanation of 
why survivors stay; it also provides space for the feelings of survivors on 
the edge of leaving. These users’ tweets show that in creating space for 
complexity, #WhyIStayed acts as an archive of moments of life- changing 
transformation in the midst of immobilization, suffering, or injury.
When I first witnessed #WhyIStayed and #WhyILeft, I experienced its 
collective resonance in my body. As I read the tweets, I felt a knowingness 
in my bones, a tightness around my diaphragm, and a sense of coming 
home. These stories expressed feelings and experiences I had never seen 
shared publicly. I remember watching the swell of tweets that September 
and feeling my own history rise up. My experiences with relationship 
violence were present in my body, but not in a familiar way, like when I 
would have flashbacks or panic attacks. Rather, I felt my own #WhyILeft 
present with my #WhyIStayed, and I experienced a sense of togetherness 
with the thousands of other survivors sharing our stories. My body was 
heavy with my story of surviving that I had carried alone for so many 
years, and it was also held in connection with thousands of other bod-
ies that carried different resonances of surviving across vastly different 
experiences. I felt an abundance of power in our collective #WhyILefts. 
This was my first experience with survivor magic, the feeling that if we 
can survive such impossible situations, we have the power to destroy im-
possible systems and build something new.
#WhyIStayed functions as a space for suffering, pain, hurt, inaction, 
or stillness. It is simultaneously a space for feeling, believing, reflect-
ing, and imagining, and it allows us to think of these immobile, often 
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invisible acts as forms of change making that can result in large- scale 
cultural shifts. One of Gooden’s more recent uses of the hashtag was a 
call for donations for the Bolt Bag Project, an initiative of her organiza-
tion, the Ella Mae Foundation. This project fills bags with necessities 
survivors may need upon leaving an abusive partner, such as toiletries, 
grocery store gift cards, and diapers, providing the opportunity for a 
speedy escape. Gooden communicated their availability and calls for 
donations via Twitter using #WhyIStayed and #WhyILeft. In addition, 
Gooden’s Bolt Bag site contains an “escape” button that allows users to 
swiftly exit the Bolt Bag website and automatically redirects the page to 
weather.com. This functions as a protective and defensive mechanism for 
a person in a violent home situation, where their computer usage might 
be observed or tracked. The boundaries between escaping and staying 
are blurred in the realm of the virtual where closing a window is a form 
of escape, linked to the desire for a larger- scale escape from a relation-
ship. Gooden’s work provides support for multiple modes of care, under-
standing that they’re linked: she initiated #WhyIStayed to facilitate the 
sharing of emotional support among survivors but has also shipped out 
nearly one thousand Bolt Bags to people escaping violence (Obie 2017).
Rethinking the relationship between these different scales of action, 
survivors imagine and desire different worlds even as we stay in violent 
relationships. When we consider desire itself as doing powerful work, 
we are thinking queerly about the futural possibilities of a body that 
stays, a body full of small gestures and feelings, vibrating with potential 
movement, which changes assumptions about the impact, size, mobil-
ity, and speed of agency. Laurence Ralph (2014) theorizes the power of 
dreaming in the midst of injury in his work with residents of Chicago’s 
Eastwood neighborhood. He discusses dreams as the material of change 
that reimagine how life could be, a future- oriented perspective where 
survivors of violence dream up alternatives to the ways things are, in-
formed by past narratives of injury. He writes, speaking of physical dis-
ability caused by gang violence, “Dreams keep people moving in spite of 
paralysis” (8), suggesting that immobilized bodies have a great capacity 
for radical, defiant, community- building dreaming work. Our language 
for social movements contains an ableism that #WhyIStayed challenges 
when it presents staying as a space where desiring, dreaming, and hop-
ing can create radical change.
This challenge to ableism in antiviolence movements is essential, 
since survivors’ bodies and minds are often permanently affected by the 
trauma they have experienced and the disabilities they may suffer as a re-
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sult of trauma. In addition, the experiences of survivors with disabilities 
are often underreported and underdiscussed in sexual violence activism. 
People with disabilities experience violent crime at three times the rate 
of people without disabilities (Bureau of Justice 2012), and when they at-
tempt to seek help or accommodations, the resources available are often 
not equipped to meet their needs (Scully 2016). Disability and queer 
studies scholar Alison Kafer offers a theory of how trauma- based disabili-
ties impact the embodied experience of time. She suggests that people 
who have post-traumatic stress disorder, which often accompanies expe-
riences of trauma, live in a kind of “anticipatory time,” constantly scan-
ning for future events that might contain a trigger. This relationship to 
time involves a projection of one’s body into the future while still inhab-
iting one’s body in the present. This theory offers a parallel to Ralph’s 
description of history- informed dreams of the future, survivors’ bodies 
holding the capacity for experiencing a multiplicity of time frames. I 
write this with care, noting that seeing disability as a resource does not 
discount the challenges of living with a disability or the experience of 
the oppression of an ableist world. This ability to hold multiple experi-
ences of time appears virtually in the space between #WhyIStayed and 
#WhyILeft, the body in each of these hashtags stretched across temporal 
moments. The futural glance of the hashtags, which point to a journey 
toward leaving, a state of having left, or a desire to leave, suggest another 
aspect of anticipatory time. Along with its debilitating aspects, it is pos-
sible that experiences of anticipatory time give survivors a perspective 
into the future. This unique sense of time may exist as a resource that al-
lows us to experience time in a different way, where we see things others 
do not and anticipate alternatives.
In the service of embodying the act of staying, I’d like to address 
something obvious yet often unspoken in academia: writing about surviv-
ing violence as a survivor is physically, emotionally, and mentally exhaust-
ing. Often in academic settings we write and teach as if we can escape 
our bodies. Staying with this space of trauma and envisioning trauma 
as transformative takes work— grueling, painful, tedious, personal work 
that is unpaid and unacknowledged. The only spaces where I have felt 
held enough to do this work have been survivor- centered spaces, writing 
with other survivors of relationship violence whose care, thoughtfulness, 
and encouragement has made entering into this archive possible, espe-
cially as my own relationship with physical disability has shifted. I have 
deep love and gratitude for my survivor babes and mentors who have 
allowed me to show up as my whole self, my broken pieces valued as 
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resources. The quality of this writing may feel fractured, disjointed, and 
this broken quality is a bodily relic of my writing process. It’s likely that 
fissures in this writing, such as the need for vastly more work on disability 
and sexual violence, are openings for further connective work.
#WhyIStayed’s archive of feelings does political and personal work on 
a multitude of levels. It clearly shifted media representation of survivors 
and shifted blame from survivors to perpetrators. It creates a survivor- 
centered space for a vast diversity and complexity of experiences with 
partner violence to coexist, moving away from one specific model of “re-
spectable” survivor stories. This hashtag encourages a vigorous critique 
of the systems currently in place for responding to sexual violence, as 
systems that perpetuate cycles of violence. Lastly, the hashtag constructs 
“staying” as a space of potential transformation, lifting up moments 
where staying becomes leaving, where survivors are able to manifest 
our magic and to dream different futures for ourselves. Staying with 
#WhyIStayed reveals how this hashtag works on multiple cultural levels, 
using a multitude of strategies to shift narratives and assumptions sur-
rounding staying with an abusive partner. #WhyIStayed works to take 
down the systems and frameworks that do not serve survivors and to 
build new ones by and for survivors in their place, and it manifests how 
survivors do this work in the midst of scarcity and trauma, surfacing the 
complexity and possibility within the act of staying.
Deep gratitude to Naomi Permutt, Erica Cardwell, Tonika Sealy- 
Thompson, Kenly Brown, Malika Imhotep, Clare Stinchcombe, Katrina 
De Wees, Beezer de Martelly, Natalia Duong, Rosalind Diaz, and Abigail 
De Kosnik for their invaluable feedback and support in the writing of 
this chapter.
Notes
 1. Though tweets are publicly available, because of the deeply personal con-
tent of these tweets, users have been made anonymous.
 2. My use of this term evolves from the Survivors’ Symposium held at UC 
Berkeley in April 2016. This event was cocreated by students, workers, activists, 
and artists responding to a lack of administrative response around multiple 
cases of gender- based violence on campus. We wanted to create a space that 
responded across institutional hierarchies, taking into account the relative pow-
er and precarity of survivors’ positions on campus, from the janitorial staff to 
tenured faculty. This symposium, which evolved from collaborations with local 
and national organizations such as BAWAR (Bay Area Women Against Rape), 
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Force: Upsetting Rape Culture (a national art activist organization aiming to 
upset the dominant culture of rape and promote a counter culture of consent), 
and Disclose (a queer Oakland- based art collective addressing sexual violence), 
as well as the UC Student- Workers Union, aimed to move activism away from a 
punitive dependence on the criminal justice system and university policy and to-
ward raising up the diversity of tactics that we use to recover from sexual violence 
and strategies of accountability and response that can be implemented through 
grassroots action.
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nine |  #gentrification, Cultural Erasure, and the 
(Im)possibilities of Digital Queer Gestures
josé ramón lizárraga and arturo cortéz
At a San Francisco memorial for Juan Gabriel, Latinx drag queen Persia 
took the stage to lip- synch Gabriel’s “Amor Eterno” while wearing a 
nude- colored bodysuit and black sombrero, all of which conjured a 
classed queerness and Latinidad.1 Persia is a mainstay in the vanishing 
Latinx queer scene in San Francisco, and her online activism and drag 
performances, including this tribute to Juanga, are part of her larger rep-
ertoire that explores the relationship between gentrification, race, class, 
and Latinx pop iconography. While people gathered at this public event 
to grieve Juanga’s recent passing, Persia’s performance challenged the 
audience to expand their feelings of loss to include the displacement— 
indeed, the erasure— of San Francisco’s Latinx queer community.
Broadly, Persia’s performances centralize how the recent expansion 
of technology- related industries have advanced spatial, cultural, and 
demographic shifts across the San Francisco Bay Area (Hutson 2015). 
Specifically, she foregrounds how the city of San Francisco— like cities 
around the world (Gulson 2011)— is promulgating social and spatial 
projects of displacement, dispossession, and gentrification in ways that 
are racialized, classed, sexualized, and gendered. In this respect, the city 
is increasingly being organized to serve the social and economic inter-
ests of its white, wealthy residents and the newly arrived technology work-
ers. However, Persia invites us to consider how race, class, and sexuality 
converge to amputate, evict, and discipline the depraved and perverse 
practices of San Francisco’s Black and Brown queers, in order to create 
sanitized gay homonormative subjects (Duggan 2002) of the city.
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Of relevance to this chapter, we examine how Persia’s work across 
digital and analog stages stimulates collective resistance practices against 
the deep entrenchment and advancement of the homonormative proj-
ect already under way in San Francisco. In particular, we make visible 
the collective imaginings percolating across Persia’s Twitter network as 
her fans, audience, and students engage in practices that are simulta-
neously dignity- affirming (Espinoza and Vossoughi 2014) and challenge 
the dominant order. On Persia’s Twitter network we pay special attention 
to those practices and artifacts— what we have to come to call digital queer 
gestures— that move across and between the digital and physical domains 
as queer Latinxs imagine and organize for new futures. While we illumi-
nate the practices of Persia, we further examine how her queerness is 
taken up, hybridized, and remixed to expand a collective understanding 
(indeed the learning) of the effects of gentrification from a racialized, 
sexualized, and classed perspective.
We highlight Persia’s digital queer gesture as public pedagogy (Reid 
2010; Savage 2010), or the learning that occurs in public spaces, popular 
culture, and political movements. We regard Persia as what Paulo Freire 
(2005) would call a cultural worker: one who actively resists the binaris-
tic division of the personal and professional identities of a teacher and 
brings her engagement with social issues to bear in her daily work with 
learners. We claim that Persia is a teacher who engages in the political 
cultural work in ways that Henry Giroux describes as mobilizing “knowl-
edge and desires that may lead in minimizing the degree of oppression 
in people’s lives” (2005, 5). In our view, she is a teacher who, as Diaz and 
Flores (2001) propose, understands the histories of the practices of her 
students and knows how to imagine something new with them, a queer 
future. The work we explore here follows the same logic; it resists pro-
viding an answer and seeks to catalyze new conversations, practices, and 
subversions that gesture toward the unknown. Like many queer encoun-
ters, “Google Google Apps Apps,” the digital queer gesture we feature, 
begins with a glance that turns to the horizon, perhaps hoping to find 
the secret meeting place that leads to a long, sweaty, and intense night of 
corporeal, linguistic, and aesthetic boundary crossing.
“Google Google Apps Apps”: A Digital Queer Gesture
In the following, we present Persia’s music video “Google Google Apps 
Apps” (2013)— a protest of the erasure, eviction, and extermination of 
queer Latinxs in San Francisco— as an example of a digital queer ges-
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ture. As a queer gesture, building on the work of Juana María Rodríguez, 
the video “inspire[s] intense feeling rather than reproduction; it is mul-
tisensory, asynchronic, polysemous, perverse, and full of promise” (2014, 
1). In effect, “Google Google Apps Apps” jars you out of time and space 
by offering a dystopically utopian, racialized, classed, and sexualized 
rendering of gentrification in the city. The video names the pain, the 
grittiness, and the sexiness that queer Latinxs are experiencing in San 
Francisco. It is in this affinity that Persia invites us to build toward the 
not- yet- here (Muñoz 2009).
By blending the semiotic affordances of video, audio, and text in the 
digital realm, the queer gesture is animated, hybridized, and revived 
across time and space to inspire queer Latinxs to disrupt taken- for- 
granted normative practices and discourses. In this respect, the digital 
character of this queer gesture extends the shelf life of its influence and 
amplifies, while also interrogating, a racialized and queer telos rather 
than offering a concrete solution. We see the practices and artifacts that 
emerge on Persia’s Twitter network as the residue of a queer Latinx com-
munity learning to heal and transform the present conditions. And in 
this learning we examine the pedagogical potential of a digital queer 
gesture as queer Latinxs make use of the affordances of such digital prac-
tices to imagine a new world.
Persia identifies the intended audience of the music video within 
the first few seconds by deploying images, sounds, and lyrics familiar 
to queer Latinxs. Accompanied by a pulsating electronic musical score, 
the piece opens with Persia dancing in front of rapidly disappearing and 
pixelated Google Map street views across the San Francisco Bay Area (fig. 
9.1, frame 1). Queer Latinxs are figuratively and literally lost in space as 
they try to find their footing on an unstable, shifting landscape. Persia 
invokes this feeling of forced migration and instability by calling out to 
her audience, “Queers. All the queers. Queers. We’re on the move! Hey 
gurl, where the fuck are you moving to?” The ensemble responds to this 
queery with “Moving to the East Bay, living like a broke güey. S.F. [San 
Francisco], keep your money. Fuck your money!” In the universe of the 
video, queer Latinxs are experiencing displacement such that their only 
option is to move to the East Bay— understood as the Blacker, Browner, 
and poorer side of the Bay Area, the non- desirable space. Even in this 
movement to find stability, however, queer Latinxs remain “broke.” As 
such, this video functions as a rallying cry for displaced Black and Brown 
queers while simultaneously, in our view, excluding the white homonor-
mative subject (Duggan 2002). For example, we note Persia’s deploy-
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ment of the colloquial Spanish word güey to serve as a reminder that 
Latinxs are the intended audience of this digital queer gesture.
By connecting the expansion of whiteness across cultural, social, and 
spatial domains to the rise of technology industry, “Google Google Apps 
Apps” examines how Black and Brown bodies, the corporeal geogra-
phies, are being disciplined. Persia offers queer Latinxs two choices as 
the wave of whiteness crashes ashore in San Francisco: engage in the cor-
poreal displacement of Brown and Black skin or live in exile. For exam-
ple, as stories unfold across multiple sites in the city, Persia turns to a toy 
store, where a Latinx character begs on her knees for whiteness: “I wanna 
be white, Daddy. Daddy, please. Daddy, please.” Persia replies with “For 
Christmas, gurl. For Christmas,” while throwing a computer- generated 
Christmas tree atop the supplicant (fig. 9.1, frame 3). The impossibil-
ity of becoming white is indexed in Persia’s response, “for Christmas, 
gurl,” as she redirects the child to wait until a distant future, whereby 
the child’s request will hopefully be forgotten— a common strategy em-
ployed by parents. In addition, “Google Google Apps Apps” is suggest-
ing that the desirability of whiteness demands that queer Latinxs engage 
Figure 9.1. Selected frames from Google Google Apps Apps video.
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in self- disciplining practices: in order to live in San Francisco, we must 
trade in our skin color, our culture, and, indeed, our self- worth. This is 
further exemplified later in the video. In a scene set in a hair salon, two 
supporting characters have a discussion about how one becomes white, 
with one saying, “A little bleach might do the trick.” The second actor 
responds, “I bleach my asshole, does that count?” To fulfill the promise 
of normativity and to remedy the feeling of being lost in space, white-
ness must be purchased and consumed. In this sense whiteness becomes 
a commodity and a seductive force that demands corporeal and spatial 
displacement of Blackness and Brownness.
As a queer gesture, Persia’s music video challenges her audience to 
reconcile two undesirable options. This is punctuated in the latter part 
of the video when we see Persia and the others applying swirls of white 
makeup on their faces (fig. 9.1, frame 4) as they sing, “Gentrify me, gen-
trify my love.” The desire to become white by the nonwhite protagonists 
of the video offers an absurd solution to the damaging effects of the 
technology industry, with the white makeup obfuscating and cleaning 
the proverbial undesired dirtiness of the Black and Brown skin. It offers a 
false hope for survival in a violently transforming city. Is becoming white 
the only escape? The audience must perpetually confront this question 
as the refrain repeats, “Google Google Apps Apps. Google Google Apps 
Apps. Gringa Gringa Apps Apps. I just wanna wanna be white.”
We contend that “Google Google Apps Apps,” as a queer gesture, is 
deploying campy and raunchy aesthetics to illuminate the absurdity of 
such a proposition of escape while simultaneously inviting queer Latinxs 
to imagine and articulate an unsanitized futurity. Following Vargas 
(2014), lo sucio— that which is dirty— is an aesthetic instantiation of 
“lewd, obscene, offensive hypersexual undisciplined bodies” (716) that 
aids in “cultivat[ing] a presence and lingering perseverance of queer sex 
and joy within neoliberal hetero- and homonormative violences” (715). 
By exalting queer dirtiness and raunchiness, lo sucio, the video decen-
ters and nuances dominant critiques of gentrification by exploring how 
queer Latinxs contend with the technology industry corporeally, spa-
tially, and culturally. To overcome these constraints, the video demands 
that queer Latinxs engage in disidentification (Muñoz 1999) in order 
to “tactically and simultaneously work on, with, and against a cultural 
form” (12)— that is, an active refusal to either identify or not identify 
with dominant cultural norms.
Living up to its queer sucio aesthetics, the video does little to offer a con-
crete or normative solution— an approach that we see as pedagogical— 
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to the damaging effects of a racialized, sexualized, and classed spatial 
project. Conversion to whiteness, though presented insouciantly as an 
object of longing in the lyrics, cannot be seen as a proposed solution. 
Rather, the absurdity of this wish highlights the limitations to searching 
for remedies through a white heteronormative and homonormative con-
ception of time and space. Persia and her collaborators instead offer an 
opening to resistance and resilience in the face of such circumstances by 
deploying and developing a Brown queer temporal and spatial analytic. 
This digital queer gesture travels across vast digital and physical terrains 
to inspire members of Persia’s ecology to imagine a new possible future, 
toward the “not yet queer” (Muñoz 2009, 22).
A Permeating Gesture: Queerness as Pedagogical across Ecologies
The queer gesture of “Google Google Apps Apps” lives on ephemerally, 
as residue, a trace or a glimmer (Muñoz 2009). In this respect, queer 
gestures are distinctly material but possess a malleability, a dynamism 
that resists stasis and permanence as queer people transform fleeting 
moments into queer futurities (Muñoz 1996, 12). José Esteban Muñoz 
contends that queer art and memoir, material artifacts, engage queer 
subjects with and in queer world- making tools and practices to disrupt 
and glitch normative time and space (2009, 131). “Google Google Apps 
Apps,” one such queer artifact, has inspired individual and collective 
learning across and within queer Latinx communities experiencing spa-
tial, cultural, and social gentrification. We document this learning by 
examining how one such member of the community– a Twitter user– 
blends genres and texts to heighten, expand, and broaden the public 
narrative around gentrification and displacement in San Francisco. In 
addition, we look to Persia’s experiences in the classroom to examine 
how the queer residue of “Google Google Apps Apps” traverses the 
boundaries of the digital and physical contexts of Persia’s vast ecology.
Twitter, Public Pedagogy, and Queer Residue
The queer residue of the music video manifests as #googlegoogle-
appsapps, as well as the deployment of digital media practices across 
Twitter. In this respect, Twitter, as a digital tool, gives us an opportunity 
to trace the movement of an idea— in this case, a digital queer gesture— 
as it is taken up, reshaped, and spread across and into the world. For ex-
ample, the hashtag #googlegoogleappsapps, reveals how Persia’s campy 
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manifesto is deployed and taken up across the network. Between July 
2, 2013, when the video was first posted on Twitter, and the writing of 
this chapter in summer 2017, #googlegoogleappsapps has been paired 
with other digital content (e.g., images, news articles, and live perfor-
mances), including the following hashtags: #gentrification, #iwannabe-
white, #stopbeingpoor, and #duhbye. We pay special attention to such 
digital media practices— that is, the hybridizing and remixing of various 
content— as a window into the individual and collective learning rever-
berating throughout Twitter as a result of the deployment of “Google 
Google Apps Apps” and #googlegoogleappsapps.
For example, one of Persia’s followers uses the hashtag— hearkening 
to the campy, sarcastic, raunchy critique— along with a link to a news 
article detailing a family’s recent experience with displacement (Fagan 
2013). This tweet combines the genres of journalism and pop culture, 
perhaps to underscore the racialized, classed, and sexualized advances 
of gentrification, of which the article was particularly tone deaf, in our 
opinion. In San Francisco public discourse around the recent expan-
sion of the technology industry tends to portray displacement and evic-
tions as incidental to “urban renewal”; in other words, Black, Brown, 
Asian, poor, and queer bodies are collateral damage to a city undergo-
ing “beautification,” indeed sanitization. This tweet highlights the peda-
gogical potential of “Google Google Apps Apps” as a way to shift and 
broaden larger normative discourses around gentrification that tend to 
be deracialized and desexualized.
In this respect, the tweet in figure 9.2 serves as critical public peda-
gogy that juxtaposes visuals and texts (and their respective semiotic af-
fordances) in order to amplify a “robust dialogue, challenging [the pub-
lic] to think critically about received knowledge and energizing them 
to recognize their own power as individual and social agents” (Giroux 
2005, 25). As Alex Reid (2010) has argued, Twitter and other digitized 
networks have enhanced our ability to engage in a kind of bricolage (de 
Certeau 1984), a tinkering and remixing, that allows us to construct al-
ternative narratives against those of dominant institutions.
From a literacy and learning perspective, we see the above example of 
combining genres as a form of intertextuality (Briggs and Bauman 1992), 
a device that attends to the interrelationship between texts (e.g., words, 
images, sounds, etc.) and focuses on the new ever changing meaning 
that emerges through hybridization and remixing (146– 47). Following 
scholars of sociocultural literacy (Gutiérrez, Bien, Selland, and Pierce 
2011; Gutiérrez and Jurow 2016), we see these practices as the creation 
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of collective syncretic texts, reflexive artifacts organized toward the devel-
opment and imagining of new futures. Occurring on the public digital 
stage, we see such practices and remixed artifacts as representative of the 
individual and collective learning— that is, the queer residue of a public 
pedagogy. In the following section, we further expand on the pedagogi-
cal potential of the digital queer gesture’s ephemera as it permeates the 
physical context of Persia’s school.
Crossing Borders: Twitter, Queerness, and the Classroom
Persia maintains a relatively public social media presence, which is un-
usual for most educators, as they tend to maintain strict boundaries be-
tween their online personas and their professional, in- school identities 
(Davis 2016). The openness of Persia’s social media presence (particular-
ly on Twitter), however, makes it possible for the ephemera of her queer 
gestures to permeate the various contexts of her ecology, including that 
of the school where she works. In this section, we purposely use our par-
ticipant’ names and associated gender pronouns, of Socrates and Persia 
interchangeably. Doing so highlights the fluidity of their identity and 
how the deployment of her queer gestures permeates the various virtual 
and physical contexts that she navigates. We believe, as illustrated above, 
that Persia adeptly uses digital tools to deepen a historical engagement 
with broader social issues in the school, sometimes with the help of other 
mass media outlets.
Figure 9.2. Tweet posted 





In March 2015 (two years after the viral “Google Google Apps Apps” 
video was published), the online magazine 4U Mag published a bilingual 
article written by Persia titled “Gurl, Bye: A San Francisco Drag Queen 
Teaches Fourth Graders About Gender.” This article, to which she linked 
on her Twitter and Facebook networks, documents his experiences as an 
educator and daytime persona of Socrates. In the piece, Persia speaks of 
her openness about his gender fluidity in a context where students, fac-
ulty, and staff have accepted him for all her gender nonconformity and 
where he feels love and appreciation. Socrates/Persia describes an envi-
ronment where, as she says, “I don’t hide who I am. . . . I don’t want them 
[students] to hide who they are” (interview, April 15, 2015). The article 
details Persia’s unabashed and unabated queer gestures that manifest 
in outfits that she describes in her article as consisting of “leopard coats 
and sequins on everything— pants, jackets and scarves,” and through her 
use of “gurl” when addressing both her male and female fourth- grade 
students. According to Persia, this latter gesture had long been part of 
her lexicon as a nightlife performer, but in this context it was deployed 
to concertedly counter the ubiquitous use of “guys” in her school. In her 
article she explains, “I’ve realized that when you use queer lingo, like 
‘GURL’ and ‘GURL, BYE,’ it gives kids a chance to think about sexism 
within our language.”
In her interview with us, she explains how the travel of her digital 
queerness is indexed by the reaction of one of her students to the article. 
Persia recounts this interaction: “And, she said . . . ‘I read your article . . . 
Gurrl Bye.’ (laughs). I was like, ‘ugh.’ I was so embarrassed. It was just so 
funny. And a lot of parents from other grades were thanking me for ex-
posing myself in such a way” (Interview, April 15, 2015). In her interview, 
Persia speaks of initially feeling nervous about parents and other adults 
recognizing her from the clubs and her very public presence online, her 
out- of- school digital queer gestures. The online viral spread of “Google 
Google Apps Apps,” however, made this compartmentalization impos-
sible. Recently, in 2017, Persia posted the following on her social media 
accounts:
When you’re on a field trip with the kids and suddenly they start sing-
ing, “Google Google Apps Apps, I just wanna be white. For xmas Gurl. 
Where the fudge are you moving to?” I CANNOT!
Without prompting, the ephemera of Persia’s famous music video mani-
fested unexpectedly in the physical context of her ecology. The lyrics 
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were cleverly adapted, undoubtedly, to conform to norms of comport-
ment expected from elementary school– age students. However, the 
primary message remained and was powerfully ventriloquized by young 
voices.
By adopting a figurative definition of gestures, we contend that ac-
tivities in digital environments constitute what Rodríguez refers to as 
gestures that “register the actions of the body politic” (2014, 4). The 
deployment of a text, an intentional digital connection, the posting of 
a picture, can suggest one’s queerness as much as a swish of the hip, a 
limping of a wrist, or a lisping of a word. And in her physical interactions 
those gestures are even more concrete, modeled, and taken up by the 
young people in her ecology. Persia’s digital and embodied queerness 
coalesce here, and her students take them up and consequently begin 
expressing queer Brown futurities.
Concluding Thoughts/Future Directions
In this brief introduction to Persia and her digital queer gestures, we 
learn how she and her network repurpose Twitter to act against a threat 
to their identities. Through her analog and digital performances, Persia 
is able to reframe the past and present for the future, to contribute to the 
social imagination, toward prolepsis (Cole 2006). Rodríguez reminds us 
that “Identity is about situatedness in motion: embodiment and spatial-
ity” (2003, 5). This statement speaks to the dynamic nature and per-
petual shakiness of identity, particularly for Black and Brown queers. In 
her interview, Persia explains how she is learning how to reconcile her 
place in history and living in what Gloria Anzaldúa (1987) has called 
the borderlands. She sees herself/himself as being ni de aqui ni de alla 
(nor from here or there). Her conscious liminality allows her to lever-
age her everyday identities and deploy queer gestures across her digital 
and analog domains of practice, unabashedly. In effect, this diffusion of 
her identities and political activism blurs the boundaries between her 
professional identity as an educator and her very important activist work 
against dispossession.
Taking a sociohistorical, ecological, and equity- oriented stance on 
teaching and learning, as we have done here, requires scholars to look at 
the role of digital social media use anew. This is an especially important 
consideration in a culture where educators typically close off their digital 
selves to the rest of their ecology, as Janine S. Davis (2016) reminds us in 
her work with preservice teachers and their use of Twitter. In this respect, 
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Persia appears unconcerned with “collapsed contexts”— where multiple 
audiences might intersect in unexpected or unintended ways (boyd 
2014). All of her audiences, including youth, have access to the complex 
nature of her identities, serving as openings to new conversations, new 
individual and collective practices, and to new queer world- making.
In keeping with our humanizing, future- oriented, ecological com-
mitments, we counter overdeterministic views of the role of tools and 
people as they engage in sociocultural phenomena. We contend that 
it was not solely Twitter as a tool or Persia as an exceptional node in a 
network that facilitated learning. Alternatively, we see learning emerg-
ing and expanding as people engage in joint activity, across time and 
space, as they repurpose digital tools to transcend everyday contradic-
tions. Of consequence to transformative learning practices and peda-
gogy, “Google Google Apps Apps” does not identify a specific protocol 
or recipe for revolution. It humanizes opportunities for individual and 
collective learning by inviting queer Latinxs to build on their culture in 
order to overcome a dilemma that has meaning in their everyday lives.
Embedded in Persia’s expansive oeuvre, we see how the pedagogical 
intersects with digital media, with very important applications for conse-
quential learning (Gutiérrez 2008). We believe that digital tools can help 
us look at the past. However, we are compelled to examine— perhaps 
because of the applied nature of education research— how our own work 
and view of the past can be used toward transformative ends in the fu-
ture. We believe digital tools can be leveraged to interrogate power in 
order to dismantle systems of oppression, as we have seen Persia and her 
network begin to engage in such practices here. This can be especially 
generative for the teachers, cultural workers, and mediators who desire, 
hunger, and yearn for equity.
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Notes
 1. Alberto Aguilera Valadez, better known by his stage names Juan Gabriel 
and Juanga, was a Mexican composer and singer whose career spanned more 
than forty years. We utilize the gender- neutral term “Latinx” to describe Persia, 
as it was self- reported. However, we use the terms “Black” and “Brown” to de-
scribe the specific nondominant communities that were part of our study to pur-
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posely index the practices inscribed in the racializing projects, which promote 
whiteness, examined herein.
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ten | Hashtag Television
On- Screen Branding, Second- Screen Viewing, and 
Emerging Modes of Television Audience Interaction
renée pastel
After only approximately a decade of existence, Twitter is one of the most 
widespread internationally used social media platforms (Guest 2016). In 
June 2017 Adweek noted, “More than 2.9 billion social interactions across 
Facebook and Twitter were recorded during the just- concluded 2016– 
2017 TV season, according to Nielsen’s Social Content Ratings” (Main 
2017), a use promoted and encouraged by shows and the networks on 
which they air.1 Since the great success of Comedy Central’s application 
of the on- screen hashtag #trumproast throughout the Comedy Central 
Roast of Donald Trump in 2011 (Schneider 2011), television producers have 
tried to make Twitter hashtags, and the new genres of conversation that 
they facilitate, a routinized part of television viewing. Various series now 
have official Twitter accounts, and many series’ writing teams, actors, 
and even fictional characters have their own official Twitter accounts as 
well.2 Much of the existing scholarship on Twitter and television analyzes 
how fans are affected by the ability to interact with television produc-
ers via hashtags and how second- screen viewing shifts viewers’ under-
standing and sense of audience participation.3 This chapter does not 
focus on the hashtags that fans create for television programs but in-
stead examines “official” hashtags— hashtags created by networks and 
shows and displayed on- screen while a show airs or streams. I am not sug-
gesting that official hashtags have replaced fan- produced hashtags but 
rather that official hashtags serve functions beyond mere promotion. In 
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other words, I argue that official hashtags can be deployed for multiple 
ends— importantly, including sociopolitical ones— and that the assumed 
dichotomy between fan hashtags as “authentic” representations of audi-
ences’ responses to a show and official hashtags as mere marketing ploys 
is not at all a clear divide. By analyzing the unusual and effective uses of 
hashtags by television shows RuPaul’s Drag Race (Logo 2009– 2016; VH1 
2017– present) and Jane the Virgin (CW 2014– present), I question the per-
ceived passivity usually associated with “hashtag activism” and propose 
an important community- building function for a shared television expe-
rience using official hashtags.
Official hashtags are integrated into the visual frame of the viewing 
experience itself and help to thematically organize conversations on and 
across social media platforms.4 An official hashtag for a series is usually 
simply the name of the series, or an abbreviation thereof, with a pound 
sign preceding it— for example, #PLL for the ABC show Pretty Little Liars, 
#Survivor for the CBS show Survivor. Occasionally, a network’s or series’ 
social media team devise a hashtag that summarizes or highlights partic-
ular diegetic events (such as #WhoShotFitz for ABC’s Scandal, displayed 
on episodes that followed an assassination attempt on one of the main 
characters, President Fitzgerald “Fitz” Grant). Official hashtags usually 
appear in semitransparent type in the corner (usually the lower- right 
corner) of the frame of every episode, either intermittently (appear-
ing and disappearing throughout the episode) or persistently (remain-
ing visible throughout the entire episode); the frequency and duration 
of each hashtag’s appearance varies among different series. Networks 
must balance the desire to encourage audiences’ social media engage-
ment against the potential irritation some viewers might feel if they find 
hashtag displays obtrusive or distracting.
Donatella Selva notes that “social television is a practice of audience 
engagement resulting in interactions more than participation. . . . Social 
television practices legitimate television as a central front stage (more 
than a source of information) where politics actually happens” (2016, 
170). This chapter asks how official hashtags shape the types of engage-
ment that Selva describes and how these hashtags can foster a deeper 
sense of community among viewers by encouraging socially conscious 
viewership, by which I mean a viewing practice that enhances awareness 
of topical issues and their impact on underrepresented minorities. In 
order to consider how official hashtags can perform a progressive politi-
cal function, I now turn my focus to my two case study television shows, 
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RuPaul’s Drag Race and Jane the Virgin, and how each employs social me-
dia, particularly Twitter.
Niche Markets and Hashtag Communities around Brands
One of the primary reasons for television shows to craft official hashtags 
is to encourage appointment viewing— that is, to incite second- screen 
tweeting during live broadcasts and to inspire FOMO (Fear of Missing 
Out) in regular viewers who fail to participate in real- time Twitter dis-
cussions about a series. Hye Jin Lee and Mark Andrejevic write, “The 
second- screen promise is to reassemble audiences around viewing- as- 
shared- event and to thereby reconfigure a version of television viewing 
as social ritual— not because viewing cannot be time- shifted, but because 
doing so would mean losing out on a proliferating array of interactive 
affordances and the forms of social networking they enable” (2013, 43). 
While the rise of official hashtags since 2011 can be viewed as a mercenary 
attempt by networks to regulate the temporality of viewers’ engagement 
with the show in a way that financially benefits them (high live viewing 
ratings generally correlate to high ad revenues), hashtags also serve view-
ers, both as time markers and as facilitators of fan conversation. Hashtags 
are time sensitive. Although a hashtag often continues on after the live 
premiere and subsequent online premiere the day after, the effective-
ness of hashtag use for participating in the community declines rapidly. 
Beyond this mainstream use of hashtags to encourage appointment view-
ing, shows aimed at narrower demographics use hashtags to draw on and 
draw out an expanded imagined viewer community through Twitter. In 
his work on imagined communities, Benedict Anderson claimed, “An 
American will never meet, or even know the names of more than a hand-
ful of his 240,000,000- odd fellow- Americans. He has no idea of what 
they are up to at any one time. But he has complete confidence in their 
steady, anonymous, simultaneous activity” (2006, 26). David Morley, trac-
ing this idea of “anonymous, simultaneous activity” through the nightly 
broadcast news as a unifying medium, predicted in 1992 that as channel 
options multiplied, this reliably social (if separated) audience experience 
would be shattered: “In a world of niche marketing and narrowcasting, 
many of us will have less and less broadcast experience in common with 
anyone else. Our communities may, to that extent, be imagined along 
more fragmented lines” (1992, 256). In the late 2010s, when “niche mar-
keting and narrowcasting” have become the norm for a great deal of 
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media distribution, social platforms such as Twitter can counteract frag-
mentation by helping communities to form online and by helping users 
find communities to which they want to belong. Hashtags, then, become 
an organizing tool for virtual communities; they solidify imagined com-
munities into visible ones and enable them to be found and easily joined. 
While there is much to be said about the ways that narrowcasting divides 
societies, one of narrowcasting’s prosocial benefits is its promotion and 
facilitation of communities organized around niche interests and the 
subsequent increased visibility of those constituencies, which may have 
been rendered marginal and invisible in the period when broadcasting 
was dominant.
The official hashtags of RuPaul’s Drag Race (RPDR; 2009– present) 
offer one notable example of how community- building takes place via 
Twitter. The show’s use of social media, particularly of Twitter, demon-
strates its producers’ investment in advancing the mainstream awareness 
and appreciation of drag culture and the creation of fandoms for drag 
performers, alongside their commitment to building and promoting the 
RuPaul brand. RPDR has evolved its use of on- screen hashtags over the 
course of its seasons. The show is a reality competition with approximate-
ly fourteen drag queens (the contestants are referred to simply as “the 
queens”) competing each season for the title of “America’s Next Drag 
Superstar.” In early seasons, #DragRace was codified as the show’s of-
ficial on- screen hashtag; what is unique about the show is the self- aware 
brand and community building through social media. Then, in season 
3, RuPaul began to “speak in hashtag,” concluding the final reunion 
episode of that season with “And if you still can’t get enough, follow 
me on Twitter, and we will become Life. Long. Friends. Hashtag Friends 
Forever.” The season 4 premiere instituted the title of each episode, or 
the name of the main challenge of the episode, as a promoted hashtag, 
rolled out on a pink banner from the lower- left corner of the screen— for 
the first episode of that season, the rolled- out tag was “#RuPocalypse.” 
In that hashtag and all subsequent tags customized for each episode, 
the show constantly promoted RuPaul’s brand humorously, tongue fixed 
firmly in cheek. In addition to these title- based hashtags, season 5 in-
troduced hashtags that invited comment on the proceedings of the epi-
sode (#DoubleElimination, for example, for the first double elimination 
in RPDR history), as well as particularly comedic throwaway comments 
(#CaftanCollection, for example, to accompany a montage sequence of 
one queen who wore only caftans for her runway looks). While the of-
ficial on- screen hashtag, #DragRace, is intermittently displayed, these 
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other official hashtags that occasionally pop up on the screen help to 
attract and guide the audience’s attention to the “hashtaggable” nature 
of the spoken dialogue on the show, its major events, and its quips and 
jokes, both visual and verbal.
In addition to the show displaying myriad official tags on the screen 
and RuPaul occasionally “speaking in hashtags,” individual contestants 
also promote themselves by coining hashtags for themselves. These “spo-
ken word hashtags” help the queens found and build their own brands, 
just as the series’ hashtags and RuPaul’s verbal hashtags contribute to the 
popularity of RPDR’s and RuPaul’s brands. By “spoken word hashtags,” 
I mean the vernacular catchphrases that the queens coin and frequently 
repeat over the course of the competition. Some notable examples in-
clude season 8 contestant Bob the Drag Queen’s “Walk into the room 
purse first,” which became #PurseFirst and the title of his first pop mu-
sic single, and season 8 and 9’s Cynthia Lee Fontaine’s “Have you seen 
my cucu [butt]?,” which fans immediately rendered as #cucu and used 
as the basis for variations, including #MissCucugeniality. Since season 
5 or 6, when contestants began “speaking in hashtag,” it has seemed 
evident that a key component in having a successful run on RPDR is 
to make quips that are immanently “hashtaggable.” While queens are 
not permitted access to social media while filming— common on reality 
television shows— each queen nevertheless uses her time on the show to 
craft a strong identity that will attract fans. RuPaul, as host and mentor, 
encourages the contestants to speak, as he does, in catchphrases meant 
to be quoted and spread, with an awareness of the potential for audience 
social media interaction. For example, in season 7, episode 10, contes-
tant Pearl describes herself and her dance partner as “flazéda,” and in 
episode 11, Pearl comments, “Flazéda: it’s the new hashtag. It’s spreading 
like wildfire!” This term sparked a discussion among the judges in epi-
sode 10 as to whether Pearl meant “laissez- faire” or some mix of “blasé” 
and “la- di- dah” and became a callback and statement for Pearl’s fans, 
despite its lack of on- screen text marking. The downside to the lack of 
screen text was that fans were not certain how to spell this neologism. 
The most popular accepted spelling seemed to be “flazéda,” and this 
is the spelling that appears on Logo’s website. Urban Dictionary also has 
an entry for “flasé dah,” with alternate spellings including “flahsay da,” 
“flase da,” “flasay dah,” “flasay da,” “flase dah,” and “flahsay dah” (al-
rightalright 2015; Iamtheother 2015). Regardless of the absence of a vi-
sual hashtag that literally spelled the new term out, viewers were primed 
to hashtag what they heard. And although the season ended in June 
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2015, “flazéda” remains an active hashtag on Twitter, mainly in refer-
ence to Pearl. #Flazéda became Pearl’s brand for the remainder of her 
season on RPDR and is now officially her brand name, with the release 
of Flazéda, her unisex fragrance, just after her season finished airing in 
summer 2015.
Once the show hit a level of popularity that came to more main-
stream attention, glossaries of terms used on RPDR began to appear on-
line, such as Buzzfeed’s “A Beginner’s Guide to Drag- Speak” in 2013 and 
Vanity Fair’s video “100 Years of Drag Queen Slang” in 2016.5 Nathaniel 
Simmons uses speech codes theory to analyze how the speech and vo-
cabulary on RPDR is structured, concluding, “It is plausible to assume 
that contestants on RPDR may be viewed as drag celebrities who influ-
ence dominate [sic] drag rhetoric” (2014, 645). He expresses the hope 
that “examining how this particular reality TV show has influenced the 
speech codes within the LGBTQ community will increase scholarship 
regarding the influence of media on collective identities of marginal-
ized groups” (646). Particularly catchy episode title and spoken word 
hashtags remain in circulation long beyond the relevant episodes or even 
seasons, and tweets nodding to this community online often string many 
RPDR hashtags together, both in reaction to relevant news about the 
show (as in Davie’s tweet reacting to the announcement of UK Netflix 
streaming the show):
“Yas! #Hieeee #GentlemenStartYourEngines #YouBetterWork 
#PurseFirst #Sickening #ShanteYouStay #LetTheMusicPlay 
#LipsyncForYourLife #Flazéda” (Davie 2017),
and in more general use, as in Abhik B.’s Instagram- linked tweet about 
cake:
“‘Love in the time of calories’ #condragulations 
#nottodaysatan #flazeda #sashayaway #sunshine . . . 
instagram.com/p/BUlSPSNDlcE/”(2017).
The building of such hashtag strings, taken from a growing vocabulary 
of catchphrases from the show, and the range of applications function as 
an indicator of both the strength of the community and of the influence 
and shaping of rhetoric the show performs.
The community created and presented by RPDR is one focused on 
self- love, acceptance, and playful snark, as exemplified by RuPaul ending 
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each episode with the admonition “And remember, if you can’t love your-
self, how in the hell are you going to love somebody else?” The RPDR 
fandom evangelizes the gospel of “Ru,” focusing on spreading this mes-
sage of love and self- love, and fans’ involvement and importance are con-
stantly acknowledged by the show. Fans are not individually named, but 
RPDR often refers specifically to its fan base, offers hashtags for the fans, 
and invites fans to contribute, once even basing a mini- challenge on fan 
art.6 For example, as of summer 2017, RPDR fans on Twitter are still em-
ploying the tag #NoRuPaulogies, which the show debuted in 2013 (sea-
son 5). Tweets such as “Being my creative over the top self, looking like 
what I look like and being at peace with it. #ThingsIWontApologizeFor 
#NoRuPaulogies” (2FikOrNot2Fik 2017) and “#socialmedia w/ 3.4 bil-
lion Internet users (2016), the only person I need to please & convince 
is myself & maybe a handful. #NoRuPaulogies” (bluebay700 2016) illus-
trate how fans use RPDR to assert their self- acceptance and reject feel-
ings of shame or self- recrimination that heteronormative society con-
stantly encourages in LGBTQ individuals.
At the same time that RPDR hashtags are taken up by fans to express 
their resistance to the ideologies of straight, or “mainstream,” society, 
the show has also become immensely popular with non- queer viewers. 
Matthew Goldmark, citing the New York Times, notes:
Drag Race leads Logo’s strategy to sell “gay culture” to a mixed audi-
ence of gay men and heterosexual women. (Logo terms this “gay-
streaming.”)  .  .  . Subsequent broadcasts of Season 1 on the Viacom 
subsidiary VH1, a cable channel that does not espouse a particular 
relationship to sexuality, corroborates the program’s imagined appeal 
beyond an LGBT audience. (2015, 504– 505)
If the transition from Logo to VH1 in March 2017 marks the moment 
when the show begins to intentionally court a mainstream audience, the 
question is whether the show can maintain its strong LGBTQ fan base 
while appealing to an audience beyond its initial target demographic. In 
an interview on Dateline NBC, RuPaul argues for the inability of RPDR to 
ever truly go mainstream: “Drag is the antithesis of the Matrix. You know, 
the Matrix says, ‘Pick an identity and stick with it. Because I want to sell 
you some beer and shampoo and I need you to stick with what you are so 
I’ll know how to market it to you.’ Drag is the opposite. Drag says, ‘Iden-
tity is a joke’” (Volkert 2016). But more than that, RPDR suggests that 
identity is a brand and an attitude that hold the potential for organizing 
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an audience into a community with shared values. Although drag is of-
ten used to accentuate the performativity and potential levity of identity, 
as RuPaul suggests, RPDR encourages the establishment of strong in-
dividualized identities as brands, which hashtags then strengthen. Fur-
thermore, those identity- based brand hashtags are then used by viewers 
to express and celebrate their own performances of identity by making 
identity about joy, individuality, and nonconformity. The hashtags also 
help viewers find one another, furthering the messages of community 
and self- love that RuPaul promotes on the show.
Breaking the Fourth Wall with Television Hashtagivism
The case study of RPDR illustrates how on- screen hashtags facilitate 
brand building (the show’s, host’s, and contestants’ brands) and, at 
the same time, foster self- expression and feelings of community among 
queer viewers. In this section I turn to another series that heavily employs 
official hashtags, the CW’s Jane the Virgin (JtV; 2014– present), which uses 
tags to encourage viewers’ awareness of, and engagement with, contem-
porary politics. Loosely adapted from a 2002 Venezuelan telenovela air-
ing on RCTV, JtV focuses on a twenty- something Latina woman in Miami, 
Jane Gloriana Villanueva, who has been saving her virginity for marriage 
at the urging of her grandmother but becomes accidentally artificially in-
seminated by a distraught and distracted gynecologist. The series centers 
on three generations of Villanueva women— Alba, Jane’s grandmother, 
who generally speaks in Spanish (with subtitles for Anglophone viewers); 
Xiomara, Jane’s mother, who is pursuing her lifelong dream of being a 
singer; and Jane, the eponymous heroine. Its omniscient wisecracking 
narrator, who speaks in a stereotypical “Latin lover” voice, comments 
on the proceedings of the show not only directly in voiceover but also by 
“typing” commentary on- screen as the episode unfolds. The typed com-
ments and hashtags pertaining to the show are integrated into the dieg-
esis of each episode and are therefore not vulnerable to being stripped 
in its afterlife on streaming sites.7
Most hashtags in a given JtV episode comment on a specific plot point 
and commonly use puns and other textual jokes. In a season 2 episode, 
for example, a hashtag appears on- screen as one character, Petra, is be-
ing immobilized and replaced by her twin: #Petrafied. Other hashtags on 
JtV reference hashtags used or mentioned by the characters in the show. 
The JtV character most invested in social media is Jane’s father, Rogelio 
De La Vega, a telenovela star with a very active Twitter profile (the char-
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acter is also active on a real- world Twitter account that is apparently oper-
ated by one of the show’s producers8), and many hashtags that JtV puts 
on- screen whenever Rogelio appears either reflect on Rogelio’s behavior 
or simply spell out the hashtags he mentions (thus neatly avoiding the 
spelling confusion that can occur with spoken word hashtags, such as 
those that proliferate on RPDR, as discussed above). For instance, when 
Rogelio is nominated for an award, and announces that he plans to live- 
tweet the awards show with the hashtags #GoRo, #RogelioMyBrogelio, 
and #VivadelaVega, all of these hashtags appear across the bottom of the 
screen as he speaks them.
A more sparingly used but more thought- provoking form of hashtag 
that appears on JtV connects the narrative world within the show to larg-
er issues facing families in the United States. Episode 9 of season 1 ended 
with Alba, Jane’s grandmother, being pushed down the stairs after seeing 
proof of criminal activities; episode 10 picks up with Alba in a coma in the 
hospital. While the Villanuevas are happy to hear that Alba should make 
a recovery, the doctor informs them, “Your mother is in this country il-
legally. She has no insurance, and the hospital cannot afford to absorb 
the cost of her care. . . . We will have to notify ICE and they will deport 
her to Venezuela, where she can continue to receive care if she needs.” 
Xiomara exclaims, “What? That can’t be legal!” and our faithful narra-
tor types for viewers, “YES, THIS REALLY HAPPENS / LOOK IT UP / 
#IMMIGRATIONREFORM,” with a sound effect (“thunk”) punctuating 
the end of each line of text. As the doctor gives the official name of the 
act of deportation to which Alba is about to be subjected (“medical repa-
triation”), a mournful theme begins to play. JtV’s creator, Jennie Snyder 
Urman, said in an interview following the airing of this episode, “We 
know how important [this issue] is to the community we are represent-
ing. The hope is by personalizing this issue and playing it out through 
beloved characters, we can make the political, personal .  .  . and hope-
fully raise consciousness, and compassion” (Orley 2015). In this way, JtV’s 
creator has “focused on love as its immigration platform” (Carlin 2015), 
using the show to humanize and make immigration reform emotion-
ally resonant and pressing for an audience beyond that which has had 
firsthand experiences of its necessity. And second- screen viewing, which 
the on- screen use of hashtags promotes, is uniquely suited to facilitating 
viewers’ immediate and visceral reactions to story lines, such as Alba’s 
threatened removal from the United States.
JtV initiates this plot that deals with immigration midway through its 
first season. For the remainder of the season and into the next, the story 
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arc about Alba’s need to be naturalized as a US citizen— and the show’s 
focus on the need for immigration reform— continues. In season 2, epi-
sode 5, which aired one year before the 2016 US presidential election, 
Xiomara and Jane meet with an immigration lawyer and ask whether 
Xiomara’s record as Alba’s sponsor would damage Alba’s chances of 
getting a green card. The lawyer responds, “It’s hard to say for sure. 
Immigration laws are constantly changing.” Then the frame freezes, and 
“#VOTE #VOTE #VOTE” appears across the bottom of the screen in 
red, white, and blue. With this hashtag, JtV’s writers and producers make 
clear that they hope viewers will empathize with Alba’s predicament and 
that this empathy will lead them to vote for candidates committed to 
reforming US immigration laws and policies. In other words, the show’s 
inclusion of “#VOTE #VOTE #VOTE” as a visual marker in scenes about 
Alba’s immigration drama makes explicit the show’s intention to be more 
than pure escapism for its audience and to alert the viewer to real- world 
issues— even to politicize viewers— through viewers’ emotional engage-
ment with the plight of its characters.
During and after the airing of the episodes concerning Alba’s pos-
sible deportation, hundreds of tweets using #ImmigrationReform ap-
peared on Twitter. Some users shared articles about medical repatriation 
and said that the show had inspired them to research the topic (Baldwin 
2015); others expressed excitement that the show got the hashtag and 
issue trending (Alexa 2015); others shared joy at the happy resolution 
to the grandmother’s immigration journey, employing the hashtag 
#WhenTVTeachesEmpathy (Kumar 2016). Hashtags such as #VOTE 
#VOTE #VOTE and #ImmigrationReform are not wholly specific to JtV, 
but they will remain visual elements of JtV episodes as markers and meta-
commentary for future audiences, who may seek context for understand-
ing why those hashtags were incorporated into episodes that aired at spe-
cific times. On the one hand, the looming 2016 election added mounting 
pressure to the JtV narrative, as the candidates for president held widely 
different positions on immigration laws and the show clearly wanted to 
inform viewers about those differences9; on the other hand, #VOTE re-
mains a hashtag that is timeless and important in its lack of specificity. 
Alba’s story highlights the significance of having a voice in politics, and 
the show urges viewers to vote, in whatever year they are watching, even 
if they discover the show many years later on a streaming platform or in 
broadcast syndication. The show’s ability to connect its fictional world 
with real- world politics provides an example of how television programs 
and networks can encourage second- screen viewers to advance issues of 
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social justice and policy change. It is uncertain whether or how future 
audiences will understand the hashtags embedded within the narrative 
of JtV, but even if second- screen viewing becomes passé in the future, the 
hashtags will likely serve as traces for future viewers to reconstruct the 
historical context of the show’s production and initial airing.
Conclusion
Media theorist Henry Jenkins noted over a decade ago, “There is a new 
kind of cultural power emerging as fans bond together within larger 
knowledge communities, pool their information, shape each other’s 
opinions, and develop a greater self- consciousness about their shared 
agendas and common interests. We might think of these new knowledge 
communities as collective bargaining units for consumers” (2007, 362– 
63). Second- screen viewers may be fans who actively contribute to so-
cial media discussions of television, or they may be “lurkers” who read 
far more than they post. Even second- screen lurkers are interpellated 
into the communities defined by official and fan- launched hashtags, and 
these tags advance second- screen viewers’ “greater self- consciousness 
about their shared agendas and common interests.” Although scholars 
have commonly viewed hashtags on television as new avenues for fan 
interaction and network marketing, I argue that hashtags have sociopo-
litical potential— to encourage self- expression by marginalized people, 
to help minority communities coalesce and find new members, to raise 
awareness about social problems, to spur activism, and to seed interest 
in legislation reform and voting— even through seemingly passive inter-
actions such as second- screen lurking. The longevity and effectiveness 
of any politicization that takes place due to second- screen viewing is 
unpredictable. Despite the ways viewers may feel involved, as Donatella 
Selva points out, “Broadcasting logic is still dominant in the use of social 
television” (2016, 169). This is to say, notwithstanding the ways networks 
and show creators are beginning to incorporate viewers’ possible social 
media use into their programs, television remains largely unidirectional, 
broadcast to viewers. Nevertheless, the paratexts created and elaborated 
by second- screen viewers who like to tweet to their favorite shows cre-
ate the possibility of a broader spectrum of influence beyond the show 
itself. In addition, if series that appeal to underrepresented communi-
ties or are willing to promote a political stance create buzz on social 
media, a burgeoning number of shows might find their communities 
online potentially building network support of those fledgling shows. 
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Hashtags may be a way to target minority viewers, help those viewers to 
find one another, and thus prompt higher ratings and longer life spans 
for these shows. As show creators and networks navigate the divided mar-
kets of niche narrowcasting and stretch the ways they try to help shape 
discussions through the hashtags they promote, there is hope that audi-
ences will respond with greater interest and passion, linking how they 
view to how they spread information and promote their own interests 
and ideals. Although there has been great ambivalence in the popular 
press about the passivity of “hashtag activism,”10 RuPaul’s Drag Race and 
Jane the Virgin serve as examples of the political benefit of expanding 
political consciousness through hashtag- organized communities online. 
Individual viewers can find like- minded viewers through hashtags but 
also engage in a performance of community that expands visibility and 
awareness.11 By fostering emotional ties to contestants (on RPDR) and 
characters (on JtV), hashtags can create shared languages for discuss-
ing the politics of underrepresented communities. The aspiration is that 
official hashtags, when folded into genuinely entertaining television, 
might prove to be an effective means for media makers to move viewers 
toward a higher degree of politicization and social consciousness.
Notes
 1. See also “Nielsen Launches ‘Nielsen Twitter TV Ratings,’” 2013. The press 
release notes, “Initial analysis of Nielsen Twitter TV Ratings reveals that the 
Twitter TV audience for an episode is, on average, 50 times larger than the au-
thors who are generating Tweets” and that Twitter conversation about television 
is a growing trend.
 2. See, for example, the Twitter accounts for ABC’s Scandal, a show with 
broad appeal on Twitter. There is the official show account, @ScandalABC; the 
writer’s room, @ScandalWriters; and the lead actor accounts, all of whom are 
extremely active (@kerrywashington, @tonygoldwyn, @bellamyyoung, etc.). 
Parallel accounts exist for many shows.
 3. Second- screen viewing is the act of utilizing two screens while watching a 
program, one for viewing an episode of television and one for interacting with 
other viewers of that episode on one or more social media platforms. See, for 
example, Wilson 2016, Portes 1998, Nagy and Midha 2014, Oh et al. 2015, and Lin 
and Peña 2011.
 4. While hashtags are used across several social media platforms, including 
Twitter, Instagram, Facebook, and Tumblr, the hashtag as an organizing prin-
ciple is strongly associated with Twitter and initially “caught on” through the 
Twitter platform. As such, throughout this chapter, I discuss hashtags in terms of 
Twitter, though I recognize that those hashtags may cross platforms. See Gannes 
2010, regarding the invention of hashtags.
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 5. See Jones 2013 and Vanity Fair 2016.
 6. In season 7, episode 5, the mini- challenge was based on the paper and tape 
recreations of Instagram fan “paperdragrace.”
 7. Until recently, sites such as Hulu and Netflix were notorious for remov-
ing all traces of network branding, possibly to allow or even encourage users to 
mistake programs for Hulu or Netflix original series. This has begun to change 
slightly insofar as Netflix now permits network logos to precede or conclude 
shows.
 8. See Schwindt 2015.
 9. See, for example, Whiting and Alonso 2012. They conclude that hashtags 
can function as “a topical annotation from the crowd” (1).
 10. See, for example, “2014: The Year of Outrage” 2014, Carr 2012, and 
Berlatsky 2015.
 11. See Gerbaudo 2012 for a good discussion of how social media can choreo-
graph activist movements, and kw 2017 for clarification on the important distinc-
tion between activism and raising awareness, which is more applicable here.
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eleven | Hashtag Rhetoric
#AllLivesMatter and the Production of Post- Racial Affect
kyle booten
Using a hashtag is now, like protesting or marching, a form of politi-
cal activism. Therefore, hashtags themselves are not merely the tools of 
online politics but are also themselves objects of political discussion or 
protest in their own right. If hashtag activism is a form of political labor, 
part of this labor is using new media to draw attention to inequality and 
injustice, and another part is a kind of metapolitics in which online activ-
ists, both central and peripheral to movements, try to negotiate— and at 
times police— which hashtags are to be used, who is to use them, and to 
what ends they can be used.
The recent history of #BlackLivesMatter, the hashtag, as it relates to 
Black Lives Matter, the movement, suggests some of the difficulties of car-
rying out activist politics on social media. The tag #BlackLivesMatter was 
created by Alicia Garza, Patrisse Cullors, and Opal Tometi in response to 
the acquittal of George Zimmerman, the killer of Black teenager Trayvon 
Martin (Garza 2014). Black Lives Matter is now a widespread (and indeed 
international) movement that reacts against (especially state- sponsored) 
violence against Black people while also drawing attention to broader 
issues of structural racism (Rickford 2015). In the context of this move-
ment, the #BlackLivesMatter tag has continued to serve as a rallying cry 
in the wake of the deaths of Michael Brown, Tamir Rice, Eric Garner, and 
Sandra Bland, among many others. Still, no account of this tag’s trajecto-
ry can be given without reference to the myriad tags it has inspired. Some 
of these, such as #BrownLivesMatter and #MuslimLivesMatter, extend 
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the antiracist message of #BlackLivesMatter. When #MuslimLivesMatter 
emerged in response to the racially motivated killing of three Muslim 
students in North Carolina in February 2015, activists debated whether 
this tag was an act of solidarity and coalition building with Black Lives 
Matter, or if it was a co- opting that unfairly equates the histories of racial-
ized violence against Black Americans and Muslims regardless of race 
(Walker 2015; Arias 2015). Alicia Garza herself suggests that variations 
on #BlackLivesMatter fail to acknowledge the ways that other nonwhite 
groups benefit from antiblackness (Garza 2014).
And then there is #AllLivesMatter. While the origins of this tag (and 
its non- hashtag variant, “All lives matter”) are murky compared to those 
of #BlackLivesMatter, by 2014 it had emerged as a discursive lightning 
rod, with activists and bloggers decrying it as a subversion of the anti-
racist agenda of the Black Lives Matter movement (see Newton 2014). 
Critics have observed that the use of this tag, with its rhetorical move 
toward “humanity” as a category that transcends race, transparently 
manifests a color- blind or perhaps post- racial politics that insidiously 
denies or silences the grievances of the Black Lives Matter movement 
(Langford and Speight 2015; Orbe 2015; Rickford 2015). In fact, the rise 
of #AllLivesMatter is grimly ironic in light of the fact that Black Lives 
Matter itself emerged as a response to the ascendance of post- racial poli-
tics during the Obama era (Taylor 2016). Still, though #AllLivesMatter’s 
color- blind racism may be obvious, it is important to understand how 
this discourse functions and reproduces itself on contemporary social 
networks.
Recent work on hashtag activism has demonstrated how activist 
movements can become “hijacked” (Hadgu, Garimella, and Weber 
2013) and, in the case of #BlackLivesMatter in particular, has point-
ed to key differences between this tag and #AllLivesMatter. My analy-
sis here stems from conversation with two recent works in particular. 
Pairing qualitative discourse with analytic techniques to analyze a small 
sample of #BlackLivesMatter tweets, Carney (2016) identified the ways 
that social media users deployed as well as contested the contradictory 
discourses represented by #BlackLivesMatter and #AllLivesMatter. She 
argues that the #AllLivesMatter tag was mostly used by young white 
women on Twitter in order to enact a color- blind (but inherently white- 
supremacist) negation of #BlackLivesMatter. Analyzing a larger sample 
of #BlackLivesMatter tweets using computational techniques, Ryan J. 
Gallagher and his colleagues (2017) unearthed some key differences be-
tween #BlackLivesMatter and #AllLivesMatter. While the former tag was 
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more often used to discuss the death of Black victims of violence, the 
latter tag was more often used to voice support for the police. However, 
these researchers also found that #BlackLivesMatter advocates them-
selves “hijacked” the #AllLivesMatter tag in order to “directly interro-
gate the stance . . . and the worldview implied by that phrase” (11).
In this chapter I contribute to this emerging conversation on 
#BlackLivesMatter versus #AllLivesMatter in several ways. While Carney 
is persuasive in her analysis of the ways that social media activist spaces 
can function as a Habermasian public sphere, I take a position inspired 
by the theorizing of Zizi Papacharissi (2014, 125), who has convincingly 
argued that online political activism often gives rise to “affective pub-
lics,” meaning “networked public formations that are mobilized and 
connected or disconnected through expressions of sentiment.” If the 
production of affect is an immediate effect of hashtag activism, language 
on social media must be understood not just as argument but also as 
rhetoric— language designed to provoke the affective responses of an au-
dience. As a historical category, rhetoric sits at the boundary between 
politics, affect, and the artful structuring of language. Here I am think-
ing of Aristotle’s (begrudging) elaboration of the ways that rhetorical 
styles arouse specific emotions, and of later theoreticians’ sometimes 
quite specific typologies of rhetorical figures designed to evoke partic-
ular affective reactions (see Quintilian 2011; Peacham 1954). Blending 
large- scale and small- scale linguistic analysis of #BlackLivesMatter tweets, 
I isolate some of the latent patterns that structure the discourses sur-
rounding this tag, patterns that evoke and evolve certain rhetorical fig-
ures in ways that make clearer these discourses’ latent ideologies as well 
as the affective states they evince and seek to reproduce.
While I do see the opposition between #BlackLivesMatter and 
#AllLivesMatter as one between “protest” and “counter- protest” 
(Gallagher et al. 2017), I note that these terms assume a relationship 
between two forces that are, though defined in terms of each other, leg-
ible as distinct entities. Perhaps these terms refer most naturally to oth-
er, nondigital forms of activist performance (e.g., physically co- present 
protesters marching in unison while counterprotesters gather nearby, 
perhaps behind a row of steel barricades; the two groups have their own 
chants and their own signs). As this chapter argues, such clear divisions 
become increasingly precarious in the context of hashtag activism. It is a 
central condition of this form of political labor that the boundaries be-
tween protest and counterprotest, earnest participant and “troll,” some-
times disintegrate. In fact, it may be the case that the dissolution of such 
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boundaries is one of the most effective tactics of those who would seek to 
enervate significant activist movements such as Black Lives Matter that 
derive energy and participation from social networks.
The Corpus
In order to gather a corpus of unique tweets, retweets were expunged 
from the data set via a variety of preprocessing steps. The final data set, 
consisting of approximately 150,000 unique tweets, is one small tempo-
ral slice of the vast history of #BlackLivesMatter on Twitter. These tweets 
come from the months following November 24, 2015, when a grand jury 
declined to indict Darren Wilson, the police officer who shot and killed 
unarmed Black teenager Michael Brown. By this time, mainstream news 
outlets had begun to cover the rise of the #AllLivesMatter tag. (See, for 
instance, the dialogue between George Yancy and Judith Butler printed 
in the New York Times [2015].)
Micro- Rhetoric: Affect, Attunement, and Chains of Equivalence
In her analysis of the uses of the #ows tag on Twitter during the height 
of the Occupy Wall Street movement, Papacharissi (2014, 93) suggests:
Twitter plays a part similar to the role music used to play for 
movements— by enabling affective attunement with the movement 
itself. . . . Affective attunement permits people to feel and thus locate 
their own place in politics.
She observes that #ows attracted not just those who agreed with the an-
ticapitalist message of Occupy Wall Street but also conservative Twitter 
users who used the tag only to advocate against it, often derisively. While 
she admits that hashtags are inherently polysemous and that there is 
thus no single “right” meaning the tag carries, Papacharissi does draw 
a distinction between those participants who deployed the tag in good 
faith and those who took it up only as what we might call “trolls.” In the 
case of #ows, “Antagonistic content injections interrupted the affective 
harmony . . . creating an effect similar to that of noise interrupting song” 
(93). Her use of the word “antagonistic” alludes to the definition of this 
term as provided by Chantal Mouffe (2000; 2013), who has distinguished 
between agonism, in which groups argue for cultural as well as political 
influence (i.e., hegemony) in an atmosphere of contentious respect for 
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other groups, and antagonism, in which the rights of opposed groups to 
even exist or speak are denied.
In the corpus under analysis here, it was not difficult to find tweets 
that evince a sort of “affective attunement” to the antiracist message of 
Black Lives Matter. Such tweets may register a range of affective posi-
tions, from disgust and despair to hope and love:1
The police don’t deserve lip service and should get 
no sympathy. NYC and Ferguson were disgusting abuses. 
#blacklivesmatter
Reimagine while we resist. Lay the foundation 
for the world we hope to see. #BlackLivesMatter 
#NewYearsRevolution
I love being black and I love black people. No more 
self hatred. No more white bullshit. #BlackLivesMatter 
#BlackPower
Still, #BlackLivesMatter does not always mean Black lives matter and in 
fact can mean the opposite. A hashtag like #BlackLivesMatter is easily 
hijacked as Twitter users use the tag to condemn the movement itself. 
The tag accompanies posts that variously characterize Black people in 
America not as the target but the perpetrators of violence against other 
groups (e.g., police, whites) or against themselves:
About 6,000 Blacks were killed by blacks in 2012. 
200 Blacks were killed by police. #BlackLivesMatter 
#SoStopKillingEachother
Other tweets change the topic:
Campaigning for late term abortion? You sicken me 
#tolerance #blacklivesmatter #disabledlivesmatter 
#unbornlivesmatter
Tweets that use the #BlackLivesMatter tag but obviously attempt to un-
dermine it are far from infrequent. In the first and second tweets, the 
tag #BlackLivesMatter is used, but its message is not: in no way do these 
tweets allege that Black lives matter. The tag is used ironically while si-
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multaneously drawing attention to the tweet (making it visible to anyone 
who searches for #BlackLivesMatter). The third tweet, however, takes 
this message and reinterprets it: Black (unborn) lives matter. Such tweets 
are evidence of that “polysemous” characteristic of hashtags; users can 
deploy the tag in ways that are outright antagonistic— or, in the case of 
the antiabortion use of the tag, ways that are well beyond the tag’s origi-
nal discursive boundaries. These examples draw attention to two differ-
ent ways of hijacking the tag: directly countering the tag’s message or 
expanding its reach to include causes that are very different from those 
it was designed to promote. In them it is possible to see the dichotomy 
between those uses of the tag that are harmonious and dissonant, those 
engaged in the work of building an agonistic movement, and those en-
gaged in antagonistic discursive sabotage.
Yet the boundary between these two poles is not always so clear. In the 
tweets that make up my corpus, it is relatively rare for a tweet to contain 
only one hashtag. Users tend to string them together in hashtag sequences, 
series of immediately adjacent hashtags. Sometimes these lists come at 
the end of a tweet:
“Hate cannot drive out hate. Only love can do that.”— 
Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. #MLK #MLKDay #MLKDay2015 
#BlackLivesMatter
In other times, the tweet simply contains an image or a link accompa-
nied by a hashtag sequence:
#HandsUpDontShoot #AntonioMartin #mikebrown #Ferguson 
#ArrestDarrenWilson #ICantBreathe #BlackLivesMatter
In one sense, this common way of using hashtags is purely functional, 
since the more hashtags in a tweet, the more likely that other users 
searching for this tag will find the tweet. At the same time, these hashtag 
sequences must also be understood rhetorically, since tags in these ag-
glomerative bundles are positioned as equivalent or at least harmonious-
ly related. It is argument by association. Eric Garner’s last words (“I can’t 
breathe”), though uttered in Staten Island, resonate in the context of 
Ferguson. And the deaths of Antonio Martin, Eric Garner, and Michael 
Brown must be understood not as isolated “incidents” but as symptoms 
of an enduring and consistent system of racialized violence. In fact, some 
tag sequences consist only of names:
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#MikeBrown #EricGarner #JohnCrawford #AkaiGurley 
#TamirRice #DontreHamilton #JordanBaker #EzellFord 
#McKenzieCochran . . . #BlackLivesMatter
In this funereal litany, those invoked as victims are equated but not dis-
solved into a category. They are indexed, remembered in their specific-
ity, though the list trails off into an ellipsis: no such list, especially one 
enclosed within a tweet, could contain all of the names.
In other moments, hashtag sequences seem to build bridges between 
Black Lives Matter, narrowly construed, and related antiracist agendas, 
such as drawing attention to a lack of diversity in Hollywood:
Dear Hollywood, #BlackLivesMatter #BlackFilmsMatter 
#OscarsSoWhite Yeah.
Sometimes these sequences entangle #BlackLivesMatter with other im-
portant and widely used political hashtags:
Don’t get angry, get active. #BlackLivesMatter #Change 
#JesuisCharlie #BeTheChange
In this case, the writer implicitly equates or connects Black Lives Matter 
with a tag in protest against terrorist violence in Paris (and in support of 
the French publication Charlie Hebdo, which had itself been accused of 
racism). If semantic yoking through hashtag sequences is the defining 
rhetorical move that Twitter users perform with hashtags, it is an interest-
ing if perhaps unresolvable challenge to mark clear boundaries defining 
exactly how #BlackLivesMatter may be used without doing violence to its 
message, without hijacking it, twisting it, or watering it down. However, 
taking these as uses of the tag that are in “good faith” (i.e., they are not 
attempting to sabotage #BlackLivesMatter), the sequencing of hashtags 
enacts what Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (2001) call “chains of 
equivalence,” the discursive positioning of political struggles as related 
without forcing them under the umbrella of a metacategory. The reader 
is not proffered an explanation of why, exactly, Black Lives Matter has 
anything to do with terroristic violence against a European publication. 
The assertion is not argued for but rather enacted, so these sequences 
are arguments that disguise their own argumentativeness.
What, then, of the tag #AllLivesMatter?
One of the primary rhetorical functions of both it and 
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#BlackLivesMatter tweets is metadiscursive, the production of both nega-
tive and positive definitions of how it and other tags should be used. 
Some tweets militate against #AllLivesMatter:
#AllLivesMatter isn’t a legitimate sentiment. It’s just 
a bullshit response to #BlackLivesMatter
The name of the protest is #BlackLivesMatter and 
nothing else. If you’re down with #AllLivesMatter you 
need to stay in your homes.
Others do the opposite:
To a racist only #BlackLivesMatter to a lover of all 
#AllLivesMatter. Learn that you are the racist.
Such tags try to draw stark distinctions between #BlackLivesMatter and 
#AllLivesMatter. Yet, if users such as these engage in the metadiscursive 
labor of regulating these tags and positioning them as opposites, users 
are not always so clear in their affiliation with one perspective and their 
antagonistic perspective toward the other. I have suggested that hashtag 
sequences are a primary rhetorical form through which Twitter users at-
tempt to place concepts, events, and people into a state of equivalence. 
While disruptive and antagonistic uses of this technique are possible, it 
lends itself most naturally to an affirmative politics. This is even the case 
when #AllLivesMatter is used with #BlackLivesMatter:
“We will never have a perfect world, but it’s not 
naive to work toward a better one” #alllivesmatter 
#blacklivesmatter #endracism #coexist
A lot of parents are teaching hate— don’t be one of 
them. - Nelson Mandela #AllLivesMatter #BlackLivesMatter
Can we disregard the above tweets as mere “dissonance,” noise that 
ruptures the “harmony” of the #BlackLivesMatter tag as it operates on 
Twitter? Such tweets trouble Papacharissi’s distinction between antago-
nistic and non- antagonistic uses of the tag. The goals and stakes of on-
line activism would likely be clearer if this activity could be neatly divided 
up into harmony and dissonance, agonistic coalitions and antagonistic 
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trolls— yet the two examples above work so that it cannot be. In the first, 
an unattributed quote invokes a generalized “we,” and it imagines a 
world in which this “we” can “#endracism” and “#coexist.” Indeed, on a 
linguistic level, this tweet allows #AllLivesMatter and #BlackLivesMatter 
to coexist, in a way, by simply juxtaposing them. The second tweet, 
this one containing a quotation attributed to Nelson Mandela, at-
tempts a similar diffusion of the tensions between #AllLivesMatter and 
#BlackLivesMatter. Mandela can signify a post- racial politics based on 
reconciliation by way of forgiveness (see Roy 2014), though here the 
quotation points more toward a perspective in which racism is a personal 
problem, one attributable to bad parenting rather than racialized struc-
tures of power and violence. In this way, this tweet does not just manifest 
a color- blind racism that seeks to silence discussion of race (and thus 
leave those racialized structures intact and beyond the reach of critique); 
it also manifests what Keith P. Feldman has called the “privatization of 
race,” a logic that “lodges the question of racial animus within personal 
expressions of preference and choice, while hiving it off from struc-
tural and historical analysis, as well as state intervention” (2016, 294). 
Crucially, however, these tweets do not actually argue against the claims 
of Black Lives Matter. Their assault on this movement is implicit, a fact 
that once again points to the important role of affect in social media poli-
tics. These tweets do not really even argue for why saying #AllLivesMatter 
and #BlackLivesMatter in the same breath (the same tweet) is not in fact 
incoherent. No explanation is needed; these tweets merely bask in the 
hope that we will learn to “#coexist.”
As foci of web- based affective politics, hashtags may indeed be tools 
through which individuals may “be counted” as part of a cause “with-
out having to enter into complex negotiations of ideological affilia-
tion” (Papacharissi 2014); people with somewhat different understand-
ings of why and how “Black lives matter” may nonetheless perform 
with each other a flexible, polysemous solidarity. The hashtag itself, 
as a linguistic artifact, lends itself to a particular form of political ex-
pression that generates “chains of equivalences” between movements, 
ideas, and causes. Doing so is as easy, in a sense, as juxtaposing two tags: 
“#BlackLivesMatter” and “#OscarsSoWhite,” “#BlackLivesMatter” and 
“#icantbreathe.” Yet, according to Laclau and Mouffe (2001), the goal of 
politics is to produce through discourse a new kind of hegemony based 
on the (provisional, contingent) coalition of various interests against 
some other interests that are themselves seeking hegemony. In their 
formulation, this aspect of politics is not secondary but foundational, 
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since positive self- definition is achieved only through the negative dis-
cursive act of constructing an opposed “Other” (just as the meaning of 
any sign is produced only in its opposition to other signs). And so when 
“#BlackLivesMatter” is juxtaposed with “#AllLivesMatter,” this “chain of 
equivalence” may be more detrimental than the overtly antagonistic uses 
of the #BlackLivesMatter tag, since it rhetorically destabilizes the bound-
ary between protest and counter- protest. To the critic, a tweet that says 
that both #BlackLivesMatter and #AllLivesMatter while offering an in-
spirational quote seems grotesquely (and perhaps even disingenuously) 
naïve. Yet what if the very vacuousness of such statements gives them 
power as tools for mobilizing an “affective public” that is not sympathetic 
to the demands of Black Lives Matter?
Statistical Rhetoric
Having closely examined some of the stakes of the different discursive 
positions carved out by #AllLivesMatter, I now step back to think about 
how this discourse’s ideologies and effects can be further uncovered 
through statistical means. While any large enough group of texts can 
be examined using computational, quantitative techniques, social media 
data invites this kind of analysis because the vastness of social networks 
such as Twitter is an unavoidable fact for those who use them. In terms of 
politics, although Twitter users do engage in bursts of one- to- one thread-
ed conversation, the sheer scale of discourse around a particular hashtag 
can also give users the sense of being an individual voicing a single utter-
ance amid an overwhelming din:
To all the ppl who keep say #AllLivesMatter. 
#BlackLivesMatter #MikeBrown #TamirRice #AntonioMartin 
#SoMuchMore
#BlackLivesMatter & #BlueLivesMatter are trending. 
May I remind you all #AllLivesMatter An eye for an eye 
makes whole world blind . . . 
In each of these tweets, the object is not any particular users but some 
unspecified number of users (“all the ppl” and the “you all” that makes 
certain tags trend), visible as an aggregate unit— in other words, a sta-
tistical phenomenon. Twitter’s interfaces and underlying algorithms, as 
well as those of third- party sites and software, make it easy to see trending 
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hashtags, and users may also get a less quantitative sense of trends sim-
ply by sampling their own feeds or by searching for tweets labeled with 
a particular tag. To use a hashtag is a twofold act; while the utterance 
carries its unique meanings, it may also in some small way cause a tag to 
trend— a collaborative rhetorical action whose most immediate function 
is merely to establish that the tag is important. Hashtags produce not 
intimate debates but swarms of discourse.
So far I have examined individual tweets as examples of hashtag activ-
ism. What follows is an attempt to glimpse some of the statistical proper-
ties of #BlackLivesMatter activism as a discursive system and to locate the 
role of #AllLivesMatter within this system.
Networking Hashtags
Out of the tweet corpus, around 30 percent end with a hashtag sequence, 
a series of at least two hashtags. Assuming that hashtag sequences imply 
some kind of semantic proximity between tags, which tags are most fre-
quently related to each other?
I call a sequence association pair any pair of hashtags that occur to-
gether in a tag sequence coming at the end of a tweet. The sequence 
association pairs extracted from the tweet “#protest today in nyc! #black-
livesmatter #trayvonmartin #mikebrown” would be (“#blacklivesmatter, 
#trayvonmartin), (#blacklivesmatter, #mikebrown), and (#trayvonmar-
tin, #mikebrown). For each user in the corpus, I gathered a unique set 
of sequence association pairs; I then combined all such lists into a list 
of sequence association pairs in which each user contributed no more 
than one instance of each. I visualized these associations in the following 
way: first, taking a random tag sequence from each user in the corpus 
(n = 10,399), I identified the pairs of co- occurring tags in which each 
tag occurred at least fifty times in this random sample; these constituted 
the possible edges in the graph. The homophily between any two tags 
was calculated as their pointwise mutual information, a commonly used 
statistic for measuring the association between terms in a corpus (see 
Manning and Schütze 1999). Edges were drawn between tags if this se-
quence association pair’s mutual information score was in the top decile 
of all such scores, with the thickness of each edge visually corresponding 
to the strength of the statistical relationship between two tags. This meth-
od for producing a network visualization of co- occurring tags is similar 
to the one used by Gallagher and his colleagues (2016) to examine the 
differences between #BlackLivesMatter and #AllLivesMatter. My inten-
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tion here was to represent the strongest associations between the most 
common tags.
Visualizing these relationships sheds light on some of the major struc-
tures of discourse surrounding #BlackLivesMatter. Figure 11.1 represents 
a subsection of this graph consisting of those components connected to 
the most frequently occurring names in the corpus: #mikebrown, #tamir-
rice, #trayvonmartin, and #ericgarner. Figure 11.2 shows this subgraph in 
the context of the larger network. Among the strongest relationships 
between tags in the corpus are those between these names, statistical 
evidence of the importance of the rhetorical strategy of listing names in 
a litany in order to remember them. The name of #trayvonmartin is con-
nected also to #rip and #neverforget; many of these tweets remembered 
him on his birthday, the fifth of February.
Figure 11.3 represents the subgraph of common tags frequently used 
in tag sequences with #AllLivesMatter, and figure 11.4 depicts this sub-
Figure 11.1. The connectedness of names.
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graph within the larger network. This tag was most strongly connected to 
#bluelivesmatter, #policelivesmatter, and #whitelivesmatter; this corrob-
orates the finding of Gallagher and his coauthors (2016) that use of the 
#AllLivesMatter tag indicates a more positive sentiment toward the po-
lice compared to use of #BlackLivesMatter. Part of the rhetorical project 
of #AllLivesMatter is not just a direct negation of #BlackLivesMatter (i.e., 
#whitelivesmatter) but also the symbolic imagining of the police force 
itself a population under attack; tweets that make this rhetorical move 
often refer to the killing of New York Police Department (NYPD) of-
ficers Wenjian Liu and Rafael Ramos by Ismaaiyl Brinsley on December 
20, 2014.
Looking beyond the connection between #AllLivesMatter and a pro- 
police sentiment, it is noteworthy that the hashtags with which this tag is 
most strongly associated also take the form of *- livesmatter. In fact, 24 per-
Figure 11.2. The position of names within the discourse network. The darker solid edges are 
connected to a key name.
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cent of tag sequences of three containing #AllLivesMatter (n = 289) also 





Such sequences bear a certain resemblance to classical rhetorical figures. 
With their omission of coordinating conjunctions (#BlackLivesMatter 
and #BrownLivesMatter), they could be considered examples of asyn-
deton, a technique “often resulting in a hurried rhythm or vehement ef-
fect” (Burton n.d.). Most notable, however, is the repetition that comes 
at the end of hashtags, themselves clauses (all lives matter, Black lives mat-
ter, nypd lives matter); epistrophe, a figure in which successive clauses end 
Figure 11.3. #AllLivesMatter’s strongest connections.
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with the same word or words (Burton n.d.), is alive and well on Twitter. 
Such combinations of tags are self- consciously repetitious, ornate. In a 
general sense, the fact that hashtag activism has taken up these figures 
suggests the degree to which contemporary social media may privilege 
forms of persuasion that use language to provoke the affective responses 
of a swarm of listeners. Yet rhetorical figures beget effects that are of-
ten quite specific. As Quintilian explains, asyndeton is used not just to 
“express anything with vehemence” but to “render” certain individual 
things “as it were, more numerous” (2011, 490– 91). In the case of these 
*- livesmatter sequences, one effect of asyndeton could be to “render nu-
merous” the types of lives that matter in addition to black lives. And ac-
cording to Henry Peacham, an early modern theorist of rhetoric, epistro-
phe (or, as he called it, epiphora) “serveth to leave a word of importance 
in the end of a sentence, that it may the longer hold the sound in the 
Figure 11.4. #AllLivesMatter’s position within the discourse network. The darker solid 
edges are connected to #AllLivesMatter.
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mind of the hearer” (1954, 42). If he is right, then *- livesmatter sequences 
attempt to “hold longer” in the reader’s mind the belief that “lives (in 
general) matter” after the particularities (“Black,” “all,” “NYPD,” “Pales-
tinian” . . .) have faded from memory. If the rhetorical force of naming 
victims derives its power from its specificity, these *- livesmatter sequences 
operate primarily according to a logic of generality. As David Theo Gold-
berg argues, “antiracist commitment requires remembering and recall-
ing”; the opposing force of “antiracialism” demands “forgetting, moving 
on, wiping away the terms of reference” (2009, 21). On a statistical level, 
#AllLivesMatter functions not solely by denouncing the claims and con-
cerns of #BlackLivesMatter; though it can do so, this discourse can also 
embrace #BlackLivesMatter as a key term while hovering safely above the 
specific events, people, and arguments to which others draw attention 
with this tag. It enacts and invites forgetting.
One goal of #AllLivesMatter as a discourse is to deny that what its crit-
ics (from prominent activists to nearly anonymous Twitter users) hold 
to be obvious: that the discourse of the #AllLivesMatter tag is incompat-
ible with #BlackLivesMatter. In fact, those who use the #AllLivesMatter 
tag with the #BlackLivesMatter tag often do so in ways that explicitly or 
implicitly argue for the complementarity of these ostensibly oppositional 
discourses. Take, for instance, the following use of the two tags:
We can’t allow this anymore!! #BLACKLivesMatter 
##BROWNLivesMatter #AllLivesMatter
Notice that in each of these cases the #AllLivesMatter tag comes at the 
end of the sequence. These are indicative of a larger trend in how tweets 
attempt to reconcile the discourses of #BlackLivesMatter and #AllLives-
Matter. In tag sequences comprised of only the tags #BlackLivesMatter 
and #AllLivesMatter, the tags were approximately four times as likely to 
appear in that order (#BlackLivesMatter, #AllLivesMatter) than in the 
opposite order (#AllLivesMatter, #BlackLivesMatter), a statistically sig-
nificant difference (n = 268, χ2 = 97.8, p < .001). A further exploration 
examined only those tag sequences in which every tag is of the form 
*- livesmatter. In such sequences that also contained #BlackLivesMatter, 
this tag was the final tag in 28 percent of them. Looking at *- livesmatter se-
quences containing #AllLivesMatter, however, this tag was the final tag in 
78 percent of them, another statistically significant difference (n = 610, 
χ2 = 185.0, p < .001). #AllLivesMatter tends to come at the end of a tweet; 
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the logic of such tweets is not that of pure equivalence (#BlackLivesMat-
ter equals #bluelivesmatter equals #AllLivesMatter). Rather, it suggests a 
logic that other tweets occasionally make explicit:
I’m in solidarity with both #BlackLivesMatter and 
#PoliceLivesMatter because #AllLivesMatter. Will you 
join me?
The tendency of #AllLivesMatter to occur at the end of tag sequences 
enacts another rhetorical figure, climax, in which words appear in order 
“of increasing importance” (Burton n.d.). More specifically, the final 
“#AllLivesMatter” is positioned as a superordinate category that logical-
ly subsumes both #BlackLivesMatter and #policelivesmatter. The use of 
this figure implies that the abolition of difference of any kind is a politi-
cal destiny and a logical inevitability. Black Lives Matter, in this formula-
tion, is merely a stepping- stone on the way to a post- racial state of affairs 
in which, finally, All Lives Matter.
Post- racial politics operate by taking a certain view of history in which 
“society has transcended the racial movement, or civil rights era” (Cho 
2009). On the level of statistical rhetoric, #AllLivesMatter enacts this 
“transcendence” again and again, proleptically figuring itself as the 
end of politics. As Feldman (2015) has argued, digital media may be an 
especially effective tool for the post- racial “dematerialization” of racial 
discourses by inviting forms of participation that are highly individual-
ized but symbolically “universal.” Indeed, certain #AllLivesMatter tweets 
suggest that taking recourse to an explicitly racialized subjectivity (rather 
than a “human” one) and even articulating grievances that stem from 
systemic injustices that are themselves racialized are not wrong so much 
as belated, tactics from an earlier step in a dialogic contention between 
protest and counterprotest that leads to a utopian moment, a time be-
yond race and also politics. This rhetorical pattern, the performance of 
post- racial transcendence, invites participants to imagine or feel them-
selves not so much against #BlackLivesMatter as after it.
#AllLivesMatter as White Noise
More than descriptive tags and more than mere slogans, hashtags are 
the semiotic units of a new form of rhetoric. Through protest and coun-
terprotest, users are figuring out new ways of making meaning in the 
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constrained space of the tweet. Hashtags are like music, allowing for af-
fective attunement (Papacharissi 2014). Yet where does music end and 
discord begin?
While #AllLivesMatter can be used in ways that are obviously antag-
onistic to the goals of Black Lives Matter, it can also be used in ways 
that are— if just as antagonistic— not obviously so. The reality is that 
on Twitter, the hashtags #AllLivesMatter and #BlackLivesMatter are 
sometimes used together in ways that do not admit their incongruity. 
#AllLivesMatter is best understood not as dissonance (recognizable as an 
off- key note, a scratch of the needle on the record) but rather “noise”— 
fuzz and chatter that makes it hard to hear the melody in the first place. 
In the context of #BlackLivesMatter, #AllLivesMatter could be figured as 
a sort of anti- Black “white noise” meant to interrupt the antiracist mes-
sage of Black Lives Matter. Politics is played out on the level of how peo-
ple use hashtags: #AllLivesMatter sometimes refuses to be positioned in 
a purely agonistic relationship to #BlackLivesMatter. It declines to fully 
symbolize a “them” against which the coalitions otherwise attuned to 
#BlackLivesMatter might organize themselves— the crucial step in a bat-
tle for hegemony (Laclau and Mouffe 2001). Insofar as social networks 
are spaces for the mass cultivation of affect, we must not ignore the ways 
that “counterprotests” like #AllLivesMatter produce not just the feeling 
of opposition but also the feeling (no less genuine for being dubious) 
that opposition is optional. And so perhaps the rise of #AllLivesMatter 
should be understood as a symptom of what Robin DiAngelo (2011) has 
called “white fragility,” the inability of white people to cognitively or 
emotionally cope with the slightest degree of “racial stress.” Like the 
“Muzak” played in elevators and airports, designed only to soothe the 
listener into a state of quietude, #AllLivesMatter provides an emotional 
escape from the “stressful” demands of Black Lives Matter. Through the 
very specific rhetorical techniques that #AllLivesMatter deploys, igno-
rance becomes weaponized.
This chapter has used a combination of close and distant dis-
course analysis in order to sketch out some of the main features of 
#BlackLivesMatter and #AllLivesMatter as complexly interrelated dis-
course systems. Yet this approach is, at last count, a static one. While pro-
viding typologies of rhetorical moves, it does not offer a sense of the ways 
that contemporary rhetoric actually works upon its audiences as it prolif-
erates across Twitter and other networks. If one goal of #AllLivesMatter 
is to create networks of those who are opposed to Black Lives Matter but 
do not have to actively feel their own opposition, the question emerges: 
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how can antiracist activists on social media not just form their own “af-
fective publics” but also disrupt the perversely bland aesthetics of post- 
racial quietude?
Note
I have refrained from identifying the authors of individual tweets. This is first 
and foremost because my goal is to critique discourses, not individual Twitter 
users whose contributions to the network may instantiate these discourses. Also, 
since Tweets and accounts can be deleted, specifying that a particular Twitter 
user posted a particular tweet would interfere with users’ “right to be forgotten.”
 1. This case study takes as its corpus a collection of tweets, gathered using 
Twitter’s Search API daily between December 30, 2014 and February 6, 2015. The 
Twitter API allows for the collection of tweets containing a specific hashtag— in 
this case, #BlackLivesMatter. When using the Twitter Search API to gather tweets 
containing a popular tag, Twitter only provides access to a sample of the recent 
data, so my data set is not guaranteed to be a “complete” archive.
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Popular Outrage, Divo Citizenship, and Digital 
Political Performativity
abigail de kosnik
The Social Drama of #CancelColbert
On March 27, 2014, the official Twitter account of The Colbert Report, 
comedian Stephen Colbert’s political satire show on the cable network 
Comedy Central, tweeted, “I am willing to show #Asian community I care 
by introducing The Ching- Chong Ding- Dong Foundation for Sensitivity 
to Orientals or Whatever.” This was the punch line of a long joke told 
by Colbert on the episode of his program that had aired the previous 
night. On that episode, Colbert announced that Dan Snyder, owner of 
the Washington Redskins football team, chose to respond to the long- 
running criticism of the team’s continued use of a racial epithet as its 
name by launching an organization called “The Washington Redskins 
Original Americans Foundation,” whose mission is “to provide resources 
that offer genuine opportunities for Tribal communities” (Washington 
Redskins Original Americans Foundation 2017). Colbert mocked the 
organization’s odd combination of a presumably pro– Native American 
mission with racist language by proclaiming that he would be supporting 
“the #Asian community,” with a (fictional) foundation whose name was 
replete with anti- Asian discourse: “ching- chong ding- dong” is derived 
from nineteenth- century English speakers’ derogatory imitations of the 
Chinese language (Chow 2014); “Orientals” is a designation for Asians 
that most Asians consider to be, at best, outdated, and at worst, racist 
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(Tsuchiyama 2016; Oh 2010); and “or whatever” indicates utter indiffer-
ence regarding what Asians prefer to be called.
However, Colbert’s tactic of deriding Snyder’s racist discourse met 
with resistance from Asian American online activist Suey Park (@suey_
park).1 Shortly after the @ColbertReport tweet appeared, Park tweeted, 
“The Ching- Chong Ding- Dong Foundation for Sensitivity to Orientals 
has decided to call for #CancelColbert. Trend it.” Soon thereafter, she 
followed up with “#CancelColbert because white liberals are just as com-
plicit in making Asian Americans into punchlines and we aren’t amused.”
Later that night and the next day, Park continued to tweet in 
#CancelColbert. Her tweets included “#CancelColbert because rac-
ist humor comes from racism” and “Still trending and waiting 
@StephenAtHome and @ColbertReport. Want to know how many hours 
#NotYourAsianSidekick trended? #CancelColbert.”
In this last tweet, Park indicates that one day after beginning her 
hashtag #CancelColbert, she has not yet received a response (she is “still 
waiting” for a reaction) from either Stephen Colbert, via his official 
personal Twitter account @StephenAtHome, or his television program 
The Colbert Report, about the #CancelColbert campaign. She notes that 
the #CancelColbert tag remains active and refers to the fact that one of 
her earlier hashtag campaigns, #NotYourAsianSidekick (which encour-
aged Asian American feminists to share their experiences of intersec-
tionality and to articulate their distinctness from white feminism) from 
December 2013, persisted for months on Twitter and attracted national 
attention (Chen and Jha 2013).
As per Park’s call to action, #CancelColbert did trend: for ten days 
after Park initiated the hashtag, thousands of tweets (more than forty- 
seven thousand, according to our data scrape, described in more detail 
below) used it. Many #CancelColbert tweets reinforced Park’s critique 
of the Colbert Report joke. For example, @eiridescent tweeted, “I can get 
behind this. ‘Ironic’ oppressive ‘jokes’ aren’t funny and still oppress. 
#CancelColbert,” and @cheuya tweeted, “Using satire that ‘ironically’ 
ridicules Asians = not productive for indigenous nor any marginalized 
group. White humor blows #CancelColbert.” However, other tweets 
accused Park of failing to comprehend Colbert’s joke. For instance, 
@BurningTheAlter tweeted, “Anyone who actually wants Colbert can-
celled is a fucking idiot who has absolutely no understanding of satire. 
#CancelColbert.” A tweet from @WorldofIsaac read, “If you want a good 
laugh, read the #CancelColbert hashtag. It’s faux outrage at its finest.”
The volume of activity in the hashtag, Park’s profile as a digital activ-
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ist, and the sharp lines drawn between supporters and critics of Park’s 
call for protest, led to coverage of #CancelColbert by prominent news or-
ganizations, including Variety (Stedman 2014), CNN.com (Respers France 
2014), Salon (Cooper 2014), and Slate (Weigel 2014), and Time pub-
lished a piece by Park and Eunsong Kim explaining the #CancelColbert 
campaign (Park and Kim 2014). Taking note of the interest generated 
by #CancelColbert, HuffPost Live, the video- streaming network of the 
Huffington Post, invited Park for an interview with host Josh Zepps on 
March 28, 2014, the day after Park originated the hashtag. Park and 
Zepps, who is a white male, openly clashed throughout the interview, 
which led to intensified press coverage of #CancelColbert and also in-
creasingly hostile tweets directed at Park, such as “‘white men don’t have 
the right to an opinion’ lol wow @Suey_Park give me a break”; “‘As a 
white man, you’re not allowed to have any beliefs.’ Sheesh”; “Annoying 
race- baiting liberals. @Suey_Park”; “Someone needs to chop Suey”; and 
most disturbingly, “Go get raped, c**; you f*****ing deserve it” and 
“You are a dirty f*****ing n****; you should probably just kill yourself” 
(Internet Ruined My Life 2016).
Four days after #CancelColbert began, on the next episode of The 
Colbert Report that aired on March 31, 2014, Colbert directly addressed 
the controversy. He did not apologize for @ColbertReport’s “Ching- 
Chong Ding- Dong Foundation” tweet, but he criticized Comedy Central 
for posting from an account with his show’s name on it that Colbert did 
not control, asked Twitter cofounder Biz Stone to help him delete the 
@ColbertReport account, and told his followers to stop harassing Park. 
“That ends the controversy,” Colbert said (Blake 2014).
The “controversy,” in the form of widespread media coverage of 
#CancelColbert, did die down after Colbert declared an “end” to it on 
March 31, but according to Park, it did not completely halt. Park says 
that a group of trolls doxxed her, publishing her phone number, email 
address, home address, and other personal information on the internet 
so that others could vilify and threaten her, and that after receiving a bar-
rage of frightening phone calls and confronting a man who was stalking 
her, she largely withdrew from Twitter (Bruenig 2015; Internet Ruined My 
Life 2016). Not all critics of #CancelColbert expressed anti- liberal view-
points, but strong threads of racism and sexism ran through the most 
vehement threats and harassment posted in the hashtag and directed at 
Park. In this chapter, I characterize #CancelColbert as a “leftist” action 
in the sense that it was antiracist, and I frame the extreme end of the 
spectrum of backlash against #CancelColbert as “rightist” in the sense 
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that people at this extreme defended racist speech (and, in doing so, 
propagated highly misogynistic speech and actions).
Popular Outrage
Liberals’ use of the internet to collectively criticize expressions that they 
interpret as racist, sexist, homophobic, transphobic, ableist, xenopho-
bic, or otherwise prejudiced, has been criticized as “call- out culture,” 
“dogpiling,” and “piling on” (Friedersdorf 2017). Some argue that when 
individuals cause offense, it is mostly done unintentionally or in minor 
ways and does not warrant their being subjected to barrages of rebukes; 
this line of thinking holds that call- out culture is “toxic” because it inhib-
its expression rather than inspiring productive dialogue among different 
groups of people (Friedersdorf 2017, Ahmad 2015). Others argue that 
for too long, public speech (which includes online posts) that is racist, 
sexist, or offensive in other ways has been allowed to proliferate without 
comment, as dominant social norms often presume such speech to be 
innocent or harmless, often excusing it as “just a joke” (Nguyen 2016) or 
“not that big of a deal” (Riley H. 2017). Some advocate for “calling in,” 
or having a private conversation with someone who has caused offense 
in order to offer them information and guidance, as an alternative to 
“calling out,” or criticizing someone for offensive speech in a public set-
ting (Ferguson 2015). However, software engineer and blogger Riley H. 
(2017) argues that calling in is not sufficient to stop harmful behavior: 
“It takes 50 call- ins before someone is tired enough of being harassed 
to make the call- out.” Pro– social justice internet users thus regard col-
lective and public articulation of outrage as a valuable tactic for making 
visible, and interrupting, public expressions of bias and prejudice that 
would otherwise be ignored, widely accepted as normal, or rapidly cov-
ered over and dismissed.
Outrage was the primary effect of the #CancelColbert campaign. 
Park’s initial #CancelColbert post publicized her own outrage at the 
@ColbertReport “joke” and called on other Twitter users to respond 
and announce their outrage using the hashtag. The common use of the 
#CancelColbert tag across the responding tweets served to aggregate and 
amplify the outrage. #CancelColbert was therefore exemplary of what we 
might call social justice digital performativity— that is, the repertoire of call- 
out culture, the order of actions commonly taken by leftists when they 
perceive that offensive speech needs to be collectively highlighted and 
disputed in the public sphere of the Internet.
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While outrage at casual racism has fueled online call- outs like 
#CancelColbert, far more intense and widespread forms of outrage— 
outrage felt deeply by masses of people for a long duration— has driv-
en large- scale political resistance and revolution. Manuel Castells’s 
book Networks of Outrage and Hope (2015) characterizes the Arab Spring 
revolts of 2010– 2012, the Occupy movement in the United States 
that began in 2011, and the hashtags through which participants in 
those movements organized and communicated, such as #ArabSpring 
and #OccupyWallStreet (or #Occupy/#OWS), as manifestations of 
society- wide outrage. Castells writes, “It was not just poverty, or the 
economic crisis, or the lack of democracy that caused the multifac-
eted rebellion. . . . It was primarily the humiliation provoked by the 
cynicism and arrogance of those in power, be it financial, political or 
cultural, that brought together those who turned fear into outrage, 
and outrage into hope for a better humanity” (2– 3). However, in 
Castells’s analysis of the political movements of the 2000s, feelings of 
outrage are not exclusive to left- wing activists. Castells also describes 
right- wing movements driven by outrage, as when he states that in 
response to the election of President Barack Obama in 2008 and the 
subsequent obstructionism exhibited by the Republican Congress, 
“The first expression of popular outrage was the rise of the Tea Party, 
a mixture of populism and libertarianism that offered a channel of 
mobilization to a variety of indignant opposition to government in 
general and to Obama in particular” (157).
I cite Castells’s arguments about #ArabSpring and #Occupy not to 
claim that #CancelColbert approached the intensity or reach of these 
sweeping political movements, but in order to underscore his claim that 
both left- wing and right- wing groups can operate from the shared affect 
that Castells calls “popular outrage.” Leftist (antiracist) outrage moti-
vated the launch of the #CancelColbert campaign, but racist and sexist 
outrage motivated many criticisms of Park, as well as the acts of trolling, 
doxxing, and stalking perpetrated against her. As Castells’s examples 
and #CancelColbert make clear, online outrage is not exclusive to any 
particular party, group, or philosophy; rather, outrage is a component 
of the repertoires of both alt- right digital performativity and social jus-
tice digital performativity. In other words, digital political performativity, of 
which online outrage is a defining aspect, can be enacted by either those 




The Alt- Right’s Affect of Underrepresentation
Noting how commonly right- wing Twitter users express outrage at left- 
wing hashtag campaigns leads to a reconsideration of Zizi Papacharissi’s 
work on “affective publics.” Papacharissi argues that “the narrative 
structures of Twitter lend form to affective modalities of storytelling” 
(2015, 12), and that affective publics differ from earlier models of public 
spheres in that they do not purport to employ “rationally based delib-
erative protocols” but are “textually rendered into being through emo-
tive expressions that spread virally through networked crowds” (14). 
Papacharissi writes, “Affective publics typically produce disruptions/
interruptions of dominant political narratives by presencing underrep-
resented viewpoints” (12). However, she notes that affective publics can, 
in turn, be disrupted; she quotes one anti- Occupy tweet that used the 
#OWS hashtag: “I’m sick of the perpetually out- raged & offended . . . I’m 
offended they can afford to take a day off work to WHINE! #OWS #99%” 
(13). #OWS sought to interrupt the dominant social, economic, and po-
litical narrative of neoliberal capitalism, but anti- #OWS posters sought 
to disrupt #OWS, perhaps regarding it as a dominant political narrative 
in that it was heavily and frequently reported on (not in the mainstream 
press but on social media platforms).
In the case of #CancelColbert, I postulate that posters who took issue 
with Park’s criticism of Colbert’s joke saw liberal outrage as a “dominant 
political narrative” that manifested in the protest against Colbert’s joke 
but also in many previous hashtag campaigns that drew attention to per-
vasive everyday racism, such as #NotMyName, #ClassicallyBeautiful, and 
Park’s #NotYourAsianSidekick.2 Right- leaning users formed an affective 
public that sought to disrupt, and interrupt, the liberal outrage that may 
have seemed to dominate Twitter in the first half of the 2010s.
I propose that #CancelColbert allows us to perceive right- wingers’ 
outrage at the “out- raged,” and their being offended by the “offended,” 
as an affective stream of outrage in its own right— that is, as rightist out-
rage writ large. In other words, alt- righters in the years leading up to 
the 2016 election did not only manifest backlash against liberal outrage; 
rather, they were themselves constitutive of an affective public motivated 
by outrage.
Topic Modeling of #CancelColbert
At my request, one of my PhD students in computer science, Andrew 
Godbehere, mined all of the tweets that appeared in #CancelColbert 
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on Twitter in the eleven days following Park’s debut of the hashtag 
(between March 26 and April 5, 2014), finding 47,434 total tweets. 
Godbehere then applied to the data set a topic- modeling program, 
which resulted in eight topics. Machine learning engineer Bugra 
Akyildiz (2015) defines topic models as “probabilistic generative mod-
els which uncover hidden thematic structures in large collections of 
documents.” One of the topics that emerged from Godbehere’s analy-
sis, Topic 7, was thematically structured around outrage. Here are se-
lect tweets from Topic 7:
Topic 7
outrage faux fake: [outrage, faux, fake, matters, real, 
time, feel, listen]
— - 
OhHiNickBlake at 1396028124— OUTRAGE OUTRAGE OUTRAGE 
OUTRAGE OUTRAGE
OUTRAGE OUTRAGE OUTRAGE #CancelColbert OUTRAGE OUTRAGE 
OUTRAGE OUTRAGE O
UTRAGE OUTRAGE OUTRAGE OUTRA
travarp at 1396013863— So #CancelColbert has gone from 
outrage to faux outrage, to faux outrage over faux 
outrage #america
FelixMcCormick at 1396045800— #CancelColbert FAUX 
OUTRAGE, FAUX OUTRAGE, FAUX OUTRAGE!
brooklynmike21 at 1396026308— I’m outrage by your 
outrage! Somebody please listen and feel sorry for 
me!!! #CancelColbert
Alf954 at 1396025257— I searched #CancelColbert and all 
I see is fauxoutrage over faux outrage. Except for  
@EdgeofSports, but hes ALWAYS offended.
jtLOL at 1396020802— Yes, only YOUR outrage is real. RT 
@Toure Don’t #CancelColbert. Because context matters 
more than fake outrage.
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DouglasRowan at 1396018674— What did people do with 
their faux outrage before social media? Who is 
going to out- outrage the other outraged community? 
#CancelColbert
itsjustjoshy at 1396100919— @StephenAtHome what did you 
do? Omg! Just read about it. Outrage!! Generic outrage! 
I don’t even know who you are anymore. #CancelColbert
Topic 7 shows many tweets mocking Park’s and her followers’ liberal out-
rage at Colbert’s joke. For example, OhHiNickBlake’s tweet consists of 
the word “OUTRAGE” typed in all caps over and over, implying that 
#CancelColbert liberals are simply shouting their feelings of outrage at 
the rest of Twitter, hoping someone will listen. There are mentions of 
“faux outrage,” “fake outrage,” and “generic outrage,” which intimate 
that the #CancelColbert tweeters’ outrage is unfounded and unjusti-
fied. brooklynmike21 tweets, “I’m outrage[d] by your outrage! Some-
body please listen and feel sorry for me!!! #CancelColbert,” and Doug-
lasRowan tweets, “What did people do with their faux outrage before 
social media? Who is going to out- outrage the other outraged communi-
ty?,” which hints that #CancelColbert supporters are not truly outraged 
but perform outrage only to seek attention.
When conservatives condemn liberals for their overt displays of out-
rage, they are themselves showing righteous anger, taking offense, and 
making known their feelings; those who express outrage at liberal out-
rage may think their position is the more rational one, but their expres-
sions are full of affect, emotion, and sentiment. Anti– #CancelColbert 
tweeters accuse pro– #CancelColbert tweeters of being overly perfor-
mative, but the “antis” are no less performative than the “pros.” The 
anti– #CancelColbert users condemn the pro– #CancelColbert camp 
for enacting “fake” and “faux” outrage, but as Victor Turner would ar-
gue, performance is not “faking,” but a form of “making” (1982, 93). In 
#CancelColbert, both pros and antis performed outrage and thus made 
something; Papacharissi would say that what both camps made over the 
course of the hashtag campaign were affective publics.
I argue that the current wave of US conservative and alt- right outrage 
is based in strong feelings of subordination: feelings of being underrepre-
sented and marginalized, not feelings of being dominant, even though 
the majority of conservatives and alt- righters are white Americans and 
thus belong to the demographic with the most political, social, cultural, 
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and economic power in the country. I claim that, more often than not, 
the affective public constituted by outraged rightists see themselves as 
followers rather than leaders, underlings rather than managers. I base 
this claim on the prominence and significance of individual spokespeo-
ple, such as Donald Trump and Milo Yiannopoulos, in the alt- right.
Divo Citizenship
Manuel Castells calls the Arab Spring, Occupy, and other social move-
ments facilitated by social media “leaderless movements” (2015, 131), 
but #CancelColbert was not leaderless. I read Park’s instigation of 
#CancelColbert, #NotYourAsianSidekick, and other social justice– 
oriented campaigns as acts of what Lauren Berlant (1997) calls “Diva 
Citizenship.” Berlant locates Diva Citizenship in moments when individ-
ual members of subordinated groups, bear witness to their experiences 
of subordination, in the hope that by making public their personal his-
tories and feelings, they will aid in “the transformation of U.S. political 
and social culture” (222). She writes:
Diva Citizenship occurs when a person stages a dramatic coup in 
a public sphere in which she does not have privilege. Flashing up 
and startling the public, she puts the dominant story into suspended 
animation; .  .  . she renarrates the dominant history as one that the 
abjected people have once lived sotto voce, but no more; and she 
challenges her audience to identify with the enormity of the suffering 
she has narrated and the courage she has had to produce, calling on 
people to change the social and institutional practices of citizenship 
to which they currently consent. (223)
Park and other women activists— such as April Reign, who launched #Os-
carsSoWhite, and Alicia Garza, Patrisse Cullors, and Opal Tometi, found-
ers of #BlackLivesMatter— have operated as diva citizens in social media 
platforms, news media, and real- world spaces. Through hashtags that 
these women launched and propelled into mainstream visibility, they 
have “flash[ed] up and startl[ed] the public” and have articulated emo-
tions and ideas that seem new to people outside of their ethnic groups 
(but are familiar to people inside those groups). They have called upon 
Americans and overseas followers to identify with their pain and with 
the pain that millions of people of color in the United States have ex-
perienced, in different sectors of American life, in the hopes of driving 
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collective change in racist American systems. Berlant lauds diva citizens 
for their “optimism” and “courage” (222– 23) in choosing to become 
public figures when, more often than not, dominant American culture 
dismisses and derides them. Park’s attempt to draw attention to Colbert’s 
joke as an example of seemingly innocuous, satirical, everyday racism fits 
Berlant’s definition of Diva Citizenship in every respect, including the 
fact that #CancelColbert attracted far more censure than support.
However, in the years following #CancelColbert, the daring and brav-
ery of diva citizens, their willingness to say what usually goes unsaid, and 
their proclaiming— and inciting others to amplify— certain thoughts and 
affects that are usually kept hidden from the majority of the American 
public have been reproduced by men on the far right of the political 
spectrum. As women like Park, Garza, and Reign asserted themselves 
as outspoken critics of how social and cultural structures continue to 
fail women and minorities, so did men like Donald Trump and Milo 
Yiannopoulos establish themselves as individuals willing to speak out 
against the failings of the supposedly dominant and entrenched liberal 
political system. Trump and Yiannopoulos rose to popularity with the 
alt- right in 2015 and 2016 by “staging .  .  . dramatic coup[s],” “flashing 
up and startling the public,” “put[ting] the dominant story”— of liberal 
inclusivity and equity— “into suspended animation,” giving voice to the 
stories and feelings of the “abjected people” who have “lived sotto voce, 
but no more,” “challeng[ing] [their] audience to identify with . . . the 
courage [they have] had to produce,” and “calling on people to change 
the social and institutional practices of citizenship.” An op- ed in the 
Washington Times in December 2015 stated that Trump “says what nearly 
everybody thinks but is too fearful or polite to say.” Buffalo Bills coach 
Rex Ryan said, introducing Trump at a rally in April 2016, “One thing I 
really admire about [Trump] is . . . he’ll say what’s on his mind. . . . [A] 
lot of people want to say the same thing. . . . They all think it, but they 
don’t have the courage to say it” (Rodak 2016). Jesse Singal (2017) wrote 
in New York Magazine in February 2017 that Yiannopoulos “has attracted 
an audience of resentful young people frustrated with ‘political correct-
ness,’ many of whom believe they aren’t ‘allowed’ to say various offensive 
things.”
Trump, Yiannopoulos, and other “heroes” of the alt- right thus act as 
divo citizens, my term for the right- wing male public figure who mirrors 
Berlant’s social justice– oriented diva citizen. The divo citizen seems to 
speak up when no one else will, about experiences and affects that are 
widely felt but little expressed. In their willingness to speak out, and in 
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their voluble criticisms of a slew of liberal customs and laws that seem 
(to their followers) oppressive and wrong, they embody rightist outrage 
both offline and online. However, diva citizens and divo citizens do not 
have an equal claim to outrage: women of color have been historically 
silenced in the United States in a myriad of ways, white men like Trump 
and Yiannopoulos have not. As Singal (2017) says, “It is plainly false that 
reactionary speech is severely restricted in the U.S. . . . This is a common 
conservative falsehood, that .  .  . people are getting fired or blacklisted 
left and right simply for ‘tellin’ it like it is.’” I am not arguing that the 
causes of diva citizens and divo citizens are morally equivalent but that 
divo citizens act like diva citizens— that these white men inhabit the posi-
tionality of oppressed women of color and perform the repertoire (speak-
ing out, defiantly telling the truth, daring to say what others will not, calling for 
widespread reform) of women of color who have dared to become public 
spokeswomen and advocates for themselves and their communities.
The performances of divo citizens are not the same as those of diva 
citizens, since any claims to being oppressed made by wealthy white male 
media celebrities would be spurious, but the performances of divo citi-
zens and diva citizens feel the same to their respective followers. That 
is, the divo citizen’s and the diva citizen’s performances stem from, and 
foster, the same affect— the affect of outrage— and thus similar affective 
publics form around both types of performers, though the diva’s public 
leans left and the divo’s public leans right. While popular outrage has 
long been a tool of the US conservatives (the “culture wars” of the 1980s 
and ’90s largely consisted of conservatives’ advocating for censorship of 
art and media that they found offensive and outrage- worthy), the 2010s 
have seen the rise of a new dimension to the outraged conservative: the 
posture of being persecuted rather than occupying the position of per-
secutor, of being the underdog rather than the one holding power, of 
being the one censored (by political correctness, which supposedly tells 
rightists they “‘aren’t allowed’ to say various offensive things” [Singal 
2017]) rather than being the one calling for censorship.
By performing being disempowered and silenced and needing to 
fight back against structural oppressive forces, and by constantly express-
ing outrage at the ways that they and their communities are made to 
suffer, spokespeople of the alt- right such as Trump and Yiannopoulos 
emulate leftist hashtag activists such as Park, Garza, and Reign. I specu-
late that liberal diva citizens may have provided the model for social me-
dia success for conservatives and alt- rightists in the 2010s, because their 
performance style— the proclamation of grievances, the call to amplify 
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or “trend” that proclamation, and the rallying of community around 
an affect of outrage that for too long was mostly individually felt and 
rarely collectively expressed— is now the dominant style of not only the 
alt- right’s most prominent representatives but also the swarms of users 
whose negative responses to campaigns such as #CancelColbert range 
from critical posts, to threatening posts, to doxxing, to harassing the diva 
citizens who launch the campaigns. The leftist tactic of using social me-
dia to mobilize outrage against systemic injustice and inequities appears 
to have been mirrored by the right and then turned against its origina-
tors. From 2014 to the present, rightists’ outrage has mobilized popular 
support for the expansion of unjust policies and laws and the intensifica-
tion of inequitable treatment of women, immigrants, and racial, ethnic, 
and sexual minorities.
The rise of alt- right digital performativity may have, in a sense, de-
feated Park, who has not led any social justice hashtag campaigns on 
Twitter following #CancelColbert. But since the election of Trump to 
the presidency in 2016, which many regard as a “victory” of the alt- 
right (Posner 2016), other leftist diva citizens have “flash[ed] up and 
startl[ed]” the public, including former acting attorney general Sally 
Yates,3 Representative Maxine Waters,4 and freelance journalist Lauren 
Duca.5 The cries of outrage made by the followers of divo citizens have 
not entirely overwhelmed the calls for inclusivity and universal recogni-
tion of human rights issued by their outraged opponents.
Notes
 1. “Suey” is not Park’s real first name. Elizabeth Bruenig writes that the fic-
tional name “Suey” “is a sardonic play on ‘chop suey’ and Asian American stereo-
types” (Bruenig 2015).
 2. In the #NotMyName campaign, people with markedly ethnic names shared 
stories of the numerous times they have heard their names mispronounced or 
have been called incorrect names. In the #ClassicallyBeautiful campaign, people 
took issue with white New York Times television critic Alessandra Stanley’s (2014) 
characterization of African American actress Viola Davis as “less classically beau-
tiful” than another lighter- skinned African American actress, Kerry Washington, 
and praised the diverse beauty of black women.
 3. On January 30, 2017, Yates, acting US attorney general, refused to defend 
President Trump’s executive order banning travelers from seven Muslim- majority 
states, “saying that she was not convinced that it was lawful,” and was fired for her 
resistance (Lizza 2017).
 4. Representative Maxine Waters of California, seventy- eight years old and 
the longest- serving Black woman in the US House of Representatives, has been 
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called “the Hero of the Anti- Trump Internet” (Sands 2017) for frequently and 
consistently speaking out against President Trump and his administration on the 
House floor, in interviews, and on Twitter (see Wire 2017).
 5. Teen Vogue published an op- ed by Duca titled “Donald Trump Is Gaslighting 
America” in December 2016 that earned Duca national attention. That month, 
right- wing political commentator Tucker Carlson invited Duca to appear on his 
Fox News show and advised that Duca should “stick to [writing about] thigh- 
high boots” (Wemple 2016). Duca retorted, “A woman can love . . . thigh- high 
boots and still discuss politics,” and titled her recurring column on Teen Vogue 
“Thigh- High Politics.” The Guardian has called Duca “an unlikely hero of the 
movement against Donald Trump” (Helmore 2017). Since the publication of her 
“Gaslighting” piece and the Carlson interview, Duca has received numerous rape 
threats, doxxing threats, and death threats (Duca 2017).
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Homophobic Twitter Hashtags, Straight Masculinity, 
and Networks of Queer Disavowal
bonnie ruberg
#nohomo on Twitter
The phrase “no homo” and its corresponding hashtag “#nohomo” ap-
pear approximately five thousand times a day on Twitter.1 Most often 
placed at the end of tweets, #nohomo is ostensibly used to signify that 
the content preceding it should not be interpreted as homoerotic or 
“gay.” However, in this essay I argue that the actual meanings of #noho-
mo, while indeed homophobic, are more nuanced and telling than they 
may at first appear. In fact, #nohomo functions as a tool for performing 
and self- policing straight masculinity. In a social media environment, the 
hashtag mediates utterances that are implicitly associated with “homo- 
ness.” These utterances fall into three main categories: (1) expressions 
of male- male intimacy, (2) the declaration of feelings, and (3) an inter-
est in self- presentation and the body. In this way, #nohomo represents 
an attempt to distance the user from associations with both queerness 
and femininity. At the same time, it stands as evidence of the anxieties of 
cisgender male heterosexuality as it is performed in social media spaces 
and links #nohomo tweeters through a network of queer disavowal.
While many other hashtags on social media platforms trend and 
then fade away, entering popular use for a brief period during a par-
ticular cultural or political moment, #nohomo has appeared with no-
table consistency throughout Twitter’s history. In this sense, the phrase 
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is an endemic fixture of the site’s discursive landscape. This is also true 
of a number of other homophobic terms and phrases used on Twitter 
(e.g., “so gay”), as well as racist, sexist, transphobic, and ableist expres-
sions of hate speech. However, #nohomo stands out among these terms 
precisely because it is, first and foremost, a hashtag: a unique unit of 
communication that emerged from within the Twitter- sphere. As such, it 
functions socially and semantically in ways that distinguish it from homo-
phobic speech uttered offline and in other digital environments. Even 
when #nohomo appears on Twitter in non- hashtag form— as “no homo” 
or “nohomo”— the phrase remains fundamentally linked to the net-
worked nature of meaning- making that the hashtag represents. #noho-
mo embodies the place where cultural anxieties about difference meet 
computer- mediated communication. At a moment when the linguistic 
unit of the hashtag is moving from Twitter into mainstream discourse, 
and when online harassment campaigns against marginalized subjects 
have reached new peaks of vitriol, the boundaries between oppressive 
language online and offline are blurring.2 Deconstructing the social and 
rhetorical functions of #nohomo offers a valuable opportunity to better 
understand the complex relationship between language and identity as 
it both manifests in and emerges from digital spaces.
The Uses of #nohomo
#nohomo, and its spoken incarnation, “no homo,” may initially seem dis-
missible as mere flip (albeit offensive) turns of phrase. To the contrary, 
my research has shown that the hashtag and its iterations serve as short-
hand for a surprisingly intricate, largely unspoken, and widely held set 
of heteronormative beliefs about what it means to express oneself— and, 
indeed, to enact oneself— as a gendered and sexual subject on the inter-
net. In particular, I contend that #nohomo most commonly performs 
a self- policing of cisgender, male heterosexuality. More explicitly than 
other forms of homophobic speech, #nohomo functions less as a direct 
expression of discrimination and more as a tool for making oneself an 
acceptable subject within a system of straight masculinity. In fact, rather 
than overt homoeroticism, the central concerns of #nohomo tweets are 
intimacy, affect, and the bodies of seemingly cisgender male users. Often 
the hashtag is deployed to mediate affectionate communication between 
such users as well as to render “safe” expressions of male- male fandom. 
Another trend that I have identified is the link between #nohomo tweets 
and male users’ expressions of emotions, both positive and negative. 
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Tweets from male users about body care and clothing are also promi-
nent fixtures within the landscape of #nohomo usage; in these cases, the 
hashtag appears to reflect an attempt on the part of speakers to distance 
themselves from associations with femininity.
Together, these patterns suggest a larger picture around #nohomo 
usage. By insisting on what is not “homo,” #nohomo signposts an other-
wise implicit network of what is imagined as “homo,” giving definition to 
queerness as seen through the anxieties of straight masculinity. By their 
nature, hashtags create networks. Rather than establishing a network of 
shared interests, political goals, or community (e.g., #BlackLivesMatter, 
#ItGetsBetter), however, #nohomo creates a network of disavowal. A net-
work of disavowal is one in which subjects are, ironically, connected 
through their attempts to distance themselves from connection. By us-
ing the hashtag to reject association with “homo- ness,” #nohomo users 
in fact build a web of links that associates them with others who have also 
deployed #nohomo. Through this network, which speaks to a set of anxi-
eties about the precariousness of heteronormativity in online spaces, the 
prevalence of #nohomo brings a queer valence to Twitter and digital 
modes of communication more broadly. In addition to its ties to histori-
cally feminine- coded genres of writing, such as the diary, platforms like 
Twitter, designed to facilitate interpersonal connection, seem to raise 
concerns about whether the structures of social media may themselves 
be “homo.” The widespread use of #nohomo stands as evidence that 
homophobic discourse thrives in digital spaces, yet it also suggests that 
the structures of computer- mediated expression might themselves be im-
plicitly understood by some users as queer.
Methodologies
This project stands at the intersection of big data, cultural analysis, 
and close reading. It emerges from a collaboration between humanists 
like myself, social scientists, and data engineers. Starting in 2012, UC 
Berkeley’s Color of New Media collective began work on a software tool 
that scrapes and parses content from Twitter associated with specific 
phrases. For the present study, we pulled tweets containing “#nohomo,” 
“nohomo” or “no homo.” These tweets were collected over designated 
periods in 2013, 2014, and 2015. The resulting data set was processed 
through the tool’s topic modeling algorithm, which generated “con-
stellations,” or common clusters in usage patterns, across the data set. 
Importantly, this algorithmic output was not the conclusion of my re-
Revised Pages
#nohomo  221
search but the starting point. By identifying patterns in the archive, which 
consisted of tens of thousands of tweets, the tool pointed me to toward 
key areas of interest and allowed me to perform a critique of a body of 
text that would otherwise be too vast for the “naked eye.”3 Conceptually, 
this work draws from notions of language, culture, power, and identity 
formation articulated by Judith Butler and Michel Foucault, as well as 
“speech act” theory, while adapting and expanding these notions for 
the digital context.4 There are also limitations to these methodologies. 
Because Twitter does not collect information regarding users’ racial and 
ethnic identities, it is difficult to comment on the role that race plays 
in #nohomo usage without making problematic assumptions. Language, 
nationality, and geography also present challenges. Even users’ gender 
and sexual identity, central concerns in the discussion below, are not 
tracked by Twitter. This means that, by necessity, my points regarding 
correlations between gender, sexuality, and #nohomo usage are less con-
cerned with “realness”— that is, definitively categorizing who #nohomo 
users “really” are— and more concerned with the equally important is-
sue of performances of identity, such as the performance of straight, 
cisgender masculinity. In place of offering definitive answers, this work 
uses the #nohomo hashtag as a window onto the anxieties and beliefs 
that drive discrimination against LGBTQ subjects and shape normative 
notions of sexual and gender identity, both online and off.
“No Homo” and #nohomo: A History
Though the phrase “no homo” has become most prominent in its wide-
spread use on social media platforms, particularly Twitter, it originates 
offline in African American vernacular culture. “No homo” was original-
ly coined in East Harlem in the 1990s, but it entered more mainstream 
circulation through hip- hop music, where it was introduced by rapper 
Cam’ron in the early 2000’s and popularized by Lil Wayne— as in the 
2009 single “Run This Town,” where Wayne raps, “It’s crazy how you 
go from being Joe Blow, to everybody on your dick, no homo” (Weiner 
2009). Here, in these early examples of the phrase’s appearance in popu-
lar culture, the link between homoeroticism (“everybody on your dick”) 
and the supposedly clarifying function of “no homo” (translated roughly 
to “but I don’t mean that in a gay way”) is clear. In response to claims 
that hip- hop culture has traditionally discriminated against LGBTQ peo-
ple, evidenced by homophobic remarks like “no homo” through which 
rap artists have distanced themselves from the figure of the “down low 
222  #identity
Revised Pages
brother,” some commentators have argued that “no homo” has actually 
allowed hip- hop to become a “gayer place.” “No homo,” so this thinking 
goes, creates the opportunity for straight male rappers to test the bound-
aries of heteronormativity by offering them the opportunity to speak and 
subsequently negate the “gayness” of their lyrics (Catucci 2009). This 
seeming contradiction, within which “no homo” might simultaneously 
encapsulate a system of cultural homophobia and make space for the 
expression of queerness, stands as a backdrop to the social functions of 
“no homo.”
The popularization of “no homo” in hip- hop, and subsequently 
mainstream, parlance coincided with the marked rise in Twitter usage 
recorded between 2007 and 2008. The translation of the phrase from 
primarily a spoken utterance to a social media fixture took place at a 
crucial moment in the popularization of the social media platform, 
when the average number of tweets per day skyrocketed 6,000 percent 
(Beaumont 2010). Hashtags are emergent units of communication: us-
ers invented and implemented them, and then Twitter integrated them 
into the site’s official system. In this moment of coevolution, “no homo” 
was already uniquely suited to the hashtag format. Similarly, to the way 
that a hashtag is placed at the end of a tweet, the verbal phrase “no 
homo” follows a speaker’s statement, clarifying and coloring its content 
and linking it within a network of references. Already functioning in 
spoken language as a kind of proto- hashtag, “no homo” transitioned 
and translated easily into #nohomo. When it did, the phrase moved be-
yond African American vernacular speech and was adopted by Twitter’s 
broader and predominantly white user base.5 In this sense, “no homo” 
reflects the well- documented phenomenon by which rhetorical innova-
tions from Black culture are co- opted and decontextualized. #nohomo 
in particular demonstrates the role that digital media can play in the 
appropriation of Black culture (Clifton 2015). In this case, Twitter func-
tioned as the primary locus and an amplifier of this cooptation.
Both “no homo,” as a phrase used in conversation, and #nohomo, its 
digital incarnation, claim to disavow the homoerotic implications of the 
utterance that immediately precedes it. They represent an attempt to 
nullify the queerness of statements that are seen as having homoerotic 
connotations or overtones. However, on Twitter, #nohomo is employed 
in this way surprisingly rarely; tweets with overtly homoerotic content 
number among the least common in identifiable genres of #nohomo 
tweets. In fact, the hashtag #nohomo has taken on much more nuanced 
social and rhetorical functions than the phrase “no homo.” Because the 
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hashtag is often appended to tweets that do not contain explicitly homo-
erotic content, #nohomo itself often “queers” tweets at the same time 
that it purports to negate queerness. This is because, by nature, the pres-
ence of #nohomo suggests that a tweet’s content might be interpreted 
as “homo.” In presenting my research on #nohomo, I have often en-
countered audiences’ expectation that the hashtag is used ironically or 
humorously. This may be true for the spoken “no homo,” but the Twitter 
data set suggests that, though #nohomo often appears in tweets with a 
jocular tone, it is almost always used in earnest. Much as Sarah Banet- 
Weiser and Kate M. Miltner have argued about hashtags in their work 
on #MasculinitySoFragile, #nohomo speaks in real and meaningful ways 
to the functions through which identity is constructed and deconstruct-
ed on Twitter (Banet- Weiser and Miltner 2016). In what follows, I have 
grouped the usage patterns of #nohomo into three primary categories: 
male- male intimacy, body care, and affect. Together they demonstrate 
how straight masculinity defines itself through queer disavowal and how 
the “homo” is imagined as a danger that lurks within the very systems of 
social media.
Male- Male Intimacy, Communication, and Fandom
Among the most frequent uses of #nohomo is the mediation of intimacy 
and affection between two or more male Twitter users— as well as be-
tween an individual male user and another man, such as a movie star or 
sports figure, for whom the user is expressing admiration. It is common 
to see #nohomo appear in tweets that proclaim sentiments of straight 
male friendship, or what might be termed “bro- ship.” Sometimes these 
tweets directly state warm feelings; at other times they simply imply car-
ing and connection by enacting friendliness. Here are two examples of 
this genre of #nohomo tweets6:
@twitterfriend1 I love you, bro #nohomo
Hey dude, happy birthday @twitterfriend2 #nohomo
In the first tweet, the speaker is using #nohomo to assure the 
friend whom he is addressing that his “love” is safe and normatively 
acceptable— in other words, heterosexual. In the second tweet, the af-
fection between the users is implied, yet the speaker still includes the 
#nohomo hashtag. The utterance “happy birthday” presumably express-
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es caring and therefore is also associated with an intimacy that could be 
perceived as “homo.” Such instances, in which #nohomo is deployed to 
disavow even the most basic sentiments of male- male friendship, suggest 
that friendliness between heterosexual men is imagined by some users to 
represent a potential site of queer slippage. While constructs of bro- ship 
allow for expressions of male- male closeness (e.g., “I love you bro”), they 
also produce anxiety between users who must always also be working 
to uphold heterosexual masculinity. Bro- ship is therefore formulated as 
straight yet queer- adjacent, and it must be carefully monitored and me-
diated in order to ward off the threat of queerness.
Importantly, in the social media context, #nohomo’s function as 
a safeguard against queerness in male- male friendships is fundamen-
tally linked to the communicative structures of Twitter. Taken as a to-
tal data set, #nohomo tweets on average contain a higher number of 
@- mentions and @- replies than random samplings of tweets. Roughly 
speaking, #nohomo tweets are approximately one and a half times 
more likely to contain @- mentions and @- replies than tweets that do 
not contain #nohomo. @- mentions and @- replies are the tools through 
which users directly link their tweets to other users. Within the for-
mal structures of Twitter, @- mentions and @- replies both enact and 
embody connections between individuals. If we understand intimacy 
as characterized in part through interpersonal closeness and attach-
ment, @- mentions and @- replies are the formal units of intimacy on 
Twitter. The fact that #nohomo tweets contain, on average, a higher 
percentage of these units suggests that structured connections through 
@- mentions and @- replies have themselves become associated, wheth-
er directly or indirectly, with the anxieties of heterosexual male socia-
bility. These mentions and replies literalize the type of intimacy that 
#nohomo polices. Through the structure of links, they create ties be-
tween users’ Twitter accounts that may themselves implicitly be associ-
ated with homo- ness.
Related to #nohomo’s function in mediating male- male friendships is 
the use of the hashtag in tweets in which male users express their appre-
ciation for male celebrities, such as movie stars, musicians, and, above all, 
athletes. These tweets usually perform fandom either through specific ref-
erences to a celebrity’s accomplishments or through a general proclama-
tion of positive sentiment. Tweets of this sort often look like this:
LeBron James is a basketball god. #nohomo
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Ok, I’m actually really liking this Justin Bieber 
album. #nohomo
Michael Phelps dominated today. That dude has muscles 
like WHAT. #nohomo
The use of #nohomo in tweets such as these suggests that male- male 
fandom, in the eyes of heterosexual masculinity, stands in complicated 
relation to “homo- ness.” As the first tweet demonstrates, the prevalence 
of #nohomo in these utterances implies a concern that men’s admiration 
of other men will be presumed queer, even when these tweets contain 
no explicitly homoerotic content. It seems that the mere expression of 
positive feeling suggests a queer intimacy that must be neutralized. The 
second tweet represents another prominent and related genre of tweet. 
Here, the celebrity or material for which the straight male user is ex-
pressing appreciation is imagined to be associated with queerness (i.e., 
liking Justin Bieber is “homo”). In the third tweet, the user expresses 
admiration for the body of a male celebrity. Whereas the first tweet re-
flects the rigidity of heterosexual masculinity, which renders unaccept-
able appreciation for other men, the second and third tweets do suggest, 
as discussed above, that #nohomo allows users to push the boundaries 
of their straight male identities. By amending their statements with #no-
homo, they are able to admit to liking “queer” music and to appreciate 
male bodies while returning to their positions as normative heterosexual 
subjects. In such moments, #nohomo makes queer- coded expression 
possible while working to uphold a hegemonic system.
Among the perceived traits of queerness that #nohomo suggests is 
the belief that same- sex friendship, intimacy, fandom, and even basic 
appreciation can constitute “homo- ness.” Notably, as the prevalence of 
@- mentions and @- replies in this data set indicates, this intimacy also ex-
tends to the structures of interpersonal communication in digital spaces; 
these structures themselves create connections that are too close for 
straight male comfort. The hashtag #nohomo makes these beliefs and 
biases visible by literalizing them into standardized rhetorical units. This 
first genre of #nohomo tweet underscores how same- sex sociability func-
tions as a site of anxiety for the performance for straight masculinity.
Body Care, Personal Appearance, and Femininity as Queer
The second major trend in the usage of #nohomo is the frequency with 
which the hashtag appears in conjunction with tweets about body care 
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and personal appearance. As is the case in tweets regarding male- male 
intimacy, these tweets seem to come primarily from straight male users. 
Within the subjects of body care and personal appearance, physical fit-
ness and clothing are both common themes. Here are three examples 
of this type of tweet:
I just finished my workout and my abs look sick. 
#nohomo
I got my eyebrows done today. #nohomo
Can I wear a scarf with a button- down shirt or is that 
weird? #nohomo
Each of these three utterances represents a different aspect of this trend. 
The implications of the first tweet seem, at first glance, the most straight-
forward. Like the tweet above in which a user expresses admiration for 
Michael Phelps’s muscles, the statement that the user’s “abs look sick” 
(“sick” used in complimentary sense) is imagined to run the risk of seem-
ing homoerotic; a male user appreciating a male body, even his own, trig-
gers anxieties about sounding “homo.” However, it is meaningful that 
the contents of this tweet also mark it as heteronormatively masculine. 
In boasting about the intensity of his workout and the resulting strength 
of his body, this user is simultaneously performing a version of straight 
male butchness as well as undermining that same identity performance 
by straying dangerously close to the queer. To say “no homo” after ad-
miring his own body implies that this user thinks he looks so good that 
he might be attracted to himself. This is an example of a tweet in which 
#nohomo infuses utterances with queer implications even as it purports 
to disavow them.
By contrast, the second and third tweets in this list are less concerned 
with homoeroticism and more with normative gender expectations. In 
the tweet about having his eyebrows “done,” the user employs #nohomo 
in order to preempt the response that it would be socially unacceptable 
for a straight man to take part in this kind of personal grooming, which 
is traditionally associated with women’s body care practices. In this case, 
the “homo” in #nohomo seems synonymous with “effeminate,” implying 
that disavowing queerness also means disavowing femininity. In the third 
tweet, the user asks whether he can wear a scarf with a button- down shirt. 
Though the question seems simple, the inclusion of #nohomo signals 
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that the users believes even this level of interest in clothing and personal 
appearance may be deemed unacceptable for a straight male subject. 
Here, #nohomo takes on a self- policing role; the user calls out and re-
jects the imagined queerness of his question, performing the task of cul-
tural regulation on himself. Whereas the first genre of #nohomo tweets 
mediated intimacies between men, many tweets in this second grouping 
mediate the speaker’s intimate relationship with his own body.
Strikingly, this genre of tweets, especially those that address body 
care and personal appearance, suggest that many of the conditions of 
“homo- ness” relate much more closely to gender than to sexuality or 
erotic desire. For a straight male subject, association with female- coded 
interests is seen as queer. Heterosexual masculinity, in such moments, 
defines itself in opposition to femininity. This is one of the key find-
ings that this research reveals: that queerness, as constructed through 
a hegemonic system of beliefs, is imagined as fundamentally linked to 
the destabilization of normative gender roles. In this way among others, 
the imagined characteristics of queerness that #nohomo tweets suggest 
differ substantially from how LGBTQ subjects and queer theory have 
traditionally articulated their own identities. They also differ from the 
common definition of homosexuality (i.e., an orientation toward sex 
or romance with a person of the same sex), suggesting that #nohomo 
speaks to a more complex network of beliefs and concerns that operate 
beneath the surface in mainstream perceptions of LGBTQ people. It is 
also important that the site of gender anxiety for straight masculinity, as 
suggested by #nohomo usage, is the heterosexual male body. #nohomo 
is much less frequently used for female- coded activities (e.g., crafting, 
shopping) and much more frequently for a set of female- coded interac-
tions with the embodied self. Far from representing a material strong-
hold of heteronormativity, the straight male body becomes a place of 
weakness. It is when discussing his body that the speaker must be most 
watchful and most self- correcting, lest discourse stray toward queer.
(Queer) Affect and Twitter as Women’s Writing
The third main trend in #nohomo usage is the appearance of the hashtag 
in association with tweets from ostensibly straight male users in which 
they directly express emotion. Some of these tweets make reference to 
positive emotions, others to negative emotions; some reflect emotional 
responses to important life events, others speak to everyday experiences. 
Here are some examples of this genre of tweet:
228  #identity
Revised Pages
I’m just feeling really sad today. #nohomo
Being a dad is the best, you guys. This little kid 
makes me so happy. #nohomo
I love you all! #nohomo
In the first tweet, the user describes feeling upset or depressed, whereas 
the speakers in the second two tweets are expressing feelings of affec-
tion and love. What these tweets share is that they reflect the belief that 
the admission of emotion is itself “homo,” regardless of the specificities 
of the sentiment expressed or the object of that sentiment. This genre 
of #nohomo tweet suggests that feeling itself is imagined as nonmascu-
line and therefore non- straight. Sadness and love alike fall outside the 
boundaries of acceptable male, heterosexual subjecthood; affect be-
comes queer. Straight masculinity on Twitter is therefore not only con-
structed through what a user may do but also explicitly through what 
(and whether) a user may feel. #nohomo here functions to mark affect 
as queer while simultaneously allowing users to return to heterosexual 
normativity after having expressed emotion.
Admittedly, this genre of tweets appears with considerably less fre-
quency than those that relate to male- male intimacy or the male body. 
However, I include it here because these tweets highlight a commonality 
that exists across almost all types of #nohomo tweets: an imagined inter-
relation between feeling and queerness. In tweets about friendship and 
fandom, #nohomo mediates sentiments of warmth and love. Similarly, 
in tweets about body care and appearance, the function of #nohomo 
is to de- queer the act of caring. The user who worries that asking about 
his clothing choices will seem “homo” is less concerned with his cloth-
ing itself and more concerned that caring too much about clothing will 
mark him as queer; the user who reports having his eyebrows done em-
ploys #nohomo to ward off the implication that he cares more about 
his appearance than a straight man should. Being “homo,” in such in-
stances, is not about doing or looking unacceptable but about feeling 
unacceptable. #nohomo itself is a unit of communication powered by 
the feeling of anxiety. It serves an affective function (rendering feeling 
un- queer) and reflects an affective state (fearing associations with queer-
ness). Like straight male users’ own bodies, the user’s state as a feeling 




This connection between queerness, affect, and identity reintroduces 
the importance of the Twitter platform itself into an analysis of #noho-
mo. “Homo- ness,” as a critique of the trends in #nohomo tweets has 
revealed, is closely linked to femininity and the expression of emotion. 
Twitter, too, is culturally associated with this same nexus of gender and 
emotion. Commonly described as a micro- blogging platform, Twitter 
emerges from a history of online, text- based self- expression platforms 
(e.g., LiveJournal) with its roots in predigital forms such as the written 
diary. Like public, short- form diary entries, tweets are commonly used to 
document or reflect on a user’s daily life. Genre historians have argued 
compellingly for the gendered history of the diary, long seen as women’s 
writing.7 In this way, Twitter and social media posting more generally 
can be understood in association with cultural constructs of feminin-
ity; simply using Twitter puts the straight male user in the realm of the 
feminine— which, by the logics of #nohomo, is queer. In this way, Twitter 
itself, as a platform, produces anxieties about queerness for heterosexual 
masculinity.
The prevalence of #nohomo on Twitter, then, can be explained by 
more than its easy translation to hashtag form. Social media sites of this 
sort promote self- reflection, emoting, and interpersonal connection. 
The “homo” is associated with intimacy and attention to the self, both 
of which Twitter fosters in its structures and its cultures. Understood in 
this way, it could be said that all tweets contain something of the queer 
that #nohomo seeks to disavow. For this reason, the widespread use of 
#nohomo on Twitter reflects not only a larger- scale social issue with ho-
mophobia and discrimination in digital spaces but also an unspoken be-
lief that social media may itself be too feminine, too intimate, and too 
queer for straight male users who are attempting to successfully perform 
heteronormative masculinity. #nohomo mediates and self- polices iden-
tity in a way that is specific to the digital environment precisely because 
that environment raises a wealth of anxieties and concerns around gen-
der, sexuality, and maintaining the normative self.
Networks of Disavowal and Not- Queer Twitter
What, ultimately, are the primary social and rhetorical functions of 
#nohomo? What is the discursive and cultural work being done by the 
hashtag? Some of its functions, notably those that seem intentional on 
the part of users, are in line with the oppressive and hegemonic values 
of homophobia. #nohomo works to uphold dominant notions of straight 
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masculinity. It mediates intimacy between men and renders acceptable 
an interest in the male body; it also allows for the expression of emotion, 
otherwise associated with queerness. At the same time, #nohomo dem-
onstrates a number of functions that blur the line between homophobia 
and queer expression. It allows for straight male users to incorporate 
elements of perceived “homo- ness” into their otherwise normative self- 
presentations. Often it colors utterances that might otherwise appear to 
have no queer valence with homoerotic implications. The hashtag sig-
nals and simultaneously counterbalances the culturally coded queerness 
of the Twitter platform itself. Across these many functions, #nohomo 
reflects a set of heteronormative anxieties and beliefs about what consti-
tutes straightness, in which straight masculinity is defined as the opposite 
of the “homo.” To be “homo” is not the same as to be gay in the way that 
gayness might be articulated by an LGBTQ subject. Rather, “homo- ness” 
is as much a matter of gender as of sexuality or desire. Being “homo” 
means falling outside accepted cultural norms for male heterosexuality 
and, in particular, in the ways that one expresses oneself in digital spaces. 
More than a tool for enacting discursive violence against LGBTQ sub-
jects, #nohomo is a tool for the self- policing of straight masculinity. This 
vision of what is “homo” does not imagine queerness as a set of desires 
that the subject has but rather as something that might happen to the 
subject— something they might accidentally slip into.
In this way #nohomo does the work of establishing identity through 
disavowal; the straight is the not queer. The straight self is a self of dis-
avowal. Because the nature of the hashtag is to create connections, #no-
homo in fact establishes a network of this disavowal between tweets and 
users. This final function, the creation of a network of disavowal, is cru-
cial for understanding the broader social implications of #nohomo on 
Twitter and beyond. #nohomo is fundamentally contradictory; it queers 
even as it negates the queer. The prevalence of #nohomo creates a “not 
queer” Twitter, a shadow network of things that are alike in refusing to 
be likened. In this way, in seeking to reject queerness, #nohomo makes 
visible a vast network of all of the things that cultural anxiety dictates may 
seem queer. It affiliates all those users who deploy #nohomo in order 
to reject affiliation with sexual and gender identities that fall outside 
the dictates of heteronormativity. Therefore, the network of disavowal 
functions on both a personal and a social level. On the level of the indi-
vidual, it creates ties between #nohomo users, who form a kind of “un- 
community,” a disparate network of those who all wish to be unaffiliated 
with the same thing. On the cultural level, #nohomo reveals a network 
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of anxieties and beliefs that seek to disavow the thing that nonetheless 
shapes and binds them: queerness.
Hashtags and homophobia on social media represent a rich area of 
further research. Research of this sort is important in this moment when 
harassment campaigns and threats are making clear that there is no easy 
distinction between what happens in online spaces and what is “real.” As 
a long- standing fixture of Twitter’s discursive landscape, #nohomo re-
flects the discrimination and hate speech present on the platform, even 
as the site exists as a powerful tool for the fight against oppression— and, 
more specifically, even as this fight takes the form of other hashtags, like 
#BlackLivesMatter. Yet #nohomo does more than this; it also demon-
strates how what people say and how they say it in online spaces is key 
to the construction and upholding of gender and sexual identity. At the 
same time, it demonstrates how nuanced, difficult, and at times contra-
dictory the performances of these identities are— how much work is re-
quired in order to make oneself acceptable as a heteronormative subject 
within digital spaces that are coded or perceived as gendered or queer. 
Whether #nohomo enacts homophobia or allows for the expression of 
queerness (while upholding a normative system) is not ultimately the 
question; it does both. What becomes clear is that it is the hashtag, this 
unique linguistic unit, that is able to do the complexity of this work, re-
vealing a vision of straight masculinity threatened by digital communica-
tion that requires digital tools to uphold it.
Notes
 1. This number represents an average of the total “no homo” phrases tallied 
at NoHomophobes.com, a website that counts daily instances of homophobic 
speech on Twitter, as noted from late 2014 to early 2016.
 2. One such online harassment campaign that illustrates the real- life stakes 
of both web- based violence and the networks formed by Twitter hashtagging is 
#GamerGate. Formed in 2014, a group of reactionary video gamers organizing 
under this hashtag has launched ongoing attacks against women, queer people, 
and people of color who push for diversity in games. These attacks received na-
tional attention through coverage in publications like the New York Times.
 3. This distinction between algorithm and analysis matters because, as 
feminist scholars of the digital humanities like Jacque Wernimont (2016) and 
Roopika Risam (2015) have noted, data- driven initiatives often risk reinforc-
ing hegemonic power structures by overlooking the politics of their “objective” 
methodologies.
 4. See especially Butler’s Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative (1997), 
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the discussion of power in Foucault’s Discipline and Punish (1995), and J. L. 
Austin’s How to Do Things with Words (1962).
 5. According to the Pew Research Centers studies of social media user de-
mographics, African American and Hispanic adults have consistently been 
somewhat more likely to use Twitter than white adults (28% of Black adults re-
ported using Twitter in 2014, as compared to 20% of white adults, for example). 
However, white users are still in the majority on the site. Once again using 2014 
as an example, the Pew Research Center reported that in that year approximate-
ly 85 percent of white adults used the internet, compared to 81 percent of Black 
adults and 83% of Hispanic adults. The United States Census Bureau estimates 
that in 2015, 77 percent of Americans were white. Together these numbers indi-
cate that white users on Twitter outnumber Twitter users of color.
 6. With the exception of tweets posted through private accounts, all of 
the user- generated content on Twitter is publicly available without password- 
protected access and is therefore considered acceptable for use in research with-
out permission from users. However, in order to best illustrate the #nohomo 
usage patterns, all of the example tweets included here are reconstructed amal-
gams rather than verbatim quotes.
 7. An example of scholarship that outlines the predigital link between gen-
der, genre, and the diary is the introduction to Suzanne L. Bunkers and Cynthia 
Anne Huff’s Inscribing the Daily: Critical Essays on Women’s Diaries (1996).
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fourteen | “Is Twitter for Celebrities Only?”
A Qualitative Study of Twitter Use in India
neha kumar
As mobile connectivity becomes increasingly prevalent across India and 
other countries in the Global South (World Development Report 2016), 
the use of social networking sites (SNSs) has also grown rapidly (Kemp 
2017). Mobile technologies are significantly more affordable than desk-
top or laptop computers and are far more appropriate for the Indian 
context, particularly in resource- constrained regions where telephone 
landlines have yet to make an appearance. Further, as mobile devices 
become more advanced, they are gradually becoming the primary com-
munication and computing medium for a significant fraction of the pop-
ulations in so- called developing countries. In India, in particular, mobile 
penetration has grown to include more than a billion subscriptions as of 
March 2016 (TRAI 2016).
A growing mobile- equipped population in the Global South, and cer-
tainly India, is online more frequently than it has ever been. Increasing 
affordability of mobile data has also encouraged a greater volume of 
online engagement. In recent years, research has shown how this popu-
lation spends a large chunk of its time on Facebook, Twitter, and various 
other SNSs, largely for communication purposes but also for various oth-
er ends (Rangaswamy and Cutrell 2012; Mudliar and Rangaswamy 2015). 
In addition to these studies of SNS adoption and use, Daniel Miller’s Tales 
of Facebook (2011) offers an ethnographic account of Facebook practices 
in Trinidad. S. P. Wyche (2013), Anicia Peters (2012), and their respec-
tive coauthors have expanded this body of work by studying Facebook 
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use in Kenya and Namibia. My own (Kumar 2014) account of Facebook 
use as a means of self- empowerment for urban Indian youth discusses 
the adoption of the SNS as the youth fulfill their aspirations toward an 
improved standard of living. This narrative of SNSs being used in the in-
terest of freedom, democracy, and empowerment across the world con-
tinues, widely holding the optimistic view of social media as engines for 
driving much- needed social and political change in various parts of the 
world (Lotan et al. 2011; Harlow and Johnson 2011), though this view has 
also been criticized (Wojcieszak and Smith 2014; Comunello and Anzera 
2012). The discourse of participation on SNSs has grown and deepened 
considerably— certainly in the United States but also in the Middle East 
and various African and Asian countries, including India. Such discus-
sion comes along with a certain utopian notion that Twitter, along with 
other SNSs, enables a process of democratization of new media that was 
previously not possible.
In this chapter, instead of focusing on participation on Twitter through 
the use of a particular hashtag, I draw on offline empirical findings from 
an urban, lower- and middle- class setting in India to show that this uto-
pian view of Twitter as a site of democratization does not quite hold there. 
Using my qualitative inquiry of Twitter use in these settings, I demon-
strate that the perceptions of Twitter that have evolved over time in India 
are different from how the SNS is perceived in other, Western settings. 
These lead to limited use or non- use of the SNS and therefore limited par-
ticipation in the hashtag culture that has rapidly become pervasive in the 
West. Here, I relate my findings to the growing literature on concerns of 
non- use of technology (Baumer et al. 2015). Eric P.S. Baumer and his col-
leagues discuss several factors that contribute toward non- use, including 
power differentials, differences in levels of social and economic develop-
ment, among others. I also engage with K. Toyama’s (2011) amplification 
theory to highlight that although the Twitter non- users I study might ex-
perience a greater awareness of their social status (or lack thereof) when 
they engage with the technology, we might also make an effort to better 
understand the choices that they make and motivations they are driven 
by. I suggest that perhaps there is, in fact, power in their act of choosing 
non- use and rejecting Twitter as a platform of expression.
Method
This chapter draws on data that was collected in the midst of an eighteen- 
month ethnographic engagement with youth from lower middle- income 
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backgrounds in the National Capital Region (NCR) in and around New 
Delhi. The ethnography was aimed at understanding how young adults 
from diverse demographic backgrounds adopted and engaged with mo-
bile technologies and used them to consume various mobile media in 
addition to getting online. The portion of this study that I draw on in 
this chapter relied on a combination of qualitative methods, including 
semi- structured interviews and media analysis of print and television 
news. The latter was motivated by the interview participants, who made 
several references to news media in print and on television. These par-
ticipants included twenty- one individuals— male and female— who were 
from low- and middle- income backgrounds and lived or worked in the 
Delhi NCR area at the time of their interviews. All participants were in 
the twenty- one- to- thirty- five- year- old age range; this is the age group that 
is most active in accessing the internet. Those who are older might also 
be familiar with the internet, in many cases, but being online is often not 
a part of their daily workflow, nor are they as digitally savvy or literate. 
The participants in my study, on the contrary, actively used smartphones 
but also knew how to use computers and were comfortably aware of dif-
ferent SNSs and related mobile services, such as WhatsApp, Hike, and 
Telegram, in addition to those that are more widely recognized, such as 
Facebook and Twitter.1 All interviews took place in a mix of English and 
Hindi, both languages in which I am fluent. Though Hindi was the na-
tive language of all participants, there appeared to be an inclination to 
converse in English when possible, perhaps owing to their perception of 
my identity as a US- based researcher, regardless of my fluency in Hindi. 
This is a trend I have observed in earlier research as well. Perhaps in per-
ceiving me as an outsider, participants made an overt effort of present-
ing themselves to me as technologically competent, highlighting how 
many different mobile devices and internet platforms they were familiar 
with. Though participants were perhaps unduly enthusiastic in their re-
sponses and eager to elaborate on them, it is unlikely that they misrepre-
sented their views or misreported their use of Twitter. Participants were 
selected using a process of snowball sampling, with a particular effort 
to ensure that there were a few women in the sample, since my earlier 
work (Kumar 2014) had highlighted how much easier it is to identify 
male technology users not only among low- income or rural groups but 
also among middle- income groups in urban India. Social and cultural 
norms in India are still much more accepting of men and boys using 
technology than women and girls, but this is slowly changing, especially 
in urban areas. Finally, although several of the participants came from 
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what might be considered middle- income households, their ability to 
afford smartphones and 24/7 internet access is still limited. It is worth 
noting that though these participants are able to afford relatively expen-
sive smartphones and internet plans, they still ration and deliberate over 
their internet use.
I analyzed the collected data using an inductive process of analysis 
by coding the interview transcripts and iteratively distilling emergent 
themes, focusing on discussions around use/non- use of Twitter— on its 
own and in comparison with other SNSs. Earlier ethnographic findings 
had demonstrated limited use of SNSs other than Facebook, and this 
meant that my study (Kumar 2014) was deliberately driven toward un-
derstanding what made Facebook more attractive than Twitter, Hike, 
or Telegram. In this chapter I focus on the findings that pertained to 
Twitter in particular, as laid out below, but also those that compared 
Twitter to the use or non- use of other SNSs.
Findings
Participants were uniformly unenthusiastic about using Twitter, though 
they were all quite familiar with Facebook and somewhat regular users 
of other services such as Hike, Viber, WhatsApp, and Telegram.2 Below I 
present the findings from my interviews to unearth popular perceptions 
of Twitter that led to its limited use or non- use by the participants in my 
study. I discuss the role that print and television news media have played 
in generating an image of Twitter as being for “high- class” people, how 
participants from low- and middle- income groups subscribe to this im-
age as well, and how other potential and competing uses of my partici-
pants’ online time have further challenged Twitter’s popularity.
The first response I heard to Twitter was from Vijay, a young male 
participant, who said, “Twitter is for high- profile people. . . . If you’re a 
big politician or if you’re a Bollywood star, then Twitter is for you.” Vijay 
further shared that he did not see any reason for him to use Twitter, 
because, he asked, “who has so much time?” It turned out that Vijay did 
have time for other SNSs, such as Facebook and WhatsApp, but he saw 
those services as allowing him to connect to his circle of friends. Twitter, 
according to him, was not a place for connecting to friends; it represent-
ed a sea of users, most of whom were unlikely to be interested in hear-
ing what he had to say. Those on Twitter were either politicians or film 
celebrities or their fans; the latter would use the service “only to check 
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what their favorite politicians or celebrities had said twenty minutes ago, 
like what they had for breakfast, or who they were meeting for dinner.”
Vijay was not the only one who viewed Twitter as a service that was not 
intended for him. However, through successive conversations, I learned 
that the news media played a large role in perpetuating this perception 
of Twitter as being for “high- class” individuals. Jeevan, who was anoth-
er young male interview participant, told me that if you looked at the 
newspaper on a given day, there would be tweets published about how 
Priyanka Chopra (a popular Hindi film actress and star of the US televi-
sion series Quantico [ABC 2015– present]) had traveled to a new, foreign 
country or a poem that Amitabh Bachchan (another popular Hindi film 
actor) had shared. I also observed that on television news programs, 
scrolling text on the bottom of the television screen would indicate what 
popular film stars or politicians were saying on Twitter, connecting their 
tweets to goings- on in their worlds. Spats between politicians on Twitter, 
regarding minor and major public issues, frequently made their way to 
sections of print media. Leaders of state departments and all well- known 
film stars were known (by participants) to have Twitter accounts that they 
use to communicate with a large fan base.
This phenomenon has also been described by Joyojeet Pal (2015), who 
studied the extensive use of Twitter by Indian prime minister Narendra 
Modi to craft (or recraft) his public image after he was elected into of-
fice. PM Modi has over 16 million followers on Twitter, making him the 
second most- followed political leader in the world, after US president 
Barack Obama (Indian Express 2015). One of my participants saw Modi’s 
heavy tweeting, however, as a sign that the PM and other politicians had 
“a lot of spare time.” For him and several other participants, subscribing 
to Twitter was for those who— like PM Modi— had very large fan follow-
ings, or those who were fans themselves, but not for those who wished 
to be heard. Deepika, a twenty- one- year- old college student, was of the 
opinion that on Twitter people could “connect with their fan club” and 
prove to the world “that they are there and everyone should listen to 
them.” She added, “I am not a diehard fan of any celebrity, so I don’t see 
why I should be there.” Jay, a twenty- four- year- old, also mentioned in this 
vein, “I have limited time. With Twitter, there is no end. How much do I 
follow?” Indeed, when I discussed Twitter use, participants— by default— 
viewed themselves as potential listeners rather than contributors. Sudha, 
a thirty- year- old schoolteacher, also responded by saying, “There are so 
many important people on Twitter. Who will listen to my voice? People 
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have so much other work to get done.” Deven, who is thirty- two and 
works at a small business, added that Twitter was meant for one- way com-
munication only— that was the image of the social media platform that 
the news media had created over time. According to him, all one could 
do on Twitter was understand “whether Amitabh Bachchan has more fol-
lowers or Shahrukh Khan [another popular Bollywood actor].”
When I asked Sudha to compare this scenario with that of Facebook’s, 
where people also might have a lot of work to get done, she said that on 
Facebook she knew that her friends would be listening and responding 
with their thoughts on her comments. That Twitter was a public medium 
did not concern her from a privacy standpoint. It did make her feel, how-
ever, that when “everyone” was listening, “no one” was listening. And, 
of course, she did not have a fan following that would be interested in 
what she had to say. This view was echoed by almost all participants, who 
were either unenthused by the idea of actively contributing on Twitter 
or actively voiced a lack of desire to use it. In comparing their use of 
Twitter to other SNSs, there were clear affordances that participants de-
rived from services such as Facebook (as Sudha mentioned), Telegram, 
or Hike. For example, Mohan (a twenty- three- year- old male participant 
who worked at a small business) shared that Telegram had become quite 
popular after the prime minister had announced that any data that was 
on Telegram stayed within India and did not get “sent overseas.” Mohan 
also shared that over time he had discovered that this was not the case 
and that Telegram was actually a Chinese app. He went on to explain 
that this had disappointed him and that he thought Hike was a better op-
tion than Telegram or Facebook because it was made by a team that was 
based in Gurgaon, India. I asked how he knew this was the case, and he 
showed me Hike’s website, pointing out their office location, which was 
indeed listed as Gurgaon. This is something he and his friends had made 
an effort to look into. Mohan also felt that, as a result of its origins, Hike 
was much more in tune with its users. This is why it distributed vouchers 
for local businesses (such as the local Domino’s Pizza), which he regu-
larly made use of. This connection with the SNS owing to its connection 
with his local surroundings was what attracted Mohan to Hike. It makes 
sense then, perhaps, that Twitter, with its lack of localized appeal, was less 
than attractive to Mohan and his friends.
Sudha and Mohan were from relatively well- to- do, middle- income 
backgrounds. Among lower- income earners, such as migrant workers I 
interviewed, there was less of a critical differentiation among the variety 
of SNSs that were available for their use. Facebook was commonly used, 
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though users talked about having transitioned to WhatsApp in recent 
years. Once again, the dominant reason that was mentioned was that it 
was clear who was reading their messages and who did not have access 
to these messages: “on WhatsApp we know who is listening to us.” One 
twenty- six- year- old female participant also mentioned that although 
WhatsApp was popular, because it allowed for conversations that were 
more private, it appeared to be a double- edged sword, because “once 
you are on a WhatsApp group with someone, you end up getting their 
phone number too.” Thus, one still needed to be careful about whom 
one was communicating with through WhatsApp. However, there was 
general agreement that it was straightforward and easy to use— “with 
WhatsApp there is no tension.” Shailesh, a twenty- three- year- old male 
participant, felt that Facebook had been replaced by WhatsApp among 
most of his friends and family, since Facebook was much slower and 
WhatsApp allowed “separate conversations.” WhatsApp was also seen 
as having a smoother, quicker workflow, while “Facebook involves too 
many steps.”
This quickness and ease of use for WhatsApp is relevant because, for 
almost all participants, but especially those from lower- income groups, 
internet access is neither free nor ubiquitous. Participants used their 
mobile devices to go online— “we can only use the internet when we 
are on our mobiles” (Diwakar, male, twenty- one)— and were limited to 
using mobile data plans. This limited access also led them to acquire 
a thorough understanding of which data plans were available to them. 
They also kept themselves updated about plans offered by competing 
providers, and there was little resistance to switching providers in favor 
of better data plans. This sensitivity to cost also meant that they had to di-
vide internet time wisely across the different SNSs. In prioritizing which 
service had more to offer them, Twitter fell to the bottom of the prefer-
ence list.
Discussion
In their discussion on research regarding use and non- use, Baumer and 
his colleagues (2015) mention that there are many ways of conceptual-
izing use and non- use, also adding that there are shades in between— as 
also discussed by Amanda Lenhart and John B. Horrigan (2003)— that 
we might sometimes miss. Baumer and his colleagues (2015) further 
discuss the “digital divide” (Keniston 2003) as a factor that induces 
non- use of technologies— that is, when an individual might wish to use 
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a technology but cannot, because those technologies may not be acces-
sible, affordable, or available. In the data on Twitter use— or non- use— 
presented above, the users are not excluded from use by individuals, 
communities, or systems, nor are costs preventing their use of Twitter, as 
in the case of work done by Susan P. Wyche and her coauthors’ work on 
Facebook use in rural Kenya (2013). There are no caste or class hierar-
chies that are driving out users, per se, as discussed by Rabin Patra and 
his colleagues (2007) who studied computer sharing in Indian schools 
and observed that girls or children from lower castes were left out of the 
fray. However, there is a conflation of some of these factors when seen 
through the lens of my participants, for whom Twitter is a sea of seem-
ingly important voices, of which (they feel) they are not a part. These 
are low- income and even middle- income users of the internet who found 
that, when compared to communities on Facebook, WhatsApp, Hike, 
and Telegram, there was no benefit to be gained from their being on 
Twitter. Jenna Burrell’s work (2012) echoes this sentiment of exclusion 
with its study of young men who frequented internet cafés in Ghana 
hoping to meet and communicate with foreigners online; though these 
men were “connected,” they were subject to an online culture that fol-
lowed Euro- American norms as well as low quality and expensive access 
to connectivity. In this study we see that the norms were created within 
India, for and by Indians. No one was actively excluded from participat-
ing; however, users had evolved into an understanding of the roles they 
could play. To be a contributor, one needed to have a fan base and a 
hefty social status. To be a listener, one needed to have a great deal of 
spare time and had to be a dedicated fan of one or more contributors. 
Twitter was seen as being composed of these “elite” and “non- elite” us-
ers, and none of my participants— from low- and middle- income back-
grounds in the technology- rich regions of India’s capital city— associated 
themselves with either of the two groups.
Kentaro Toyama’s amplification theory (2011) discusses the effect that 
introduction of a new technology might have on a population that is rid-
den with acute socioeconomic inequalities. According to Toyama, tech-
nology amplifies the differences between people. He argues that while 
technology can be used “to augment, improve, or streamline existing de-
velopment capacity, it cannot make up for the lack of human intent and 
capability, whether it is the ability to implement an effective national vac-
cination program, the capacity to provide quality agricultural extension, 
or the intent to govern a country without corruption” (2). In the case of 
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my study above, it would seem that Twitter is this technology that cannot 
make up for the lack of human intent or capability. Indeed, my findings 
indicate that in the case of Twitter, it is the people with power, the so- 
called elite of the country, who remain “in power” over this particular 
form of media, public and universal though it might be, while those who 
are the “non- elite” remain sans power. However, I argue for broadening 
Toyama’s perspective here. Introducing a technology like Twitter to us-
ers may or may not be fruitful— that is, it may or may not be adopted. 
However, in that Twitter is accessible and that people in India, be they 
ordinary or “elite” citizens, have the freedom and agency to exercise 
their choice to use or not use the platform, non- users might feel quite 
differently about the technology than if this choice were to be taken 
away from them. In my study (Kumar 2014), by examining use of SNSs 
other than Twitter, I was able to discern that my participants also had 
other services to turn to. There was little or no remorse that Twitter as a 
platform was not intended for their use, because they had plenty of other 
options available to them. What they chose to spend their limited (and 
potentially expensive) online time on was a choice that they made, and 
they felt that it was quite natural for Twitter to fall to the bottom of their 
list of preferences. The nature of communication that these competing 
SNSs offered was far preferred, and in some cases, as we saw, there was 
even disdain for the petty concerns that actors and politicians brought 
up in their tweets that were subsequently glorified and discussed, ad infi-
nitum, by print and television news media. Intent to use, then, must also 
be given its place of importance in this theory of amplification so that we 
might also reflect on what drives the forces that shape the adoption and 
use of a technology.
Conclusion
In my study of Twitter adoption and use, in addition to the parallel use 
of other SNSs, by a young, urban Indian population, I discovered that al-
though these participants had easy access to mobile internet, Twitter was 
not a popular medium for them to use. In a country that ranks sixth in its 
number of Twitter users (Nisha 2015), I investigated the reasons under-
lying lack of widespread Twitter use (“Twitter accounts for only 17% of 
Indian social network users” [PTI 2015]). I found that while Twitter had 
acquired an image as a service that was exclusively for politicians and 
film celebrities or their fan followings, services such as WhatsApp and 
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Hike were able to connect with the users’ desires to have connections 
that were “on the ground” and with people in locations that they were 
most familiar with, as well as in well- defined “separate conversations.”
I used my findings to connect with and begin to challenge the claims 
of amplification theory (Toyama 2011). An incomplete perspective fo-
cused on Twitter use alone might attest to Toyama’s point that technol-
ogy, when introduced, amplifies only socioeconomic differences. By also 
analyzing adoption and uses of competing technologies, we might offer 
ourselves an enriched perspective that highlights how intent and free-
dom of choice also make a difference. Infrastructural constraints such 
as limited or expensive connectivity to the internet have their own role 
to play in shaping this choice and resultant use. Thus, we see that while 
hashtag analyses provide a deeper understanding of varied social phe-
nomena at play, probing the nonengagement in hashtag culture— and 
Twitter in general— can likewise lead us to novel insights regarding on-
line participation trends.
Notes
 1. Released in December 2012, Hike is India’s first social media company, 
https://get.hike.in; Telegram, released in August 2013, is a cloud-based social 
media/messenger service, https://telegram.org.
 2. Viber, which requires a telephone number, was released in 2010 and is 
used for instant messaging and media exchange.
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fifteen | Reterritorializing Twitter
African Moments, 2010– 2015
reginold a. royston and krystal strong
An Introduction to the African Social Mediascape
Africa is the fastest- growing market for mobile devices in the world to-
day (ITU 2015; GSMA 2014). Since 2001, cell phone use on the conti-
nent has grown exponentially, giving Africans unprecedented access to 
digital communications, particularly voice telephony, but also internet- 
connected devices. This often- cited development has led many to label 
Africa’s emerging infrastructure as symptomatic of “leapfrog” innova-
tion, in which a fledging society skips over legacy, statist- driven indus-
trial technologies, such as those around telecommunications that still 
dominate the West (Davison et al. 2000). However, while physical infra-
structure transformation in Africa has not progressed as rapidly as the 
telecommunications sector, practices of “lead users” (von Hippel 2005) 
do exist on the continent, particularly when it comes to mobile phone 
cultures. This chapter examines the use of Twitter in the last five years in 
Africa to mark unique ways that Africa’s Twitter- sphere has deployed the 
technology in innovative forms of discourse, particularly around identity 
and political organizing.
In this chapter we attempt to illustrate how the process of deterri-
torialization that media theorists Néstor García Canclini (1995), John 
Tomlinson (1999), Pierre Lévy (2001) and Gil- Manuel Hernàndez i Martí 
(2006) have described as symptomatic of globalization, also works in re-
verse. Anthropologists Jonathan Xavier Inda and Renato Rosaldo have 
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stated that the colonial spread of media conglomerates from the West to 
the rest is “only half of the story of globalization. . . . Cultural flows do 
not just float ethereally across the globe but are always re- inscribed in 
specific cultural environments” (2002, 11). In this way, Twitter practices 
on the African continent and diaspora have made distinct reterritorial-
ized geographies of media practices that can be dubbed African Twitter. 
But even within this African social mediascape, Twitter is one of a grow-
ing number of tools enabling an innovative mobile media ecology.
The African mobile device market has an impressive array of lo-
cal practices, regional apps, and niches for tech developers. When 
Facebook purchased WhatsApp in 2014, the voice and messaging ser-
vice (part curated community, part p2p (peer- to- peer) texting service) 
had already become the most widely used app in Africa and the Middle 
East, next to Facebook itself— while the service still struggled for visi-
bility in the United States (Activate Analysis 2016). Other apps such as 
the Skype clone Viber and South Africa’s 2go also have penetration in 
the millions of users on the continent. But short message service (SMS) 
communication— that is, text messaging— remains the key form of digi-
tal connection on the continent. The majority of mobile devices on the 
continent are twelve- key “feature phones”— semi- smart devices made 
by companies like Samsung, Nokia, or Korean or Chinese firms, with 
little or no way to download apps or customize programming without ag-
gressive hardware hacks (Poushter and Oates 2015; Ekine 2010).1 Twitter 
is part of an African social mediascape that includes practices such as 
texting, intentionally missed calls (“pinging”/“beeping”/“flashing”) 
(Donner 2007), web- based instant messengers like Viber and WeChat, 
factory- embedded Facebook apps, and the micro- banking tool M- PESA, 
among others. That Africa is at the heart of an emerging mobile inter-
net provides a strident foil to the lingering perception across media and 
tech development discourse that the continent remains the antithesis of 
modernity (Mbembe 2001).
In this volume and elsewhere, much has been written about the trans-
formative impact of Twitter in other Africa- based social upheavals, in-
cluding those in Egypt, Tunisia, and Algeria, often termed the “Arab 
Spring.” During our separate and ongoing research projects (Strong 
2015; Royston 2014), we met almost no one using Twitter as an SMS- 
based application, though this was the origin of the platform when it 
became a media phenomenon at the SXSW Interactive Festival in 
Austin in 2007. The commercial researcher Portland Communications 
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identified more than 11.5 million geotagged tweets from Africa over a 
three- month period in 2011. That number has undoubtedly grown with 
African Twitter megatrends such as #Kony2012, #BringBackOurGirls, 
and #FeesMustFall, indicating that, despite its use among Africa’s digi-
tal elites, Twitter is an undeniable discursive and technological force in 
Africa’s social mediascape. The concept of a social mediascape draws from 
Arjun Appadurai’s Modernity at Large (1996), in which the anthropolo-
gist described late- capitalist, transnational culture as being produced 
by “global flows” where a “complex and interconnected repertoire” of 
varied media channels help to construct the narratives of people’s lives 
in linked, uneven, and disjunctive ways (35). Among these socially and 
materially implicated spheres of public discourse and exchange, the me-
diascape remains essential to the shaping of contemporary life, espe-
cially identity practices in the age of networks.
Perhaps what is most surprising about Twitter and social media use in 
general on the continent is not that Africans are adept in spreading their 
life experiences using the instruments of modernity but rather that these 
practices prevail amid a media ecology of what Brian Larkin (2008) de-
scribes as one configured by “breakdowns.” The mobile web may witness 
Africans socializing, engaging in commerce, accessing the internet, and 
connecting internationally via voice and data, in ways that surpasses the 
ability of Western information technology users, many of whom are typi-
cally confined to “walled gardens,”2 subscription lock- ins, and lack of ac-
cess to international cellular networks. However, failing infrastructures 
continue to mark the African sociotechnical system, particularly when it 
comes to water, sanitation, roads, and electricity. This ecology of break-
downs also figures prominently in discourse on Twitter.
In the sections below we briefly describe several key moments of hy-
pervisibility for Africans on Twitter, through the coproduction of trend-
ing topics and use of hashtags during media events, online sociality, and 
political discourse. Using these megatrends as backdrops to a broader 
discussion on the production of self and subjecthood through media 
use, we consider two cases that are essential to our ethnographic engage-
ments. First, we examine how in Ghana’s Twitter space, the local hashtag 
#dumsor resonates through differential global networks signifying a dis-
course of cynicism amid the talk of a “Rising Africa.”3 Conversely, the 
global circulation of the #BringBackOurGirls hashtag in Nigeria and 
beyond illustrates how strategic reappropriation of the foreign gaze has 
been able to mitigate translocal catastrophe toward progressive, if un-
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resolved, ends. These key moments demonstrate how the audience and 
scale of Twitter have worked toward both the detriment and benefit of 
media events local to the continent.
Key Moments in African Twitter, 2010– 2015
In our fieldwork, in interviews, and in critical analysis of other research, 
it is clear that Twitter has been utilized in several veins in the African con-
text: (1) as a key form of connection to Africa’s digital diasporas; (2) as 
an information source for news and entertainment producers and con-
sumers; (3) as a media tool for elite and professional tech users; (4) as a 
source of transnational discourse via hashtags and trending metrics; (5) 
as a facilitator of political visibility and movement building; and (6) as a 
platform for group sociality, particularly intracontinental discourse, hu-
mor, and other forms of contemporary cultural phenomena. The time 
frame is important for several reasons. Although Twitter has been avail-
able as service since 2006 (with 1 million users being first recorded in the 
United States in 2008) (Toole, Cha, and Gonzáles 2012; Arrington 2008), 
the adoption of Twitter among African users was also significant during a 
key moment of global Twitter visibility, vis- à- vis the Arab Spring, and the 
2010 FIFA World Cup. We believe that presenting both the generalizable 
trends during this significant period of African (and global) uptake of 
Twitter serves as a multidisciplinary perspective in documenting the plat-
form’s life on the continent and perhaps the Global South. We wanted to 
also contextualize Twitter use, which is important but cannot be decen-
tered from other local social media practices. Providing the broader scope 
of Twitter in Africa’s social mediascape speaks to Twitter’s context among 
other tools, which have been just important (Mxit, WhatsApp, radio) if 
not more. Later in this chapter, however, we highlight the local stories 
and deployments of Twitter, and the impacts that have been produced 
via their particular context, in order to speak to the different and par-
ticular effects of the platform, especially among Africa’s diverse transna-
tional media publics.4 The inspiration for many of the political upheav-
als discussed below was the result of events in Tunisia, Egypt, and Algeria 
between 2011 and 2012. The description of these events as “Arab” belies 
Black life in North Africa, reinforcing a colonial fragmentation of this part 
of the world. The Occupy movement, amplified through Twitter (includ-
ing #OccupyNigeria, #OccupySenegal, and #OccupySouthAfrica), was as 
much an African phenomenon as it was a Middle Eastern media moment. 
In this chapter we focus on key events in the sub- Saharan region reflecting 
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our ethnographic engagements and because popular notions of techno-
science and material history continue to ignore contributions of this part 
of the world to “modern” technology.5
African Twitter attempts to overcome the asymmetry of global infor-
mation networks, and media generally, which are dominated by appara-
tuses such as BBC, CNN, Viacom, and others. Against these clustering 
nodes in the global mediascape, hashtag activism has been a particu-
larly potent weapon in the struggle for representation. The platform has 
proved central to mitigating what Nigerian writer Chimamanda Ngozi 
Adichie (2009) has described as the “danger of a single story” and, spe-
cifically, prescriptive narratives of “catastrophe” that ensnare the very 
idea of Africa. The key moments below help define “African Twitter” 
as a coherent geography of users, discourses, tools, infrastructures, and 
practices. Though Twitter’s branded “moments” are anchored to the life 
span of specific trending topics, in our usage here we use moments inter-
changeably with the notion of media events. As such, these key events are 
chronological, contemporaneous, and aggregative discourses, contribut-
ing to a range of interventions that crosscut local, national, regional, and 
global interests. From the description of practices above, in the following 
section we group African Twitter’s most influential hashtags into five the-
matic clusters: (1) global media events, (2) culture and everyday life, (3) 
crisis intervention, (4) governance, and (5) protest movements.
As in other Twitter publics, global media events that figured promi-
nently in the international press were experienced synchronically among 
Twitter users in Africa and beyond. The 2010 World Cup in South Africa 
(#WorldCup; #WC2010) was the first case of a global Twitter experi-
ence geographically centered in Africa.6 This was itself a stark reversal 
of the colonial relations embedded in global football and its mediated 
consumption, which more often sees African footballers playing for 
European clubs and African football enthusiasts supporting European 
leagues (Darby 2002). Other memorable events include President 
Barack Obama and First Lady Michelle Obama’s visits in 2013 (#POTUS/
FLOTUSinAfrica), the death of Nelson Mandela (#Mandela, #Madiba), 
and the 2015 historic visit of Pope Francis to Kenya, Uganda, and Central 
African Republic (#PopeinAfrica, #PopeBars).
Central to African Twitter’s contrarian discourse is the attempt to dis-
rupt sensationalist narratives that have long defined the continent. For 
instance, #someonetellCNN circulated counterdiscourses about culture 
and everyday life in Africa after CNN reported that President Obama 
was visiting the “terror hotbed” of Kenya ahead of his 2015 official visit. 
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Other hashtags have offered less oppositional takes on the diversity and 
complexity of African (national) cultures. Both #IfAfricaWasABar and 
#GrowingUpAfrican trended globally in 2015 as Africans around the 
world satirically tackled shared experiences of childhood and cultural 
traditions, as well as the region’s geopolitical diversity, which was re-
hashed months later as a facetious “Twitter war” between two of Africa’s 
largest technocultural enclaves, #NigeriavsKenya. Crises such as natural 
disasters and violent attacks are among the quickest to trend on Twitter. 
However, in the African context, moments of crisis intervention gain 
inconsistent traction. Media analysts (Zuckerman 2015; Tufecki 2014) 
and Twitter users have noted how mainstream media and social media 
algorithms collude to ignore terrorist attacks when the victims are not 
Americans or Europeans, such as in the murder of 147 Kenyan students 
by al- Shabaab terrorists in April 2015 (#147notjustanumber), as com-
pared with the global exposure of the attack on the French magazine 
Charlie Hebdo in January earlier that year (#jesuischarlie).
Without question, the most impactful arena of African Twitter’s influ-
ence is in the realm of politics. Over the past twenty years, democracy 
in Africa has been plagued by conflict, corruption, tenure elongation, 
and political systems that are unresponsive to the citizenry. Twitter has 
played an important role in enhancing the participation of citizens in 
governance. Many African politicians have active Twitter accounts and 
engage with constituents on the platform. During elections, members of 
the electorate informally monitor polls and electoral irregularities under 
hashtags that typically follow the form of #[CountryName]Decides (e.g., 
#GhanaDecides, #NigeriaDecides, #KenyaDecides). Alongside these re-
formist approaches to political change, Twitter has aided in the organiza-
tion of mass protest movements and, occasionally, revolution. Tunisia’s 
and Egypt’s popular uprisings that resulted in regime change in 2011 
were the first to be labeled “Twitter Revolutions.” #OccupyNigeria in 
2012 similarly used Twitter to facilitate sustained national protests against 
the removal of fuel subsidies by the government. At the time of this writ-
ing, the movement among South African students since 2015 to decolo-
nize the university and nation by removing physical structures of colo-
nialism on campuses (#RhodesMustFall) and against proposed fee hikes 
that would decrease access to education in the country (#FeesMustFall) 
continues to grow and signal the continued promise of Twitter’s role in 
Africa’s social transformation.
These key moments illustrate how through the hashtag mechanism 
Africa produces a distinct discursive space7 around notions of interest 
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and relevance to the continent and its diasporas. This is a corner of the 
African social mediascape that activates personal identity practices (via 
“profile pages” and user handles), a social interactional space via the use 
of hashtags, participation via media events, and a material reality in the 
form of political and social movements, especially with regard to man-
agement of the physical resources of the political economy.
#Dumsor: Ghanaian Twitter and the Ecology of Breakdown
In contrast to #OccupyNigeria, #OccupySenegal, and #OccupySouthAfrica 
as fomented on Twitter, Ghana’s young political activists took to a reform-
ist agenda, utilizing a number of hashtags, including #GhanaDecides in 
preparation for the 2012 national elections. Ghana has enjoyed relatively 
smooth transitions of electoral power since 1992 and is described by the 
US State Department and others as a “stable” and “peaceful” democracy 
(US State Department 2015). These factors have contributed to a dis-
course of what one might describe as “African” exceptionalism for the 
West African country that it has enjoyed since becoming the first colo-
nized nation on the continent to achieve its independence, in 1957. But 
while Ghanaian Twitter’s discourse initially advanced an optimistic narra-
tive of “openness, honesty, and accountability” (NGO Star- Ghana 2015), 
the continuing failures of the Ghanaian government to address failing 
public infrastructures have given way to a discourse of despondence us-
ing the hashtag #dumsor, a shaming discourse that challenges the na-
tion’s identity as a leader in Africa. In this section we analyze how the 
efforts of local advocates on- and offline intervened in a nation- centric 
discourse relying on Twitter’s global scale and accessibility. This trans-
national visibility, however, did little to ameliorate local conditions. The 
experience reflects the limited penetration of Twitter among Ghana’s 
overall mobile phone user base, and perhaps the failures of hashtag ac-
tivism in general, to transform conditions on the ground when not tied 
to media events such as elections.
Ghana’s visibility on Twitter was heightened during the 2010 World 
Cup, when the “Black Stars” became the first African team to reach the 
tournament’s semifinal rounds, as users hashtagged #GHA for Ghana, 
#BlackStars, and #Vim, a colloquial expression of “energy!”
By the 2012 national elections in Ghana, Twitter began to be utilized 
as a chief means of political organizing and online rhetoric.8 At local 
tech meetings dubbed “BarCamps,” civic advocacy groups began to pro-
mote Twitter as a chief way of interacting, especially for individuals who 
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could not be physically present at conferences and networking sessions. 
Organizers at these events projected the tweets of student participants 
on large screens behind presenters. A civic advocacy group also formed 
in 2012 called GhanaDecides and began to promote election participa-
tion through “TalkParties” on Twitter. Other tech- focused civil organiza-
tions began to use the tool, as well as did celebrities and traditional radio 
and TV broadcasters.
Dumsor, pronounced /doomn suh/ is an Akan word that means “off, 
on” and describes the phenomena of “lights off,” or electricity failures, 
largely due to scheduled and unscheduled blackouts by the publicly 
administered utility, the Electric Company of Ghana (ECG). Ongoing 
failures of the national electric grid had been brewing since the ear-
ly 2000s due to the dwindling capacity of the country’s chief power 
source, the Akosombo Hydroelectric Dam. Equipment was deteriorat-
ing, service lines were unreliable, and increasing demand was growing 
due to population growth in the capital Accra (Miescher 2012; Eshun 
and Amoako- Tuffour 2016; “VRA to Shut Down” 2015). The dam was 
an achievement of Kwame Nkrumah’s First Republic government but, 
in the new millennium, also a sign of its weakening infrastructure. The 
term “dumsor” began to be used sparsely in the country’s south accord-
ing to participants interviewed, when power outages spiked in 2008 due 
to years of drought. Water eventually returned, but blackouts became 
more regular again when a pipeline in the Gulf of Guinea supplying fuel 
to Ghanaian auxiliary generators was ruptured in the summer of 2012. 
In our research, “dumsor” appears on Twitter as a keyword or hashtag 
only intermittently until 2013. Prior to this, Twitter bloggers such as Efia 
Nkroman, a programmer and active volunteer in her mid- twenties using 
the handle @LightOffGhana1, initially attempted to provide a public ser-
vice by compiling crowdsourced outages and putting online the officially 
scheduled periods for “lights off” by ECG. But before she ceased to tweet 
in 2014, her tweets had grown more frustrated and less neutral. Parody 
accounts, both profane and politically strident, such as @Online_ECG 
and @_E_C_G, meanwhile, had taken her place in commenting about 
both the municipality and the worsening dumsor crisis. These fake ECG 
accounts often satirically castigated tweeters for their expectations of 
service reliability. In response to students complaining about not being 
able to stay up late to study or iron shirts for classes the next day, parody 
tweeter @ECG_ghana replied “u no get steam iron?” A more poignant 
post on March 10, 2015, showed a picture of doctors and nurses in a 
blacked- out hospital room with the text “Blame JDM for this, not us,” 
referencing Ghana’s sitting president, John Dramani Mahama.9
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In 2015 dumsor reached crisis levels when the electricity grid’s load- 
shedding schedule, often more of a loose impression of the rolling black-
outs, started to announce that power would be shut off for twenty- four- 
hour periods throughout the country, instead of the typical twelve- hour 
blackouts. On the ground, the scheduled outages could last for days at 
a time, especially for areas only tenuously connected to the grid. That 
year, #dumsor peaked on the internet, with a Wikipedia page started in 
February, several Facebook groups sprouting up to discuss the issue, and 
thousands of serious, sarcastic, irate, and politically strident comments 
about dumsor on Twitter. In early May, international Ghanaian pop star 
Sarkodie released a song about dumsor, which became the anthem for 
a new “Dumsor Must Stop” campaign, initially promoted on social me-
dia by celebrities like film star @yvonnenelsongh. While the nonparti-
san hashtag #GhanaDecides served as an ambivalent form of political 
critique aimed at reforming the state, by the close of the troubled 2012 
contest, the hashtag was being deployed by the established political par-
ties and election bureaucracy to promote mainstream politics. But in 
contrast, #dumsor did not appear in any of President Mahama’s tweets 
until his failed reelection campaign in 2016.
Nevertheless, the term “dumsor” has become a potent form of social 
critique, circulated by Twitter users in the homeland and diaspora. Its 
signification goes beyond electricity concerns to address perceived fail-
Figure 15.1. A fake Twit-
ter account purporting 
to be from the municipal 
firm Electricity Company 
of Ghana blames then 
President John Dramani 
Mahama for frequent, 
disabling power outages 
in 2015. The photo al-
legedly shows hospital 
workers using light from 
mobile phones to do 





ures to make good on the promises of neoliberal deregulation in the 
2000s, the discovery of oil reserves in 2008, and Ghana’s designation as 
one of Africa’s only “middle income” economies by the World Bank in 
2011: #DumsorMustStop is a potent alternative tag, but most tweets tack-
ling the failures of the government use the simple construct #dumsor as 
a static pessimistic descriptor. Tweets that utilize it are often despondent, 
literally reflecting powerlessness. A tweet directed at then president 
Mahama from a user in the Ashanti region of central Ghana criticized 







@JDMahama (@Aye_Asem_OOO, April 10, 2016)
Mahama suffered defeat in the 2017 national election in part due to 
growing dissatisfaction with the economic downturn caused by an ongo-
ing energy crisis and inflation.
Sarkodie’s song and a May 15, 2015 Dumsor Must Stop march drew 
critical attention and ultimately produced a national media event to 
highlight jobs and business revenue being lost, deadly accidents, and 
the growing hesitancy of foreign investors, including diaspora returnees. 
But the vehemence of the movement was parried in part by a human 
disaster in June 2015 when an explosion at a local gas station killed over 
one hundred people. Many attributed the incident to the failures of the 
government, even dumsor itself, as generators were in use in the area 
where “lights off” had occurred. The spark of the explosion was believed 
to have been started by leaking gas, either from the fuel station or from 
backup generators nearby, which was accelerated by seasonal floodwater 
escaping through Accra’s failing sewer systems and roads. Reserve power 
generators were brought in to relieve the crisis later in late 2015, but by 
the time of this writing, rolling blackouts had returned to the major cities 
Accra and Kumasi, prompting a spate of “dumsor has returned” tweets 
on Twitter, among online activists as well as headlines in mainstream 
media. The despondence that #dumsor signals has been potent in forc-
ing the political establishment to address a crisis that betrays Ghana’s 
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narrative of African singularity with regard to peace, development, and 
democratic social order. But its continued use, like the phenomenon 
itself, signals an enduring technoculture of breakdown, entrenched in 
developing economies, even as lead use on mobile technology such as 
Twitter provides a narrative of advancement.
#BringBackOurGirls: Reappropriating the Gaze of Interventionism
Nigeria shares with its regional neighbor the frustration of social and po-
litical breakdown, which similarly animates its national social mediascape 
with everyday critiques of the state and rampant infrastructural failure. 
Unlike Ghana, however, discourses of crisis rather than stability more 
often characterize Nigeria, Africa’s most populous country and largest 
economy, after the turn to democracy in 1999. Violent conflict surround-
ing oil extraction in the Niger Delta region and the more recent ongo-
ing menace of Islamic extremist group Boko Haram in the northern 
region have claimed thousands of lives and internally displaced over 2 
million civilians since 2010 (Amnesty International 2016). The govern-
ment’s inability to protect its citizens has only compounded existing 
cynicism toward a political system that is popularly regarded as corrupt 
and ineffective.
Despite a general lack of faith in formal political channels, Nigeria’s 
Twitter scene has become increasingly central to public life as both a 
venue for national discourse and a means for activists, celebrities, civil 
society groups, and everyday citizens to galvanize support for electoral 
participation, protest, and demands for government intervention. The 
2011 “Enough is Enough Nigeria” (#EiENigeria) multiplatform social 
media campaign to organize young voters during national elections 
was an early harbinger of Twitter’s potentiality in Nigeria, particularly 
among users who are young, educated, and urban. #OccupyNigeria was 
the first hashtag to trend internationally in January 2012, when Nigerians 
launched demonstrations and a national labor strike in response to the 
government’s removal of the fuel subsidy, which is one of the few ben-
efits citizens derive from the oil- producing nation. Both media events 
helped produce the social media infrastructure that facilitated the ascen-
dance of what is, to date, Nigeria’s most visible Twitter mobilization and 
the focus of this section, #BringBackOurGirls.
On April 14, 2014, heavily armed members of Boko Haram stormed a 
girls boarding school in the northern Nigerian village of Chibok, kidnap-
ping over three hundred secondary students between the ages fifteen and 
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eighteen and burning the school to the ground. Though Boko Haram 
has garnered international press for dozens of deadly attacks in recent 
years, none of these tragedies attracted the media attention or affective 
response of the efforts to rescue the Chibok schoolgirls. The circulation 
of the hashtag and rallying cry #BringBackOurGirls in many ways defies 
the critiques of “clicktivism” that are dismissively levied against online, 
increasingly Twitter- driven forms of activism— namely, that online forms 
of activism have a “limited shelf life” and thus are unlikely to catalyze 
enduring social transformation (Drumbl 2012). Our discussion here em-
phasizes that the Bring Back Our Girls media campaign amplified grass-
roots organizing rather than substituting for it; it also reappropriated the 
gaze of interventionism, which typically inflects Twitter activism toward 
Africa, in favor of locally defined political interests.
Nine days after the kidnappings, the first tweet was sent with the 
hashtag #BringBackOurGirls. Much attention has been drawn to the 
“global phenomenon” of the hashtag: a month after its first use, BBC 
Trending (2014) reported that it had indexed 3.3 million global tweets. 
The most highly circulated of these accompanies an image of US first 
lady Michelle Obama in the White House with a handwritten sign in-
scribed with the hashtag (see fig. 15.2). Creating international aware-
ness to pressure the Nigerian government to intervene was an express 
purpose of the Twitter campaign. In the immediate days after the ab-
duction, parents and community members unsuccessfully pursued the 
militants on foot. However, after news spread about the attack through 
national media, the government released a false report that the girls had 
been rescued. In the capital, Abuja, hundreds of women organized dem-
onstrations to force the government to take deliberate steps to rescue 
the girls, under the leadership of several women politicians and activ-
ists, including former minister of education, Obiageli Ezekwesili. With 
intense international scrutiny and offers of assistance from the United 
States, United Kingdom, France, and China, the Nigerian government 
publicly vowed to secure the girls’ release. However, many of the girls 
are still missing, even despite reports that the United Kingdom and 
United States discovered the location of a large group of the Chibok 
girls through surveillance in the weeks after the kidnapping.10
Though the #BringBackOurGirls Twitter campaign failed in its stat-
ed objective, this moment remains an instructive case study of the ways 
Twitter can productively amplify activist work in Africa and other parts 
of the Global South even while the medium itself threatens to efface 
these forms of grassroots labor. Online activism has been scrutinized for 
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its reliance on technocratic metrics (clicks, tweets, subscriptions) and 
anonymous social relations that require “low- stakes” sacrifices rather 
than a commitment to the more taxing, prolonged work of building 
social movements (e.g., Gladwell 2010; White 2010). However, in the 
global/digital peripheries where access to smartphones and mobile in-
ternet access remains uneven, mobilizing what Malcolm Gladwell (2010) 
disregards as the “weak ties” of social media to increase the visibility of 
specific issues stands to strengthen and safeguard on- the- ground move-
ments rather than replace them. That the Nigerian government com-
mitted at all to a rescue effort after erroneously claiming the girls had 
been returned is a direct result of the international shame the Twitter 
campaign produced. For local activists who reported facing intimidation 
from state agents to suspend their demonstrations, their increased vis-
ibility on social media provided an indirect form of protection, since tar-
geting protesters with violence would only compound the government’s 
public relations problem.
Still, despite such benefits of aligning Twitter and grassroots activism 
for local activists, the hashtag archive of #BringBackOurGirls obscures 
their continued work. A Google Images search of “Bring Back Our 
Girls” returns an overwhelming majority of images of Western celebri-
ties holding up a handwritten sign with the hashtag. That this has be-
come the archived story of the movement speaks to the effects of what 
Figure 15.2. Perhaps the 
most widely recognized 
tweet of the #Bring-
BackOurGirls campaign. 
US First Lady Michelle 
Obama poses with a 
sign in the White House 
in support of the nearly 
300 girls kidnapped by 
Boko Haram militants 
in Northern Nigeria. 





Jean Baudrillard in 1981 famously described as the “simulacra,” in which 
images, optics, and simulations (in this case, of direct political action) 
supersede the original object. In this context, this means that despon-
dent images of Westerners effectively erase the activism of the Nigerian 
women whose unsung heroism is actually driving the production of 
these images. Women activists continue to lead mobilizations for the 
rescue of the Chibok girls, over three years after the hashtag has stopped 
trending, and they continue to keep women’s issues a part of Twitter dis-
course, as in the case of 2015’s trending #BeingFemaleInNigeria, which 
featured everyday experiences of sexism in Nigeria. These gendered 
forms of erasure are important to bear in mind, particularly as social 
media publics are idealized as more gender- inclusive than conventional 
African public spheres.
At its core #BringBackOurGirls is a campaign predicated on interven-
tion, which is an especially complicated terrain of practice in the African 
context. The normative belief that the continent is ripe to be “saved” by 
Westerners was established through the logics of colonial empire. Such 
legacies continue with contemporary technocratic forms of “develop-
ment,” in which technology plays a central part. #BringBackOurGirls of-
fers a contrastive approach to #KONY2012, which is African Twitter’s most 
controversial “crisis” to date. KONY 2012 was a Twitter campaign and 
cause célèbre anchored to a two- minute short film of the same title that 
was produced by the nonprofit organization Invisible Children. Filmed a 
decade earlier by trio of twenty- something American film school gradu-
ates who traveled to Uganda to “find a subject to make a film about,” the 
film constructs a victim narrative surrounding child soldiers in northern 
Uganda with the express purpose of mobilizing enough social media 
support in the West to pressure military intervention to capture Joseph 
Kony, rebel leader of the Lord’s Resistance Army. KONY 2012 was under-
written by what Nigerian writer Teju Cole (2016) describes as the “white 
savior industrial complex,” in its rabid construction of Africa as a perpet-
ual “zone of intervention,” which worked to fuel the appeal of the viral 
campaign.11 #BringBackOurGirls, conversely, is rooted in preexisting lo-
cal efforts to compel government action. Though there were eventually 
some calls for Western military intervention after President Goodluck 
Jonathan failed to act militarily, Bring Back Our Girls is ultimately a re-
fusal of the logics of “white savior” interventionism that are typically at 
work in responses to crises in the region. To the extent that Bring Back 
Our Girls proponents mobilized international power brokers, including 
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the extensive African diaspora(s) in Western countries, they did so strate-
gically in order to shame local and national actors into action on behalf 
of citizens. Rather than mobilize discourses of victimhood, which help 
create the conditions of possibility for (further) foreign intervention, 
Nigerian activists emphasized the personhood of the girls and their aspi-
rations, which guided them to pursue education under such unfavorable 
conditions. The sustained advocacy to date on behalf of the Chibok girls 
and others subsequently trafficked by Boko Haram also indicates that 
activists understand Twitter to be a space that offers the possibility of 
local and global convergence. However, the maelstrom of criticism now 
associated with KONY 2012 and the contrasting approach of Bring Back 
Our Girls both suggest that African Twitter will trend toward discourses 
and mobilizations that are locally rooted and center the particular inter-
ests of African people.
Discussion: Africa’s Reterritorialization of Twitter
A hashtag is what Henry Jenkins would describe as a transmedia text, 
capable of spreading across digital platforms and through discursive 
styles while retaining its role as a meaningful signifier (Jenkins, Ford 
and Green 2013). Hashtag movements in Africa have had meaningful 
impact with regard to both the discursive online space but also the mate-
rial lifeworlds of politics and the politics of media technology in particu-
lar. As illustrated before, Africa’s Twitter users and movements have not 
been simply obsessed with politics or the politics of representation. Yet 
the question of identity and technology remains at the core of Africa’s 
Twitter practices. By “identity” we signal not simply the static or cultural 
notions related to tradition and shared meaning among Twitter users 
living on the continent. Instead, we deploy a notion of identity as a set of 
discursive practices, where media is implicated. The culture of iPhones, 
MySpaces, and YouTubes simultaneously enforces the notion that the 
individual is the chief articulator of their identity claims in the digital 
age. But there is always a “struggle for representation” at the core of this 
co- construct of the self.
Stuart Hall described a similar struggle for representations of authen-
tic identity as crucial to the artistic work of young Afro- Caribbean and 
Black filmmakers and musicians in late twentieth- century England: “We 
have been trying to theorise identity as constituted, not outside but with-
in representation; and hence of cinema, not as a second- order mirror 
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held up to reflect what already exists, but as that form of representation 
which is able to constitute us as new kinds of subjects, and thereby en-
able us to discover places from which to speak” (1990, 102).
Social media is a new form of representation, not just with respect 
to profile pictures and avatars, but in the construction of identity, the 
production and relations that construct identity. Twitter use in Africa is 
one form of this practice of identity (that of the “prosumer”) (Toeffler 
1981), and this mediation of the self is useful in thinking about the pro-
duction of the self in virtual spaces that are translocal if not global. The 
African social mediascape, particularly Twitter, has been a space for the 
simultaneous deterritorialization of African political action, where trans-
national tools and models of activism and self- representation have pro-
vided a moment of rearticulation for social movements at the grassroots 
levels. The Western gaze still overdetermines the capacities in Africa, 
even as the users of the platform are increasingly global, but in these 
key moments cited above, Twitter has been made African, reterritorial-
izing the process of innovation. Twitter, WhatsApp, and Facebook may 
have been designed in elite software houses in California, but the local 
adoption and innovation of users, often conceived as being outside the 
core demographic, continues to provide innovative practices and tacit 
understanding of how technologies produce connections and subject-
hood. #BringBackOurGirls and #dumsor highlight differing valences 
of these practices, where global visibility met differing outcomes of real 
politics on the ground.
Notes
 1. It should be noted that Facebook, Viber, WhatsApp, and Twitter often 
come factory- embedded in the software systems of these phones, though that is 
not always the case.
 2. “A ‘walled garden’ is a telecom industry term for restricted resources kept 
within a firm’s proprietary networks or operating systems, such as Comcast’s 
Xfinity content, most AOL services, or Apple’s iOS software.”
 3. The trope of “Africa Rising” is a disputed political- economic development 
that began again in the new millennium (Gilley 2010; Wadongo 2014; “Africa 
Rising” 2011).
 4. The authors would also like to acknowledge that at the time of writing, 
few, if any, scholarly pieces addressed the emergence of an African Twitter. This 
early publishing record now includes Bruce Mutsvairo, ed., Digital Activism in 
the Social Media Era (Palgrave Macmillan, 2016); Bitange Ndemo and Tim Weiss, 
eds., Digital Kenya: An Entrepreneurial Revolution in the Making (Springer, 2016); 
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Seyram Avle, ‘‘Radio locked on@ Citi973,’ in Everyday Media Culture in Africa 
Audiences and Users. Vol. 18, 161– 79, Wendy Willems and Winston Mano, eds., 
(Taylor and Francis, 2016).
 5. For examples of the Eurocentric, tech determinist view on Africa, 
see Terry Reynolds and Stephen H. Cutcliffe, “Technology and the West: A 
Historical Anthology,” in Technology and Culture (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1997). For a critique of this view, see Rosalind Williams, “Afterword: An 
Historian’s View on the Network Society,” edited by Manuel Castells, The Network 
Society: A Cross- Cultural Perspective (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2004).
 6. Barack Obama’s first visit as president to Africa, in 2009, produced a tor-
rent of Twitter activity, but in our ethnographic encounters, the platform was not 
yet ascendant on the continent.
 7. André Brock (2012) considers a similar experience of “Black Twitter” in 
the American context. This idea of discursive space builds upon the idea of “so-
cial space” developed by Henri Lefebvre and Edward Soja.
 8. The 2014 Portland Communications report shows Accra, Ghana’s capital, 
as one of the leading urban locales for Twitter use on the continent, though 
Ghana’s ranking on Twitter use remains low compared to use in South Africa, 
Kenya, Algeria, and Egypt.
 9. @ECG_ghana Oct. 17, 2012, 4:34 am @twitz_ov_mascot [Twitter]; 
@_E_C_G March 10, 2015 “NB: Blame JDM for this not us.”
 10. As of 2018, 82 of the original kidnapped women and girls have been re-
leased. Bukola Adebayo. 2018. “Missing Chibok girls not coming back, Boko 
Haram commander tells police.” CNN, July 18. Accessed September 14, 2018. 
https://www.cnn.com/2018/07/18/africa/chibok-kidnapping-suspects-arrest-
ed/index.html.
 11. Original tweets found on https://twitter.com/tejucole.
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Participation on Twitter across African Borders
naveena karusala, trevor perrier,  
and neha kumar
In February 2016, Siyanda Mohutsiwa (2016), a writer, speaker, and self- 
declared Pan- Africanist, delivered a TED Talk about the promise of 
Twitter as a site for fostering social Pan- Africanism: the idea that people 
of each African country can relate to, share, and collaborate with one 
another despite cultural and geographic differences. She recounted how 
in the summer of 2015 she was inspired by the question of what each 
country would be doing or drinking if Africa were a bar and tweeted, 
“#IfAfricaWasABar South Africa would be drinking all kinds of alcohol 
and begging them to get along in its stomach,” referencing the attempt 
to rebuild South Africa after apartheid. By the end of the week, the 
hashtag had amassed more than sixty thousand tweets.
We qualitatively examine this hashtag from the perspective of 
outsiders— to the network of Twitter data as well as to the culture. 
This perspective allows us to expose the challenges in navigating being 
“outside” when attempting to analyze the realities of social movements 
through Twitter data. Our research contributes to studies that examine 
the limits of what we can infer about experienced realities from Twitter 
data and analysis. Some examples include studies that look at prior 
social movements such as the Arab Spring, Black Lives Matter, and the 
Charlie Hebdo protests (Khonsari et al. 2010; Segerberg and Bennett 
2011; Bruns et al. 2013; Recuero et al. 2015; Freelon et al. 2016). For 
instance, Kaveh Ketabchi Khonsari and her coauthors analyzed tweets 
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related to Iran’s Green movement to understand the “anthropological 
and sociological characteristics” of modern social movements, assign-
ing users roles such as “listeners,” “brokers,” and “gatekeepers” (2010). 
Also, Jennifer Larson and her colleagues (2016), through an analysis 
of tweets on the Charlie Hebdo protests, theorized that one’s decision 
to protest is based on the views of one’s immediate social network. 
This type of understanding of participants’ perceptions and motiva-
tions is particularly important in #IfAfricaWasABar because of how it 
intentionally elicits judgments about nations and identities connected 
to Africa. As a result, we reflect on how being an outsider to the move-
ment and relevant data might simultaneously render inferences about 
the movement problematic.
The idea that Twitter data is not perfectly representative of the physi-
cal world is not new. Certainly there are individuals who choose not to use 
or cannot access Twitter. Of those who do, there are “elite users” who gar-
ner a disproportionate amount of attention (Wu 2011). Geographically, 
Kalev Leetaru and his coauthors’ (2013) global study of geotagged tweets 
showed that English tweets in Africa clustered around South Africa, 
Kenya, Nigeria, and Ghana, while South Africa and Nigeria had the most 
influential users. At the same time, affordances of social media platforms 
can also skew or limit representation of the user (Marwick 2005; boyd 
and Crawford 2011; Marwick 2014; Bonilla and Rosa 2015; Rost et al. 2015; 
Kow et al. 2016ABC). Yarimar Bonilla and Jonathan Rosa’s (2015) analy-
sis of #Ferguson pointed out the gaps in knowledge when qualitatively 
analyzing tweets, such as the author’s intended meaning and targeted 
audience, related but non- hashtagged tweets, and reason for participa-
tion. Our study seeks to understand how such issues of representation 
related to the use and affordances of Twitter play out specifically in a 
transnational conversation and how they are compounded when we are 
outsiders to the social movement.
To understand and work beyond the problematic aspects of an out-
sider’s perspective, we turn to two critiques of data analysis. In Alex S. 
Taylor’s (2011) work titled “Out There,” he argues that researchers char-
acterize “new” contexts as a complex and vastly different network, result-
ing in a problematic view of researchers as objective observers of the 
network and subjects as something to map out. Meanwhile, Gillian Rose 
(1997) cautions researchers to not fall into the opposite trap. She argues 
that researchers cannot assume they fully understand their subjectivity, 
emphasizing the importance of recognizing multiple knowledges and 
absent knowledges in the research process. We examine the insights pro-
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vided by these critiques on how to complicate inferences about social 
movements made through Twitter data.
In the sections that follow, we describe our methods for collecting 
and analyzing the tweets containing “#IfAfricaWasABar.” We then de-
scribe our findings in terms of what we learned about African countries’ 
cultures and geopolitics, positioning ourselves as (US- based) outsiders 
looking in and learning through these tweets. Finally, we discuss our 
findings in light of Taylor’s and Rose’s critiques to help us rethink cur-
rent methods used to analyze online social movements, particularly in 
the context of the Global South.
Method
We collected our dataset of 2,326 original tweets and their associated 
retweets by querying Twitter’s public Search API for tweets containing 
“#IfAfricaWasABar” and “#IfAfricaWereABar” multiple times a day on 
July 29, July 30, July 31, and August 4 of 2015. The latter two searches 
were limited to tweets with a newer ID than the maximum tweet ID in the 
former two searches. Twitter’s Search API “searches against a sampling 
of recent Tweets published in the past 7 days” to return tweets contain-
ing the search query with any combination of capitalized and lowercase 
letters (“Search API”). However, it does not return exhaustive results; 
according to documentation, “Some Tweets and users may be missing 
from search results” (“Search API”). We ordered the tweets and associ-
ated metadata in various ways. First we analyzed the original tweets by 
creating a random sample of approximately 5 percent (170) of original 
tweets and coding for the aspect of the country commented on by the 
user (e.g., leadership, conflict, stereotypes). We categorized these codes 
into high- level codes of cultural traditions and attitudes, economic ties 
and criticisms, and political events and relationships. Next we created 
frequency lists and calculated percentages of user- submitted locations 
(based on one- and two- word phrases), the number of times a country 
was mentioned in the set of tweets and retweets, and other metadata, 
such as users’ interface language preferences, users’ number of tweets in 
the data set, and place information attached to a tweet. We also created 
ordered lists of the 100 most retweeted tweets (and the user who created 
them) and the 100 most- followed users (and the 512 tweets that they cre-
ated). We coded these tweets based on the aspect of the country being 
commented on and the user’s description. We also created a list of tweets 
categorized by the country the tweet mentioned. This list was joined with 
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a list of users and their submitted locations parsed into a three- letter 
country code using pattern matching; we then used this combined list 
to determine how many users’ submitted locations matched the country 
mentioned in their tweet or retweet. Prior work has indicated that while 
the location field on social media is not guaranteed to match the user’s 
true location, location should be operationalized within the research 
context and determined accordingly (Johnson 2016).
We detail the authors’ backgrounds, because this analysis, includ-
ing our understanding and coding of tweets, is colored by our experi-
ences. The first and third authors are both cis females of Indian origin. 
The second author is a white American cis male. We collectively have 
eighteen years of experience doing research in the United States, India, 
Kenya, and South Africa. To frame our analysis, we position ourselves 
as researchers who are “outside,” learning about African countries and 
the relationships among them through these tweets. In the process of 
coding, we occasionally needed to research general knowledge about 
a country or look up unfamiliar phrases, references, and people to un-
derstand the tweet’s commentary. According to critiques of reflexivity, 
acknowledging this process is important, because our interpretation of 
each tweet is partial and only one of many that could be produced by 
diverse knowledges (Rose 1997).
Who Is Tweeting?
To start with, we wanted to know who contributed to this hashtag. 
Approximately 76 percent of users in this data set had a user- submitted 
location description. According to a one- and two- word frequency list 
of user- submitted locations, the most frequently mentioned countries 
and cities were Kenya (Nairobi), Nigeria (Lagos), South Africa (Cape 
Town, Johannesburg), Ghana (Accra), and Uganda (Kampala). Other 
than these five countries, locations also frequently referred to Africa as a 
whole, New York, England or the United Kingdom, Botswana, Zimbabwe, 
Namibia, and Zambia. This reflects place data as well, which indicated 
that tweets were most often associated with Kenya, South Africa, Nigeria, 
Uganda, the United States, and Ghana. Most users had a single tweet in 
the data set, counting both tweets and retweets. The number of tweets 
posted in a user’s account lifetime averaged to 20,623 but had a median 
of 5,672, indicating a smaller number of users that heavily use Twitter or 
have been members for a relatively long time. The average number of 
followers that users had was 2,076, but the median was 399, once again 
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indicating a smaller number of users with a large number of followers. 
In fact, approximately 10 percent of users had more than 2,000 follow-
ers. Users also overwhelmingly used English as their interface language 
(94%), while the next most popular language was French, used by just 2 
percent of users.
Among these users, we wanted to know who was having a significant 
impact on the hashtag in terms of content creation, retweets, and number 
of followers. The most retweeted original tweet, having 50 percent more 
retweets than the next most retweeted tweet, was “#IfAfricaWasaBar The 
bartender would apologize about the loud Nigerian table but explain 
that they’re the ones keeping the place in business.” It may not be sur-
prising that this was a popular tweet, considering it was about Nigeria, 
where many users of the hashtag were from. However, the user, a report-
er for the Wall Street Journal, had two other tweets in the set of one hun-
dred most retweeted tweets and more than double the average number 
of followers. These characteristics generalized to other users in the list. 
Many top retweeted users described themselves as reporters, analysts, 
journalists, writers, or radio or TV personalities— all occupations that 
arguably rely on creativity and a large social network. In fact, Mohutsiwa 
herself had contributed two of the most retweeted tweets, and Anele 
Mdoda, a popular South African radio DJ, was the most- followed user 
on the list. The number of followers and high number of retweets each 
user had reflects the power of these users’ social networks— compared to 
the overall data set, most retweeted users had a much higher average of 
22,437 followers and a median of 3,568 followers. Additionally, nineteen 
users contributed a disproportionate fifty- one of the one hundred most 
retweeted tweets. Overall, this data mirrors previous findings showing 
that elite users, such as bloggers, celebrities, or media representatives, 
attract the most attention on Twitter (Wu 2011). However, it would help 
us better understand how Twitter’s strata of influence affected this so-
cial movement if we could know who these users imagined they were 
reaching or influencing with this hashtag, compared to how users inter-
acted with the tweet online. Comparisons could also be made between 
the imagined audience of, say, the Wall Street Journal reporter and that of 
natives of African countries, like Anele Mdoda or Siyanda Mohutsiwa, to 
understand the role of identity in influence.
Switching gears, we also examined the characteristics of users with 
the highest number of followers. The top five most- followed users 
did not have the most retweeted tweets (which can indicate less influ-
ence on Twitter [Cha et al. 2010]) but were news organizations such as 
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@mashable (Mashable Inc.), @BBCAfrica (BBC news in Africa), and @
cnni (CNN International). They posted “meta”- tweets seeking to spread 
information about the hashtag. The following are a few examples:
#IfAfricaWasABar hashtag pokes fun at Africa’s ever- 
complicated geopolitics http://t.co/cPMRlI6P0S
#IfAfricaWasABar: Twitter erupts in pan- continental 
satire fest http://t.co/PZxBV5SSWS http://t.co/
MePvB5Hyek
RT @CNNAfrica: #IfAfricaWasABar creator @SiyandaWrites: 
‘Africans on social media are dying for opportunities 
to talk about Africa’ http:// . . . 
Local news and radio stations, such as Radio702 in South Africa and 
Naij in Nigeria, posted meta- tweets as well. Other most- followed users 
were individuals with occupations such as social media personalities, 
radio personalities, entrepreneurs, rappers, and bloggers in Africa that 
elicited a large following. Most of these users posted retweets, with a 
minority of users posting more or exclusively original content. Nota-
bly, most- followed users with the highest number of retweets of origi-
nal tweets were a journalist, a media site that critiques Western media 
content about Africa called “Africa is a Country,” and a user in Nairobi 
with a computer science– related occupation (indicated by the hashtags 
#socialprogrammer and #computerscience). Their high number of 
retweets combined with a relatively high number of followers indicates 
their influence relative to other most- followed users (Cha et al. 2010). 
Because “most- followed” accounts had the ability to reach a wide audi-
ence, looking at the motivations of their discourse around the hashtag 
(“ever- complicated,” “satire fest”) combined with the scope of their au-
dience might lead to a more nuanced understanding of how users from 
different parts of the world learned about and perceived the hashtag.
What’s Happening in the Bar?
We also delved into the diverse commentary users provided via the tweets. 
In the set of tweets and retweets, the most frequently mentioned coun-
tries were Nigeria, Kenya, and South Africa by far, followed by Uganda, 
Zimbabwe, Ghana, and Ethiopia. The most frequently mentioned non- 
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African countries were the United States and China. Many countries were 
mentioned fewer than ten times, often located in continents other than 
Africa. In our analysis, we sorted the tweets into what stood out to us as 
high- level yet multifaceted categories: cultural traditions and attitudes, 
economic ties and criticisms, and political events and relationships.
Tweets regarding culture in our sample commented on both specific 
aspects of culture, such as traditions, as well as more general attitudes 
regarding a country’s culture and how it relates to Africa as a whole. 
Some tweets commented on the unique traditions of a country that 
might come out in a bar setting, such as language, dance styles, or food 
preferences. For example, a user commented on Angola’s hypothetical 
language skills: “#IfAfricaWasABar Angola will be tht chick tht agrees 
to everything said in english coz she doesn’t understand wht is said.” 
After we learned that Angola’s official language is Portuguese and that 
its primary languages exclude English, this tweet seemed to be point-
ing out Angola’s distinctiveness among half of all the countries in Africa 
that have English as an official or de facto official language (though this 
does not mean English is a primary language in these countries) (CIA 
2016). Similarly, other unique cultural practices came up, too, such as 
Ivory Coast’s traditional dance: “#IfAfricaWasABar Ivory Coast will be 
dancing mapouka throughout the night.” We learned that mapouka is a 
traditional dance from southeast Ivory Coast that has received media at-
tention for purportedly inspiring the twerking dance style and eliciting 
a government ban on being performed in public spaces. It seemed that 
from the user’s point of view, the nation was characterized by this dance 
and its associated events.
Tweets also pointed out other cultural phenomena that were not 
codified into traditions but were instead embedded into the attitudes 
of a country’s residents: “#ifAfricawasabar Swaziland’d be drinking tra-
ditional beer while secretly wishing it cld hv some of this ‘lager’ folks 
are always talking abt.” Written by Mohutsiwa herself, we interpreted 
this tweet as a comment on the perhaps repressed but extant desire of 
Swaziland’s people to better meld the traditional and the modern, hav-
ing learned that Swaziland is the only absolute monarchy in Africa and 
retains much of traditional Swazi culture. In this case, the hashtag serves 
to point out the rapid “modernization” of Africa and the perceived by- 
products of not keeping up. Meanwhile, the way many users tweeted 
about South Africa was another example of a cultural attitude, this time 
more critical: “#IfAfricaWasABar you know South Africans would be 
there every day while pretending to themselves they’re not part of it.” 
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Here, the tweet describes the user’s notions of South Africa’s prevalent 
attitudes toward other African countries, implying a sense of superiority 
or refusal to identify with Pan- African culture. This particular tweet was 
authored by @Africasacountry, a media site originally founded by Sean 
Jacobs, a native of South Africa, to critique American or Western media 
content about Africa. However, Jacobs himself may not be the author of 
the tweet, as the site has multiple contributing authors or, potentially, a 
social media manager. Looking at replies to this tweet, most users indi-
cated agreement with the sentiment while a few were more reluctant to 
agree, replying “Really?” or “Ouch.” As outsiders, it is difficult to assess, 
past these replies, the complexity of the sentiment in question, consid-
ering that nuanced agreement or disagreement with the tweet can be 
expressed only in replies. Commentary on countries’ status within Africa 
was not limited to South Africa, however. Countries with different ethnic 
makeups, such as Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Egypt, were also con-
sidered to be “loners” at the bar or mingling only among themselves.
Another category of tweets commented on the economic choices and 
trends often brought about by a country’s leadership. These tweets re-
lated to how a country spends money or creates economic ties with other 
countries. Some tweets could often be critical of spending, indicating 
a concern for the direction of the economy and leadership. One user 
tweeted: “#IfAfricaWasABar Nigeria would be the potbellied Oga buying 
drinks (on a credit card) for everyone. . . .” This tweet criticizes govern-
ment spending without means, which we inferred based on the use of 
Oga, the Yoruba word for “chief,” often used to describe government 
positions and made popular by its use by a public official in a contro-
versial interview. Users also commented on economic relationships be-
tween countries and were particularly critical of dealings with the United 
States and China: “#IfAfricaWasABar people would be slow dancing with 
the West but snogging China in the toilets http://t.co/ZleDeTnjnK.” 
Not only were African countries’ characters in the bar, but so were 
other countries by virtue of the opportunistic economic relationships 
forged with them. Other tweets were even more critical of countries’ 
economic ties, especially when they involved forces dominated by the 
West: “#IfAfricaWasABar Tanzania would be that guy with alot of money 
(resourses) [sic] and still depends on his white friends for drinks. (IMF 
& WB).” This tweet appears to indicate judgment of countries that rely 
on aid or perhaps purposefully keep up relationships with organizations 
often criticized for supporting neo- imperialism. In fact, one user point-
ed out the irony of maintaining such relationships: “#IfAfricaWasABar 
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Europeans would spike all the drinks then sell antidotes to everyone at 
a later date.” This tweet, while generating agreement among many us-
ers, elicited opposing viewpoints claiming that it is stereotyping Europe. 
Though we can see greater complexity through replies, there is little 
sense of what these multiple perspectives on issues such as many African 
countries’ colonial past mean for social Pan- Africanism in terms of ac-
tual cooperation and relatability among Africans.
Finally, users also commented on politics, ranging from historical con-
flicts or political trends to current events. This made #IfAfricaWasaBar 
not only a method of commentary but also a record of certain political 
events that were relevant at the time the hashtag was trending. As a result 
of this embeddedness in experience and history, these tweets seemed 
to require a deeper understanding of the history of African countries 
than we as US- based researchers possessed in order to understand us-
ers’ intentions and deeper meanings. From our perspective, in some 
tweets the tone could be satirical, wishing to point out ongoing politi-
cal turmoil. One user commented on Zimbabwe’s political leadership: 
“#IfAfricaWasABar Mugabe is the guy who still doesn’t leave even when 
the barman puts up all the stools and switches off all the lights.” We 
learned that this tweet satirizes the fact that Robert Mugabe has been 
president of Zimbabwe since 1987, comparing him to an overly persistent 
customer at the bar.
More current events were also the center of attention in coun-
tries like Burundi, where Pierre Nkurunziza had won a third term in 
a controversial election at the time #IfAfricaWasaBar was trending: 
“#IfAfricaWasABar #Burundi will be that guy on the phone promising 
his wife he’ll just be staying for two drinks whilst ordering a third.” The 
metaphor expanded outside the bar as well, even talking about long- 
standing conflicts between countries under the guise of trouble getting 
into the bar: “#IfAfricaWasABar South Sudan would need a fake ID and 
hope Sudan is not the bouncer that night.” Here, the tweet refers to 
South Sudan’s relatively recent independence from Sudan after a civil 
war and instability since then. Users also commented on more underly-
ing conflicts between countries, such as the soured relationship between 
Nigeria and Ghana: “#IfAfricaWasABar Nigeria and Ghana would be the 
two guys who came together then end up beefing.” We interpreted this 
tweet as a reference to Nigeria’s and Ghana’s stances on immigration 
coming in from the other country, pointing to a historical conflict that 
comes out in the disorderly atmosphere of a bar.
Examining characteristics of users and tweets helped us gain a bet-
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ter understanding of the way the hashtag was being used and by whom. 
However, it is also valuable to understand the questions regarding rep-
resentation that the hashtag brings up. One issue of representation was 
the dominance of the English language. The overwhelming majority of 
users wrote their tweets in English, and the hashtag itself is an English 
phrase. Indeed, in an analysis of five thousand hashtags in Africa, more 
than three- quarters of tweets were written in English (Portland Africa 
2017), and it has been argued that the many different languages spoken 
in African countries makes English a lingua franca that unites people 
across language barriers (Portland Africa 2017). However, prior work 
shows that English geotagged tweets are concentrated in South Africa, 
Kenya, Nigeria, and Ghana (Leetaru 2013). This may explain the high 
participation we see in this hashtag from those countries, but it also begs 
the question of which countries English is uniting on Twitter.
Additionally, understanding who is able to represent whom is impor-
tant in examining a hashtag like #IfAfricaWasaBar. Therefore, we exam-
ined the number of tweets and retweets that matched the user- submitted 
location with the country mentioned in the tweet. Approximately 41 
percent of tweets had users with locations that contained the name of a 
country that could be parsed into a standard three- letter abbreviation. 
Matching the user- submitted location with the country mentioned in the 
tweet showed that only 16 percent of parsable tweets had matching loca-
tions. The countries that consistently had a slightly higher percentage of 
matching locations than percentage of country mentions were countries 
with high hashtag participation overall, such as Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, 
Nigeria, South Africa, Uganda, and Zambia. Additionally, because we 
only parsed country names, this does not account for user- submitted lo-
cations consisting solely of the frequently mentioned major cities in these 
countries, such as Nairobi, Kenya, or Accra, Ghana. While not every user- 
submitted location mirrors a user’s true location or national identity, this 
data may indicate that participation on Twitter shapes how much self- 
representation a country has within the hashtag. Indeed, entire coun-
tries were considered irrelevant at the “bar.” Looking at our random 
sample and the set of tweets that mention small countries like Seychelles 
or Mauritius, users often tweeted about the smaller or less well- known 
countries in similar ways. From one user from Botswana and located in 
Canada: “#IfAfricaWasABar Dudes like Seychelles, Madagascar, Cape 
Verde and Mauritius wouldn’t even get in because nobody really knows 
about them.”
Other users recognized the effects of uneven representation of coun-
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tries in the way a Western media organization like CNN might misperceive 
or oversimplify the hashtag: “@CNN be looking at this #IfAfricaWasABar 
trend like, So you mean all this [sic] countries are in Nigeria.” Other 
users tweeted about participation in the hashtag itself from non- African 
users, pointing to the importance of identity and representation in a 
conversation like #IfAfricaWasaBar:
When I see white non African people tweeting the 
#IfAfricaWasABar hashtag http://t.co/uIitZdNNXB
My face when a non- African tweets using 
#IfAfricawasaBar [crying/laughing emoji] srsly tread 
lightly. . . . http://t.co/YDORrb6lKS
These tweets show that questions of representation are important to a 
social movement like #IfAfricaWasaBar. However, looking at the data set 
from a bird’s- eye view might point out these issues, but it does not delve 
further into the motivations behind these notions of participation or the 
complexities of why certain countries are underrepresented or repre-
sented in particular ways.
Discussion
Our findings aimed to highlight what we could learn about notions of 
social Pan- Africanism as viewed and engaged by the tweets we collected 
from the hashtag #IfAfricaWasaBar. We also noted the motivations and 
intentions that were more difficult to understand as outsiders to the 
movement and to the online network itself. In order to learn from this 
perspective to make Twitter analysis of social movements more fruitful, 
we find a middle ground between Taylor’s (2011) critique of othering 
and Rose’s (1997) argument for the need to recognize multiple knowl-
edges and the absence of knowledges. In the rest of this discussion, we 
look at Twitter research in terms of Taylor’s critique, exploring current 
proposed methods of bridging “in here” to “out there” in Twitter analy-
ses. We then argue for methods that go one step further to focus on 
multiple knowledges and the absence of knowledges.
In looking at our study through the lens of Taylor’s critique, it is easy 
to believe that it does not apply, since Twitter (like other social media) re-
ally is a network. Users are the nodes, and communication creates edges 
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among various users, which leads to Twitter analysis methods that make 
inferences about communities’ real- life behavior based on the commu-
nication that is evident within the network. However, these methods of 
analysis create a bird’s- eye view of Twitter interactions, and prior work 
shows that in addition to not understanding users’ own perspectives on 
the social media activities being analyzed (Marwick 2014; Bonilla and 
Rosa 2015), researchers are limited to the type of data and representa-
tion of identity that the social media platform allows users to provide 
(Marwick 2005). Specific to hashtags, any meta- remarks on the use of 
one, such as counter- hashtags like #AllLivesMatter to #BlackLivesMatter 
or meta- tweets that comment on the hashtag, need to manifest in the 
form of a hashtag, tweet, retweet, or reply in order to be taken into ac-
count. Furthermore, it is difficult to assess based on public discourse 
(Kow et al. 2016) on Twitter if participation in the hashtag (or lack there-
of) has affected the user offline. As a result, prior work has described 
the benefits of qualitative interviews and ethnography in understanding 
user perspectives and technology use (boyd and Crawford 2011; Marwick 
2014).
However, we wish to specify how qualitative methods in Twitter analy-
ses of social movements, particularly in a cross- cultural context, might 
be used to avoid simply erasing the inside/outside dichotomy and in-
stead complicate the researcher’s interpretation of a social movement 
on Twitter. Recognizing Rose’s notion of multiple knowledges and the 
absence of knowledges requires considering how “networks cut every-
where else, besides, ‘back here’” (Taylor 2011). From this perspective, it 
becomes important to better engage with where the network of a hashtag 
“cuts” or stops (Taylor 2011). This stopping point could be quite literal in 
contexts with lack of internet access or language barriers in an English- 
dominated conversation. It could also be due to disagreement with the 
hashtag itself, lack of awareness or understanding of the hashtag, or 
simply being part of the periphery of the movement, as seen with the 
smaller or culturally distinct countries in this study. There could also be 
stopping points from a user’s point of view— opinions on who should 
or should not be participating in the hashtag can also determine where 
the network can be considered cut, as in the case of users who felt non- 
Africans should not be participating in the hashtag.
Therefore, intending to complicate researchers’ understanding of 
the social movement, qualitative interviews of non- users of the hashtag, 
in addition to users, may be beneficial. Eric Baumer and his colleagues 
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have explored non- use of technology, showing that understanding non- 
use can provide an idea of the larger trends that result in non- use amid 
widespread usage (Baumer et al. 2015). Similarly, understanding non- use 
of a hashtag and the Twitter platform can provide insights on why issues 
of representation might be arising and the multiple knowledges at play 
in defining a social movement.
Admittedly, determining who non- users are begins with learning who 
users are as well as who is being underrepresented in the hashtag and on 
the social media platform. Non- users might be those who do not use the 
platform itself but might be likely to if they were on the platform (which 
in turn relies on access to that demographic as well as an understand-
ing of a likely user and the intention of the hashtag). Non- users of the 
hashtag could also be found by examining users’ ties on the platform for 
friends who did not participate in the hashtag despite the users’ partici-
pation. Examining replies to meta- tweets may also be useful in finding 
users who did not necessarily use the hashtag but had a perspective on 
the meta- tweet. Finally, as in the case of #BlackLivesMatter, users who uti-
lize variations of the hashtag without using the original might be consid-
ered non- users who are indirectly interacting with the hashtag. In these 
ways, Twitter research might be able to balance a view from “inside” the 
data with the recognition that there are always multiple and sometimes 
missing perspectives that the researcher must always worry about when 
characterizing a social movement from the outside.
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seventeen | Beyond Hashtags
Black Twitter and Building Solidarity across Borders
kimberly mcnair
It was the year of the Occupy Wall Street Movement, Arab Spring, and 
the Egyptian Revolution. I began following the 2011 London uprising like 
most “xennial” Black Americans— via social media (Merriam- Webster 
2018). Traditional media outlets had moderate coverage, but I found 
it easier to follow the protests in real time on Twitter. As I settled into 
my third year of graduate school at UC Berkeley that fall, the Occupy 
Oakland encampment at Frank H. Ogawa Plaza— newly renamed by pro-
testers and occupiers as Oscar Grant Plaza— was only five blocks away from 
my apartment in downtown Oakland, California. Oscar Grant III was a 
twenty- two- year- old Black man killed by a Bay Area Transit police officer 
in the early morning of New Year’s Day 2009. Amid the tear gas fumes 
and sounds of helicopters above, I understood the unrest in London 
that had started two months earlier as existing within a global context 
of Black death in police custody. The London uprising was sparked by 
outrage over the death of Mark Duggan, a twenty- nine- year- old Black 
man killed by police in Tottenham, North London, England, in August 
of that year. The protests and confrontations with police spread across 
London and other cities in England, and the hashtags #MarkDuggan, 
#LondonRiots, and #UKRiots went viral days after Duggan’s death.
This chapter explores how Black political expression has evolved in 
the social media age. It grew out of a curiosity about how Twitter as a plat-
form offers a way to connect with similarly marginalized communities 
in the African diaspora and evolved into an examination of how social 
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media and smartphone technology are used in international movement 
building. To this extent, the “Black” in Black Twitter extends past the on-
line neighborhoods that are interconnected by signifying cultural knowl-
edge and practices and addresses the offline reality of blackness born 
out of continued subjugation (McNair 2015; Brock 2012; Florini 2013; 
Clark 2014). This chapter positions one case study within the historical, 
cultural, and political context of the United Kingdom.
As a way to communicate and build movements, social media and 
Twitter in particular facilitated an inter- diasporic dissemination of infor-
mation. Through the use of hashtags, Black Twitter (an online commu-
nity described at times as a racial, social, or political formation) circulates 
cultural forms that travel between the United States and throughout the 
diaspora (McNair 2015; Brock 2012; Florini 2013; Clark 2014). The vis-
ibility of the Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement in the United States 
is a key example of how US- born social movements have helped enliven 
simultaneous movements and decades- long struggles (Brown 2005). 
Deaths in police custody and community surveillance are the threads 
that connect the US Movement for Black Lives to established activist or-
ganizations and networks created around the globe. The constellation of 
hashtags as visual material, the adoption of “Black Lives Matter” as a po-
litical frame, and resistance to violent policing as a legitimate response 
contributed to the solidarity among Blacks in the United States and the 
United Kingdom.
This chapter explores the condition of Black Britons as victims of po-
lice brutality and their use of discursive activism online and off. Through 
interviews with community activists and family members of those killed 
by police, I focus on the following themes: (1) how movement partici-
pants use social media as a political tool, (2) what social media can tell us 
about diasporic communication regarding global struggles, and (3) how 
social media has changed Black political participation. I also explore 
how youth of color in London use smartphone applications specifically 
designed to monitor and record police- citizen encounters to collect vi-
sual evidence of systemic racism.
Scholars Lisa Nakamura and Peter Chow White have described the 
internet as a space where “race itself has become a digital medium, a 
distinctive set of informatic codes, networked mediated narratives, maps, 
images, visualizations that index identity.” Through this lens, I think of 
Black Twitter as a Black online community, connected through a shared 
understanding of political and historical meanings, formed within the 
same history of racialization (and racial understanding) that exists in the 
Revised Pages
Beyond Hashtags  285
physical world (McNair 2015). These “online neighborhoods,” Meredith 
Clark writes, “mirror the variety in the Black lived experience.”1 With this 
framing, we can imagine these neighborhoods as London, Birmingham, 
and Brixton, or Baltimore, Los Angeles, and Oakland, and the border 
crossing that has also become characteristic of Black Twitter. Blackness 
(and, by extension, the lived experiences of Black people) has no need 
for boundary maintenance (Brubaker 2005). The “Black” includes not 
only the diaspora but the history of criminalization and surveillance as 
well. The different neighborhoods that form Black Twitter use tweets to 
challenge the images that the press has used to represent Black people 
(and the criminalization of young Black men in particular). As scholar 
S. Craig Watkins explains, “Hashtags put news media organizations on 
notice that they were being watched, scrutinized, and held accountable 
for the narratives that they constructed.” Therefore, social media has 
helped redirect the arc of the story, framing the conversation about race 
and inequality in the US happening in (offline) traditional broadcast 
news outlets acting as gatekeepers. Black Twitter as participatory media 
has enabled diasporic Blacks to co- create the news and influence the way 
stories of Black people killed by the police have been reported (Graeff 
et al. 2014).
I propose that the emergence of Twitter as a political tool is a re-
sponse to a discursive crisis. This crisis is the skewed depiction of Black 
victims of police murder and the community uprisings that often occur 
in white mainstream media. These tweets represent a point of conten-
tion between traditional news outlets (and their function as a space that 
reproduces racist ideology) and counter- hegemonic discourses. We also 
see a progression within social (media) constructed communities like 
Black Twitter from discursive identity (as a performance of cultural un-
derstanding) to “discursive activism” (transforming frequency of use into 
a currency of use) (Watkins 2014). Hashtags are a discursive intervention 
made in response to this crisis. This “#” language emanating from social 
media— such as #BlackLivesMatterUK— decenters traditional kinds of 
social action, such as established political organizations and parties, and 
privileges a group- centered style of participation (McNair 2017). I argue 
that Black Twitter should be understood as a counter- hegemonic project 
and media intervention after decades of increased policing of Black and 
other ethnic minorities in the United Kingdom.
The Black Lives Matter movement, which originated in the United 
States, expanded into the United Kingdom through protests coordinat-
ed by activists such as Natalie Jeffers, cofounder of Black Lives Matter 
286  #identity
Revised Pages
UK (BLMUK), as publicity surrounding cases of death in police custody 
in the United States increased and international public outrage esca-
lated. As an online community with shared political interests, cultural 
references, and practices rooted in the Black experience, Black Twitter 
facilitated the communication and coalition building necessary between 
diasporic locations (Florini 2013; Watkins 2014).
Family members of victims of police violence delivered a letter to 10 
Downing Street, the British prime minister’s residence, on the day of the 
seventeenth annual march against deaths in custody during the Black 
Lives Matter UK/US Solidarity Tour in 2015. The solidarity tour was an 
act of reciprocity, organized mostly through communication via social 
media. The United Families and Friends Campaign (UFFC), together 
with other grassroots organizations, invited Patrisse Cullors, one of the 
cofounders of Black Lives Matter (United States), in February 2015 to 
tour across the United Kingdom. Others involved included Adeyemi 
(Ade) Johnson, brother- in- law of Sheku Bayoh; Stephanie Lightfoot- 
Bennett, the twin sister of Leon Patterson; Jo Orchard, the sister of 
Thomas Orchard; Ajibola Lewis, the mother of Olaseni (Seni) Lewis; 
and Cephus (Uncle Bobby) Johnson, the uncle of Oscar Grant, along 
with his wife, Beatrice X Johnson, both from Oakland, California. Later 
that year, the Ella Baker Center for Human Rights and the American 
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) brought a number of family members 
from the United Kingdom to Southern California to share their family 
members’ stories, including Shaun Hall, the brother of Mark Duggan; 
Kadisha Burrell- Brown, sister of Kingsley Burrell; and Marcia Rigg, the 
sister of Sean Rigg, who traveled to the United States from the United 
Kingdom to start a global conversation about deaths in police custody 
and state violence (Rigg 2015).
For seventeen years now, the families and supporters meet annually for 
the UFFC remembrance procession at Trafalgar Square in London and 
then march to Downing Street to the prime minister’s residence to hand 
in a letter of demands (Rigg 2015). The UFFC T- shirt worn by Stephanie 
Lightfoot- Bennett includes the statistic and statement: “1518 Deaths in 
Police Custody Since 1990 in London and Wales. 0 Convictions.” At the 
time of the 2015 march, of the 1,518 deaths in police custody since 1990, 
152 of these victims were Black. Despite there being ten unlawful killing 
verdicts, there has not been a single conviction (INQUEST Charitable 
Trust 2017).
In late 2016 I conducted interviews with Marcia Rigg and Stephanie 
Lightfoot- Bennett, the cochairs of the United Family and Friends 
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Campaign, and Shareefa Panchbhaya from StopWatch UK, who all par-
ticipate in the Black Lives Matter movement in the United Kingdom. 
I asked them questions about their experiences incorporating social 
media into their activism. The United Family and Friends Campaign 
was created in 1997 by media activist Ken Fero and was a coalition of 
Black families (at that time) who raised the issues of Black families and 
Black deaths in police custody in the United Kingdom. The organiza-
tion has since become a multiracial organization for all those affected 
by deaths of loved ones in police custody. Marcia Rigg is the cochair and 
cofounder of UFFC along with Stephanie Lightfoot- Bennett. Marcia’s 
brother Sean Rigg, who suffered from mental health issues for a period 
of twenty years, died in 2008 in police custody. The hashtag created for 
Marcia’s brother, #SeanRigg, has been in circulation since as early as 
July 2010 among the many campaigns and organizations created to re-
sist deaths in police custody (i.e., Police State UK, UK Black Defenders, 
and INQUEST). And because of the tireless work that Marcia has done 
over the years, this hashtag has been shared as recently as December 
2017. Stephanie Lightfoot- Bennett, another longtime organizer with 
UFFC, is the twin sister of Leon Patterson, a man who was murdered by 
the police in 1992. The hashtag created for Lightfoot- Bennett’s brother, 
#LeonPatterson, began in June 2015 included on a list of other known 
victims (e.g., #SeanRigg and #MarkDuggan) of death in police custody. 
And by August 2016 it had drawn many comparisons to the Freddie Gray 
case in Baltimore, Maryland.
Though African American popular culture dominates international 
media, this exposure to Black Atlantic life and culture does not go both 
ways. Many people in the United States are unaware of the systemic is-
sues faced by Black Britons; participants believe that the solidarity tour 
has helped change that (Rigg 2016). When reflecting on her trip to the 
United States, Marcia Rigg stated:
From the beginning, the most surprising aspect of our trip was the 
lack of awareness amongst communities and activists in the US in re-
lation to the UK context. . . . Black lives on both sides of the Atlantic 
appear to mean nothing and there is a remarkable disproportionality 
of deaths.
Over her many years working with UFFC, there hasn’t been enough me-
dia attention, and any media attention garnered from the T- shirts, dem-
onstrations, and social media presence would help bring their cause to 
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the top of the political agenda. “That’s where change will only happen,” 
she insists. Rigg suggests that “the difference in this day and age is social 
media.” She further explains:
One of the issues we have here as they have in the States is media 
attention. We don’t get proper media platform attention. In those 
days in the 1990s there was no social media. There were no mobile 
phones and such. It was all made by word of mouth. . . . Social media 
is a platform for protest and campaigning, and the news can spread 
fast worldwide. . . . It’s modern- day protesting, Twitter, Instagram. . . . 
When young people in Britain found out about what’s happening 
here and we started to tell them about our history . .  . suddenly ev-
eryone is awake. The future generation have woken up, and they are 
much more political than past generations. It’s phenomenal.
Lightfoot- Bennett also spoke about the uses of social media:
For getting to know what’s going on, like with Mzee Mohammed [an 
eighteen- year- old Black male who in 2016 died after being detained 
by police at a shopping center in Liverpool following reports he had 
a knife] .  .  . It brings people out in solidarity for the family .  .  . be-
cause they had to raise some money to send Mzee back to Jamaica. 
And once social media had heard about the story, heard about what 
happened, people were now willing to help donate to get him back 
home.2
The hashtag #FergusonSolidarityTour started on January 20, 2015, and 
was used to promote the first leg of the Ferguson US to UK Solidarity 
Tour until March 11, 2015. The hashtag was included in tweets originating 
from individuals and organizations in the United States and the United 
Kingdom who either participated in the solidarity tour or were affiliated 
with Black Lives Matter (i.e., Ella Baker Center (Oakland, California), 
the American Civil Liberties Union of Southern California, Defend the 
Right to Protest (DTRTP, in the UK), and notable members of BLM Oak-
land and BLM Los Angeles). The highest rate of tweets and retweets 
occurred during visits to college campuses like Kings College University 
(fig. 17.1), University College London, Edinburgh University; cities like 
Leeds and Sussex; and the protest at the G4’s corporate headquarters 
in London. The hashtag #CaravanForJustice began on October 3, 2015, 
and kicked off the second leg of the Ferguson US to UK Solidarity Tour. 
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This hashtag has been tweeted and retweeted hundreds of times by as 
many individuals and organizations over the past two and a half years 
and is still in circulation as of June 2017.
There have been multiple “caravans for justice,” and the slogan has 
been repurposed for everything from resisting New York’s stop- and- 
frisk policy, to protesting President Donald Trump, to defending the 
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) policy and undocu-
mented immigrants. The hashtag predecessors #LondonToFerguson 
and #LondonToNYC had emerged a year earlier in 2014 in the wake 
of the deaths of Mike Brown and Eric Garner. By November 2015 calls 
began for all of those involved with #LondonToFerguson to connect 
with the United Families and Friends Campaign (fig. 17.2). During the 
January 2015 solidarity tour, UFFC and BLM were mentioned together 
in the same tweet for the first time; and August 2016 was the first time 
BLM UK and UFFC were mentioned in the same tweet. However, tweets 
and retweets are not the best indicators, as much of the organizing and 
alliance building between organizations like UFFC and BLM still hap-
pens through traditional movement practices, offline. In a way, Twitter 
Analytics cannot tell the full story.
These organizations’ engagement with social media represent a 
Figure 17.1. Ferguson 
Solidarity Tour at Kings 
College University (UK). 
In the largest image, 
Marica Rigg is second 
from left and Patrisse 
Cullors is fourth from 





change in discursive activism in Black political movements over time. A 
change of medium— that is, moving from the television news broadcasts 
of court cases and protests to “live streaming” and video capabilities via 
smartphone technology— allows for a change in message, frame, and 
point of view. The United Families and Friends Campaign has tradition-
ally utilized their website (uffcampaign.org) and their Facebook page 
more often than their Twitter account (@UFFCampaign). However, as 
the social (media) movement that became the global Movement for 
Figure 17.2. @UFFCam-
paign Twitter follower.
Figure 17.3. Defend the 
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Black Lives grew, the organization incorporated social media into their 
repertoire. According to Foller.me analytics for Twitter, the organiza-
tion joined Twitter in 2011— one month after the London uprising. They 
describe themselves as “a coalition of those affected by deaths in po-
lice, prison, immigration and psychiatric custody.”3 With 918 tweets and 
1,479 followers (a ratio of 2.07 followers per following) the organization 
shows a moderate usage of the platform as compared to other UK- based 
organizations. Defend the Right to Protest (@righttoprotest, figs. 17.3 
and 17.4), which cosponsored the solidarity tour, joined Twitter in 2011 
and has 5,588 tweets and 9,551 followers (3.35 followers per following) to 
date. Black Lives Matter UK (@ukblm, fig. 17.5), which joined Twitter in 
2016, only has 1,501 tweets but over 22.9K followers (67.50 followers per 
following). However, this may be a result of general curiosity or goodwill 
and not necessarily participation offline.
Here again, the numbers presented do not tell the full story. Using 
the Foller.me Twitter Analytics tool to look deeper, I found that break-
ing these statistics down per one hundred tweets illustrated diffusion 
of information and UFFC’s proud network and activist community. For 
every one hundred tweets, UFFC had three replies, included seventy- 
five @mentions or #hashtags, and 100 percent of their tweets included 
Figure 17.4. Defend 
the Right to Protest (@
righttoprotest) Twitter 
account. Vigil held in Riv-
erside, California, during 
the Ferguson Solidarity 
Tour. Pictured: Marcia 
Rigg (prominent, right) 
and Stephanie Lightfoot- 
Bennett (second from 




media or web links. On average, fifty- four of one hundred tweets were 
retweets from allied organization like 4wardeveruk.org and justicefork-
ingsley.wordpress.com. What is most interesting is that UFFC spent as 
much time publicizing other organizations and related campaigns as 
their own events. Their connections to other organizations doing simi-
lar work as part and independent of the Black Lives Matter movement 
in the UK illustrates the longevity and impact of the group. The tweet 
frequency of BLMUK is similar to UFFC, with three replies, eighty- two 
@mentions and #hashtags, forty retweets, and fifty media embeds and 
links for every one hundred tweets. However, again, this organization 
has joined only since the summer of 2016, a year and a half as compared 
to both DTRTP and UFFC, which joined in 2010 and 2011 respectively. 
This means that BLMUK has had a larger social media impact than 
UFFC to date, largely influenced by the Black Lives Matter name and 
the movement in the United States and other global locations. Their 
most liked domains include news outlets like The Guardian, the Evening 
Standard, and The Independent and the BBC. This illustrates a difference 
in media strategy as far as visibility, whereas BLMUK has focused on 
large demonstrations and direct- action protests that gain news media 
Figure 17.5. Black Lives 
Matter UK (@ukblm) 
Twitter account. An-
nouncement about the 
annual @UFFCampaign 
march. Image taken from 
US to UK Justice Tour 
in 2015. Pictured, from 
right to left: Cephus 
“Uncle Bobby” Johnson, 
Beatrice X Johnson, 
Stephanie Lightfoot- 
Bennett, and Marcia 
Rigg.
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coverage. This is different from UFFC, which has largely focused on 
garnering support for families, criminal trials, police inquisitions, and 
their annual procession.
UFFC’s collaborator, DTRTP, was formed by millennials in the after-
math of the student protests of November and December 2010 and is 
closely affiliated with the National Union of Students (NUS). The orga-
nization, which, according to their Twitter bio, campaigns against “po-
lice brutality, kettling and the use of violence against protesters,” is in-
dicative of a generational shift in movement building and different com-
munication strategies. For every ninety- seven tweets, DTRTP replied thir-
teen times, included eighty- eight @mentions and fifty- nine #hashtags, 
retweeted fifty- six times, and provided forty- five links to organizations 
such as NUS and the Cole Family Truth Campaign. Though they have 
an average of ten more replies than UFFC, DTRTP engaged with— really 
talked to— more people online than UFFC. This indicates a frequency 
of use and familiarity with Twitter as a discursive and visibility strategy 
familiar to this new generation of activists. Youth who are frequent users 
of social media then tap that frequency to build momentum for various 
campaigns and actions (Fromm 2016).
Rigg spoke more about the need to make UFFC international, be-
cause people in the United States were not aware of what’s been hap-
pening in the United Kingdom. And from her observation, young Black 
Britons were not aware that the same thing happening in the United 
States had happened in the United Kingdom. Rigg recalled, “Because 
the younger generation were coming out on the streets for BLMUK but 
the younger generation in this country and a lot of people in this coun-
try were not aware of deaths in custody in this country either. Because 
the media doesn’t give it the platform that it deserves.” This is why they 
invited Patrisse Cullors (cofounder of Black Lives Matter and from the 
Ella Baker Center in Oakland, California) to the United Kingdom in 
January 2015 for an eight- day tour across the United Kingdom. Rigg re-
called, “She reciprocated some of the UFFC to come to the United States 
and so we did . . . [The Caravan for Justice] went to Oakland, Salinas, 
Riverside, LA. . . . We went to eight different counties in California, and 
we met all the families to tell our stories, and they couldn’t believe [what 
was happening in the UK]” (figs. 17.3 and 17.4).
For Rigg, the major struggle in the fight against police custody deals 
with the lack of convictions (zero to date, regardless of the victim’s race) 




What’s happened is that police officers did not have body- worn cam-
eras. There’s no CCTV police vehicles in this country. We have CCTV 
everywhere, on the streets, on buses, in taxis, everywhere. . . . The UK 
is a “big brother state” except in police vehicles, where the deaths 
happen and the brutalities happen behind closed doors but the only 
witnesses are police officers.
Rigg campaigned to require cameras in police vehicles, which was initi-
ated in 2016. During the Caravan for Justice tour in the United States, 
Rigg was interested in one particular tool— a mobile phone app. The 
ACLU of California, in partnership with the Ella Baker Center, devel-
oped the Mobile Justice CA app. The app would allow people to record 
and report (via automatic upload) their interactions with law enforce-
ment to the ACLU for review. After the Caravan for Justice tour in the 
United States, Patrisse Cullors initiated the creation of the YStop app for 
UFFC along with the aid of the Ella Baker Center, UCLA, and the ACLU. 
Rigg emphasized the significance of the app:
Black people have said for decades that police officers lie, they bru-
talize us. But there was never any proof. But now there is proof, we 
are recording it ourselves, and putting it on social media. . . . That’s 
made the massive awareness in police brutality and deaths in custody. 
Because everybody can see, now. . . . Even though people are record-
ing, there are not many convictions. [But now] the world can see we 
are not lying. That’s the difference in social media, people getting the 
cell phones out and recording it.
The idea of social media influencing the creation of smartphone apps 
is a breakthrough in police- citizen interaction. However, I needed a way 
to gauge the success of such tools. I spoke with Shareefa Panchbhaya, 
who has worked with StopWatch, a UK organization dedicated to re-
search and activism that challenges policies around stop- and- search. 
She’s a supporter of UFFC and promoted YStop in communities, organi-
zations, events, and universities during stop- and- search workshops. For 
Panchbhaya, it’s a youth empowerment project. Panchbhaya explained, 
“YStop came from StopWatch and RELEASE (the national center of ex-
pertise on drugs and drugs law). It was demanded and created by young 
people, brought forward and demanded by young people so young peo-
ple could know their rights.”
YStop lets people put their locations directly in the app. This way, if 
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the police try to grab the phone, the phone shakes and the video gets 
uploaded immediately to YStop. The complaint goes immediately to 
YStop and to the police. It doesn’t save on the phone; it saves online. 
Improvements are needed, and, unfortunately, the way the UK justice 
system handles judicial proceedings means that video footage is not al-
ways counted as permissible evidence. Panchbhaya admits that YStop was 
not an immediate success. “It had about 8,000 downloads, 1,400 videos, 
100 reports,” she explained. Panchbhaya was hopeful about how social 
media may encourage people to download and use the app.
StopWatch UK’s @YStopUK Twitter account has 884 followers and 
has composed over 3,000 tweets with 513 likes. The app is described 
as a “stop and search project for young people by young people” and 
has posted images and information on how to download the app as re-
cently as October 2017. StopWatch UK joined Twitter in April 2011, four 
months before Mark Duggan’s murder, and initiated their YStop UK ac-
count in June of 2014. Compared to the organization’s Twitter account, 
@StopWatchUK, which has roughly 2,300 followers (1.38 followers per 
following) with 1,259 more tweets with 284 likes, the reach and popular-
ity of the YStop app is still undetermined. According to Foller.me analyt-
ics for Twitter, @YStopUK replied to tweets three out of one hundred 
times (the same as UFFC and BLMUK). However, their average retweets 
(33/100) and inclusion of links (70/100) is more indicative of the func-
tion of not only the YStop Twitter page but also the YStop app itself. On 
both Twitter accounts the StopWatch campaign shares video tutorials 
and short documentaries on the YStop app and how to use it. They also 
offer alerts regarding police sweeps and patrolling of specific communi-
ties as well as articles related to the growing resistance to police violence 
in the United Kingdom. Young people also tweet their stories, and other 
community members tweet about recent cases of police brutality. These 
stories are then retweeted by StopWatch UK and YStop UK and illus-
trate the emotional and mental toll stop- and- search policies have had on 
young Black Britons.
For Panchbhaya, the app would encourage people who don’t usually 
get involved to report and make complaints. Though StopWatch and 
YStop use standard Facebook and Twitter to communicate with YStop 
users and community members, she feels they need to revise their social 
media strategy. She admits that they don’t have the best numbers when 
it comes to Twitter (both YStop and StopWatch don’t have thousands of 
followers). “It’s not always the best tool,” she insists. “It keeps things cur-
rent, but as far as engagement it’s more important for people to text or 
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call someone.” From Panchbhaya’s comments, it would seem that they 
had only begun to think about collecting data on usage and efficiency. 
This also illustrates the challenges in transitioning smartphone users 
from those who engage with social media about issues of police surveil-
lance into those who use smartphones as tools of surveillance against 
the police. What is promising is that as the international Movement for 
Black Lives matures, so will the strategies used within the movement. 
Social media and smartphone apps are two strategies among many that 
can harness the energy of the masses to disrupt global systems of oppres-
sion.
The imbalance in the ways Black victims are depicted in the media 
has been met by innovation in visual strategies (e.g., the Solidarity Tour, 
marches, and T- shirts, to name a few) as well as communication strate-
gies (e.g., social media) on both sides of the Atlantic. The tweets includ-
ed in this chapter illustrate how a social media presence can function as 
a means for political intervention in the public sphere. Harnessing the 
frequency and currency of social media usage has also popularized new 
smartphone technology to expose violent police citizen encounters in 
their communities. These interventions have not only challenged the 
framing of Black victims in broadcast news but have also exposed the 
inequalities in legal policies that disproportionately affect Black people 
whenever they come in contact with the police or other agents of the 
state.
Through their mutual concern around deaths in police custody 
without legal redress, the United Family and Friends Campaign and 
the international coalition of Black Lives Matter activists used discursive 
activism in the form of the solidarity tour, social media platforms, and 
smartphone applications to help bring the movement to the interna-
tional stage (Rutherford 2016; INQUEST 2017). The United Family and 
Friends Campaign represents one example of the multitude of organiza-
tions that have played roles in bringing the deaths of Black Britons to 
the forefront. Furthermore, their activism helped initiate the creation 
of new activist tools in the form of smartphone applications. Although 
these initiatives are still works in progress, they show advancement in the 
ways activists are using new technology to help in the fight against polic-
ing as a global system of racism. The major takeaway from this project 
is that beyond the hashtags, we see a network of African- descended peo-
ples who are venturing into the formation of a diasporic black political 
identity, wherein social media serves as a cyber communication center 
that helps coordinate tangible political practices offline.
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Notes
 1. Clark: “I define Black Twitter as a temporally linked group of connectors 
that share culture, language and interest in specific issues and talking about spe-
cific topics with a black frame of reference. And when I say ‘black,’ that isn’t just 
limited to US blacks, but blacks throughout the diaspora, and I think a lot of 
what we see reflects on blacks just in the US, but I do want to make that distinc-
tion clear, that it is not just of a matter of what we talk about here in the United 
States” (quoted in Ramsey 2014).
 2. See Perraudin 2016.
 3. @UFFCampaign Twitter Account.
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eighteen |  The Color of New Media  
Enters Trumplandia
transcribed by nicolas chang
edited by abigail de kosnik
The following is an edited transcript of a meeting of the Color of New 
Media that took place on February 1, 2017. All eight of the members who 
attended that day were women; six were women of color.
We include this transcript as a historical record of individual and col-
lective reactions of our working group to the election of Donald Trump 
to the US presidency, and the earliest acts of his administration, cap-
tured a week and a half after Trump’s inauguration.
This meeting took place amid an array of notable events:
• Twelve days before this Color of New Media meeting, on January 20, 
2017, the inauguration of Donald Trump as the forty- fifth president 
of the United States of America occurred.
• Eleven days before the meeting, the Women’s March took place in 
cities all across the United States and around the world and be-
came what was probably the largest single- day protest in US history 
(Broomfield 2017).
• Five days before the meeting, on January 27, 2017, Trump signed his 
first executive order denying entry into the United States by citizens 
of seven Muslim- majority countries, which quickly became known 
as the “Trump Travel Ban” or “Muslim Ban.”
• Two days before the meeting, on January 30, 2017, acting attorney 
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general Sally Yates ordered the Department of Justice (DOJ) not to 
defend Trump’s executive order and was dismissed that day by the 
Trump administration.
• On the morning of February 1, 2017, just a few hours before this 
Color of New Media meeting, the Senate Judiciary Committee ap-
proved the nomination of Republican senator Jeff Sessions as attor-
ney general. Also, Trump made remarks at the start of Black History 
Month that implied that he thought that nineteenth- century abo-
litionist Frederick Douglass was still living (WhiteHouse.gov 2017; 
Wootson 2017).
• A public lecture by alt- right agitator Milo Yiannopoulos on the 
UC Berkeley campus was scheduled for the evening of February 1, 
2017, and protests had been organized by Berkeley students, and by 
the antifascist, or antifa, organization called the Black Bloc, which 
would all unfold about seven hours after the Color of New Media 
meeting concluded.
De Kosnik began the meeting by asking members to share one or two 
persistent thoughts or reactions they’d been having since Trump’s inau-
guration.
Reactions of Women of Color to the Election and the Women’s March
YAIRA. I am a student of Latin American literature, and this whole 
political climate that we’re in dialogues with how Latin Ameri-
can dictatorships were micro- experiments, the US’s neoliberal 
experiments. I think the current political climate sort of takes 
me there [to US- imposed Latin American dictatorships] in re-
lation to authoritative and retrograde discourse in the service 
of corporate interests.
As a woman of color, [I’ve also been thinking about] the 
Women’s March, and something that caught my attention 
from that event was how out of place I felt, even though part 
of its platform was inclusivity. It didn’t necessarily feel that way. 
There was something about it that didn’t resonate with certain 
realities of minority groups.
ABIGAIL DE KOSNIK. And other women of color have told me that 
too. “Was that a white woman’s march?” was one of the ques-
tions around those events— as amazing, as stupendous as they 
were.
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PAIGE JOHNSON. Thinking about the events that are happening 
today [Yiannopoulos’s scheduled talk on the Berkeley campus 
and the planned protests against it] has really made me think 
about the early scholarship on what it means to be a nonwhite 
person on the internet, [where] there were two streams of 
thought: either the internet is the great equalizer [where] you 
can be whoever you want to be, or you don’t get to erase race 
or gender in that space. I think we’re having that conversation 
a lot more— some have been having that conversation a lot 
more with the Black Lives Matter movement. I think the ways 
in which violence carries over into the digital realm is some-
thing that we are going to have to start to grapple with [more] 
in different ways.
The Confirmation of Jeff Sessions as Attorney General
JOHNSON. I’m just so mad about [Jeff] Sessions [being appointed 
attorney general of the United States]. I mean, there’s so much 
to be mad about, but for me, that really hits home, as someone 
from Alabama, having to deal with his bullshit for fifty years in 
the Senate— and now, to see him validated on a public stage in 
this way! Of course he’s been in the Senate majority for forever. 
Just to see him reach this level . . . ! The fact that he’s being vali-
dated and put in a position of power that he had not before, in 
a way he failed to gain before. Like, [before the Trump admin-
istration, Sessions was told,] “You are blatantly racist, and you 
make racist policies, so we cannot elect you to this type of sort 
of national leadership position.” The fact that he won today 
just . . . [The Senate Judiciary Committee approved Sessions’s 
appointment to attorney general on the morning of February 
1, 2017, minutes before the beginning of the Color of New Me-
dia meeting.]
DE KOSNIK. If I’m recalling right, you’re alluding to the Senate 
hearings to make Sessions a federal judge that happened 
years ago, and I think Strom Thurmond was on that commit-
tee. [Strom Thurmond, the longest- serving senator in Ameri-
can history, was a prominent opponent of racial integration 
throughout his political career.] And when Strom Thurmond 
tells you you’re too racist to be a judge, I feel like you’re too 
racist to be a judge. [laughter]
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[While Thurmond chaired the 1986 Senate Judiciary Committee that 
voted down Sessions’s nomination, Thurmond did not personally vote 
against Sessions. However, two Republican senators on that committee, 
Arlen Specter and Charles Mathias Jr., did vote against Sessions.]
The Struggle Did Not Begin Now
RA. One of the things that I’ve been dealing with is that it feels 
like a secondhand exhaustion, where I know that I haven’t nec-
essarily been in all the places and on all the streets [protest-
ing], but I just feel so exhausted. I feel like turning inward 
and feel like avoiding. I think that part of it comes from just 
trying to make sense of this new white liberal frenzy that’s all 
about being on the streets and all about waking up and being 
disappointed with America for the first time. And I guess for 
me it’s that there has been so much cause and so many things 
to protest, at least from my positionality [as an African Ameri-
can woman]. Specifically on the eve of the Women’s March, 
I remember being on Instagram and seeing [that] someone 
I went to high school with posted a picture of their glittery 
uterus sign and wrote a caption about how they recognized this 
is the first time they felt this enraged to march. And I remem-
ber feeling like, “Really? Now? 2017, this moment?” A lot of 
what’s happening doesn’t feel surprising. What else is America 
gonna do after its first Black president? This kind of energetic 
excitement around racism is, in my mind, what I expected to 
come after what some would perceive as a false victory— or this 
incomplete victory— in the end of racism [that was thought 
to be achieved by Obama’s presidency]. Of course post- racial 
America would lead itself into this trap.
“We’re in This Moment of Acceleration”: The Citizenry Is Not 
Complacent
RA. I’ve been thinking a lot about protest, thinking a lot about 
what it means to have all of these representational exercises 
that show that we’re fed up and that we’re not gonna take it, 
but then what does it mean if those don’t actually hold any 
weight or hold much weight? If the cabinet keeps getting con-
firmed, if the policies keep getting advanced, then the courts 
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can say that this ban is unlawful, and Trump can say, “I’m gon-
na do it anyway, and I’m gonna fire the attorney general [Sally 
Yates].” 
DE KOSNIK. Or individual airports can just choose to defy the [ex-
ecutive] order also. [On January 29, 2017, the San Francisco 
International Airport released an official statement announc-
ing that the airport opposed Trump’s Muslim ban executive 
order and supported the people who had come to the airport 
in droves to protest the ban (Saleem 2017)].
RA. Right, right. It’s interesting to watch all of this play out in real 
time. And I’ve been seeing a lot of thought on Twitter too. 
Online [people are saying], “Obama was lying when he said 
presidents can’t do what they wanted.” Or maybe he didn’t 
want to break the law, which is what Trump is doing. Or maybe 
he was more bound to the Constitution than our current ad-
ministration is. It’s interesting for me to just watch people try 
to make sense of Trump and then map Trump’s trajectory onto 
Obama and what a lot of people perceive as his [Obama’s] lack 
of ambition or this radical, on the other end of the spectrum, 
agenda. And we are seeing the Constitution being violated and 
ignored. And how we shouldn’t normalize that or accept that’s 
the way our government is supposed to run.
JOHNSON. We’re in this moment of acceleration. That’s a part of 
what prompts people to get out [protesting] again. I think 
that if this happened slowly over four years, people would have 
been resigned to it. Like, “Ugh, of course.” To see this kind of 
counterpoint [happening now] is causing people who initially 
supported what was happening to take a step back— people 
who were moderate. Of course, there’s people like the [Steve] 
Bannons. But I think we started to see it immediately after the 
election, that people were like, “Oh, health care. Now I kind 
of regret my vote.” I think that part, that demographic is going 
to start to get more liberal.
DE KOSNIK. I would love that. I admit that I’m a little dubious 
about that. There is a Tumblr that’s called “Trumpgrets,”1 but 
you know, I wish that were more of that conversation today, or 
tomorrow.
JOHNSON. There were a couple things around the time the execu-
tive order for the [Muslim] ban came out. There were people 
who were like, “I voted for Trump but now my husband, who 
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works for the military, is stuck.” I think that as it starts to actu-
ally affect that demographic more, we’ll see.
DE KOSNIK. I love that prediction.
The Optics of the Resistance and of the Trump Administration
KAILY HEITZ. I think there’s definitely something about optics, 
about the visuality of protesters, but also this weird hyper- 
public persona that Trump has while also being very secretive. 
Like, he’s all over Twitter, but you can see how surveillance is 
happening and from a very tight group of powerful people. 
They see what’s happening, and they see that there’s an imme-
diate pushback to their actions. So it’s like we can see how the 
optics are working on social media, at least at the governmen-
tal power level. There’s a sort of panopticon that’s happening.
DE KOSNIK. Was I correct in seeing [then White House press secre-
tary] Sean Spicer hold up printouts of tweets that Trump had 
issues with? I mean, is that what the press secretary’s role is 
today? Is it printing out Twitter? I think there are some optics 
that if this becomes normalized we should remember when 
these things started to happen. And remember how inappro-
priate and childish a lot of the behavior seems to be without a 
regard for appearing more presidential or seeming more ma-
ture or above it. There’s this kind of willingness to engage at 
this very middle school playground level with almost anybody. 
I’m thinking about the “context collapse” on Twitter that Alice 
Marwick and danah boyd [2011] talk about, where you can just 
tweet at a celebrity and they retweet you, or they tweet back 
at you. And you shouldn’t share that same social space with a 
person of that status, but suddenly you do. It’s like, “Oh, now 
the president can retweet or fight with almost anyone in the 
country— anyone in the world— whose tweet he picks up on 
and has some issue with.” So there’s something about the para-
dox of the optics where, on the one hand, it’s being very pub-
lic and really wanting to be out there and way too much, too. 
Like, not just in a way that’s overly accessible and welcoming 
but overly engaged and overly immersed. There’s something 
strange about Trump’s Twitter behavior, that’s more— to re-
inforce Yaira’s point about other kinds of dictatorship— more 
like a dictator would be, or how a king would behave. I think 
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about regimes like the ancien régime in France or something. 
Trump’s Twitter behavior seems more like that kind of impe-
rial power, which can be really capricious. A king can be ca-
pricious, but a president is not supposed to have those same 
triggers.
How Can White Women Be Allies?
JULIANA FRIEND. Something that myself and many others are 
thinking about is how, as a white woman, I can best be an ally 
at face- to- face protests given two things. One, that you don’t 
want to dominate the space visually or physically. Two, that in 
particular events with particular aims, the presence of white 
people might matter a lot to the optics and impact of an event, 
by making it impossible for those in power to claim that oppo-
sition is only coming from those with marked subject positions. 
So perhaps the decision of how to participate is particular to 
the context. And then there is the question of history. I think 
the Anti- Milo Toolkit addressed this really well.2 The toolkit 
teaches that there is a risk of reinforcing flippant, unqualified 
praise for free speech. Like, when Milo calls himself a free 
speech fundamentalist, he obscures the history through which 
free speech has been made accessible for some people and not 
others. So how does someone from a less marked subject posi-
tion play a positive role in protests in the moment, in the now, 
in a way that draws attention to that history rather than further 
effacing it?
DE KOSNIK. Yeah, and of course you’re talking about today on this 
campus, as Yiannopoulos is speaking tonight, and we know 
that the protest is scheduled at 6:15 pm today, so when you say 
“free speech in the now,” you mean a few hours from now.
“Can He Do That?”: The Balance of Power under Question
MIYOKO CONLEY. I’m going back to the idea of the acceleration 
that is happening. I just keep thinking about how I feel the 
acceleration, and the moves that the Trump administration is 
pulling with its backlash against protesters, shows how much of 
our governmental system is reliant on decorum. And a sense of 
people following rules that are not actually laws. And then the 
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fact that Trump and his team are not following those rules feels 
like mass confusion. I also feel within myself and other people 
a lack of education in asking, “Can he do that?” I start thinking 
to myself, “Can he do that? Is this unlawful? Do we have any 
kind of safeguarding to prevent someone in the White House 
from doing this, or were we just relying on him not doing it, be-
cause that would be the sensible thing to do and the nonracist, 
not hateful thing to do?” But when someone kind of comes 
up with hateful actions and just starts pumping them out, re-
ally, really quickly, we start to think, “Well, what type of lawful 
recourse do we have?”
DE KOSNIK. The social drama that just played out with Yates and 
Trump does seem to be about balance of power and rule of 
law and the fact that there are parts of the federal government 
that are partitioned off from the presidency on purpose. The 
A.G. [attorney general] is supposed to interpret the law and 
the president is not supposed to influence the A.G.’s interpre-
tation of the law. So I think to Paige’s point about the accelera-
tion, one thing that the protests seemed to effectuate was Sally 
Yates’s desire to perform, because she understood that there 
was a kind of a vote that happened with the airport protests. 
And so people were wondering, Who is going to represent that 
voice of the people, that will of the people? And the A.G. de-
cided that she should be it. She decided she should be the ac-
tor on the national stage that expresses the will of the people 
in a dramatic way as that dramatis personae, and she expressed 
it. And then, as you were saying, Paige, it did not take but a 
few hours for the executive branch to respond with a big fat 
“No.” Yates is standing up for the rule of law, for the balance of 
power, and the executive says, “No, that’s not going to happen. 
I don’t respect that.” Then, after that, you knew this adminis-
tration was not going to respect the balance of power. And I 
think that’s pretty dramatic, as far as Victor Turner’s [1980] 
four- stage process of social drama goes, where first is breach 
and then crisis.
This is a major crisis, because, to Miyoko’s point, it does 
throw the whole underpinning of checks and balances into 
question, as far as people even within the Republican estab-
lishment taking sides. I do think that the message is very clear 
to them. And the message was that, “If you take sides, that will 
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be noted.” There won’t be this safe zone of, “Oh, I’m going 
to respectfully disagree and I’m going to maintain my power 
base.” What it looks like the message was today [with the firing 
of acting A.G. Yates]— we can’t tell exactly how this is going to 
play out even three hours from now— but today, it looks like 
the message was “If you disagree with this administration, you 
will not hold on to your power base. Your power will diminish 
in some way, large or small.”
LYNDSEY OGLE. What’s so crazy, too, is that when that happened, 
when they started circulating some of the footage from Yates’s 
Senate confirmation hearing, and then it’s Sessions that’s ask-
ing her, “If you get an unconstitutional mandate from the pres-
ident, are you prepared to be in opposition?” And that’s [her 
exchange with Sessions, in which Yates stated that she would 
oppose an unconstitutional mandate from the president] part 
of what got her confirmed. [Sessions was approved to replace 
Yates as attorney general on the morning of this meeting.] It’s 
just the . . . 
DE KOSNIK. The irony, the dramatic irony of it all . . . 
OGLE. Shonda couldn’t write this. [laughter]
DE KOSNIK. Shonda Rhimes? Yeah.
OGLE. I’m also thinking about [journalist] Sarah Kendzior. She’s 
been, since the election started, clocking the ways that fascist 
undertones were there, since the beginning, in the rhetoric 
that was around Trump’s campaign. And one of the things that 
she tweeted out really early, and repeated a couple of times, 
is the importance of noting, at the beginning of a fascistic re-
gime, all the small things that seem really small, but all are out 
of the norm— to note them, to keep a record of them. That 
sort of recordkeeping is going to be more and more important 
as we move forward.
The Muslim Ban and Black Muslims
RA. I’ve been thinking about the conversations around the Muslim 
ban and rumors that are circulating, and I’ve been asking Black 
Muslim folks that I’m in community with, and a lot of them 
were like, “They’re [the government] not concerned with us.” 
They’re not going to go to the Philly mosque and protest or 
“register” all of them. [There was speculation in early 2017 that 
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a mandatory Muslim registry might be created in the United 
States.] That’s not a concern for them, thinking about Black 
immigrants in this current discourse around immigration. But 
still, I’ve heard conversations that are grateful that Black im-
migrants [seem] to have a little longer to figure out their shit 
because they’re not the ones being targeted right now, in this 
moment. It’s coming, but they have a moment. I guess I’m try-
ing to reckon with utilizing erasure as a tactic. That’s a lot to 
work through. But working to utilize the blind spots in this ad-
ministration, or maybe creating some, to recognize that there 
are some things that this administration doesn’t care about the 
same way. I think that there are ways that some folks, some “is-
sues” are considered below white people’s attention, and how 
might we make that blind spot politically advantageous.
DE KOSNIK. Yeah. Communities that are not so visible or “com-
mon,” as Fred Moten says [in the book that Moten coauthored 
with Stefano Harney, The Undercommons: Fugitive Planning and 
Black Study (2013)]. There’s a collective called the Raqs Media 
Collective [2010] that has written about “seepage.” There’s a 
critical legal studies scholar called Lawrence Liang [2005] who 
thinks of seepage as something that happens when the mo-
ment and the situation is opportune. Seepage takes advantage 
of the infrastructure not right up front on the face of the build-
ing. It’s something that happens in the cracks of the building, 
and it can alter the composition of the material so that enough 
seepage can bring that building down. So I’ve been thinking 
about that opportunism and that kind of fast but small action. 
What can escape, and what can remain hidden in plain sight? 
What are those tactics right now?
The Resistance Needs to Be Anticapitalist
OGLE. I think that in collaboration with that we’ve got to talk about 
capitalism. Part of me feels like until we have a full- scale inter-
nal strike, we’re just nothing. You know, because that’s what 
they care about. If you cut their money off at the knees, that’s 
really the only type of opposition that has been tried in the 
small scale in the United States, North America, and was quick-
ly crushed time and time again. But for me that felt like the 
only type of opposition that there’s no playbook for how power 
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can co- opt that yet. I think that we’re talking about protest as 
a strategy, but that gets re- enfolded back into power. I think 
about who’s now being inducted into the Hall of Fame, and 
who’s getting MacArthur grants, and there are ways in which I 
think we all know that that has also been fully co- opted by capi-
talism and power. So for me it feels like the last thing left, and 
also the thing that’s the most possible here . . . 
DE KOSNIK. Is a labor movement.
OGLE. Is a labor movement.
DE KOSNIK. Yeah, is a general strike. I mean, in a way, neoliberal 
capital already did the work of collapsing the labor movement 
in this country over decades. But I have heard the term “gen-
eral strike” being thrown around recently. For the first time 
in my lifetime, I’m hearing calls for that in the United States.
And I’m also seeing some analysis of this moment as a cor-
porate takeover. The extraction industries and the deregulated 
financial industries that depend on their continual exploita-
tion of the American populace, at this point, those parts of 
society are done working through middlemen. They’re done 
trying to get the “right people” elected, and they’ve basically 
effectuated a takeover of power directly and explicitly, because 
they don’t want to deal with the political system anymore. They 
would rather just reconfigure the political system to be what 
they need it to be.
One of the parts of hopefulness is some of those people 
making that argument are basically saying that corporate 
America is running scared. We are near the end of the extrac-
tion of fossil fuels. I mean, we’re not at the total end of that, 
but as fossil fuel becomes more scarce as a resource, the finan-
cial industry is starting to get some blowback from that ram-
pant extraction of value.
The Need for a New Kind of Undergraduate Education
DE KOSNIK. I think there’s a broader need for education— of 
course I think this, because I’m an educator— but to Ra’s 
point  .  .  . people don’t understand that these things are all 
implicated in each other. How a Black rights movement is 
a Muslim rights movement not just because there are Black 
Muslims but because it’s a human rights movement. And that 
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a white women’s march is a movement for all women’s rights. 
There’s always been an understanding in this country of the 
relatedness of these movements in this country, and some of 
that is about needing intersectional discourse and not having 
a common vocabulary. But a lot of it— how these movements 
have been thought of as separate— is how capitalism has op-
erated, keeping neighborhoods separate, keeping kids segre-
gated in schools and housing, and people literally remaining 
ignorant of each other’s struggles. And I feel like we are re-
ally paying the price for a whole century of different groups 
striving for equality in this country but not really learning 
the major lesson of the need for unity of the struggle, and 
how they have been divided from each other, mostly by racist 
capitalism.
I think there’s so much more critique to do, more educa-
tion to do, and yet we don’t have time to put together, to re-
configure undergraduate education so it really teaches people, 
at eighteen, the lessons they need to be prepared to fight this. 
We don’t have time to get people ready. There’s ways we need 
to act right now and tonight and tomorrow.
“How Many Years Have [Racists] Felt Oppressed?”
RA. I’m curious as to all these young folks and people [we] go to 
school with, because they invited this man [Milo Yiannopou-
los] here, if they have had all this racism bubbling under the 
surface of their lives. How many years have they felt oppressed 
by their inability to say it [racist speech]? Or if something about 
this moment empowers them to claim this racism, or this con-
servatism, in a public way. Because it is troubling for me to ac-
cept that these leaders of the Berkeley Republicans— and I’ve 
had run- ins with people from Breitbart too— and their cries for 
free speech are supported by institutions, because they [have] 
more fiscal and social privilege than the people that they’re 
endangering. And I’m really interested to know, had they al-
ways known that they wanted to say these things out loud and 
couldn’t? Or is the affirmation from whatever little frustrations 
they might be having as white individuals? This growing multi-
cultural world has given them a new textbook for ways for deal-
ing with their frustration, to yell and attack rather than sitting 
in it and processing in a more healthy way.
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HEITZ. Yeah, and I think how much of that is space for a move-
ment for propaganda. Like, before the Japanese internment 
[during World War II, more than 110,000 Japanese Americans 
were interned in camps throughout the United States], we had 
a wave of anti- Japanese sentiment. People posting these flyers 
saying, “Japs go home.” And we have the same sort of thing, 
but it’s not flyers. It’s happening online.
OGLE. I will say, having seen the entire election cycle in Missouri, 
that there’s a lot of rhetoric about the reason why Trump won. 
What the left is missing. What’s coming from the right, right 
now, is, “Your protests are ridiculous, you’re missing the point. 
You have ignored [the] middle.” I’ve been really trying to un-
derstand, I’ve been trying to identify the rationale for agree-
ment, for not only electing Trump, but also these policies he’s 
making. Because in my own mind, and when I have conversa-
tions with various liberals, there’s a fine community in the Mid-
west, but . . . they cannot dissociate those ideas from racism.
It’s a huge portion of the population, so your option is to 
let a huge portion of the population that has this racist under-
current just never able to voice [that racism] or whatever, or 
something else is going on. Unfortunately, I have not identi-
fied this something else that’s going on, but that’s part of my 
dissertation work.
The Usefulness of the Middle American Trump Voter
OGLE. But I will say to these stories about ignoring Middle Amer-
ica, about the rest of America ignoring their needs, or the 
needs of the lower-middle class: that if you read these articles, 
they’re not being written by those constituents. They’re be-
ing written by the wealthy or the upper- or upper- middle- class 
conservatives.
DE KOSNIK. So that group as a construct is convenient . . . 
OGLE. I feel like it’s a trope. And it’s not that it’s not true. Obvi-
ously, there is a lot of shrinking resources and people that feel 
alienated and feel like they have not been— they’re the “de-
plorables” they have not been recognized. But it’s interesting 
that that is the group that this community of wealthy or upper- 
middle- class conservatives keeps going back to. But they [more 
economically privileged conservatives] are not particularly in-
terested in doing the work to help solve [the problems facing 
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the lower- middle or lower class], as much as saying, “You liber-
als are not looking at this community.”
DE KOSNIK. When you put it that way, it makes sense. Because if we 
think about this as the ascendency of corporatism to the White 
House, then corporatism can definitely not own its own inter-
ests in terms of interests that it’s representing and defending. 
They can’t say, “We’re here to defend the corporations and 
the exploitation and the system that we have going on.” It has 
to, instead, say to some reasonable sector of exploited people, 
whose labor is being extracted, it has to say, “We’re here to 
defend you,” to those people. It can’t own itself.
OGLE. Then, it just becomes, “I’m sorry.” It just becomes a cycle. 
The reaction, the discourse, that comes from the left is, the 
left says, “Yeah, you’re saying this, but you’re not interested in 
doing anything,” and the right’s saying, “No, you’re not paying 
attention, you’re just . . .” And it’s this loop where no one’s ac-
tually really addressing the needs of these communities.
DE KOSNIK. Right. The community just gets ignored either way.
OGLE. It’s interesting even the way that radio in the Midwest— that 
was rough for me, just listening to the way that people were 
discussing things leading up to the election. They knew that 
Trump was going to win, they knew for certain that Trump was 
going to win. So the shock that a lot of us felt . . . 
DE KOSNIK. They didn’t feel.
OGLE. They didn’t feel.
The Myth of “Vast Swaths of Untrodden Whiteness”
JOHNSON. My family [of African Americans in Alabama] never 
bought it [that Trump’s victory was all about Midwestern eco-
nomics] for a second, because the jig goes sky- high when you 
consider that there are Black people in the Midwest. What is 
this idea that there are vast swaths of untrodden whiteness in 
the middle of the US that are completely devoid of people of 
color? If you look at, demographically and economically, who 
is continually at the bottom rungs in the US? [The majority of 
nonwhite people in the United States at every class and educa-
tion level voted for Clinton.] That’s why I can never get behind 
this idea that “it’s not about race, it’s about economics.” Be-
cause that is alternative facts. [laughter] Because all you have to 
do is look at this country . . . 
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DE KOSNIK. All the Black and brown people didn’t just move to the 
edges of the map of the United States.
JOHNSON. Or you just sort of think of this transcript of Trump’s 
speech at the Black History Month breakfast [this morning]. 
And he’s still using this discourse of Blacks in the inner cit-
ies. Ben Carson [an African American] being head of HUD 
[the Department of Housing and Urban Development] is go-
ing to fix the inner cities. [Trump said, “We’re going to work 
very hard on the inner city. Ben is going to be doing that big 
league.”] And that’s what makes this so infuriating, to see this 
idea [that Black people only live in urban areas] being taken 
up by the press over and over again, this type of justification, 
because it just completely erases the actual on- the- ground real-
ity.
DE KOSNIK. Well, thank you, everybody, so much for participating 
today. I thought this was really amazing and productive, and I 
just thank everybody.
On the evening of this Color of New Media meeting, the scheduled lec-
ture by Milo Yiannopoulos on the Berkeley campus was canceled after 
Black Bloc activists threw Molotov cocktails at, and smashed windows 
of, campus buildings (Kutner 2017). On February 2, 2017, one day after 
our meeting and the Yiannopoulos protests and cancellation, President 
Trump threatened to withdraw federal funding from UC Berkeley in a 
tweet:
If U.C. Berkeley does not allow free speech and 
practices violence on innocent people with a different 
point of view— NO FEDERAL FUNDS? (@realDonaldTrump, 
February 2, 2017)
Notes
Participating members of the Color of New Media: Abigail De Kosnik, Paige 
Johnson, Yaira, Miyoko Conley, Juliana Friend, Ra, Kaily Heitz, Lyndsey Ogle 
(some names are abbreviations or pseudonyms).
 1. Trumpgrets is a website that posts news articles about, and social media 
posts by, people who voted for Trump and regret their vote: https://trumpgrets.
tumblr.com.
 2. The Official Anti- Milo (Digital) Toolkit (which can be accessed in its en-
tirety at http://bit.ly/2ha3EpG), was created by a group of UC Berkeley stu-
dents and alumni just prior to the planned lecture by alt- right spokesperson Milo 
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Yiannopoulos. Some authors of the toolkit were members of the Color of New 
Media.
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nineteen |  The Color of New Media Responds to  
UC Berkeley’s “Free Speech Week”
transcribed by lida zeitlin wu
edited by abigail de kosnik and keith p. feldman
The following is an edited transcript of a meeting of the Color of New 
Media that took place on September 1, 2017. Of the fourteen people who 
attended that day, eleven are women (six women of color) and three are 
men (one man of color); several identify as LGBTQ.
In the immediate aftermath of the events of February 1, 2017 (see 
“The Color of New Media Enters Trumplandia” in this volume), right- 
wing provocateur Milo Yiannopoulos promised to return to UC Berkeley 
and stage what he termed “Free Speech Week” at various venues around 
the campus. Throughout the spring semester, an increasing number of 
faculty clashed with university administrators over the content of their 
participation on social media while online harassment of faculty and stu-
dents of color grew. In April high- profile conservative culture warriors 
Ann Coulter and David Horowitz were to be featured on campus, though 
in both instances plans fell through. At the same time, the Berkeley 
College Republicans (BCR) and the Young America’s Foundation (YAF) 
filed a lawsuit alleging that the university restricted “conservative speech” 
on the campus, thereby violating the organizations’ constitutional rights 
to free speech, due process, and equal protection. Meanwhile, just be-
fore the beginning of classes at the University of Virginia, a “Unite the 
Right” rally descended on Charlottesville, featuring virulent white na-
tionalist and neo- Nazi rhetoric, allegedly to protest the possible removal 
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of a statue of the Confederate general Robert E. Lee. They were greeted 
by an organized counterprotest that included the presence of a growing 
antifascist movement. Clashes resulted in one of the “Unite the Right” 
participants driving his car into a crowd of people, killing a counter-
protester named Heather Heyer. A documentary video reporting on the 
events by Vice News soon went viral while President Trump persistently 
drew moral equivalences between those protesting to keep the statue 
and those resisting their white supremacist views.
Then UC Berkeley’s new chancellor, Carol Christ, dubbed 2017– 2018 
“Free Speech Year.” The first major event was a BCR/YAF– sponsored 
speech by conservative pundit Ben Shapiro, on September 14, which 
made headlines for prompting the university to spend an estimated $600 
thousand to cover the cost of an expanded police presence while greatly 
restricting access to campus facilities. The Yiannopoulos event, originally 
scheduled for September 24– 27, was advertised as bringing together lumi-
naries in the alt- right and “alt- lite” universe with Coulter, Horowitz, and 
Pamela Geller, and was to be headlined by former Trump counselor and 
Breitbart executive Steve Bannon. Thirty- six hours before it was to begin, 
Free Speech Week ended up being canceled by Yiannopoulos’s student 
group sponsors, the Berkeley Patriot, even as the administration promised 
to spend more than $1 million to provide security for the speakers.
Critiques of Chancellor Christ’s Statement on “Free Speech”
ABIGAIL DE KOSNIK. Thanks, everybody, for coming. I’m just going 
to read pieces of [Chancellor Carol Christ’s email regarding 
“free speech” on the UC Berkeley campus] to kick us off. So 
this came out on Wednesday, August 23, from our chancellor. 
[These are only excerpts from the chancellor’s letter.]:
“Dear Students, Faculty and Staff: This fall, the issue of free speech 
will once more engage our community in powerful and complex 
ways. Events in Charlottesville, with their racism, bigotry, violence 
and mayhem, make the issue of free speech even more tense. The 
law is very clear; public institutions like UC Berkeley must per-
mit speakers invited in accordance with campus policies to speak, 
without discrimination in regard to point of view. The United 
States has the strongest free speech protections of any liberal de-
mocracy; the First Amendment protects even speech that most of 
us would find hateful, abhorrent and odious, and the courts have 
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consistently upheld these protections. But the most powerful ar-
gument for free speech is not one of legal constraint— that we’re 
required to allow it— but of value. The public expression of many 
sharply divergent points of view is fundamental both to our de-
mocracy and to our mission as a university. . . . Once you embark 
on the path to censorship, you make your own speech vulnerable 
to it. . . . Some constitutionally protected speech attacks the very 
identity of particular groups of individuals in ways that are deeply 
hurtful. However, the right response is not the heckler’s veto, or 
what some call platform denial. Call toxic speech out for what it 
is, don’t shout it down, for in shouting it down, you collude in the 
narrative that universities are not open to all speech. Respond to 
hate speech with more speech.”
So that’s a message from our chancellor. As you know, we 
have a number of alt- right speakers coming to campus in the 
near future, including Milo Yiannopoulos, and I also just want-
ed to say, just to give this context, that Penn State University 
and four other colleges have now refused to allow the white 
nationalist Richard Spencer to speak on their campuses. Here 
are the five universities that have refused to let Spencer speak 
on their campuses: Penn State University, the University of 
Florida, Michigan State, and Louisiana State, and Texas A&M 
canceled an event that was already scheduled for September 
11. Those are public universities. So let’s hear some thoughts 
about our chancellor’s position, about what’s going to hap-
pen on this campus this year, and if people want to also reflect 
on what happened last year with Milo’s planned visit and Ann 
Coulter’s visit, that would also be welcome.
SHERRY. The line that really stands out to me is “Call toxic speech 
out for what it is, don’t shout it down, for in shouting it down, 
you collude in the narrative that universities are not open to all 
speech.” I am troubled by a directive coming from the chancel-
lor, an official, [about] how folks are to respond in a space. It’s 
one thing to offer the space— that’s already a conversation. But 
then to also give a directive in how to respond. . . . And in the 
next line, it says “respond to hate speech with more speech.” 
So shouting is not speech? Then the voices of those shouting, 
or the voices of those who would use loud noise, are being ren-
dered as ineffective, invisible, not speech.
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RA. As someone who has studied higher education and the chang-
ing demographics of this campus, I personally find it really con-
cerning as to what it means to protect those who are intending 
to use their voices as an act of violence against others and who 
those others are. As individuals who have been systematically 
erased from our campus community, I think we’re essentially 
doubling down on the elitism of the UC and, specifically, of 
where our country’s tides are coming in.
DE KOSNIK. Could you say a little more about that— what we’re 
doubling down on and how the tide is turning?
RA. Yeah, absolutely. So the idea of simultaneously erasing com-
munities of color from our campuses, while also protecting 
others who are attempting to, through their speech, dehuman-
ize those exact communities.
DE KOSNIK. And you’re referring to campus policies about admis-
sions that have involved over time in such a way? [In the mid- 
1990s, after California banned affirmative action in college 
admissions, enrollments of Black and Latino students immedi-
ately dropped by about half, to 4 percent and 9 percent of the 
entering class, respectively. While there has been an increase 
in Latino enrollments over the past twenty years (to 15 percent 
in 2015), enrollment of African American students has contin-
ued to drop (to 2 percent in 2015).]
RA. This context is necessary for our conversation, because it’s 
kind of difficult to call out toxic speech if you’re not even on 
campus. If your community is not on campus, or if you were 
already engaging in practices of survival to maintain your po-
sition on campus, plus the realities of stereotype threat .  .  . I 
think all these things come into the conversation that hinders 
communities from “standing up” for ourselves in the face of 
hate speech. And as for the changing tide in the country, I’m 
referring to Forty- Five’s [President Trump is the forty- fifth pres-
ident of the United States] potential desire get rid of DACA. 
[President Barack Obama signed an executive action in 2012, 
called Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, which allowed 
people who had entered the United States as children with-
out documentation prior to 2007 to obtain work permits that 
were renewable every two years. About 800 thousand people 
have received work permits through DACA. At the beginning 
of September 2017, the Trump administration announced the 
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repeal of the program. As of August 2018, the status and future 
of DACA remained unclear.] We’re literally putting college 
students at risk of their bodies being criminalized while also si-
multaneously attempting to get an education. So I think there 
are a lot of things happening in the context of our country that 
really add to my disheartened feelings about Christ’s message, 
which is again, in my opinion, a doubling down on protecting 
those who actually need to be called out.
MARCELO GARZO MONTALVO. Can I also say that [Christ’s message] 
really embodies the neoliberal university in particular? It em-
bodies the limits of neoliberal politics, when neoliberalism 
tries to erase power dynamics that are historically embedded, 
and operates in this “moral high ground” that is very conde-
scending in terms of how it resonates with certain students— 
specifically, students of color and activist students who are 
directly resisting forces that are seeking to enact violence. It 
resonates more with Trump’s “there’s two sides of the situa-
tion,” you know? Which is how she’s framing it. This is what 
neoliberalism actually does: it proposes this alternative to con-
servatism and ends up being kind of the mirror image of it, or 
two sides of the same coin. And of course it just relies on so 
much privilege, and the erasure or normalizing of that privi-
lege, and is very much [from] that “chancellor position” of 
speaking down to these masses and trying to pacify them.
JOY. If I could build on that, that was one thing that struck me 
from the email: a kind of false equivalence, this idea that it’s 
two extremes and we ought to allow both of them to engage in 
discourse, that there’s a fundamental value in allowing two dif-
ferent equivalent sides. But you can’t really say there’s an equiv-
alence between white supremacist rhetoric that logically ends 
in genocide and people who are trying to fight back against 
that. There’s no equivalence to be made.
RA. [Christ’s] message also seems willfully naïve about the way 
these acts of “free speech” literally create unsafe and violent 
situations for students who have to make life out of these 
campuses. Or just folks who can’t just come for the weekend 
without being counterprotested. There’s a way in which every 
speaker, every event, every rally, makes this less of a suitable 
learning environment for folks whom this white supremacist 
rhetoric is actually and abhorrently against. And I don’t un-
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derstand how the fact that “free speech,” even if it’s just words, 
leads to and attracts violence in a way that has really material 
outcomes, is lost on our environment.
DE KOSNIK. I’ll just represent quickly Christ’s thinking as it’s been 
translated to me by the chair of my department. Some of the 
thinking that Christ has shared with the chairs is: “We’ll put a 
lot of money towards security. We’ll have these people come 
and lock it down in their space where they speak, and nobody 
gets hurt, and then we can’t say that we refused them. Then 
they have to be quiet after that, because”— and maybe I’m add-
ing in some of my own reading here too— “you let them have 
their space once, and you lock it down with tons and tons of 
campus security, more than we had last year, and then they 
can’t ever say again that they didn’t have that space for that 
time.” So that’s one way to look at the chancellor’s approach.
And I also just wanted to say that every single one of the 
campuses that has refused [Richard] Spencer has done so on 
the grounds of [the threat of] violence. So I do want to bring 
violence into the conversation.
A Militarized Police Force on the UC Berkeley Campus
JOY. Just to respond, let’s also name what violence is, in that we’re 
not actually talking about security. We’re talking about a mili-
tarized police force that is occupying our campus. That is an 
act of violence to many bodies, myself included. So the idea 
that Christ is using a militarized police force to benefit us just 
does not hold up with my experience or the experiences of the 
students I’ve come in contact with.
DE KOSNIK. Yeah. That kind of violence that you just named is 
more what Ra was talking about, too, which is that it’s about 
our students’ spaces being disrupted. It’s about our students’ 
lives and the lives of the people who dwell here, who study 
here, who are using this space in ways that they feel are the 
most constructive for them at this time in their lives. That a 
space like that should be disrupted by the routine appearance 
and reappearance of a militarized police force is a kind of vio-
lence that is guaranteed to happen.
SPARKLE. I’m thinking about the type of campus climate that is 
being created. It doesn’t just create an unsafe environment for 
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students, but also for workers, which is one of the reasons why 
we used the tactic of filing grievances last year [when Milo Yi-
annopoulos was scheduled to come to campus (see “The Color 
of New Media Enters Trumplandia” in this volume)], to say 
that it was a violation of our contract to have— 
DE KOSNIK. Of your union contract. [Academic Student Employ-
ees belong to the UAW Student- Workers Union Local 2865.]
SPARKLE. Yeah, of our student workers’ contract— the health and 
safety article. [We argued that it was a violation of our con-
tract] to have people who are creating an unsafe and violent 
environment on campus and to have a militarized police pres-
ence on campus, which actively resulted in violence. People 
who were walking across campus were criminalized. I think 
that unpacking the type of violence that Christ is referencing 
in her email might be important, because we’re using different 
definitions of violence. The violence that she’s saying is intol-
erable in her email is destruction of property. So that’s really 
dehumanizing, to hold up that as the pinnacle of what kind of 
violence is unacceptable, when Milo [Yiannopoulos] is doxx-
ing undocumented students and trans students actively and 
inciting people to do these people harm. [In the lead- up to 
Free Speech Week, Yiannopoulos publicly posted photos and 
identifying information of two student senators, including one 
transgender woman and one Muslim woman, who reported 
receiving widespread slurs, vulgarities, and death threats. Yi-
annopoulos encouraged similar forms of harassment during 
events he held at the University of Wisconsin and the Univer-
sity of Washington.]
“Freedom” as Protection of Property
KAILY HEITZ. I was just thinking about the ways that the word 
“freedom” has been recognized, and this constant callback 
to constitutional rights— that this country is built on the sem-
blance of liberty and freedom, but those have always been used 
against Black people and always to protect whiteness and prop-
erty, as you were saying. That also makes me think of all the 
other related incidents that we’ve been talking about: police 
violence against Black communities, Black Lives Matter, and 
the continuation of taking away some of those rights that we’re 
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struggling for. Really realizing that sense of complete freedom 
for everyone through the ratification of some things like per-
mitted action— the continuous call to [reinforce that] “We 
have the freedom to do XYZ,” but not recognizing how that 
actually takes freedom away from the majority of people.
PAIGE JOHNSON. I was reading [Christ’s] letter again, and I was 
really taken aback by one phrase, which was “If you choose to 
protest, do so peacefully. That is your right, and we will defend 
it with vigor.” So this idea that the only response to this kind 
of presence on campus is a peaceful protest, this idea that free 
speech is consequence- free speech.
Again, if we go back to this rhetoric of freedom and protest 
as an essential part of the founding principles of this country, 
as our constitutional rights to free speech, well, those consti-
tutional rights were founded in violence. That speech wasn’t 
peaceful speech, and those protests weren’t peaceful pro-
tests. So this idea that, as Sparkle noted and what I immedi-
ately picked up on, it’s about protecting the property of the 
university. It’s about the fact that windows were smashed last 
[academic] year [at the February 1 protests against Yiannopou-
los’s scheduled lecture]— those were the things that were 
subsequently brought up in the [administration’s] letters to 
the campus community after last year’s events, that are being 
brought up again, and heralded again, as a thing that cannot 
happen. It’s a thing that spread in the news, right? This “vio-
lence” of the UC Berkeley students and paid protesters and 
antifa that show up [was the story of the February 1 protests as 
reported by many news outlets]. So, again, you see the ways in 
which the actual safety of our student community is nowhere 
within this document.
Whether we’re using various definitions of violence or bodi-
ly harm or safety, in light of the fact that we actively had stu-
dents and faculty doxxed last year [for authoring the Official 
Anti- Milo (Digital) Toolkit, which can be accessed in its entire-
ty at http://bit.ly/2ha3EpG] who are still dealing with those 
repercussions, the concern that underlies this statement [to] 
“the community” is the protection of the university’s property. 
I just feel like that if that [the safety of property] is heralded 
above the safety and concerns of the students, then, I mean, 
with all due respect, fuck it [laughter]. That should not be the 
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concern of a public university that in many ways, as we’ve al-
ready noted, does not reflect “the public” of this area or state. 
You can go back to the diversity reports that were put out in 
2013, the subsequent reports from 2015— you can see who is at 
risk, who is the minority on this campus, whether ideologically 
or physically, and it’s not the windows. It’s not the new Amazon 
student center. [The newly remodeled MLK Student Union 
includes Amazon@ASUC Student Union, a hub for receiving 
and returning packages, situated at the primary entrance to 
the campus. During the February 1 protests, several of its win-
dows incurred damaged.]
JOY. I think that’s absolutely right, and I see it as not only about 
protecting property but about protecting the very apolitical 
idea of diversity and multiculturalism that completely takes 
out of account the structural things that an actual view towards 
abolishing white supremacy, or social justice, or however you 
want to think about it, would require us to address. When 
Christ talks about us going down a path of censorship, it im-
plies that we’re already in an ideal liberal society instead of the 
actual society we really live in.
The Free Speech Movement Being Invoked to Protect Racist  
Hate Speech
ANONYMOUS 2. A couple thoughts that I’m having: one, the way 
that free speech gets invoked, and specifically the Free Speech 
Movement. [The Free Speech movement was led by students 
in the early 1960s at UC Berkeley. It culminated in December 
1964 with a series of large- scale actions in Sproul Plaza, that 
resulted in Berkeley’s Academic Senate agreeing to expand 
the contours of permissible political discourse for members of 
the Berkeley community. Its legacy is routinely hailed on the 
campus, including by the chancellor in her letter, even as the 
substance of that legacy is continually debated.] To me it’s re-
ally interesting and kind of goes to the call for peaceful protest 
[mentioned earlier]. With the Free Speech Movement, part of 
what was at stake was accessing public space in order to advo-
cate for civil disobedience, to contest racist discriminatory poli-
cies in the Bay Area. So students were accessing the platform 
of the campus in order to advocate for civil disobedience, to 
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contest white supremacy. And that was peaceful protest, and 
that had enormous impact. So I think that what’s lost today is 
our own history of what was at stake in the Free Speech Move-
ment, as well as the fact that the connections between here 
[this time] and the Free Speech Movement gets invoked to 
protect the right of hate speech. I think that history is really, 
really important: what was at stake there [for the Free Speech 
Movement] in accessing the platform of Sproul Plaza in order 
to contest and take action and organize acts of civil disobedi-
ence against white supremacy?
How Administration and Police Use New Media Platforms
ANONYMOUS 2: And then the platform question is also very inter-
esting to me because— and maybe it kind of goes to the new 
media [focus of the Color of New Media] as well— we get these 
emails from the administration. What about the platform of 
the emails themselves? How many people heard about “No 
Marxism” or whatever they called themselves? We heard about 
[it] precisely because the chancellor sent out an email explain-
ing that this thing called “No Marxism” was going on. [A “No 
to Marxism” rally was slated to take place in downtown Berke-
ley on August 27, 2017, although the city denied the organizers 
permits and the event never took place.] What kind of process 
went into the construction of that email, which gives us a nar-
rative about what’s happening on this campus? Who has access 
to that? Who can send an email to the entire campus and use 
that platform to frame these things? To me that’s also an issue.
I don’t know if everybody’s on this Nixle thing or what-
ever it’s called. [Nixle is a messaging service used by the UC 
Berkeley Police Department [UCPD, the campus police] to 
send alerts to the campus community about matters of public 
safety.] So UCPD says, “Don’t go to a protest,” and a couple of 
days later, the chancellor sends out another message saying, “I 
want to applaud everybody” [for a peaceful protest]. . . . There 
are these mixed messages.
What are the counter- platforms? How do we create another 
stage or platform? Because clearly that’s a pretty big platform, 
to be able to send an email out like that [to the entire campus 
community].
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Intersections of Physical Space and Digital Space at and through  
UC Berkeley
DE KOSNIK. Thank you so much for getting to the intersection of 
the stage of Sproul Plaza and the platform of email and the 
digital, because we do have to talk about that. That is one of 
our working group’s core questions, always, and I just want to 
go through some of the ways that physical space and digital 
space have intersected over the past year— have intersected at 
Berkeley and through Berkeley.
First of all, I would like to propose that this rising move-
ment of white nationalism has been largely formulated on-
line. The trolls began trolling online first, and something like 
Charlottesville is something that results from a lot of digitally 
networked activity and communication between those peo-
ple. So now we are— Berkeley is— being trolled. The trolling 
takes place in the physical space as well as online, and those 
cannot be completely disconnected. It’s not like [we can dis-
miss online hate speech as] “Oh, that’s just trolling.” We can’t 
talk about it with this dismissive lens anymore, because now 
we see how trolling can happen in so many spaces, virtual and 
actual.
The other thing I wanted to bring up is the order of events: 
An online provocateur, Milo Yiannopoulos, who doxxes trans 
people and who trolled [people of color online]— he called 
Leslie Jones, an African American actress, out for days, to 
the point that Twitter banned him [in July 2016], and Twitter 
hardly bans anybody. That person [Yiannopoulos] became a 
prospective physical guest speaker on this campus, which then 
caused a lot of other digital things to happen and caused physi-
cal things to happen, and [these events] incited a tweet from 
our president threatening to take away the federal funding of 
this campus. So there’s this way in which the feedback between 
the digital space and the physical space has been going on for 
a while now on this campus, where an online provocateur ral-
lies a group of online trolls to swarm people of color and trans 
people online. And he gets to be a highly paid speaker for that, 
and that results in physical demonstrations and manifestations 
that lead to some property being broken and people being ar-
rested, and that leads to our president threatening us online. 
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And then there’s more organization [in response to the presi-
dent] in online space.
I also want to recognize that some members here put to-
gether the Anti- Milo Digital Toolkit, which was an online re-
source that helped many people on this campus and other 
campuses mobilize against alt- right speakers coming to lecture 
at their campuses. Some of those authors, including our stu-
dents and former students, were named on Breitbart, a promi-
nent online periodical that is for the alt- right audience, and as 
a result of that, we at this university had to take those students’ 
information off of our web pages, because we didn’t want them 
to be even more vulnerable to online predation. So those are 
just a few ways in which all of these different ways of network-
ing, mobilizing, and activating large groups have intersected 
just at Berkeley. And I think the Free Speech Movement is the 
reason that Berkeley has been a site of so much activity and 
trolling. It makes us a target, and we become Reddit [laughter]: 
that space where people come to troll and hate and perform 
that identity out in the public. Sproul Plaza becomes that [type 
of] website, you know?
I want to hear if people have more to say about that in-
tersection between virtual and actual spaces that has been 
happening for the last year now, in a way that I haven’t seen 
recognized in the chancellor’s email, for instance. I think that 
people who don’t talk about that intersection of the internet as 
a space of politicization and physical spaces of politicization— I 
think people who miss that are not really seeing what’s happen-
ing right now.
JOY. So this hasn’t necessarily been publicized on campus, but for 
the last several years, our residence halls have been targeted by 
hackers into our [networked] printer systems, printing racist 
and hateful and violent flyers across our campus. This is some-
thing that has happened across college campuses in the last 
several years. It’s something that’s primarily been held within 
higher ed conversations of how we deal with it. But, yeah, our 
students have been targeted repeatedly.
DE KOSNIK. Thank you for bringing up that example. I didn’t know 
about that.
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The Narrative of Violence at Berkeley
SHERRY. When you talk about public space and the platform for 
performance being Sproul Plaza  .  .  . Well, there’s this thing 
where you say, “At Berkeley . . . ,” and I just wanted to broaden 
that to think about the city of Berkeley too. As someone who 
is part of community organizations here in the city, the other 
site for performance this past weekend was Civic Center Plaza 
and MLK [Martin Luther King Jr.] Park, ironically, with all the 
alt- right folks blocking there. [These were the events of August 
27, 2017, in which several thousand participants in the Bay Area 
Rally Against Hate converged in downtown Berkeley, along 
with several dozen right- wing protesters.] What are we talking 
about when we think about the virtual, or what becomes public 
on a broader scale?
Because there is this attention around the world: if you look 
up the hashtag #Berkeley or #BerkeleyProtest or #NoHateIn-
TheBay, everyone’s looking at that to see what’s gonna hap-
pen this weekend before they go to San Francisco. There are 
several narratives happening at the same time, right? There’s 
what you’ve seen on CNN and Fox News, which are looking for 
the narrative of violence that’s happening. I know firsthand, 
because several of us were involved this past Sunday with our 
signs, “No Hate in the Bay,” and our kids and families were 
out there, and there were folks singing and chanting peace-
fully. And that would not make the national news. That [story] 
would not be picked up by any mainstream networks.
There is this interesting split between the real and the vir-
tual, where that [the virtual] does become what we see made 
mainstream. I know that was probably the same thing that was 
happening in the sixties with the Free Speech Movement, but 
to be living it out and feeling this sense of, “Hey! Why is that 
becoming the story, when there are a whole bunch of other 
stories that are happening?” I think that’s where those of us 
at Berkeley, in Berkeley, and around Berkeley have a duty to 
tell our stories of what the counternarratives are against this 
dominant narrative, which is very much aligned with Forty- 
Five’s way of looking at “many sides.” No! There were folks of 
color aligned with white folks and queer folks [at the Berkeley 
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Civic Center Plaza and MLK Park protests]. . . . Everybody was 
coming together and singing and letting folks know that this 
[neo- Nazis and white supremacists marching] was not going to 
fly in Berkeley.
STEFFEN MOESTRUP. I just want to pick up on [this topic of] news 
coverage [of recent protests in the city of Berkeley] and also 
to what extent it spreads to elsewhere on our planet. Being 
an outsider and also coming from another place [Denmark], 
I’ve been tracking the coverage of UC Berkeley a bit. And it’s 
about the expectation of violence to happen or conflict to hap-
pen. And then the reaction when the rallies were rather peace-
ful was more like relief that it did not happen. So that doesn’t 
really counter the fact that it [news coverage of Berkeley] al-
ways revolves around this tension and relief and distances it 
[a Berkeley event] from what it’s about. And it becomes more 
about the form and output of the event, or this relief after the 
event, and not really the substance of the event. Those are the 
reactions I see when I look at my own country’s coverage of 
this place.
Possibilities for Counternarratives and New Performances
HEITZ. Yeah, [there are questions about] what is real and what is 
the narrative we’re trying to keep? Because it seems like even 
though Berkeley is an institution that’s physical, tangible, real, 
it’s still very much an institution that is being created. And so if 
we’re in the process of imagining something new, which I feel 
we all are by just being together at this moment, there’s some-
thing powerful about media, and the ability to create one nar-
rative, and [our ability to] imagine something that’s alternate 
to the dominant narrative. I wonder about the effectiveness of 
that, like how much those hashtags get out in the world and 
how many people actually see them? But [those hashtags offer] 
an opportunity for people to either confront what’s happening 
and say, “This is the story that I want to tell about it,” or create 
something else.
There’s something about visibility at Berkeley, too, that I 
want to bring attention to, that this is a campus where this stuff 
has physically happened, and what would it mean if we actually 
did say no to these folks and didn’t allow for this type of visual 
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representation of Berkeley? [But] the fact that we’re allowing 
them to come in is vital for types of narratives that have the 
potential to be really transformative.
TONIKA. I find what you’re saying very exciting. I mean, that’s part 
of the reason that I think this space is so important. The analy-
sis and understanding of where the pressure points are, and 
where the contradictions that create this problem are, are im-
portant, but to also be looking at that for strategies for imagin-
ing something else that could be done through new media or 
the intersection between new media and— what did we say, real 
world performance?
DE KOSNIK. Physical space [performance]?
TONIKA. Physical space performance. As we know not to expect 
from this state a certain level of protection, we know not to 
expect from entities that are dependent on this state for their 
sense of self [such as universities] a certain level of protection. 
That’s clear. But if we depend on something else— like you’re 
saying, there’s an invitation to ask, “What is it that we actually 
depend on?” I think we’re dealing with a scenario in which . . . 
You can’t look for Mother, you know? You can’t. It’s hard, and 
it’s painful to be like, “It’s your [the university’s] place to care 
for us, but you don’t know how to do it for us. And how would 
you? Because there’s no history, as [Anonymous 2] was saying, 
of you knowing how to do that.”
What I struggle with as a person from outside, and what I 
get excited about as a person from outside, is that it’s confus-
ing to know what the history of free speech is and to come here 
and be like, “Yeah! Berkeley!” And then being like, “What?” 
You know, trying to unpack that [the Free Speech Movement] 
means [understanding what they did]: “Oh, so they occu-
pied this thing [UC Berkeley]! They occupied it virtually, and 
in space, and they’re continuing to occupy it [because their 
movement continues to be invoked in the present day]. Ex-
plain the strategy for that occupation!” Which leaves us with 
the opportunity to sort of use . . . I don’t want to say “master’s 
tools.” [Queer Caribbean American feminist Audre Lorde fa-
mously argued that “the master’s tools will never dismantle the 
master’s house.”] But we can ask, “What does the current mo-
ment open up for us if the challenge really is in the imagina-
tion?” And I get really excited about a space like this, because 
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this is my performance studies training asking, “Where can 
we play?” And I don’t mean to use play in a way that reduces 
the importance or the potential of what happens, but also like 
[clapping], “Where can we move? Where can we dodge and 
swing and swoop and hide?” You know? So that’s what I get ex-
cited about, and I think new media creates new ways to move, 
to respond in these slick kinds of [ways], “Oh, you want non-
violence? Okay.”
Whose University Is It?
DE KOSNIK. I think it’s clear to us who live here and work here 
that we’re being interpellated into a national social drama 
that the people in this room did not call forward. So we’re 
being cast as the resistance in a conflict that is expected to 
turn violent. That’s our role in this, except we didn’t enter the 
ring. We didn’t say, “Great! It’s on! Let’s fight!” It’s interest-
ing how much I’ve been thinking about the words “homeland 
security” or “homeland defense,” and thinking about Berkeley 
as a homeland that we now have to defend because it’s being 
invaded by certain things: by certain people, ideas. It feels in a 
way like we’re being called to arms without having deliberately 
or explicitly asked to engage in combat. So combat is sort of 
forced upon us in some way, and even when it doesn’t happen, 
and even when, as Sherry was saying, the whole recent protest 
that happened just last weekend, was peaceful, it doesn’t fit the 
whole narrative of the social drama. It doesn’t even register. 
It doesn’t even become a factor in the overarching narrative, 
whatever that is, and whoever is authoring that.
JOHNSON. I’ve been thinking a lot about this question of the vir-
tual and the actual, of Berkeley as a real place but also an imag-
ined place, and then the university’s attempt to position itself 
as the bastion of the public when it suits the university’s needs, 
which has brought me back to the Occupy movements and the 
protests that were happening back in 2011 and 2012. Now we’re 
in the space of Berkeley, a public university, and as a result of 
it being a public university, it is beholden to certain standards 
of public decency and public allowance, right? So we have to 
allow certain kinds of speech to happen on campus because we 
are public, but I feel like Berkeley very much thought of itself 
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as not public when it came down to the Occupy protests that 
were happening on Berkeley’s campus. That was my first ex-
perience with the militarized police force on this campus, and 
[their] coming in and very explicitly trying to determine who 
should be here and who shouldn’t be here: Who is a student? 
And who is an Other?
So at that point, Berkeley stopped belonging to the city of 
Berkeley, to the Bay Area: Berkeley belonged to the institution 
of Berkeley. And I think that tension often gets lost. I’ve been 
tracking and reading a lot of the [white] supremacist hashtags 
that pop up around events like this [the upcoming talks by 
alt- right spokespeople], and how certain images and narratives 
are spread through those, especially with the recent pivots to 
digital that all these news outlets are making. So no one’s writ-
ing substantially about anything anymore; it’s all video clips 
now and how those videos get weaponized and used.
To step outside of it, it’s been interesting to see how Berke-
ley becomes public when it suits the safety concerns of Berke-
ley, not necessarily the concerns of its student population, its 
teaching population, its worker population— none of its com-
munity that it’s beholden to in certain ways. But then also to 
see how that gets played out in the digital as well, where that 
nuance and that tension is totally lost. [Online discussion of 
events at Berkeley is] very much a narrative of “liberal Berkeley 
and the violence that it manifests against the right,” and so on 
and so forth.
I think, so often, the imagined Berkeley and the narra-
tives that come with that, whether it be the ghosts of the Free 
Speech Movement, or how it thinks about itself as a leading 
public institution within this country or within the world, how 
oftentimes the desires of the actual Berkeley and the desires of 
the right very much are in alignment, and that gets erased in 
the digital a lot of the time. It’s still very much dependent upon 
this narrative or idea that Berkeley is the counter— that we are 
the space of resistance, and I think that presence is here, but, 
institutionally and officially, that oppositionality doesn’t exist. 
In fact, institutionally and officially, the desires of the univer-
sity are very much in alignment with those [alt- righters] who 
are being invited to speak on this campus.
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The Threat of Revolution
DE KOSNIK. I do want to say that listening to you made me realize 
that Berkeley is a threat. Not the institution of the University of 
California at Berkeley, but the people that the institution gath-
ers together on this campus. I mean groups like this room— 
they are a threat. We are a threat, and you can see that threat in 
the amount of repression [laughter], in the sheer volume of our 
voices being shouted down, or our wishes being ignored, or— 
my favorite— one of our former chancellors telling students to 
“be civil.” [In the midst of Black Lives Matter protests taking 
place nationally and locally, and in the immediate aftermath of 
American Indian Studies professor Steven Salaita being noto-
riously “unhired” from his tenured position at the University 
of Illinois allegedly over the content of his tweets during the 
Israeli siege on Gaza, UC Berkeley’s then chancellor, Nicholas 
Dirks, marked the beginning of the fiftieth anniversary of the 
Free Speech Movement with a campus- wide message arguing 
that free speech and civility were “two sides of a single coin.”] 
I like how free speech was not the question when our students 
were protesting against tuition hikes, and rather “civility” be-
came the word of the day.
The sheer volume of enmity directed at exactly the people 
Berkeley was designed to attract and host— even if Berkeley no 
longer fulfills that promise or potential in large part— the fact 
that a group still exists in some space for some period of time 
all together is a potential problem for a lot of people. There 
is always the question, “What if that group did get together? 
What if they did decide to make changes? What if they decided 
to demand some real alterations in the systems of power?” And 
I actually think part of the violence narrative is that everybody 
sort of knows that revolution can be violent. And so when peo-
ple start to repeat the violence expectation and the violence 
narrative coming out of Berkeley, it’s a repressed suspicion 
in them that actually there could be a class revolution. There 
could be a race revolution, a gender revolution. Those things 
could happen from a place like Berkeley. Because where else 
would it come from? It would have to come from a place where 
a lot of people who, in “normal” or “mainstream” society, live 
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on the edges. Here at the University of California at Berkeley, 
they live in the middle: we are the university. And so I do think 
there is a way that the institution aligns with the right, and that 
number of forces gathered against us tells me something about 
our power.
SHERRY. Why you gotta give us hope, Gail? [laughter]
ANONYMOUS 2. I’m thinking about our campus ecology, and how 
our campus ecology is the physical manifestation of our his-
tory of resistance. I mean, the structure of California Hall has 
been augmented in order to shut down protest and occupa-
tions. The five- hundred- thousand- dollar fence outside of our 
chancellor’s mansion was installed as a result of the Students 
of Color Conference, the largest student- run conference in the 
state, which was a system- wide push to showcase how Dirks was 
a racist. That fence lives on our campus as a physical manifes-
tation: they know the revolution is coming, and they see our 
bodies as dangerous.
RA. So what do we do? I’m trying to understand— we obviously 
have all this power, and there’s obviously a threat just in the 
mere existence of folks whose existence and ways of thinking 
are inconvenient to the powers that be. But then we have this 
fray of, whatever you want to call them, who seem to have the 
university by the proverbial balls. And I just feel so thoroughly 
assaulted by this small group of people. It feels like they have 
the ability to change the entire energy of the campus, with 
some very concerted acts that are backed by power and money 
and infrastructure that I don’t have access to, and I don’t know 
people who have access to them. So I’m wondering, whether 
it’s through media intersections or new coalition strategies, 
how can we give body and shape to this threat? But I don’t want 
to say that, because I don’t want to be at war against this thing 
that, in my eyes, wouldn’t be a threat if it wasn’t so thoroughly 
backed by a really specific type of oppressive infrastructure. 
Whatever the group is called, that are doing all the things— 
they would be easier to shout down if they weren’t backed by 
lawyers and money, and all this stuff that makes them . . . not 
indefensible . . . 
DE KOSNIK. Unassailable.
RA. Unassailable, there you go! They have a big fence in front of 
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them too. So what are ways to go about this coalition work, or 
this revolution work, that can actually unsettle this fence that 
surrounds these people?
Identifying Multiple Publics and Communities Involved
SHERRY. I just wonder . . . earlier someone mentioned the “pub-
lic.” I wonder what role identifying the multiple publics that 
are present here has in all of this. When you’re talking about 
one group, I feel that that email, or the ways that the system is 
operating, doesn’t fly, doesn’t work unless there’s an audience 
that it’s catering to. Yes, people send their kids here from a 
whole lot of places and it works for them, and that messaging 
and everything that’s going out is for somebody, and it’s be-
ing received, and it’s like, “Yes, I need to know that my kids 
are going to be safe. I need to know that I didn’t make the 
wrong choice.” So we need to identify those multiple publics 
that are present and what’s working there. I think the work 
that we’re doing here is very important in calling out how the 
micro- workings of these structures and what we’re just taking 
for granted as the “safety narrative.”
HEITZ. On that note, who is the public that’s really paying atten-
tion to this particular group right now? I wonder if what makes 
this particular group so dangerous right now and so violent is 
white fragility and the fact that so many people are paying at-
tention to it, because [they think], “I can’t handle this type of 
racism! I can be perfectly fine with racism that exists already, 
structurally, but now I have something to prove, that I’m a 
‘good’ type of white person!” So along with this whole idea 
of “What do we do?,” I can’t help but keep coming back to 
Black Lives Matter, too, because it really started as an alterna-
tive way of addressing violence— structural violence, not just 
police violence— and bringing together communities like Fer-
guson and Oakland and creating all these chapters in a really 
constructive and not- violent way. But it didn’t get a whole lot 
of attention until it became something that the media could 
grab onto.
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The Internet as a Space of Connectivity for White Supremacists
GARZO MONTALVO. Some of this might be a little awkward with 
the timing and the flow of the conversation, but I’m sitting 
here listening, especially about the original question regarding 
the digital and the physical, and there are a couple things that 
are coming up for me. The main thing I’m trying to translate 
is, just thinking about the internet and the digital historically, 
as a cultural thing or moment, where we’re still really trying 
to figure out what its effects really are. I’m just sitting here 
and thinking that one of the things we have to grapple with is 
how the digital is producing a particular kind of space. And on 
one hand I firmly believe in its possibilities. In Gail’s class [De  
Kosnik taught a digital humanities seminar called “Making 
Sense of Cultural Data” in Fall 2016] I worked on, specifical-
ly as a Native Studies scholar, how indigenous communities 
worldwide are taking up new media and using it to connect 
and learn in ways that work for us and end up helping fulfill 
our ancestors’ prophecies.
The digital can be powerful in this way, and it can be con-
nectivity, but what I’m sitting here reflecting on is the under-
side of all that. That’s how I’m thinking historically about the 
alt- right as an internet- age thing, in the sense that it’s not new 
in terms of white supremacy, but it is new in the ways that it’s ar-
ticulating itself. In particular, it provides a space of connectivity 
among very isolated white people, especially white men, who 
feel disenfranchised and victimized [according to] this weird 
narrative that I’m hearing. It’s kind of interesting for me to 
think about it in that way, as someone who’s outside of that ex-
perience: How do you formulate that there’s a white genocide 
happening?
And that narrative really gains more traction in an inter-
net situation, where there are these very isolated spaces that 
can have so- called echo- chamber- y dynamics, where the digital 
does provide a space for people to just get into these stories 
that are really delusional or just very insular. It’s a very coward-
ly kind of energy. I remember when YouTube first came out, 
and before I learned to not read the comments, it was just hate-
ful. I find it a very cowardly way to express your opinion in this 
anonymous way and just put out this really vile stuff. I’m just 
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thinking that, historically, that’s connected, like, “Oh, you’re a 
really vile and hateful person too. Let’s hang out online, and 
we can organize.” [laughter] You know what I’m saying? It cre-
ated that space to really ferment, in that sense.
And the other thing I’m thinking about in that context is 
that a lot of these homies are sitting and playing a lot of vid-
eogames that are war games. A lot of them are consuming vio-
lence of all types in a very normalized way— it normalizes and 
glorifies a lot of war and particular types of violence. You see it 
in the way that they come out in, basically, cosplay— they come 
up in these white supremacist superhero things. I’m just think-
ing about it culturally. There are a lot of things in there, and 
I’m also thinking about this question: what do we do?
“We Continue to Struggle from a Place of Love”
GARZO MONTALVO. For me, the one thing we do is we continue 
to struggle, and we continue to struggle from a place of love, 
because in seeing all that, what’s producing all of it is profound 
fear and misunderstanding, and that creates a lot of that vi-
olence in the material. I’m talking at the individual level of 
these white supremacists and what may be appealing to them, 
but of course there is also the structural violence that we’ve 
been struggling against. But the way in which it’s manifesting 
now is a very particular and emotional experience of fear and 
isolation and alienation from who you are. You don’t know 
who you are or where you come from, and everything that you 
think is true in terms of the supremacy of Western civilization 
is in crisis and crumbling, and this is a response to that. I want 
to think that my best self can show up for that, and be like, 
“Yes! Western civilization and whiteness is imploding, is being 
dismantled, is going away, but that doesn’t need to be a source 
of fear for you. That’s what we need for this planet to exist. We 
need for that to happen, and you can be a part of that.” I think 
that’s what motivates a lot of the alt- right: they want to feel like 
they’re a part of something, and it ends up being this really 
violent kind of space.
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Use Every Tool We Have
JOHNSON. I’ve also been thinking a lot about strategies, and I’ve 
said in [Color of New Media meetings] before that I feel that 
in the most abstract, ideological sense, until we strike at the 
heart of capitalism and just burn this university down, there’s 
nothing that can be done. But I’m on the market this year, so 
I can’t officially say that. [laughter] But I think that in terms 
of things that have helped me, particularly last year and in 
my earlier years here, stuff like the Anti- Milo Toolkit was su-
per useful, particularly with my students, because I realize that 
for many of them, there was a really fundamental lack of un-
derstanding about what the rhetoric was. For them, [the con-
troversy around Yiannopoulos’s visit to campus] was kind of 
about someone who’s conservative and who wants less taxes. 
So for them to go through [the toolkit] and thoroughly know 
what this person is advocating for and have it [the informa-
tion about what Yiannopoulos has said and what he stands for] 
gathered in one place was extremely useful.
I mostly teach freshman and sophomores, and mostly 
freshman, so that [semester of Yiannopoulos’s scheduled lec-
ture, Spring 2017] was their first semester at the university, so 
for them it was a rhetoric of “But we all deserve free speech, 
right?” That’s what they had been told up until that point, so 
for them to be able to make these connections about what this 
speech is advocating for was really eye- opening for them. So I 
think there’s stuff we can do in our classrooms, of course.
I’ve also been thinking about the recent slate of protests in 
South Korea, particularly the sort of ghost protests that were 
happening. So what does it mean to invoke the digital when to 
be in the physical is particularly precarious for certain bodies? 
And what was used a lot then were actually mass projections 
and images, and, as we know, that eventually led to the ousting 
of the South Korean president [Park Geun- hye in March 2017]. 
It eventually led to an opening up of space for mass physical 
protests, which then led to a political outcome that was de-
sired, but the reason I’ve been thinking about that is about that 
power of imagery.
I’ve been thinking a lot about Charlottesville and why that 
particular moment seemed to resonate more than every other 
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moment of these protests over the last couple of years, and I 
think it really has to do with this image of a group of mostly white 
men with torches within this particular space of the South. As 
someone from the South, that is an image that is present in re-
ally particular ways within our public institutions. I think there 
was something about that connection, like when they’re using 
this language and saying these things, “This is what they actual-
ly mean!” People now get the Klan connection to the alt- right. 
So I think it’s really important and really powerful to not erase 
these visual references— to see when that speech is used what 
it’s actually advocating for. Particularly in the space of Califor-
nia, where it’s not just about anti-Blackness, but also about the 
mass violence against indigenous populations, against Latinx 
populations, against Chinese populations— to connect with 
what that white supremacist violence actually looked like and 
meant in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and still looks 
like and means. It might not be at the same scale— we might 
not be dealing with the treasure trove of indigenous peoples’ 
bones that this university is sitting on anymore.  .  .  . [at the 
time of this meeting, UC Berkeley’s Phoebe A. Hearst Museum 
of Anthropology held the remains of approximately ten thou-
sand Native Americans, one of the largest collections in the 
world.]
DE KOSNIK. We’re still dealing with it.
JOHNSON. Yeah, I know, the university is dealing with it. But I guess 
I mean that that type of mass violence gets hidden away within 
California’s prison systems. It’s not on the street, except when 
it comes to our homeless populations in Northern California. 
I would love to ask someone who is more technologically savvy 
than me: Is there a way to bring this imagery and history and 
real- time make it happen during these moments of speech? 
Isn’t that nonviolent counterprotest? We’re not smashing the 
windows, but we can project on the windows. We have these 
huge archives at the university, and we can get the digital [tech-
nology]. We have these images, so what would it mean to not 
let the face or public image of this rhetoric be equated with 
the New York Times article about how dapper Richard Spencer 
is? What if it shows these white people picnicking at lynchings? 
It’s the bodies of starving Chinese men, the bodies of the indig-
enous communities within this area— it’s this. It’s not just about 
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free speech— it’s about what the consequences of that speech 
are, and we’ve seen the consequences of that speech. So I think 
that would be really cool.
DE KOSNIK. I do think there’s something about Charlottesville that 
was about [those events taking place] at the foot of Thomas 
Jefferson’s home, having the master’s house sit on top of that 
university, having a statue to slavery be in the center of that 
campus. And, by the way, the White House was also a place 
where Thomas Jefferson lived, and I think the conflation of 
that White House with the master’s house is really important 
right now. That’s the history that we are reckoning with, that’s 
the trajectory of the United States of America that we’re in 
right now. It’s not just Monticello; it’s the White House that 
we’re facing. So that’s the house we have to dismantle with 
whatever tools we can.
Thank you, everybody! This was so productive and genera-
tive and really great, and I do find hope in this group. So thank 
you for being here today, and let’s just close it with some love! 
[applause]
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